| Latin American Military In The 1990s |
Article Index for Latin American |
Website Links For Latin American |
Information AboutLatin American Military In The 1990s |
|
INTRODUCTION This article will look at the reasons why the military in most of Latin America still retain substantial power, and suggest what this augurs for the likely projection of the problem. It will try and assess whether the armed forces still have the means and motivations to break the rules of the political game, and will put forward a negative answer. Contrary to the view that military prerogatives reflect obstacles that are endemic to these regimes and undying, we shall suggest that the status currently enjoyed by the armed forces can be largely understood in terms of the legacies of their past, as well as circumstances of the post-transition. We shall suggest that the military's jurisdiction over several "reserved domains", while it clearly damages the standing of Latin American nations on the democratic consolidation index, does not pose a serious threat to the continuation and amelioration of democracy. We can predict that patterns will be setting down in the direction of reduced privileges and diminished conflict with civilians, but we should expect this to be a very gradual process. Before entering the discussion, it will be beneficial to briefly inspect a theory which influenced the approach of many scholars towards the subject. In his classic study on the military, Samuel Huntington (1957) argued that modernisation induces their professionalisation. This should entail their retreat from the political arena, and concentration on military affairs. In Latin America, modernisation has not led to this configuration. Several years after military authoritarian regimes were replaced by civilian electoral democracies, the military still enjoy - de jure and de facto - far-reaching prerogatives, and these generate recurrent conflict (to degrees varying across nations), between the officers and the civilian governments. In some cases, these privileges are accorded by the Constitution; in others, the military attain their objectives by breaking the rule of law. Modernisation theory can offer a useful approach to civilian-military relations, but its application to short and medium term tendencies encounters crucial difficulties. It is certainly true that a modern state is - by definition - one where the armed forces are a professional body concerned with military business, are under the control of the Executive, and do not interfere in domestic politics or the formulation of foreign policy. However, the suggestion that greater modernisation coincides with higher degrees of professionalism seems to employ a view of the former as a homogeneous process, whereby social, economic and political modernisation follow harmonious courses. This is very objectionable: while modernisation in one domain may on average be reflected in the others, likely entailing one another on the long run, they need not occur simultaneously. Latin America offers clear evidence for this: before the breakdowns of institutional democracies, modern political structures were not accompanied by modern civil societies; under military regimes, some social and sometimes economic modernisation were achieved (as in Peru and Argentina) or deepened (as in Chile) but without political modernisation occurring; today, economic and social modernisation are under way, but political modernisation does not always follow. Instead of leading to social and political harmony, modernisation in the region has often induced social strife and contestation (regarded as instances of anomie by some scholars). Another problem with the argument just outlined, is that while political modernisation does involve the establishment of a professional military, the latter per se does not imply their exit from politics on the short or medium run. Military professionalism and involvement in government need not be inversely related. If the military apparatus can remain autonomous and outside politics, they may professionalise while conserving political power. This was the case of Brazil, where they controlled government but left everyday economic management to technocrats. It is instead their engagement in everyday political and economic business, that has a taming effect on professionalism, as the Central American and the Argentine cases illustrate. Modernisation theory can offer us a useful reference point, as it addresses the key issue of the relation between modernisation, military professionalism and their politicisation. But because we are primarily concerned with military-civilian relations on the short term, we shall not use a modernisation approach in our analysis. Nor shall we try to uphold or confront that theory, which would require lengthy separate discussion. It is apparent, that very significant contrasts exist across the Latin American nations we discuss. But to juxtapose national cases would not allow us to identify common transnational motifs, which is central to our purpose. The question we address is important on various grounds. It is central to a major problem faced by civilian governments today, on how to control and re-organise the armed forces they have inherited. To understand patterns in military attitudes is crucial, also because they remain a critical actor in politics, often perceived as offering a threatening alternative to democracy. In view of the unknown of general Pinochet's imminent retirement prescribed by the Chilean Constitution, our discussion is especially topical for Chile; we shall give careful attention to that country, and hint what our discussion implies as a likely finale for the forthcoming contest. The paper is divided into two main parts. First, we shall look at the reasons why the military still hold considerable political power, under two headings: (a) legacies of their past; (b) current attempts to re-define their status. The first discussion will argue that the desire of the officers and certain civilian sectors for continued military prerogatives is largely inevitable, and does not signal ambitions to subvert the system. The second will suggest that for varied causes, governments have often been prone to give in to military demands. In light of that analysis, we shall then consider the conditions under which the military would be motivated and able to disrupt the civilian order, and indicate why these are generally absent. We shall finally draw some conclusions and point at their primary implications. It would also be worthwhile expanding on the circumstances through which the military came to power in the nations we discuss. However, while this would be beneficial, it is not the most crucial discussion in terms of the current tendencies in civilian-military relations. Due to limitations of space, this dimension will not be deeply examined. THE MILITARY'S PAST AND THEIR INSISTENCE ON "RESERVED DOMAINS" We shall now look at the reasons why the armed forces have strong desires for extensive privileges and political power - in parallel to which, large civilian sectors acquiesce to this. We shall argue that these attitudes are "understandable" in terms of the military's past and what this implies for their "role-beliefs" and preoccupations. While the institution ought to lose its prerogatives if democracy is to be perfected, their reluctance to renounce them should not be interpreted as the expression of designs to disrupt democracy. A gradual rather than abrupt decrease in the officers' power, may be more healthy for the new democratic polities, as well as for the military institution. First, great attention should be paid to the military's history since the foundation of the subcontinent's nation states. From this, largely stem their role self-perception, ethos, and "national security doctrine" - as well as civilian outlooks towards them. The officers' traditional involvement in government makes it "natural" for them to seek its endurance, and for large sectors of society to endorse this. The armed forces traditionally played a function in the region, that they did not enjoy elsewhere. As Alain Rouquié (1982: 21) reminds us, "Armée et État en Amérique Latine ... sont en effet deux réalités consubstantielles: la création de l' armée permanente {Link without Title} l'État dans sa capacité souvraine". To this may have contributed the struggles for independence, the social and political backwardness of the newly sovereign states, and to an extent also the heritage of Spanish rule with its lack of juridical tradition and a distinctive relationship between the military, power and civil society - as the so-called cultural or "essentialist" explanations discuss. To support the argument that the armed forces's past role affects military and civilian attitudes towards their claims, we can contrast the Brazilian case with Uruguay's. In Brazil, traditionally characterised by high social inequality and a weak party system, the Constitution accorded the military a very prominent role in the maintenance of internal order, ever since the Republic was founded in 1889. Before the Nova Republica, few serious attempts had been made to seriously alter this. In many cases, civilians even sustained the officers' power in order to have them on their side against other groups, and used the Constitution to justify their interventions and prerogatives. The status enjoyed by the institution throughout Brazilian history is central to explaining their desire for power, and the civilians' frequent nonresistance on this. There has never been a Minister of Defence, and this affected the attitudes of the military and civilians alike towards the proposal to create one, which was first aired in 1985. Because of this tradition, the Brazilian military have a historically rooted "role-belief", entailing deep "new professionalist" involvement in managing political conflict and development, and this remains largely uncontested by society. For example, their blocking of agrarian reform met with only moderate criticism. It is often argued that their formulation of a national security doctrine along these lines, "profoundly influenced debates in other militaries". When the officers were not only traditionally prominent, but also successful in modernising the country, these "role-belief" mechanisms are reinforced. The Chilean military often exhibit a historical vocation with distinctively messianic traits - in parallel to which, civilians continue to look at the institution's prowess as an indicator of national prestige. This heritage clearly generates deep sensitivities about proposals to re-define the armed forces' role. Uruguay's case contrasts sharply with Brazil's or Chile's. Until the crises of the 1960s, the military held little political power. This was not the result of fortuna; it had deep roots in the Colorados' traditional pacifism, and the Blancos' concern that the armed forces were serving their opponents' interests. It is often observed, that the transition back to democracy was regarded by both military and civilians as a restoration of the status quo ante. This meant, that civil society was much less inclined to accept continued military power, and the armed forces more yielding to relinquish it and reassume their old functions, upon losing the 1980 plebiscite. This resulted in Uruguay being atypical, as a case where high military prerogatives were withdrawn with minimal levels of conflict. A variable connected to this first point, regards the institution's past relations with political society - the elected bodies of government, political parties, trade unions etc. - especially under military rule. The less conflictual this relationship has traditionally been, the more willing are political forces and public opinion to allow a certain dose of privileges for the institution. In Brazil this relationship was not as inimical as in Chile or Argentina. The armed forces did not dismantle political parties, and often ruled under a civilian president, so much that the distinction between military and civilian rule was often blurred. To this, we add that human rights abuses were nowhere near the levels of the Southern Cone. These conditions contribute to the present endorsement by many civilian sectors, of substantial prerogatives for an institution which has traditionally held close links to the elected polity, often behaving as one more interest group competing for power according to the rules of the political game. In fact, Brazil currently offers an interesting and atypical combination of high military prerogatives, and very low conflict with government. The armed forces's past helps make their intents "comprehensible", and not an indication of rebellious ambitions. European concerns for undue military power, ought to take this historical dimension into account. It is interesting that even a fierce antagonist of the institution, Chilean socialist leader José Antonio Viera-Gallo (1997i), says that the cuestión militar is not central to Chile's democracy, and that the West's excessive preoccupation with the issue is symptomatic of tendencies to "aplicar el modelo político occidental a una realidad distinta, donde los militares siempre tuvieron un papel que no juegaron en Europa". It is also telling that J.A. Guilhon Albuquerque and José Álvaro Moisés (1989), do not see the military problem as one of the "five dilemmas" of Brazil's democratic consolidation. Second, we should consider the problem of military budgets, which frequently stirs conflict with the Executive. An organisation that traditionally enjoyed a certain measure of wealth (that affects the life standards of the officers), and often controlled major industries (as in Brazil), cannot be expected to easily accept drastic reductions in income. In Brazil, expenditure was traditionally low (0.6-0.8 % between 1976 and 1984). After 1985, little changed in this respect, but the military lost control of key industries which they formerly enjoyed. This happened with relatively little conflict, perhaps due to the separations that existed between different military groups. In Argentina, expenditure sharply fell from almost 6 % in 1982 to less than 4 % at the onset of Alfonsín's administration, and the institution now faces serious budgetary problems. Chile's situation contrasts sharply. The military accumulated large claims on resources while in office (including a 10 % share of Codelco's copper sales), and fiercely resisted attempts to contest these. Expenditure was between 6 and 9 % of GDP and remains in that region. As a general rule, we see officers defending what they have secured while in office, rather than claiming shares of state resources allocated to other purposes. Budget cuts cause conflict, but provided civilians do not underestimate military determination to defend their income, the situation is unlikely to degenerate. A third crucial issue where the military refuse to accept civilian supremacy, concerns their refusal to respond for human rights abuses. This is probably the major source of friction in the Southern Cone. In Uruguay it was almost the only significant dispute left, following the 1985 Pacto del Club Naval. Despite the relatively low level of abuses, the issue is crucial also in Brazil. It had apparently been settled by a 1979 Amnesty Law granted by president Figueiredo, but in 1985 it regained impetus as Catholic activists published a report on torture, Brasil: Nunca Mais. The more seriously they risk trials and convictions (or merely public censure and forced retirement), the more officers oppose civilian efforts to re-open the issue. While this clearly stands in the way of "reconciliación histórica", we should recognise that military determination to block trials is fundamentally motivated by concerns for their personal and the institution's safety and future. On a worrying note, we could argue that this attitude is also rooted in the military's corporate identity, their powerful esprit de corps that often sets them apart from civilian society. They have their own judicial procedures, and a historical aversion towards civilian interference in their matters. However, even this does not translate into defiance of civil rights or rejection of the civil judiciary's legitimacy, and does not constitute a threat to democracy. We should also note that the issue of human rights is slowly going to lose importance, as the culprits and victims (or their relatives) age and pass away. THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE RE-DEFINITION OF THE MILITARY'S STATUS We saw that the persistence of prerogatives is largely "comprehensible" in view of military and civilian attitudes that spring from the armed forces' past. Now we shall look at how governments are currently trying to re-define their position. We shall argue that civilians often displayed tolerance (sometimes even endorsement) towards some endurance of military power. Governments have pressing reasons to remain on good terms with the officers. While a military disruption of the civilian order is highly unlikely for the reasons we expose in this paper, perhaps the major remaining risk lies in excessive civilian belligerence towards them, as was the case with general Oviedo's coup threat in 1996. Therefore, unless civilians were to dismantle the armed forces, which is unthinkable, they must ensure that the latter are part of (and loyal to) the system, rather than antagonise it. This may have some costs, in terms of granting them undemocratic privileges. Also in ensuring military obedience to the Executive, accommodation is crucial: as David Pion-Berlin (1991: 546) writes, "subordination must be accepted", and civilian supremacy can only be achieved through consent. On occasions, divisions within the officer corps enabled civilians to decrease military power. This happened in Argentina, where Alfonsín could confront senior officers on the issue of human rights abuses, while junior officers were in revolt against them. To an extent it was the case of Brazil, where serious rivalries existed between the "military as government", the "military as institution", and the Serviço Nacional de Informações. But this is the exception rather than the norm. In Chile, the transition was permeated by high tension between the military and the Concertación leaders (many of whom were exiled and otherwise persecuted under Pinochet). Government repeatedly pledged to challenge military privileges - which include respect for the 1978 Ley de Amnistía, the continuation in office of nine senators designated by the armed forces, a National Security Council dominated by them (that appoints two of the seven judges of the Supreme Court), and a share of Codelco's copper sales. The institutional bases, as well as the endorsement of the right-wing opposition (Renovación Nacional and Unión Democrática Independiente) for most privileges, are known. However, the Aylwin and Frei administrations did little to carry their designs through. They did not press too vehemently for constitutional change - for example, by calling a referendum on the issue. As Alan Angell and Benny Pollack (1994) argue, it is "surprising that conflicts did not have wider political significance". What are the reasons for civilian cautiousness ? A first consideration certainly involves fear. With the December 1990 acuartelamiento, Pinochet sent a warning signal that he would not tolerate civilian intrusions with the institution's and his family's interests. However, we should note that civilians were finally able to bring to court retired general Manuel Contreras (whose involvement in Orlando Letelier's murder was not covered by the Ley de Aministía, having taken place overseas), without military reprisals following. A second explanation regards the tasks a more aggressive stance would involve. The government's claim that they are impotent towards the military, helps leave them immune from blame and takes pressure off them. This is hard to demonstrate but deserves attention. Were the Concertación constitutionally able to prosecute the officers for human rights abuses and cut their budgets, they would have to pursue this to a decisive extent, or otherwise suffer profound criticism, and perhaps lose votes to the opposition. Doing the former would be costly, possibly risky, and may end in defeat. Unless the armed forces constitute a major menace to the system (which is rare, as in Guatemala in 1993 or Paraguay in 1996), civilians may be better off finding a modus vivendi with the officers, than continuously challenge their power. This argument would be flawed, if public opinion were pressing governments to engage in clashes. But if large sectors of society hold the officers in favourable light, governments are less likely to take measures that harm them. This second configuration is the most common. Many scholars in fact worry that the civilians' mentality is dangerously pro-military. In Chile, 42.1 % of the population in 1996 evaluated the armed forces "bien" or "muy bien", while 37.9 % had such favourable an attitude towards Government, and 11.3 % towards political parties. Only the Catholic church, with 66.8 % support, enjoyed more popularity as an institution that the military. The officers' prestige and popularity is a key element of their influence; while this is different from formal authority, it clearly favours the latter. The Brazilian military too, enjoy a certain respect by civilians. A famous incident regards deputy Bete Mendes, who recognised their military attaché in Montevideo, colonel Alberto Brilhante Ustra, as her torturer. She asked president Sarney to recall him, but army minister Leônidas Pires Gonçalves defied this demand. Very strikingly, the incident ended with conciliatory statements by army spokesmen and the deputy, the latter expressing regard for the military. The Chilean and Brazilian cases contrast with Argentina's, where the military not only are blamed for the economic failure of the Proceso government, but were also discredited by defeat at war. This lack of prestige was central to the institution's loss of power, and Alfonsín's success in moving against their prerogatives, which is rather atypical. Argentine military leaders including former presidents Videla, Viola and Galtieri were put on trial for human rights abuses in 1985, and military resources seriously cut, while nothing remotely similar was even attempted in Chile. This discussion leads us to crucial considerations regarding civilian control over the armed forces in the past, which has implications for what governments may achieve today. The officers' reputation in society was often driven by the upper classes' proclivity to support them, relying on them in order to combat perceived threats from the lower sectors, engendering what Stepan (1988: ch. 1) calls "brumairean moments" in Latin American history. Chile's coup, rather than resulting from military ambitions, had been "commissioned" by powerful representatives of civil society, including Church leaders, who preferred a prætorian system to Allende's rule. Thus, when civilians controlled the officers, these were mainly instances of what Huntington (1957) calls "subjective civilian control". This involves the power relations among civilian groups, as a type of authority advanced by one as a means to enhance its power over the others. Because of the factionalism reigning among civilian interests, it was usually impossible for civilians as a whole to maximise their power over the military. To this, we add that while the officers ruled, they often exploited and helped sharpen tensions between civil and political society, tarnishing or preventing the possibility of cohesion by the whole civilian establishment. But today things changed, as virtually all of civil and political society adhere to common norms of the political game. This paves the way for "objective civilian control", but it will take time to overcome past legacies, which actively called for military involvement in politics. We must unfortunately observe, that although there is now wide consensus on the iniquity of recurring to the military for the resolution of political disputes, exceptions do occur, reinforcing military power. Having carefully cultivated his relationship with the officers, president Fujimori used them to dissolve Congress and increase his authority, in his golpe blanco of 1992. Claims that the 1995 war with Ecuador was used to serve military interests, also deserve attention. Haiti's 1991 coup by an anti-Aristide junta, the brief rule of Jorge Serrano in Guatemala in 1993, and general Lino César Oviedo's acuartelamiento and threatened coup in Paraguay in 1996, all show that some civilian sectors are still willing to support the military to attain their objectives. Even in Brazil, there was talk of possible military interventions in case that the Partido dos Trabalhadores won the 1996 elections; however unlikely, this signals that civilian mentality remains a factor in the officers' standing. Civilians too, must re-shape their "role-beliefs" and functions, to push the army back to the barracks. One vital issue regards the need to establish institutions (governmental and not) with knowledge and mastery of military matters. If the officers conserve a monopoly on military expertise, the capacity of Government to control them is inhibited. To the present day, there exist few military specialists among politicians, academics and journalists. This is slowly changing, with efforts by members of civil and political society, to empower themselves to become actors in military affairs. An example regards the work of the Núcleo de Estudios Estratégicos at the Universidade Estadual de Campinas. But it will take time before civilian institutions reach the rank of Brazil's Escola Superior de Guerra or Argentina's Escuela de Defensa Nacional. Civilian inexperience on military questions, is particularly damaging when it is combined with military performance of internal security functions (or war). In fact, it is the former that makes the latter so inauspicious (the involvement of France's gendarmerie or Italy's carabinieri in internal security management, is not a source of political power). Terrorism, insurgency, and border conflicts, will eventually become a relic of the past, but the process is far from complete. And when the armed forces are engaged in these, their political standing benefits. Since Governments have never formulated a política militar and are inexperienced in strategic affairs, the officers can easily act as a powerful pressure group in the drawing of legislation and decision-making processes on issues that involve their deployment. This happened in Peru, with the struggle against Sendero Luminoso and the war with Ecuador. It also happens in Brazil, when the military are employed to execute functions that pertain to civilian police, often corrupt and inefficient. Re-defining the military's role will take time. Sometimes civilians decide to tolerate or endorse military prerogatives, at other times they are unable to eliminate them. But these difficulties do not threaten democracy's continuation. CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY DISRUPTION OF THE CIVILIAN ORDER We have discussed why the military desire to preserve their power, and civilians rarely oppose this effectively. We suggested that the military do not aspire to disrupt democracy. We shall now argue that military disruptions of the system are improbable, also due to the absence of those conditions that usually allow those interventions to occur and succeed. The first consideration regards the deep social changes that took place, and in parallel to this, the demise of world communism. This meant the sharp decline of a once-powerful ideological-based Left (parliamentary and not), that was central to most military interventions in the past, Velasco's Peru being a known exception. Subversive groups were often incorporated into the system, as with the M-19 in Colombia. Only small, isolated factions still advocate lucha with neglect for constitutional channels, and anarchy and syndicalism are history. With the exception of Brazil, even the parliamentary Left is in decline. In the past, the military often filled a power vacuum, when the system was on the brink of ungovernability or communism. As Plato wrote, if government fails, it is natural that the armed forces take care until democracy can be reinstated. But as Latin America left behind the social and economic emergencies of the past, this is now a remote risk. Together with the bipolar world order, also disappeared US support for authoritarianism. This was central to most takeovers in the past - sometimes through direct aid and sanctions, as in the overthrows of Jacobo Árbenz, João Goulart and Juan Bosch, sometimes through other means, as in Chile's coup. Today, the superpower is no longer willing to lend support to military pronunciamentos. Washington decisively condemned Fujimori's golpe blanco, Venezuela's two attempted coups, José Serrano's government, and general Oviedo's acuartelamiento. Not less importantly, this same change in attitude affected public opinion, in countries where political consciousness has risen considerably. The "Zeitgeist of the present time" involves a deep assimilation of democratic values by society. To this we add the weight of intra-american and international integration, which created a network whereby newly democratic countries support one another in the path to consolidation. The OAS 1991 Santiago declaration calls upon member states to support one another in this endeavour. The existence and fortification of NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market, the Grupo de los Tres, CARICOM and AEC, as well as closer links with the EU and international institutions, help prevent the possibility that one country leave the community of democratic nations. Denunciations and pressures on Peru in 1992 (including by the IMF), on Guatemala in 1993, on Paraguay in 1996 (especially by MERCOSUR), provide ample evidence for this. Coups occur on commission. As Alan Angell (1984: 127) writes, "No military coup ever takes place without some, even substantial, civilian support". While many Chileans still revere Pinochet as their saviour, this does not translate into support for another 11th September. First, because the motivations behind those events vanished. Second and perhaps most vitally, because military rule would seriously jeopardise business and financial interests. In the past, the agents of foreign capital may have seen in authoritarianism a better guarantee for stability than a democracy, where communism might triumph. Today, democracies are rightly perceived as stable, and international commitment to civil rights and rule of law signifies that a nation departing from them risks isolation and economic retaliation. Foreign investment and credit (not to mention NAFTA membership, to which Chile aspires), are largely conditional on continued democracy. CONCLUSIONS This paper addressed the question of whether we should worry about the military's continued control of "reserved domains". We looked at explanations behind this situation, in terms of the military's stances and civilian responses, and argued that civil-military relations are gradually moving in a democratic direction. We then discussed the absence of those conditions which would motivate and enable the officers to break the electoral order, to conclude that continued military privileges do not pose a threat to it. For Chile, this suggests that whatever stances general Pinochet takes towards his retirement, civilians will likely avoid confrontation. They will attempt to reduce military prerogatives, but will prioritise the need to keep the officers within the system, which may involve concessions. It will take time before civil-military relations are those that democracy prescribes. But the officers are bound to adapt their "role-beliefs" to the new order, relinquishing their role as self-proclaimed guardians of national welfare against insurrectionism. This process might be eased by the military's traditional acceptance of democratic values; as Alain Rouquié (1982: 422) writes, "la démocratie représentative reste {Link without Title} horizon ... Ils s'en réclament dans leur légitimation comme dans leur objectifs, en se proposant de l'améliorer ... mais non de l'anéantir ou de la détruire, comme ce fut le cas sous d'autres cieux", and Alan Angell (1984: 122) stresses that "The basic political discourse of Latin America, for all the times it has been violated, is still that of constitutional and representative government ... this is the tradition the military claims it has come in to protect". As it is now unlikely that they can usurp power in order to protect democracy, military "role-beliefs" needs to be re-defined. The institution's militarismo, occasionally misinterpreted as a menace, can help smoothen this re-definition of their ethos. Unlike the pseudo-militarism of Fascism, reflecting a design for a militarised society, Latin militarismo is fundamentally self-directed, signifying the institution's own arrangement as a "total entity" built on the military creed, separate from the civilian world. This does not clash with democracy. On the contrary, it can help prevent military "penetration" into government, auguring well for the institution's professionalism and disengagement from politics. On the medium-long run, we can expect officers to pay more attention to issues of professionalisation and technical advancement. This is especially likely for militaries who aspire to a greater world role, like the Brazilian, which may then influence other armed forces. This process would benefit from intra-american or international initiatives for military cooperation. The damaging experiences of factionalism and discord (as in Argentina and Brazil), should also prompt officers to make efforts towards unity, which can be achieved through disengagement from politics. As Alan Angell (1984: 136) observed, the officers often decided to retreat to the barracks when they "felt that to hold on to power would undermine military's unity ... and deepen the ever-widening divisions in its rank". To this expectant picture, we cannot leave out an unknown. We are today witnessing an increase in external pressures, notably by Washington, for Latin American governments to take stronger action in the anti-narcotics war. This has important implications for civil-military relations in the countries concerned, as the Colombian, Bolivian and Peruvian cases show. First, the military often react negatively to these attempts to interfere in domestic matters, both on nationalist grounds, and because some officers are involved in drugs trafficking. This damages relations with governments who usually are (or claim to be) cooperative with foreign powers on these matters. Second, military involvement in such high-profile operations helps expand their managerial role in society and intelligence activities, favouring their involvement in politics, for the reasons we exposed in the previous section. Genuine professionalism that prompts the officers to withdraw from the political arena, may be more smoothly attained if they are called to perform fundamentally castrense duties. Until professionalism is "consolidated" and civilians are able to formulate a política militar, "new professionalism" options involving the military in internal security, risk curbing their withdrawal from politics. Finally, we must ask where our picture fits into the literature on the subject. Many scholars writing on civil-military relations, are largely concerned with democratic theory. They assess the implications of military power for democracy and its consolidation, from a theoretical and comparative perspective. Our purpose was fundamentally different. We were concerned with whether the military's power threatens the status quo (whether or not this be consolidated democracy), and where current patterns are conducting. This paper may have been perceived as having a more confident view, and a fairly amiable attitude towards the military, compared to other works on the subject. But any such impression would not be apropos, because we did not intend to express a view on the "acceptability" of military prerogatives. The military clearly stand in the way of completing the transition to democracy. However, without entering that discussion, we tried to show that the civilian order is not at risk, and patterns are likely to lead towards a democratic configuration of civil-military relations REFERENCES
Needler, Martin (1975), Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power, in Latin American Research Review, vol. 10
____ (1986b), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Baltimore MD: JHUP
|
|
|