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A definition is a statement of the and www.dictionary.com . STIPULATIVE DEFINITIONS See Also: Stipulative definition A definition may either give the meaning that a term bears in general use (a ''descriptive'' definition), or that which the speaker intends to impose upon it for the purpose of his or her discourse (a ''stipulative'' definition). Stipulative definitions differ from descriptive definitions in that they prescribe a new meaning either to a term already in use or to a new term. A descriptive definition can be shown to be right or wrong by comparison to usage, while a stipulative definition cannot. A stipulative definition, however, may be more or less useful. A ''persuasive Definition'' , named by C.L. Stevenson, is a form of stipulative definition which purports to describe the 'true' or 'commonly accepted' meaning of a term, while in reality stipulating an altered use, perhaps as an argument for some view, for example that some system of government is ''democratic''. Stevenson also notes that some definitions are 'legal' or 'coercive', whose object is to create or alter rights, duties or crimes.Stevenson, C.L., ''Ethics and Language'', Connecticut 1944 INTENSION AND EXTENSION See Also: Intension Extension (metaphysics) An Intensional Definition , also called a ''connotative'' definition, specifies the Necessary And Sufficient Conditions for a thing being a member of a specific Set . Any definition that attempts to set out the essence of something, such as that by genus and differentia, is an intensional definition. An '' Extensional Definition '', also called a ''denotative'' definition, of a concept or term specifies its '' Extension ''. It is, a list naming every Object that is a member of a specific Set . So, for example, an intensional definition of ' Prime Minister ' might be ''the most senior minister of a cabinet in the executive branch of government in a parliamentary system''; whereas an extensional definition would be simply a List Of All Past And Present Prime Ministers . One important form of extensional definition is '' Ostensive Definition ''. This gives the meaning of a term by pointing, in the case of an individual, to the thing itself, or in the case of a class, to examples of the right kind. So you can explain who ''Alice'' (an individual) is by pointing her out to me; or what a ''rabbit'' (a class) is by pointing at several and expecting me to 'catch on'. The process of ostensive definition itself was critically appraised by Ludwig Wittgenstein .''Philosophical investigations'', Part 1 §27-34 An ''enumerative definition'' of a concept or term is an '' Extensional Definition '' that gives an explicit and exhaustive listing of all the Object s that fall under the concept or term in question. Enumerative definitions are only possible for finite sets and only practical for relatively small sets. DEFINITION BY GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA of living things uses definition by genus and differentia.]] See Also: Genus-differentia definition Traditionally, a definition consists of the ''genus'' (the family) of thing to which the defined thing belongs, and the ''differentia'' (the distinguishing feature which marks it off from other members of the same family). Thus 'triangle' is defined as 'a plane figure (genus) bounded by three straight sides (differentia).See Genus-differentia Definition Rules for definition by genus and differentia See Also: Fallacies of definition Certain rules have traditionally been given for this particular type of definition.Copi 1982 pp 165-169Joyce, ''ibidem'' #A definition must set out the essential attributes of the thing defined. #Definitions should avoid circularity. To define a horse as 'a member of the species ''equus''' would convey no information whatsoever. For this reason, Locke adds that a definition of a term must not consist of terms which are synonymous with it. This error is known as ''circulus in definiendo''. Note, however, that it is acceptable to define two relative terms in respect of each other. Clearly, we cannot define 'antecedent' without using the term 'consequent', nor conversely. #The definition must not be too wide or too narrow. It must be applicable to everything to which the defined term applies (i.e. not miss anything out), and to no other objects (i.e. not include any things to which the defined term would not truly apply). #The definition must not be obscure. The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term which may be obscure or difficult, by the use of terms that are commonly understood and whose meaning is clear. The violation of this rule is known by the Latin term ''obscurum per obscurius''. However, sometimes scientific and philosophical terms are difficult to define without obscurity. (See the definition of Free Will in Wikipedia, for instance). #A definition should not be negative where it can be positive. We should not define 'wisdom' as the absence of folly, or a healthy thing as whatever is not sick. Sometimes this is unavoidable, however. We cannot define a point except as 'something with no parts', nor blindness except as 'the absence of sight in a creature that is normally sighted'. Essence See Also: Essence In classical thought, a definition was taken to be a statement of the essence of a thing. Aristotle had it that an object's essential attributes form its "essential nature", and that a definition of the object must include these essential attributes. Posterior Analytics , Bk 1 c. 4 The idea that a definition should state the essence of a thing led to the distinction between ''nominal'' and ''real'' essence, originating with Aristotle. In a passage from the Posterior Analytics , Posterior Analytics Bk 2 c. 7 he says that we can know the meaning of a made-up name (he gives the example 'goat stag'), without knowing what he calls the 'essential nature' of the thing that the name would denote, if there were such a thing. This led medieval logicians to distinguish between the so-called ''quid nominis'' or 'whatness of the name', and the underlying nature common to all the things it names, which they called the ''quid rei'' or 'whatness of the thing'. (Early modern philosophers like Locke used the corresponding English terms 'nominal essence' and 'real essence'). The name 'hobbit', for example, is perfectly meaningful. It has a ''quid nominis''. But we could not know the real nature of hobbits, even if there were such things, and so we cannot know the real nature or ''quid rei'' of hobbits. By contrast, the name 'man' denotes real things (men) that have a certain quid rei. The meaning of a name is distinct from the nature that thing must have in order that the name apply to it. This leads to a corresponding distinction between ''nominal'' and ''real'' definition. A nominal definition is the definition explaining what a word means, i.e. which says what the 'nominal essence' is, and is definition in the classical sense as given above. A real definition, by contrast, is one expressing the real nature or ''quid rei'' of the thing. This preoccupation with essence dissipated in much of modern philosophy. Analytic Philosophy in particular is critical of attempts to elucidate the essence of a thing. Russell described it as "a hopelessly muddle-headed notion".''A history of Western Philosophy'', p. 210 More recently Kripke's formalisation of Possible World semantics in Modal Logic led to a new approach to Essentialism . Insofar as the essential properties of a thing are ''necessary'' to it, they are those things it possesses in all possible worlds. Kripke refers to names used in this way as Rigid Designator s. GENETIC DEFINITION A ''genetic definition'' describes the process or method by which a thing is formed. ''"But if you define the circle as a pattern resulting from having a segment of a line revolve around one of its ends, this is a genetic definition because it tells you how to make a circle."'' Claude Lévi-Strauss . "Discussion of Lévi-Strauss's paper 'Social Structure'" ( RECURSIVE DEFINITIONS A Recursive Definition , sometimes also called an ''inductive'' definition, is one that defines a word in terms of itself, so to speak, albeit in a useful way. Normally this consists of three steps: #At least one thing is stated to be a member of the set being defined; this is sometimes called a "base set". #All things bearing a certain relation to other members of the set are also to count as members of the set. It is this step that makes the definition Recursive . #All other things are excluded from the set For instance, we could define Natural Number as follows (after Peano ): #"0" is a natural number. #Each natural number has a distinct successor, such that:
#Nothing else is a natural number. So "0" will have exactly one successor, which for convenience we can call "1". In turn, "1" will have exactly one successor, which we would call "2", and so on. Notice that the second condition in the definition itself refers to natural numbers, and hence involves Self-reference . Although this sort of definition involves a form of Circularity , it is not vicious, and the definition is quite successful. LIMITATIONS OF DEFINITION Given that a , players compete to find circularity in a dictionary. Many philosophers have chosen instead to leave some terms undefined. The , Part 1 §87, italics in original claiming instead that explanation of a term is only needed when we need to avoid misunderstanding. Locke and Mill also argued that we cannot define Individuals . We learn names by connecting an idea with a sound, so that speaker and hearer have the same idea when the same word is used.This theory of meaning is one of the targets of the Private Language Argument This is not possible when no one else is acquainted with the particular thing that has "fallen under our notice".Essay III. iii. 3 Russell offered his Theory Of Descriptions in part as a way of defining a proper name, the definition being given by a Definite Description that "picks out" exactly one individual. Saul Kripke pointed to difficulties with this approach, especially in relation to Modality , in his book ''Naming and Necessity''. There is a presumption in the classic example of a definition that the ''definiens'' can be stated. Wittgenstein argued that for some terms this is not the case.''Philosophical Investigations The examples he used include ''game'', ''number'' and ''family''. In such cases, he argued, there is no fixed boundary that can be used to provide a definition. Rather, the items are grouped together because of a Family Resemblance . For terms such as these it is not possible to state a definition; rather, one simply comes to understand the ''use'' of the term. SEE ALSO
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