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OVERVIEW To put substance into this metaphor, at least three components of a 'computable' system model must be specified. Firstly, the data-structure which specifies the least coherent element of 'computation' must be identified. Secondly, the rules of syntax under which these least data-structures may be combined must be specified. Thirdly, some plausible form of brain control over these data-structures must be invoked. As with all computation, the elegance and flexibility of the final 'program' is largely dependent upon the elegance of the data-structure definitions, around which other issues revolve. In the real brain, presumably the problem is one of finding a data-structure model at the right degree of abstraction such that contact remains with the active neuroscience of the real brain while contact is gained with the process attributes of a mind. The barrier to the latter has been a sufficiently scientific conception of consciousness, surely the precursor concept of any mind, that could even in principle be engineered. One approach that seeks a resolution of these issues is the Cognitive Process Consciousness model, which seeks to identify human consciousness with a 'computable' and defined system of cognitive processes. COMPUTATIONALISM AND THE SIMULATION HYPOTHESIS It is relevant to the Simulation Hypothesis in that it illustrates how a simulation could contain conscious subjects, as required by a " Virtual People " simulation. For example, it is well known that physical systems can be simulated to some degree of accuracy. If computationalism is correct, and if there is no Problem in generating Artificial Consciousness from cognition, it would establish the theoretical possibility of a simulated reality. However, the relationship between cognition and Phenomenal Consciousness is Disputed . It is possible that Consciousness requires a substrate of "real" physics, and simulated people, while behaving appropriately, would be Philosophical Zombies . MINIMAL COMPUTATIONALISM See e.g. David Chalmers paper: LEVELS OF EXPLANATION David Marr (1981) proposed that cognitive processes have three levels of description: # Computational level: Describes that computational problem (i.e., input/output mapping) computed by the cognitive process. # Algorithmic level: Presents the algorithm used for computing the problem postulated at the computational level. # Implementational level: Describes the physical implementation of the algorithm postulated at the algorithmic level in biological matter (e.g., the brain.) SEE ALSO REFERENCES
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