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April 19
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2006
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June 26
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2006
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Arlington Central School District Board of Education v Pearl Murphy, '' Et Vir '
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05-18
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
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2006
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Alito
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Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
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Ginsburg
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Souter
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Breyer
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Stevens, Souter
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Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
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'',
548 U.S. (
2006 ), was a
United States Supreme Court case about
Expert s' fees in cases commenced under the
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Justice
Samuel Alito , writing for the majority, ruled that IDEA does not authorize the payment of the experts' fees of the prevailing parents. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part, and in the judgment. Justices
David Souter and
Stephen Breyer filed dissents.
The respondents, Pearl and Theodore Murphy of , then sued to require that the School District pay for the experts' fees incurred in the course of the trial.
The
District Court held that part of the fees were covered under the law, and required the School District to pay them. The
Second Circuit Court Of Appeals affirmed, but acknowledged that other Circuits had ruled differently.402 F.3d 332 (2005) The Supreme Court granted ''
Certiorari '' to resolve the differences between the circuits.
IDEA allows a court to "award reasonable
Attorneys' Fees as a part of the costs." The issue to be decided was whether this includes experts' fees.
The School District said that the
Plain Language of the statute should govern, ''i.e.'' that "attorneys' fees" means only those fees paid for an attorney's services. The Murphys argued that the word "costs" is more important, and that the plain meaning of "costs" includes the cost of hiring an expert witness.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, ruled that the ability to award attorneys' fees does not include the ability to award experts' fees. "Costs," the Court wrote, is a
Term Of Art that generally does not include either type of fees. To add attorney's fees to costs is exceptional under
American Law , which is why it was written into the statute. That change of the court's power does not affect it's power over experts' fees.
Furthermore, relying on
Previous Cases , the Court said that without clear notice to the states, a statute cannot require that a certain fee shall be assessed against the state.See ''
Crawford Fitting Co. V. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. '', 482 U.S. 437 In response to the Murphys' contention that the
Legislative History suggests that experts' fees should be included, the Court stated that because the statute's actual wording is unambiguous, there is no need to consult outside sources. In addition, the fact that the Act authorized a
GAO study of the effect of awarding costs does not change the actual wording of the Act, which does not so award them.
Justice Ginsberg concurred in part with the decision, and concurred in the judgment. She disagreed with the way the Court applied the "clear notice" requirement, but found the rest of the ruling to be correct.
Justice Breyer dissented from the Court's ruling, and was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. Stating that the statute is not unambiguous, and relying on the
Legislative History , Breyer wrote that the term "costs" was intended by Congress to include the cost of hiring expert witnesses. He also wrote that the "Act's basic purpose" dictates that the award of all costs, including experts' fees, be allowed. He rejected the application of the "clear notice" rule.
Although he had also joined Justice Breyer's dissent, Justice Souter dissented separately to write that certain
GAO studies authorized by IDEA give weight to Breyer's arguments and distinguish this case from those the majority cites.
