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The telegram instructed the ambassador to approach the Mexican government with a proposal to form a Military Alliance against the United States . It promised Mexico land in the United States if they were to help. It was intercepted and decoded by the British , and its contents hastened the entry of the United States into World War I. TELEGRAM Zimmermann's message was On the first of February, we intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavour to keep the United States of America neutral. MEXICAN RESPONSE A general assigned by Mexican President Venustiano Carranza assessed the feasibility of a Mexican takeover of their former provinces and came to the conclusion that it would not be possible or even desirable for the following reasons:
Carranza formally declined Zimmermann's proposals on April 14 , by which time the U.S. had declared war on Germany. BRITISH INTERCEPTION Codebreakers . The word Arizona was not in the German codebook and was therefore split into smaller parts.]] The telegram was intercepted and Decrypted enough to get the gist of it by codebreakers Nigel De Grey , William Montgomery and Admiral William R. Hall of the British Naval Intelligence unit, Room 40 . This was made possible because the code the Foreign Office used (0075) had been partially cryptanalyzed using, among other techniques, captured plaintext messages and a Codebook for an earlier version of the Cipher captured from Wilhelm Wassmuss , a German agent working in the Middle East . The British government, which wanted to expose the incriminating telegram, faced a dilemma: if it boldly produced the actual telegram, the Germans would know that their code had been broken; and if it did not, it would lose a promising opportunity to draw the United States into World War I — the message was sent during a period when anti-German feeling in the United States was running particularly high, following the death of 128 U.S. travelers on British ships by German submarine attacks. There was a further problem — they could not simply confidentially show it to the United States government. Because of its importance, the message had been sent from Berlin to the German ambassador in Washington , Johann Von Bernstorff , for onward transmission to their ambassador in Mexico, von Eckardt, by three separate routes. The British had obtained it from just one of these — the Americans had given Germany access to their private diplomatic Telegraph in an effort to encourage President Woodrow Wilson 's peace initiative. The Germans were not afraid of using it because the messages were encrypted, because as a matter of principle the United States did not at that time read other countries' diplomatic correspondence and because, unlike Britain, the U.S. did not have any code-breaking capability. The telegraph cable went from the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to Copenhagen and then via Submarine Cable to the United States via Britain (where it was monitored). For the British to reveal the source of the telegram to the United States would have meant also admitting to the American government that they had tapped U.S. diplomatic communications. The cable to Washington was in code 7500, a newer, more difficult code. However, the embassy in Mexico did not yet have this code, so the German embassy in Washington would have to re-transmit the message in an older code, 13040 or 13042, both better known to the British. BRITISH SOLUTION The British government guessed that the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. would send the message on to the embassy in Mexico via the commercial telegraph system, and therefore a copy would exist in the public telegraph office in Mexico City . If they could get a copy, they could pass it on to the United States government stating that they had discovered it through espionage in Mexico. Therefore, they contacted a British agent in Mexico, known only as Mr. H., who bribed an employee of the commercial telegraph company to obtain a copy of the message. In his autobiography, Sir Thomas Hohler , the British ambassador in Mexico at that time, claims to have been Mr. H. To the delight of the British code breakers, the message had been sent from the German embassy in Washington to Mexico using the older cypher in the Wassmuss codebook and could therefore be completely decrypted. The telegram was delivered by Admiral Hall to the British Foreign Minister, Arthur James Balfour , who in turn contacted the U.S. ambassador in Britain, Walter Page , and delivered the telegram to him on February 23 . Two days later he relayed it to President Woodrow Wilson. EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES Popular sentiment in the United States at that time was anti-Mexican as well as anti-German. General John J. Pershing had long been chasing the revolutionary Pancho Villa , who had carried out several cross-border raids. This was costly for the U.S. government, and Wilson was considering discontinuing the search until new elections were held in Mexico, a new government installed, and a new constitution promulgated (a constitutional convention, which would adopt the 1917 Constitution Of Mexico , was underway at the time). News of the telegram exacerbated tensions between the U.S. and Mexico, since such a treaty, if in place, would have hindered the election of a new Mexican government more friendly to American interests. Initially the telegram was widely believed to be a forgery by British intelligence designed to bring America into the war on the Allied side. This opinion, which was not restricted to pacifist and pro-German lobbies, was bolstered by German and Mexican diplomats, and by some American papers, especially the Hearst press empire. However, on March 29 1917 , Arthur Zimmermann gave a speech confirming the text of the telegram, and so ended speculation on its authenticity. Also, a number of ships (eg the RMS Lusitania ) had been torpedoed with heavy loss of life. On April 2 , President Wilson asked Congress to agree to declare war on Germany, and on April 6 Congress complied. The United States had entered World War I on the Allied side. UNITED STATES DECLARES WAR AGAINST GERMANY The telegram began by stating: "We intend to begin on the first of February Unrestricted Submarine Warfare . We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral".Immediately after its publication there was an outpouring of anti-German sentiment. Wilson responded by asking Congress to arm American ships so that they could fend off potential German submarine attacks. A few days later, on April 2 , 1917 , Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. On April 6 , 1917 , Congress complied, bringing the United States into World War I. German U-boat s had previously attacked U.S. ships near the British Isles , so the telegram was not the only cause of U.S. entry into the war. It was perceived as especially perfidious that the telegram was first transferred from the U.S. embassy in Berlin to the German embassy in Washington before being passed on to Mexico. Once the American public believed the telegram to be real, it became all but inevitable that the U.S. would join the Great War. HISTORICAL POST-SCRIPT In October 2005, it was revealed that an original typescript of the deciphered Zimmermann Telegram had recently been discovered by an unnamed historian who was researching and preparing an official history of the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The document is believed to be the actual telegram shown to the American ambassador in London in 1917. Marked in Admiral Hall's handwriting at the top of the document are the words: "This is the one handed to Dr Page and exposed by the President." Since many of the secret documents in this incident had been destroyed, it had previously been assumed that the original typed "decrypt" was gone forever. However, after discovery of this document, the GCHQ official historian said: "I believe that this is indeed the same document that Balfour handed to Page." SEE ALSO REFERENCES
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