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The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was an alleged pair of attacks by naval forces of the Democratic Republic Of Vietnam (commonly referred to as North Vietnam) against two American Destroyer s, the USS ''Maddox'' and the USS ''Turner Joy'' . The attacks were alleged to have occurred on 2 August and 4 August , 1964 in the Gulf Of Tonkin . Later research, including a report released in 2005 by the National Security Agency , indicated that the second attack most likely did not occur, but also attempted to dispel the long-standing assumption that members of the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson had knowingly lied about the nature of the incident. {Link without Title} The outcome of the incident was the passage by Congress of the Southeast Asia Resolution (better known as the Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution ), which granted Johnson the authority to assist any Southeast Asia n country whose government was considered to be jeopardized by " Communist aggression". The resolution served as Johnson's legal justification for escalating American involvement in the Vietnam Conflict . BACKGROUND See Also: Vietnam War Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group Operation 34A Although the United States attended the Geneva Conference (1954) , it refused to sign the Geneva Accords (1954) . The Accords mandated, among other measures, a ceasefire line, intended to separate Vietnamese independence and French forces, and elections to determine the rulership of Vietnam on both sides of the line, within 2 years. It also forbade the political interference of other countries in the area, the creation of new governments without the stipulated elections, and foreign military presence. The United States promptly subverted all of the measures of the Accords at once when it installed anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem as President of South Vietnam, and gave him military backing. By 1961, poor decisions by Diem, almost all against the counsel of his American advisors, including refusals to hold elections, and attacks on Buddhism (the majority religion in southern Vietnam), and other ethnic groups, had made him unpopular. In that year, a popular uprising began, headed by the National Liberation Front . The U.S. also began providing direct support to the South Vietnamese in the form of military and financial aid and military advisors, the number of which grew from 600 in 1961 to 16,000 by the end of John F. Kennedy 's presidency in 1963. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration. While Kennedy had originally supported the policy of sending military advisors to Vietnam, he had begun to alter his thinking due to the military ineptitude of the Saigon government and its inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms. Shortly before his assassination in November 1963, he had begun limited recall of American forces. Johnson's views were likewise complex, but he had supported military Escalation in Vietnam as a means to challenge the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union . The Cold War policy of Containment was to be applied to prevent the "fall" of Southeast Asia under the precepts of the Domino Theory . After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more American forces to support the Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in Southeast Asia. According to the (North Vietnam) known as Operation 34A , had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. In 1964 the program was transferred to the Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (SOG). For the maritime portion of the covert operation, Tjeld-class fast patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam. Although the crews of the boats were South Vietnamese naval personnel, approval of the plan came directly from Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, CINCPAC in Honolulu. After the coastal attacks began, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the terms of the Geneva Accords , but the U.S. denied any involvement. Four years later, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted to Congress that the U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in the South Vietnamese attacks against the DRV. The ''Maddox'', although aware of the operations, was not directly involved in these attacks. Veterans of U.S. Navy SEAL teams stated that U.S.-trained South Vietnamese commandos were active in the area on the days of the attacks. Deployed from Da Nang in Norwegian-built fast patrol boats, the Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN, 'soldiers that fight under the sea') made attacks in the Gulf area on the nights of 31 July and 3 August. On July 31, LDNN commandos in "Nasty" fast attack boats attacked a radio transmitter on the island of Hon Nieu. On 3 August, they used a shipboard cannon to bombard a radar site at Cape Vinh Son. The North Vietnamese responded by attacking hostile ships visible in the area. While US officials were less than honest about the full extent of hostilities that led to the Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution , critical claims that a naval commander fired weapons solely to create an International Incident tend to overlook circumstances and opportunistic responses that suggest a less intentional motivation. THE INCIDENT , 1964 and showing North Vietnamese patrol boats]] Daniel Ellsberg , who was on duty in the Pentagon that night receiving messages from the ship, reports that the ships were on a secret mission (codenamed ''Desoto'') near North Vietnamese territorial waters. On 31 July 1964 , the American destroyer USS ''Maddox'' (DD-731) began an electronic intelligence collection mission in the Gulf Of Tonkin . Admiral George Stephen Morrison was in command of the local fleet from his Flagship USS ''Bon Homme Richard'' (CVA-31) . The ship was under orders not to approach closer than eight miles (13 km) from the North's coast and four miles (6 km) from Hon Nieu island. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent4.htm Pentagon Papers] When the SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the ship was 120 miles (193 km) away from the attacked area. Pentagon Papers First Attack On 2 August the ''Maddox'' was, as attack and opened fire with its five-inch (127 mm) guns, forcing the patrol craft away. U.S. aircraft launched from ''Ticonderoga'' then attacked the retiring P-4s, claiming one as sunk and one heavily damaged. In fact, none of the three vessels was sunk. The ''Maddox'', suffering very minor damage from a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet, retired to South Vietnamese waters where she was joined by the destroyer '' Turner Joy ''. Alleged Second Attack On 4 August , another ''Desoto'' patrol on the North Vietnam coast was launched by ''Maddox'' and the ''Turner Joy'', led by Captain John J. Herrick. This time their orders indicated that the ships were to close no more than 11 miles (18 km) from the coast of North Vietnam. Pentagon Papers The destroyers received radar and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack by the North Vietnamese navy. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of enemies. An hour later, at 1:27 p.m. Washington time, Herrick sent a cable in which he admitted that the attack may never have happened and that there may actually have been no Vietnamese naval craft in the area: "Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by ''Maddox''. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken" (Ellsberg, 9-10). An hour later, Herrick sent another cable, stating, "Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft" (Ellsberg 10). In response to requests for confirmation, at around 4:00 p.m. Washington time, Herrick cabled, "Details of action present a confusing picture although certain that the original ambush was bona fide." (Ellsberg 10). At 6:00 p.m. Washington time (5:00 a.m. in the Gulf of Tonkin), Herrick cabled yet again, this time stating, "the first boat to close the ''Maddox'' probably fired a torpedo at the ''Maddox'' which was heard but not seen. All subsequent ''Maddox'' torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing ship's own propeller beat" {Link without Title} (Ellsberg 10).
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