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The Tet Offensive of 1968, more properly called '''''Tong Cong Kich/Tong Khoi Ngia''''' (''General Offensive, General Uprising''), was a military campaign launched between 30 January and 8 June 1968 by the combined forces of the National Front For The Liberation Of South Vietnam (NLF, or derogatively, ''Viet Cong'') and the People's Army Of Vietnam (PAVN).Military offensives are generally known by the titles applied to them by the attacking party. In the West, however, this convention was abandoned during the Cold War. The ''General Offensive, General Uprising'' also took place during the early stages of the media revolution which, for the first time, allowed the real-time depiction of historic events to the public. This helps explain why both historians and the public have always referred to the Tet operations by their Western title. The purpose of the operations, which were unprecedented in their magnitude and ferocity, was to strike military and civilian command and control centers throughout the Republic Of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and to spark a general uprising among the population that would then topple the government, thus ending the Vietnam War in a single blow. The operations are called the Tet Offensive in the West due to the fact that they were timed to begin on the night of 30 January , '' Tết Nguyên Đán '', the Lunar New Year . The NLF and North Vietnamese struck nearly simultaneously during the most sacred Vietnamese holiday while many Army Of The Republic Of Vietnam (ARVN) troops were on leave. The offensive was a country-wide in scope and well-coordinated by NLF/PAVN forces. More than 80,000 communist troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns, and the national capital of Saigon .Dougan and Weiss, p. 8. The attacks, were, until that time, the largest military operation conducted by either side in the war. The initial attacks took South Vietnamese and American forces by surprise, but most were quickly contained and beaten back by the allies, inflicting massive casualties on the NLF. The exceptions were attacks on ancient imperial capital of Huế , where intense fighting lasted a month and the continuing struggle around the U.S. combat base at Khe Sanh , where fighting continued for two more months. Although the offensive was a military disaster for communist forces, it also had a profound effect on the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the communists were, due to previous defeats, incapable of launching such a massive effort. The most important result of the offensive, therefore, occurred not in Vietnam, but in the United States, where the first real questioning of and debate over that nation's war policies took place. PLANNING Planning in Hanoi for an offensive during 1968 began in the spring of 1967 and continued until early the foillowing year. There has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese Lao Dong Party and military historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the Tet Offensive, even decades after the event.Elliot, ''The Vietnamese War'', vol. 2, p. 1055. Tet signaled the end of a bitter decade-long debate within the Party between the Northern and Southern-firsters, and those who supported either the Soviet Union or the PRC. Domestic policy, war strategy, and foreign relations. Nguyen Chi Thanh, the head of COSVN . Go all out for victory rather than the protracted guerrilla war. Match the American escalation.Nguyen, p. 20. By 1966-1967 there were calls for peace talks and a revision of strategy. Thanh vs. Giap. Giap had long advocated primarily using guerrilla tactics against the U.S. and South Vietnam, whereas Thanh had supported general main force actions. By 1966-1967, Le Duan ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare.Nguyen, p. 22. The foreign policy dilemma - Beijing: protracted war on the Maoist model, resist talks. Moscow: negitiate with the Anmericans, but arm PAVN with conventional weapons. The irony: Beijing vs. Moscow. Soviets and the conventional military model. The PRC feared a large-scale effort. General Vo Nguyen Giap , although Giap claimed afterward to have been against the idea, planning it "reluctantly under duress from the Le Duan dominated Politburo." Gilbert, Marc, and James Wells ''Hau Nghia Part 3: "Out of Blind Xenophobia"'', 2005. http://grunt.space.swri.edu/gilbert3.htm Overriding Giap, the North Vietnamese leadership decided that the time was ripe for a major conventional offensive. They believed that the South Vietnamese government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular in the south that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of the South Vietnamese population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the north to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Even if unsuccessful, they believed the offensive would improve the political situation for North Vietnam. "Dovish calls for talks, criticism of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate - all needed to be silenced."Nguyen, p. 24. End the war with one stroke and cause a political uprising in the south. If that failed, a better position to conduct negotiations. Resolution 14, a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction." 27 July 1967 - The Revisionist Anti-Party Affair. Hundreds of Party members, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested. All based on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the Tet Offensive.Nguyen, p. 27. The rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the General Offensive, General Uprising in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. Thanh was killed in July. Giap's staff. Three Phase Offensive. The offensive involved simultaneous military actions in most of the larger cities in South Vietnam and attacks on major allied bases, with particular efforts focused on the cities of Saigon and Hue. Concurrently, a substantial assault was launched against the U.S. firebase at Khe Sanh. The Khe Sanh assault drew North Vietnamese forces away from the offensive into the cities, but North Vietnam considered the attack necessary to protect their supply lines and divert American attention. According to General Giap, Hanoi 's goals were not purely military but political and diplomatic as well, to take advantage of public opposition to the war in the United States and the weakness of the Saigon Government. Giap sought to accomplish the following:
On the diplomatic front, North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh announced 0n 30 December that Hanoi ''would'' rather than ''could'' hold peace talks if the U.S. halted Operation ''Rolling Thunder'', the bombing campaign in North Vietnam, unconditionally.Dougan & Weiss, p. 10. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. Logistics - During 1967 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south.''Victory in Vietnam,'', p. 208. Doyle, Lipsman, & Maitland, ''The North'', p. 46. PREPARATIONS Signs of impending communist action did not go unnoticed among the intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967, both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in PAVN/NLF strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year, for example, intelligence agencies had observed signs of a major communist military buildup. In addition to captured documents, observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: In October the number of trucks observed heading south through Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected the communists "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time."Dougan & Weiss, p. 11. From Spring through the fall of 1967, the U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the North Vietnamese and the NLF in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking the airstrip and Combat Base at Khe Sanh , the western anchor of the Marine's defensive positions in Quang Tri Province . By the time the action there had ended in May, 940 North Vietnamese troops and 155 Marines had been killed.Moyars Shore, ''The Battle of Khe Sanh''. U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch, 1969, p. 17. During early September and lasting into October, the North Vietnamese began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Quang Tri Province. The intense shelling (100-150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation ''Neutralize'', an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the demarcation line. On 27 October , an ARVN battalion at Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province, came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, the 273rd PAVN Regiment attacked a U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Loc Ninh, in Binh Long Province. The attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division . The most severe of what were coming to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted occurred during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kontum Province. The clashes between the three regiments of the 1st PAVN Division, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade , and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 North Vietnamese and 262 U.S. troops had lost their lives. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. firepower and aerial might could applied indiscriminately. Tactically and strategically, these "Border Battles" made no sense. What the communists had done was fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities of South Vietnam. Westmoreland and MACV were more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January , a force estimated at between 20,000-40,000 North Vietnamese troops had besieged the U.S. Marine Combat Base. MACV was convinced that the enemy planned to stage a spectacular attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. At the beginning of January, the U.S had committed 331098 Army soldiers and 78,013 Marines in nine divisions, an armoured cavalry regiment, and two separate brigades to South Vietnam. They were joined by the 1st Australian Task Force, a Royal Thai Army regiment, two Korean divisions (the Capital and 9th), and a Korean Marine Corps brigade.Stanton, p. 195. South Vietnamese army strength totaled 427,000 men, with the Air Force, Navy and Marines adding another 47,000.Dougan & Weiss, p. 124. To deter any such possibility, Westmoreland had deployed a quarter of a million men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to the I Corps Tactical Zone. This course of events disturbed Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand , commander of U.S., forces in II Corps, which included the city of Saigon. Weyand, a former intelligence officer, was highly suspicious of the pattern of PAVN/NLF activities in his area of responsibility, and notified Westmoreland of his concerns on 10 January . His commander agreed and ordered 15 U.S. battalions back to the outskirts of the capital.Dougan & Weiss, p. 8. When the offensive did begin, a total of 27 allied maneuver battalions defended Saigon and the surrounding area. In the days immediately preceding the offensive, the preparedness of both the ARVN and the U.S. military were relatively relaxed. North Vietnam had announced in October that it would observe a seven-day truce from 27 January to 3 February in honor of the Tet holiday, and the South Vietnamese army made plans to allow recreational leave for approximately one-half of its forces. General Westmoreland, who had already cancelled the truce in I Corps, requested that the South Vietnamese cancel the upcoming cease-fire, but South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu (who had already reduced the cease-fire to 36 hours), refused to do so, claiming that it would damage troop morale and only benefit communist propagandists.Dougan & Weiss, p. 12. "If we's gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us."Dougan & Weiss, p. 11. "SHAKE THE EARTH" Whether by accident or design, the first wave of attacks began shortly after midnight on 30 January in the II Corps Tactical Zone. Nha Trang , headquarters of the U.S. I Field Force, was the first to be hit, followed shortly by Ban Me Thuot , Kontum , Hoi An , Da Nang , Qui Nhon , and Pleiku . The attacks were coordinated between battalion-strength elements of the NLF and PAVN Division-sized elements. Mortar and rocket attacks were followed by ground assaults. General Phillip B. Davidson , MACV chief of intelligence, notified Westmoreland that "This is going in the rest of the country tonight and tomorrow morning."Dougan & Weiss, p. 12. All U.S. forces were placed on maximum alert. Khe Sanh The Khe Sanh Combat base was the northwestern anchor U.S. Marine Corps' defensive line below the DMZ in Quang Tri Province. As far as can be presently ascertained, the attack on Khe Sanh, which began on 21 January , was intended to serve two purposes: As a diversion to draw American attention and forces away from the population centers in the lowlands; and to prevent the forces at Khe Sanh from obstructing supplies and troops moving south on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail. In turn, MACV stated that the purpose of the Combat Base was to provoke the North Vietnamese into a focused and prolonged battle, which would allow the application of massive U.S. artillery and air strikes to inflict massive casualties in a relatively unpopulated region. Khe Sanh and its 6,000 defenders were surrounded by three PAVN divisions, totaling approximately 20,000 men. Throughout the battle, which lasted until 8 April , the Marines were subjected to heavy artillery bombardment, combined with sporadic small-scale infantry attacks. There was never any major ground assault on the base, and the battle was largely a duel between American and Norht Vietnamese artillerists, combined with air strikes conducted by U.S. and South Vietnamese aerial forces. American air support eventually included massive bombing strikes by B-52 s. Ground supply to the base was cut off, and airborne resupply became difficult due to enemy antiaircraft fire. Thanks to innovative high-speed "supply assaults" utilizing fighter-bombers in combination with helicopters, and the U.S. Air Force 's use of C-130 Hercules cargo transport aircraft to employ the LAPES tactic, aerial resupply was never halted. The American media covered the battle extensively and often made pessimistic comparisons to the battle of Dien Bien Phu , where a French base had been besieged and ultimately overrun by the Viet Minh forces during the First Indochina War . In the end, the North Vietnamese withdrew from the area and both sides claimed that the battle had served its intended purpose. The U.S. estimated that 8,000 PAVN troops had been killed and considerably more wounded, against 730 American lives lost and another 2,642 wounded. Prados, John and Ray W. Stubbe, ''Valley of Decision''. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993, p. 454. As with the Vietnam War in general, however, the loss of American lives left a much greater impression upon the American public than did a military victory that could only be measured in terms of "kill ratios." The fact that the "vital" Khe Sanh base was unceremoniously abandoned on 23 June 1968 , having been deemed of no further military value, inevitably encouraged a sense of futility about the battle and the war itself. The siege of Khe Sanh may have simply been a diversion simply designed to distract American attention from the impending Tet Offensive. As historian , General Lowell English , called the battle "a trap ... to force you into the expenditure of absolutely unreasonable amounts of men and materiel to defend a piece of terrain that wasn't worth a damn."Dougan & Weiss, p. 42. In post-war interviews, PAVN officers acknowledged that their intent had indeed been to draw U.S. forces away from the cities.Karnow, p. 554. Saigon Although Saigon was the focal point of the Tet Offensive, the Communists did not seek a total takeover of the city.Wiest, Andrew, ''The Vietnam War, 1956-1975''. London: Osprey Publishing, 2002, p. 41 Rather, they had six primary targets to strike in the downtown area: the headquarters of the ARVN General Staff; the Independence Palace, the American Embassy, the Long Binh Naval Headquarters, and the National Radio Station. Also attacked were the central police station, the Co Loa artillery base, and the Armored Command headquarters. The initial attacks in the Saigon-Cholon area were conducted by the NLF 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th, 267th, 269th, and 506th Local Force Battalions, the 2nd Independent Battalion, and the C-10 Sapper Battalion. The defense of the Capital Military Zone was primarily a South Vietnamese responsibility, and by 3 February , it was defended by the 30th, 33rd, 35th, and 41st ARVN Ranger Battalions; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Vietnamese Marine Corps Battalions; and the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 11th, and 11th Airborne Battalions. The U.S. Army had the 716th Military police Battalion, seven infantry battalions (one mechanized), and six artillery battalions engaged.Stanton, p. 215. Severe fighting between NLF and American forces ocurred around the Phu Tho racetrack, which was being utilized as the NLF's command and control center. One of the most important NLF targets was the radio station. Communist troops had brought a tape recording of Hồ Chí Minh announcing the liberation of Saigon and calling for a "General Uprising" against the Thieu regime. The building was siezed and held for six hours, but the NLF was unable to broadcast due to a power cut off at the transmitter site (which was situated at a different location) as soon as the station was seized. Outside the city proper, the communists attacked the logistical and headquarters complex at Long Binh with the 275th NLF Regiment and the U-1 Local Force Battalion; Bien Hoa Air Base (the 274th NLF Regiment) and the ARVN III Corps headquarters (the 238th NLF Local Force Battalion); and Tan Son Nhut Air Base (the D-16 and 267th Battalions and one battalion of the 271st NLF Regiment). A total of 35 NLF battalions had been committed to the Saigon targets, many of whose troops were undercover members who lived and worked within the city or its environs. By early February, the communist high command realized that none of its military objectives were being met and halted any further attacks on fortified positions. Sporadic fighting with NLF holdouts continued in Saigon until 7 March . Some sections of the city were left badly damaged by the combat, particularly by U.S. air and artillery strikes. 20,000 homes were left in ruins, including much of the Chinese district of Cholon.Dorland, Gilbert N. ''Legacy of Discord: Voices of the Vietnam Era''. Potomac Books, 2001, p. 8 Huế The city of Huế was attacked by ten PAVN and six NLF battalions and almost completely overrun. Thousands of civilians believed to be potentially hostile to Communist control, including government officials, religious figures, and expatriate residents, rounded up and executed in what became known as the Massacre at Huế. The city was not recaptured by the U.S. and ARVN forces until the end of February. Due to the historical and cultural significance of the city, the U.S. did not immediately apply air and artillery strikes as widely as it had in other cities. Instead, U.S. Marines of the 1st Marine Division and several Army units had to clear the city street by street and house by house; a deadly form of urban combat the U.S. military had not seen since World War II , and for which its soldiers were not trained. During most of February, the allies gradually fought their way towards the Citadel, a fortified three-square-mile section of the city, which was recaptured after four days of intense struggle. The U.S. lost 216 men and the ARVN 384. The allies estimated that North Vietnamese forces lost 8,000 men in the city and in fighting in the surrounding area.Willbanks, James H. ''The Battle for Hue, 1968''. April 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/MOUTWilbanks.htm Thousands of civilian lives were also lost during the struggle for the city. Lasting 26 days, the battle of Huế was one of the longest and perhaps the bloodiest single battle of the Vietnam War. The extent of the massacre of civilians by the Communists was only realized over the following months and years, with the last mass graves being found in 1970. Approximately 2,800 bodies were found, and another 2,000 persons were still missing.Arnold, James R. ''The Tet Offensive 1968''. New haven CT: Praeger, 1990, p. 82. In the aftermath of Tet, the Communist command described the battle of Huế as "an overall success." Their unapologetic description of the massacre of civilians was that: "Huế was a place where reactionary anti-communist spirit had existed for over ten years. However, it took us only a short time to drain it to its root."Arnold,, p. 91. AFTERMATH In total, the United States estimated that 45,000 NLF and PAVN soldiers were killed, though the actual figure may have been significantly lower.Oberdorfer, Don, ''Tet!'' Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, p. 261 The U.S. ARVN, and allied Australian, and Korean forces suffered 4,324 killed, 16,063 wounded, and 598 missing.Department of Defense, ''CACCF: Combat Area Asia Casualties Current File, as of Nov. 1993, Public Use Version''. Washington DC: National Archives, 1993. (other sources give a higher estimate of about 5,000 ARVN troops killed). Arnold, p. 90. The first and most ambitious goal, to produce a general uprising, ended in a dismal failure for the communists. While fighting in Hue and Saigon continued for some time, in most cities the communists were driven back within days. The effort to regain control of the countryside was initially more successful. According to the U.S. State Department the NLF "expanded their control in urban areas and have made pacification virtually inoperative. In the Mekong Delta the NLF was stronger now then ever and in other regions the countryside belongs to the VC."Schmitz, p. 106. Unfortunately for the NLF, this state of affairs did not last. Heavy casualties and the backlash of the South Vietnamese resulted in territorial losses. The diplomatic struggle, the option feared by Lao Dong Party militants prior to the offensive, came to occupy a position equal to that of the military struggle.Nguyen, p. 35. Casualties inflicted on NLF units forced the North Vietnamese to fill one-third of its ranks with PAVN troops.General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs Of Staff reported that the Tet Offensive had brought counterinsurgency programs to a halt and "that to a large extent, the VC now controlled the countryside."? However, this change had little effect on the war, since North Vietnam had little difficulty making up the casualties inflicted by the offensive.Arnold, pp. 87-88. The NLF reformed itself as the Provisional Revolutionary Government Of South Vietnam , and took part in future Peace Negotiations under this title. Hanoi did not anticipate the psychological effect the Tet Offensive would have on the U.S.Arnold, pp. 86-87. For example, the attack on the U.S. Embassy was allocated only 16 NLF soldiers, and even the expenditure of this force was considered by some officers to be misguided.? Only after they saw how the U.S. was reacting to this attack did the communists begin to propagandize it. The violence witnessed during the offensive had a deep psychological effect on the South Vietnamese civilian population. Confidence in the government was shaken, as the offensive seemed to reveal that even with massive American support, the government could not protect its citizens.Dougan & Weiss, p. 118. The South Vietnamese army also suffered lowered morale, with the desertion rate increasing from 10.5 per thousand before Tet to 16.5 per thousand in July of 1968Arnold, p. 90. The human and material cost to South Vietnam was staggering. The niumber of civilian dead was estimated at 14,300 with an additional 24,000 wounded.Dougan & Weiss, p. 116. 630,000 new refugees were generated by the offensive, and they then joined the nearly 800,000 others already displaced by the war. One of every twelve South Vietnamese was in a refugee camp.Dougan & Weiss, p. 116. More than 70,000 homes had been destroyed in the fighting and perhaps 30,000 more were heavily damaged. Fresh determination on the part of the Thieu government. On 1 February the president declared a state of martial law and, on 15 June the national Assembly passed Thieu's request for a general mobilization and the induction of 200,000 draftees into the armed forces by the end of the year. This would bring South Vietnam's troop strength to more than 900,000 men.Dougan & Weiss, p. 119. Military mobilization, anti-corruption drives, demonstrations of political unity, and administrative reforms. Theu also established a National Recovery Committee to oversee food distribution, resettlement, and housing construction for the refugees. The government and the Americans were encouraged by a new determination among the ordinary citizens of South Vietnam. Many city dwellers were indignant that the NLF had launched their attacks during Tet and drove many into active support of the government. Journalists, political figures, and religious leaders alike - even the militant Buddists - professed confidence in the government's plans.Dougan & Weiss, p. 120. The attacks did create a crisis in the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson , which was unable to convince the American public that the offensive had been a major defeat for the communists. The offensive had a profound psychological impact on the Johnson administration, elite decision makers, and the media. According to historian Peter Braestrup, Tet "affected political Washington far more than it did the general public."? Although U.S. public opinion polls continued to show a majority supporting involvement in the war, this support continued to deteriorate and the nation became increasingly polarized over the war. That the communists were able to mount a major, country-wide assault at all was a blow to U.S. hopes of winning the war rapidly, and starkly called into question General Westmoreland's earlier public reports of "light at the end of the tunnel." Likewise, the optimistic assessments of the administration and The Pentagon came under heavy criticism and ridicule. At the end of March the administration began a reevaluation of its war policy. On the advice of the so-called Wise Men , the administration made major changes including ending bombing campaign in North Vietnam and reversing the escalation of American forces, capping troop levels at 550,000. Responsibility for the fighting of the war was to be turned over increasingly to the South Vietnamese and negotiations were to be sought with Hanoi. After Tet, President Johnson continued to claim the war was going well for the United States. His credibility was undermined however by the leak of Westmoreland's request for 206,000 additional troops just two days before the United States Democratic Party 's New Hampshire Primary . President Johnson suffered a unexpected setback in the election, finishing barely ahead of United States Senator Eugene McCarthy . Soon afterward, Senator Robert F. Kennedy announced he would join the contest for the Democratic nomination, further emphasizing the plummeting support for Johnson's administration in the wake of Tet. On 31 March Johnson announced he would not seek reelection, and announced a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. Troop request On 9 February Westmoreland wrote General Wheeler that he needed reinforcements to be able to "go on the offensive as soon as his attack is spent". Wheeler, however, told President Johnson that the ARVN might not withstand further attacks. On 12 February Westmorland's requests became more urgent: "I must reinforce from other areas and accept a major risk, unless I can get reinforcements, which I desperately need." The general believed that he could not assist ARVN in defense of the cities and Khe Sanh as well.Schmitz, p. 105.) This caused confusion within the White House and, on 20 February , Johnson sent Wheeler to Vietnam to determine military requirements in response to the offensive. Wheeler's written report contained Westmoreland's request for 206,003 additional troops. According to the report, in spite of heavy losses PAVN/NLF forces were "operating with relative freedom in the countryside" and that South Vietnamese forces remained in a defensive posture around towns and cities. It went on to state that the additional troops were necessary to "counter the enemy offensive", to restore security in the cities, towns and countryside and to "regain the initiative through offensive operations".? According to the Pentagon Papers : A fork in the road had been reached. Now the alternatives stood out in stark reality. To accept and meet General Wheeler's request for troops would mean a total U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam - an Americanization of the war, a callup of reserve forces, vastly increased expenditures. To deny the request for troops, or to attempt to again cut it to a size which could be sustained by the thinly stretched active forces, would just as surely signify that an upper limit to the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam had been reached.The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 4 Chapter 2, "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, To evaluate Westmoreland's request and its possible impact on domestic politics, Johnson convened a task force on Vietnam and called for a complete policy reassessment. This was to include the CIA's belief that: the communists certainly were not desperate or fearful of early collapse. A reconsideration of their capabilities to succeed in a long war may have been a contributing factor. And they probably regarded the balance of forces as sufficiently favorable to warrant a major and widespread offensive. The fact of Presidential elections in the US may have influenced their decision, and, of course, the tactical advantage of the Tet truce played a role in the immediate timing. In any case, it does not appear that they undertook the present offensive because they had concluded that protracted conflict was no longer feasible for them.U.S State Department Policy Reassessment and the "A to K" Review Clifford Task Force members Walt W. Rostow , Wheeler, and General Maxwell D. Taylor argued that the offensive had been "a desperate attempt to seize cities and promote popular uprisings" and represented an opportunity to defeat the North Vietnamese on the United States' terms.Townsend Hoopes, ?) Members Paul Nitze , Earl Warnke and Nicholas Katzenbach on the other hand, argued that neither side could win militarily, and that North Vietnam could match any troop increase and it was time to seek a negotiated settlement.? While this was being deliberated, the troop request was leaked to the press and published in the '' The New York Times '' on 10 March 1968 . The article, written by Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith , revealed that the troop request had begun a serious debate within the administration. According to the article, many high-level officials believed that the U.S. troop increase would be matched by the communists and would simply maintain a stalemate at a higher levels of violence. The article also stated that officials were saying in private that "widespread and deep changes in attitudes, a sense that a watershed has been reached."? Dave Palmer later wrote in ''Summons of the Trumpet'': Looked upon erroneously but understandably by readers as a desperate move to avert defeat, news of the request for 206,000 men confirmed the suspicions of many that the result of the Tet Offensive had not been depicted accurately by the President or his spokesmen. If the Communists had suffered such a grievous setback, why would we need to increase our forces by 40 percent?Palmer, Dave R. ''Summons of Trumpet''. Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1995, ? Clark Clifford also pointed out the same dilemma. At a meeting with Johnson and Robert S. McNamara he stated that There is a very strange contradiction in what we are saying and doing. On one hand, we are saying that we have known of this build up. We now know the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched this type of effort in the cities. We have publicly told the American people that the communist offensive was: (a) not a victory, (b) produced no uprising among the Vietnamese in support of the enemy, and (c) cost the enemy between 2,000 and 5,000 of his combat troops. Now our reaction to all of that is to say that the situation is more dangerous today than it was before all of this. We are saying that we need more troops, that we need more ammunition and that we need to call up the reserves.? During the fall of 1967, two questions weighed heavily on the minds of the U.S. administration. Was the strategy of attrition working? Who was winning the war? The answers could seemingly be found by the solution of a simple equation. Total the number of PAVN/NLF troops incountry, subtract those that were killed and determine the "cross-over point" at which the number of those eliminated exceeded those recruited or replaced. There was bitter disagreement, however, between the MACV and CIA order of battle estimates concerning the strength of guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence shops and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used as a gauge of U.S. success in the conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations ''Cedar Falls'' and ''Junction City'', the CIA members of the group believed that the number of NLF guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within South Vietnam could be as high a 500,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000.Dougan & Weiss, p. 22. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about the public pereception of an increased estimate. According to the MACV chief of military intelligence, General Joseph McChristian, the new figures "would create a political bombshell" since they were proof positive that PAVN and the NLF "had the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition."Dougan & Weiss, p. 22. In May, MACV attempted to gain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that the NLF militias did not constitute a fighting force, but were instead "essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection."Dougan & Weiss, p. 23. The CIA responded that the notion was ridiculous, in that the militias were directly responsible for half of the casualties inflicted on U.S. forces. With both groups in deadlock, George Carver, CIA deputy director for Vietnamese affairs, was asked to mediate the dispute. In September Carver eventually devised a compromise. The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final quantification of forces and a prose addendum would explain the agency's position. ( CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence ) George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of 1982 . Media impact According to many contemporary reporters and later historians Tet was viewed as one of a series of victories won by the U.S. which were turned political defeat. Many people, both at the time and in retrospect, have criticized the media for the negative light in which it portrayed both the war in general and the Tet Offensive in particular. General Wheeler complained of "all the doom and gloom we see in the U.S. press" after Tet. General Westmoreland would later write: "The war still could have been brought to a favorable end following the defeat of the enemy’s Tet Offensive. But this was not to be. Press and television had created an aura, not of victory, but defeat."? According to this view, the communists "actually gained strength because of inaccurate reporting by the U.S. and international press." According to this thesis, the inaccurate reporting heavily contributed to the destruction of Americans' will to fight."Hammes, p. 70.) For example, in ''Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won The War'', Dennis Warner writes "This is the only war lost in the columns of The New York Times . They created an image of South Vietnam that was as distant from the truth as not even to be a good caricature. There were those who invented, distorted, and lied."Warner, Denis, ''Certain Victory''. Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978, p.? One of the most commonly cited works on the media is ''Big Story'', by Peter Braestrup, a former Marine Corps officer and veteran war correspondent for The Washington Post during the Tet Offensive. Braestrup exhaustively analyzed press coverage of the Tet offensive and concluded that the press misreported the offensive as a defeat for the U.S. and that the reporting amounted to a "portrait of defeat".Braestrup, Peter, ''Big Story''. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1977, Vol. 1, p. 705. Probably the most well-known example of an anti-war statement in the press is Walter Cronkite 's special report on the war of February 27 , 1968 . After returning from a two week tour of Vietnam in which he "met with American and South Vietnamese officials, toured the country and reported from ongoing battles in Hue and other places" (Schmitz p 110) he returned to New York where he directly criticized the military leadership and the Johnson administration: "We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest cloud." He concluded by saying that the U.S. was "mired in a stalemate" and called for a negotiated end to the conflict.Kaiser, Charles, ''1968 In America''. New York: Grove Press, 1997, p.77. This was in contrast to his first report in Saigon where he reported that "The Viet Cong suffered a military defeat."Schmitz , p. 111. James Arnold wrote "At the time, political and military leaders from Johnson and Westmoreland down blamed the press for losing the war. The effort continued for years thereafter as discredited leaders sought to recover prestige. But their carping obscures the fact already described that even with a fully muzzled press, America had no viable war-winning strategy."? Television reporting is also credited for bringing the horror of war into the living rooms of the U.S. It was widely believed that the media portrayal then caused the public to turn against the war. This view is held by many in the military and some political conservatives in the U.S. To this day, the Tet Offensive is cited as an example of the important role of media in the political and psychological aspects of warfare. The opposing view was that the strength of the NLF and PAVN demonstrated that statements by senior U.S. military personnel and the Johnson administration regarding progress in the war were untrue. This view, that the war had reached a stalemate and caused the Johnson administration to reevaluate reports of the war's progress. Specifically Robert Komer reported to Ellsworth Bunker that the pacification program ( CORDS ) now had 68% of the South Vietnamese population was under control of Saigon while 17% was under control of NLF.Schmitz, p. 56.) MACV reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive". General Bruce Palmer had reported that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to trying to survive in the mountains."Schmitz, p. 58.) In spite of this, public support in the U.S. continued to decline. In October 1967, for the first time, a plurality of Americans believed that American participation in the war had been a mistake. To shore up public support Johnson brought Westmoreland back to the U.S. to reassure the public that progress was being made. According to this view, the reevaluation of the war by senior members of the administration resulted in the end of the escalatory phase of the war. Supporters of this view cited McNamara's resignation, Secretary Of Defense Clark Clifford and te Wise Men's advice that the war was unwinnable and that the U.S. should take steps to disengage and seek a political solution. This view holds that this reevaluation caused the administration to conclude that the war had reached a stalemate. this support continued to deteriorate and the nation became increasingly polarized. Caine, Major Philip D. ''The United States in Korea and Vietnam: A Study in Public Opinion''. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1968/nov-dec/caine.html Ironically, it was Westmoreland's press briefings that focused the media's attention on the siege at Khe Sanh and diverted it from the impending offensive. The American press and public were shocked not so much by the Tet Offensive, as by the fact that the country's military and political leaders had been outmaneuvered. Only a few months previously, Westmoreland had told Congress that the end of the war was in sight.Westmoreland, William C. ''A Soldier Reports''. New York: Doubleday, 1976, ? Daniel Hallin and Clarence Wyatt also studied the effect of the media on public opinion. They found virtually no evidence to support any causal relationship between editorial tone and bias in the media with loss of public support for the war.Darley, William M. ''War Policy, Public Support, and the Media''. Parameters, 2005. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05summer/darley.htm Hallin maintains that there was in fact a shift in the tone of coverage during and after Tet, but this change was a reflection of the shift in the opinions of elite decisions makers in the U.S.Hallin, Daniel, ''Presentation given at the “American Media and Wartime Challenges”'' Conference. March, 2003. http://pubpol.duke.edu/centers/tiss/pubs/documents/Hallin.pdf Professor John Mueller also studied the effects of the media on public opinion during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. He found no relationship between the media and popular support but linked support to casualty levels.? Army historian William Hammond, considered an authority on military and media relations, concluded that there was little evidence for a link between media coverage and popular support for the war. He wrote that "press reports were still often more accurate than the public statements of the administration in portraying the situation in Vietnam."? But by 1968, the charge that the press lost Vietnam had become an article of faith to many Vietnam veterans. In fact, it had been General Westmoreland's rosy military predictions to the press and his inability to predict the Tet Offensive that undercut public support. Many journalists stationed in Saigon felt betrayed by him for not anticipating events and for wrongly guiding the lens of the media on Khe Sanh. "The battle dragged on for two months ..." writes Stanley Karnow, "becoming almost daily fare for American television viewers ...."Karnow, p. 552. NOTES REFERENCES Published government documents
Memoirs and biograqphies
Secondary sources
External Links
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