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The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was proposed by U.S. President , 2006 . to use ground-based and space-based systems to protect the United States from attack by strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missile s. The initiative focused on strategic defense rather than the prior strategic offense doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Though it was never fully developed or deployed, the research and technologies of SDI paved the way for some Anti-ballistic Missile systems of today. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was set up in 1984 within the United States Department Of Defense to the Strategic Defense Initiative. It gained the popular name Star Wars after the 1977 science fiction film. Under the administration of President Bill Clinton in 1993 , its name was changed to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and its emphasis was shifted from national missile defense to theater missile defense; from global to regional coverage. BMDO was later renamed to the Missile Defense Agency . This article covers defense efforts under the SDIO. STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE BEFORE SDI SDI was not the first U.S. defensive system against nuclear ballistic missiles. In the 1960s, The Sentinel Program was designed and developed to provide a limited defensive capability, but was never deployed. Sentinel technology was later used in the Safeguard Program , briefly deployed to defend one U.S. location. In the 1970s the Soviet Union deployed a missile defense system, still operational today, which defends Moscow and nearby missile sites. SDI is unique from the earlier U.S. and Soviet missile defense efforts. It envisioned using space-oriented basing of defensive systems vs solely ground-launched interceptors. It also initially had the ambitious goal of a near total defense against a massive sophisticated ICBM attack, vs previous systems which were limited in defensive capacity and geographic coverage. INITIAL IMPETUS In the fall of 1979, at Reagan's request, Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham conceived a concept he called the High Frontier, a concept of strategic defense using ground and space based weapons theoretically possible because of emerging technologies. It was designed to replace the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, a doctrine that Reagan and his aides described as a suicide-pact. Daniel O. Graham . '' Confessions of a Cold Warrior ''. October 1995. ISBN 0-9644495-2-8. The initial focus of the strategic defense initiative was a Nuclear explosion powered X-ray Laser designed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by a scientist named Peter L. Hagelstein who worked with a team called ''O Group'', doing much of the work in the late 1970s and early 1980s. O Group was headed by physicist Lowell Wood, a protégé and friend of Edward Teller , the ''"father of the Hydrogen Bomb "''. Ronald Reagan was told of Hagelstein's breakthrough by Teller in 1983, which prompted Reagan's speech on March 8 , 1983 , in Florida, ushered in the last phase of the Cold War , bringing the nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union to its most critical point before the collapse of the Soviet Union later that decade. The concept for the space-based portion was to use lasers to shoot down incoming Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile s (ICBM) armed with Nuclear Warheads . Nobel Prize-winning physicist Hans Bethe went to Livermore in February of 1983 for a 2 day briefing on the x-ray laser, and "Although impressed with its scientific novelty, Bethe went away highly skeptical it would contribute anything to the nation's defense."1 p127. PROJECT AND PROPOSALS , 1983 speech initiating SDI.]] In 1984, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was established to oversee the program, which was headed by Lt. General , 2006 . Research and development initiated by the SDIO created significant technological advances in computer systems, component miniaturization, sensors and missile systems that form the basis for current systems. Initially, the program focused on large scale systems designed to defeat a Soviet offensive strike. However, as the threat diminished, the program shifted towards smaller systems designed to defeat limited or accidental launches. By 1987, the SDIO developed a national missile defense concept called the Strategic Defense System Phase I Architecture. This concept consisted of ground and space based sensors and weapons, as well as a central battle management system., 2006 . The Ground-based Systems Operational Today trace their roots back to this concept. In his 1991 , 2006 . In 1993, the Clinton administration, further shifted the focus to ground-based interceptor missiles and theater scale systems, forming the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and closing the SDIO. Ballistic missile defense has been revived by the George W. Bush administration as the National Missile Defense and Ground-based Midcourse Defense. GROUND-BASED PROGRAMS Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) The ERINT program was part of SDI's Theater Missile Defense Program and was an extension of the Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment (FLAGE), which included developing hit-to-kill technology and demonstrating the guidance accuracy of a small, agile, radar-homing vehicle. FLAGE scored a direct hit against a MGM-52 Lance missile in flight, at White Sands Missile Range in 1987. ERINT was a prototype missile similar to the FLAGE, but it used a new solid-propellant rocket motor allowing it to fly faster and higher than FLAGE. Under BMDO, ERINT was later chosen as the , 2006 . Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) It was the first system tested by the Army that employed hit-to-kill, four test launches were conducted in 1983 and 1984. The first three tests failed because of guidance and sensor problems, but the fourth test succeeded. This technology was later used by the SDIO and expanded into the Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interception System (ERIS) program., 2006 . Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interception System (ERIS) Developed by , 2006 . DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPON (DEW) PROGRAMS See Also: Directed-energy weapon X-ray laser An early focus of the project was to be a curtain of X-ray lasers powered by nuclear explosions. The curtain was to be deployed, first by a series of missiles launched from submarines during the critical seconds following a Soviet attack, then later by satellites and powered by nuclear warheads built into the satellites - in theory the energy from the warhead detonation was to pump a series of laser emitters in the missiles or satellites and produce an impenetrable barrier to incoming warheads. However, the first test on , 2006 ., known as the Cabra event , which was performed in an underground shaft, resulted in marginally positive readings that could be dismissed as a faulty detector. Since a nuclear explosion was the power source, the detector was destroyed during the experiment and the results could not be confirmed. Technical criticismBloembergen, N., Patel, C. K. N., Avizonis, P., Clem, Ro., and Hertzberg, A., "Report to the APS of the Study Group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons," Reviews of Modern Physics, No. 3, Part II, July 1987; ISBN 9997342895. based on unclassified calculations suggested that the X-Ray laser would be of at best marginal use for missile defense K. Tsipis, "Third-Generation Nuclear Weapons," SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1985 (University Press, 1985)., and critics often cite the X-ray laser system as the primary focus of SDI and its apparent failure becomes a main reason to oppose SDI. However, the laser was never more than one of the many systems being researched for ballistic missile defense. Despite the apparent failure of the Cabra test, the long term legacy of the X-ray laser program is the knowledge gained while conducting the research. A parallel development program developed laboratory x-ray lasers M. D. Rosen et al., "Exploding Foil Technique for Achieving Soft X-Ray Laser," pp.106-109, and D. L. Matthews et al., "Demonstration of a Soft X-Ray Amplifier," pp.110-113, Physical Review Letters, 54 (14 January 1985). for biological imaging and creation of 3D holograms of living organisms. Other spin-offs include research on advanced materials like , 2006 . Chemical laser See Also: Chemical laser Beginning in 1985, the Air Force tested a , 2006 . Neutral Particle Beam In July 1989, the Beam Experiments Aboard a Rocket (BEAR) program launched a sounding rocket containing a neutral , 2006 . Laser and mirror experiments The High Precision Tracking Experiment (HPTE), launched with the Space Shuttle Discovery on STS-51-G , was tested June 21 , 1985 when a Hawaii-based low-power laser successfully tracked the experiment and bounced the laser off of the HPTE mirror. The Relay mirror experiment (RME), launched in February 1990, demonstrated critical technologies for space-based relay mirrors to be used with an SDI , 2006 . Launched on the same rocket as the RME, the Low-power Atmospheric Compensation Experiment (LACE) satellite was built by the , 2006 . LACE was also used to evaluate ground based Adaptive Optics , a technique now used in civilian telescopes to remove atmospheric distortions. Hypervelocity Rail Gun (CHECMATE) The purpose of the research into hypervelocity rail gun technology was to build an information base about rail guns so that SDI planners would know how to apply the technology to the proposed defense system. The SDI Rail Gun investigation, called the Compact High Energy Capacitor Module Advanced Technology Experiment (CHECMATE), had been able to fire two projectiles per day during the initiative. This represented a significant improvement over previous efforts which were only able to achieve about one shot per month. Hypervelocity rail guns are, at least conceptually, an attractive alternative for a space based defense system. This is because of their envisioned ability to quickly shoot at many targets. Also, because only the projectile leaves the gun, a railgun system can potentially fire many times before needing resupply. A hypervelocity rail gun works very much like a nuclear accelerator insofar as it converts electrical energy into kinetic force imparted on the projectile. A metal pellet (the projectile) is attracted down the rails by current flowing through one rail, then the projectile and then subsequently down the other rail. Through the magnetic forces that this single system achieves, a force is exerted on the projectile moving it down the rail. Railguns can generate muzzle-velocities in excess of 24 miles per second. At this velocity, even a rifle-bullet sized projectile will defeat the front armor of a main battle tank, let alone a thinly protected missile guidance system. Rail guns face a host of technical challenges before they will be ready for battlefield deployment. First, the rails guiding the projectile must carry very high amperage and voltage. Each firing of the railgun produces tremendous current flow (almost one-half million amperes) through the rails, causing rapid erosion of the rail's surfaces (through ohmic heating, and even vaporization of the rail-surface.) Early prototypes were essentially single-use weapons, requiring complete replacement of the rails after each firing. Another challenge with the rail gun system is projectile survivability. The projectiles experience acceleration force in excess of 100,000 G (1G = normal earth gravity.) In order to be effective, the fired projectile must first survive the mechanical stress of firing, and then the subsequent impact on target. In-flight guidance, if implemented, would require the onboard guidance system to be built to the same standard of sturdiness as the main mass of the projectile. In addition to being considered for destroying ballistic missile threats, rail guns were also being planned for service in space platform (sensor and battle station) defense. This potential role reflected defense planner expectations that the rail guns of the future would be capable of not only rapid fire, but also of multiple firings (on the order of tens to hundreds of shots). David Pahl, Space Warfare And Strategic Defense, Bison Books, 1987, ISBN 0 86124 378 1 SPACE-BASED PROGRAMS Space-Based Interceptor (SBI) Groups of interceptors were to be housed in orbital modules. Successful hover testing was completed in 1988 and demonstrated successful integration of the sensor and propulsion systems in the prototype SBI. It also demonstrated the ability of the seeker to shift its aim-point from a rocket's hot plume to its cool body, a first for infrared ABM seekers. Final hover testing occurred in 1992 using miniaturized components similar to what would have actually been used in an operational interceptor. These prototypes eventually evolved into the Brilliant Pebbles program., 2006 . Brilliant Pebbles Brilliant Pebbles was a non-nuclear system of satellite-based, watermelon-sized,, 2006 . It was designed to operate in conjunction with the Brilliant Eyes sensor system and would have detected and destroyed missiles without any external guidance. The project was conceived in November 1986." Missile Defense Timeline ", Missile Defense Agency John H. Nuckolls, director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from 1988 to 1994, described the system as “The crowning achievement of the Strategic Defense Initiative”. The technologies developed for SDI were used in numerous later projects. For example, the sensors and cameras that were developed for Brilliant Pebbles became components of the , 2006 . Though regarded as one of the most capable SDI systems, the Brilliant Pebbles program was canceled in 1994 by the BMDO., 2006 . However, it is being reevaluated for possible future use by the MDA. SENSOR PROGRAMS , 1989 .]] SDIO sensor research encompassed visible light, ultra-violet, infrared and RADAR technologies, and eventually led to the Clementine mission though that mission occurred just after the program transitioned to the BMDO. Like other parts of SDI the sensor system initially was very large scale, but after the Soviet threat diminished it was scaled down. Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) BSTS was part of the SDIO in the late-80's, and was designed to assist detection of missile launches especially during the boost phase. However, once the SDI program shifted toward theater missile defense, the system left SDIO control in the early 90's and was transferred to the Air Force., 2006 . Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) SSTS was a system originally designed for tracking ballistic missiles during their mid-course phase. It was designed to work in conjunction with BSTS, but was later scaled down for the Brilliant Eyes program., 2006 . Brilliant Eyes Brilliant Eyes was a simpler derivative of the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) that focused on theater ballistic missiles rather than ICBMs and was meant to operate in conjunction with the Brilliant Pebbles system. Brilliant Eyes was renamed Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS) and scaled back further under BMDO, and in the late 1990s it became the low earth orbit component of the Air Force's Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)., 2006 . Other Sensor Experiments The Delta 183 program used a satellite known as ''Delta Star'' to test several sensor related technologies. Delta Star carried an infrared imager, a long-wave infrared imager, an ensemble of imagers and photometers covering several visible and ultraviolet bands as well as a laser detector and ranging device. The satellite observed several ballistic missile launches including some releasing liquid propellant as a countermeasure to detection. Data from the experiments led to advances in sensor technologies.The Aerospace Corporation. '' Delta Star: an SDIO Space Experiment ''. Accessed June 18, 2006. COUNTERMEASURES In warfighting, Countermeasure s can have two general meanings: # The immediate tactical action to reduce vulnerability, such as Chaff , Decoy s, and maneuvering. # Counter strategies which exploit a weakness of an opposing system, such as adding more MIRV warheads which are less expensive than the interceptors fired against them. Countermeasures of various types have long been a key part of warfighting strategy. However with SDI they attained a special prominence due to the system cost, scenario of a massive sophisticated attack, strategic consequences of a less-than-perfect defense, outer-space basing of many proposed weapons systems, and political debate. Whereas the current U.S. NMD system is designed around a relatively limited unsophisticated attack, SDI planned for a massive attack by a sophisticated opponent. This raised significant issues about economic and technical costs defending against Anti-ballistic Missile Defense Countermeasures used by the attacking side. For example if it had been much cheaper to add attacking warheads than to add defenses, an attacker of similar economic power could have simply out produced the defender. This requirement of being "cost effective at the margin" was first formulated by ''. October 20 , 2004 . A sophisticated attacker having the technology to use decoys, shielding, maneuvering warheads, or other countermeasures would have multiplied the difficulty and cost of intercepting the real warheads. SDI envisioned many space-based systems in fixed orbits. In theory an advanced opponent could have targeted those, in turn requiring self-defense capability or increased numbers to compensate for attrition. SDI design and operational planning had to factor in all these countermeasures and the associated cost. CONTROVERSY AND CRITICISM projectile was fired from a light gas gun at a velocity of 23,000 feet per second (7,000 meters per second) at this cast aluminum block.]] SDI is believed to have been first dubbed "Star Wars" by opponent , 1986 . Ashton Carter , a fellow at MIT , assessed SDI for Congress in 1984. He said there were a number of difficulties in creating an adequate missile defense shield, with or without lasers. He said X-rays have a limited scope because they become diffused through the atmosphere, much like the beam of a flash light spreading outward in all directions. This means the X-rays needed to be close to the Soviet Union, especially during the critical few minutes of the booster phase, in order for the Soviet missiles to be both detectable to radar and targeted by the lasers themselves. Opponents disagreed, saying advances in technology, such as using very strong laser beams, and by "bleaching" the column of air surrounding the laser beam, could increase the distance that the X-ray would reach to successfully hit its target. Physicist Hans Bethe , who worked with Teller on both the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, both at Los Alamos , claimed a laser defense shield was unfeasible. He said that a defensive system was costly and difficult to build, but simple to destroy, and claimed that the Soviets could easily use thousands of decoys to overwhelm it during a nuclear attack. He believed that the only way to stop the threat of nuclear war was through diplomacy and dismissed the idea of a ''technical solution'' to the Cold War, saying that a defense shield could be viewed as threatening because it would limit or destroy Soviet offensive capabilities while leaving the American offense intact. In March 1984, Bethe coauthored a 106-page report for the Union Of Concerned Scientists that concluded "the X-ray laser offers no prospect of being a useful component in a system for ballistic missile defense." Union Of Concerned Scientists . Space-Based Missile Defense: A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA. March 1984. Teller countered that Bethe and the other anti-defense activists could not have it both ways. Teller said Bethe had helped him usher in the nuclear age, had become opposed to nuclear weapons and afraid of nuclear war. But, Bethe was also opposed to stopping the threat of offensive capabilities through massive defensive programs. Teller testified before Congress that Bethe, "instead of objecting on scientific and technical grounds, which he thoroughly understands, he now objects on the grounds of politics, on grounds of military feasibility of military deployment, on other grounds of difficult issues which are quite outside the range of his professional cognizance or mine." On 28 June 1985, David Lorge Parnas resigned from SDIO's Panel on Computing in Support of Battle Management, arguing in 8 short papers that the software required by the Strategic Defense Initiative could never be made to be trustworthy and that such a system would inevitably be unreliable and constitute a menace to humanity in its own right.Parnas, D.L., Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems , ''Communications of the ACM'', December 1985, Vol. 28, No. 12, reprinted from ''American Scientist'', Journal of Sigma Xi, Vol. 73, No. 5, pp. 432-440. graffiti in Kassel, West Germany says "Keinen Krieg der Sterne! Stoppt SDI! SDAJ" or (No star wars! Stop SDI! SDAJ .]] Supporters of SDI hail it for contributing to or at least accelerating the fall of the Soviet Union by the , 2006 . There was also the question of how to test this massive weapons system under conditions resembling nuclear war. Joseph Cirincione. A Brief History of Ballistic Missile Defense . Published July 2 , 1998 , updated Winter 2000. Deaths of Researchers Since 1982, there have been a growing number of SDI researchers who died or disappeared under mysterious circumstances. None had any apparent motive for killing themselves. According to the British government, the deaths are all a matter of coincidence. Did 22 SDI Researchers really ALL Commit Suicide? Treaty Obligations Another criticism of SDI was that it would require the United States to modify, withdraw from, or violate previously ratified treaties. The , 1976 ., which limited missile defenses to one location per country at 100 missiles each, would have been violated by SDI ground-based interceptors. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Many viewed favoring deployment of ABM systems as an escalation rather than cessation of the nuclear arms race, and therefore a violation of this clause. SDI and MAD SDI was criticized for potentially disrupting the strategic doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction . MAD postulated that intentional nuclear attack was inhibited by the certain ensuing mutual self-destruction. Even if a nuclear first strike destroyed many of the opponent's weapons, sufficient nuclear missiles would survive to render a devastating counter-strike at the attacker. The criticism was that SDI could have potentially allowed an attacker to survive the lighter counter-strike, thus encouraging a first strike by the side having SDI. Another destabilizing scenario was countries being tempted to strike first before SDI was deployed, thereby avoiding a disadvantaged nuclear posture. Ronald Reagan responded that SDI would be given to the Soviet Union to prevent the imbalance from occurring., 2006 . How and whether this massive technology transfer would have happened was often debated. A complication of the MAD argument was that MAD only covered intentional nuclear attacks by a rational opponent with similar values, not accidental launches, rogue launches, or launches by non-state entities. Non-ICBM Delivery Another criticism of SDI was that it would not be effective against non-space faring weapons, namely Cruise Missile s, Bomber s, and non-conventional delivery methods such as delivery via commercial naval vessels. This latter method in particular would be attractive to terrorists and rogue states as it would be inexpensive, difficult to trace, and technologically undemanding. TIMELINE FICTION AND POPULAR CULTURE Because of public awareness of the program and its controversial nature, SDI has been the subject of many fictional and pop culture references. This is not intended to be a complete list of those references.
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