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This is different from the current, technologically achievable concept of Virtual Reality . Virtual reality is easily distinguished from the experience of 'true' reality; participants are never in doubt about the nature of what they experience. Simulated reality, by contrast, would be hard or impossible to distinguish from 'true' reality. The idea of a simulated reality raises several questions:
TYPES OF SIMULATION Brain-computer interface In a Brain-computer Interface simulation, each participant enters from outside, directly connecting their brain to the simulation computer. The computer transfers sensory data to them and reads their desires and actions back; in this manner they interact with the simulated world and receive feedback from it. The participant may even receive adjustment in order to temporarily forget that they are inside a virtual realm (e.g. "passing through the veil"). While inside the simulation, the participant's Consciousness is represented by an Avatar , which could look very different from the participant's actual appearance. The Cyberpunk genre of fiction contains many examples of brain-computer interface simulated reality. Virtual people In a virtual-people simulation, every inhabitant is a native of the simulated world. They do not have a 'real' body in the 'outside' reality. Rather, each is a fully simulated entity, possessing an appropriate level of consciousness that is implemented using the simulation's own logic (i.e. using its own physics). As such, they could be downloaded from one simulation to another, or even archived and resurrected at a later date. It is also possible that a simulated entity could be moved out of the simulation entirely by means of Mind Transfer into a synthetic body (an example of this in fiction is when SID 6.7 escapes his simulated reality in the movie Virtuosity ). This category subdivides into two further types:
and
Emigration In an emigration simulation, the participant enters the simulation from the outer reality, as in the brain-computer interface simulation, but to a much greater degree. On entry, the participant uses Mind Transfer to temporarily ''relocate'' their mental processing into a virtual-person. After the simulation is over, the participant's mind is transferred back into their outer-reality body, along with all new memories and experience gained within. Intermingled An intermingled simulation supports both types of consciousness: players from the outer reality who are visiting (as a brain-computer interface simulation) or emigrating, and virtual-people who are natives of the simulation and hence lack any physical body in the outer reality. , who are sovereign software programs indigenous to the computed realm. ARGUMENTS We are living in a simulation Nick Bostrom's argument The philosopher Nick Bostrom investigated the possibility that we may be living in a simulation. A simplified version of his argument is: :i. It is ''possible'' that a civilization could create a computer simulation which contains individuals with artificial intelligence. :ii. Such a civilization would ''likely'' run many – say billions – of these simulations (just for fun; for research, etc.) :iii. A simulated individual inside the simulation ''wouldn’t know'' that it’s inside a simulation – it’s just going about its daily business in what it considers the “real world”. Then the ultimate question is – if one accepts that points 1-2-3 are at least ''possible'', which of the following is more likely? :a. We are the ''one'' civilization out there in the universe that will eventually develop the ability to run AI simulations? Or, :b. We are one of the ''billions'' of simulations that has run? (Remember point iii.) In greater detail, his argument attempts to prove the Trichotomy , that: :either # intelligent races will never reach a level of technology where they can run simulations of reality so detailed they can be mistaken for reality; or # races who do reach such a level do not tend to run such simulations; or # we are ''almost certainly'' living in such a simulation. Bostrom's argument uses the premise that given sufficiently advanced technology, it is possible to simulate entire inhabited planets or even larger habitats or even entire universes as quantum simulations in time/space pockets, including all the people on them, on a computer, and that simulated people can be fully conscious, and are as much persons as non-simulated people. If we then assume that the human race could reach such a technological level without destroying themselves in the process (i.e. we deny the first hypothesis); and that once we reached such a level we would still be interested in history, the past, and our ancestors, and that there would be no legal or moral strictures on running such simulations (we deny the second hypothesis) - then
Assumptions as to whether the human race (or another intelligent species) could reach such a technological level without destroying themselves depend greatly on the value of the Drake Equation , which gives the number of intelligent technological species communicating via radio in a galaxy at any given point in time. The expanded equation looks to the number of posthuman civilizations that ever would exist in any given universe. If the average for all universes, real or simulated, is greater than or equal to one such civilization existing in each universe's entire history, then odds are rather overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition that the average civilization is in a simulation, assuming that such simulated universes are possible and such civilizations would want to run such simulations. Frank Tipler's Omega Point Physicist , the computational capacity of the Universe is capable of increasing at a sufficient rate that this computation rate is accelerating hyperbolically faster than time runs out. In principle, a simulation run on this Universe-computer can thus continue forever in its own terms, even though the external Universe lasts only a finite time. The implication of this theory for present-day humans is that this ultimate cosmic computer will essentially be able to resurrect everyone who has ever lived, by recreating all possible quantum brain states within the master simulation. This would manifest as an "emigration" or "virtual person" simulated reality. From the perspective of the inhabitant, the Omega Point represents an infinite-duration Afterlife , which could take any imaginable form due to its virtual nature. At first glance, Tipler's hypothesis requires some means by which the inhabitants of the far future can recover historical information in order to reincarnate their ancestors into a simulated afterlife. However, if they really have access to Infinite computing power, that is no problem at all -- they can just simulate "all Possible World s". (This line of thought is continued in Platonic Simulation Theories ). However, recent observations suggesting an accelerating universe mean that the Big Crunch, on which the theory was originally predicated, is now thought an unlikely scenario. Also, recent ideas in modern physics suggest that time and space are not infinitely divisible, but instead have a Discrete Nature . Should these ideas turn out to be true, it would constitute a serious, even insurmountable, hurdle to the Omega point idea, which relies heavily on the (assumed) existence of increasingly small intervals of Time and Space . Computationalism & Platonic simulation theories Computationalism is a Philosophy Of Mind theory stating that Cognition is a form of Computation . It is relevant to the Simulation Hypothesis in that it illustrates how a simulation could contain conscious subjects, as required by a " Virtual People " simulation. For example, it is well known that physical systems can be simulated to some degree of accuracy. If computationalism is correct, and if there is no Problem in generating Artificial Consciousness from cognition, it would establish the theoretical possibility of a simulated reality. However, the relationship between cognition and Phenomenal Consciousness is Disputed . It is possible that Consciousness requires a substrate of "real" physics, and simulated people, while behaving appropriately, would be Philosophical Zombies . This would also negate Nick Bostrom 's simulation argument; we cannot be inside a simulation, as conscious beings, if consciousness cannot be simulated. Some theorists Bruno Marchal Russel Standish have argued that if the "consciousness-is-computation" version of Computationalism and Mathematical Realism (also known as mathematical Platonism ) are both true our consciousnesses ''must'' be inside a simulation. This argument states that a "Plato's heaven" or Ultimate Ensemble would contain every algorithm, including those which implement consciousness. Platonic simulation theories are also subsets of the Multiverse theories and Theories Of Everything . Dreaming In order to demonstrate the possibility that what we accept as reality is a simulation there should be some evidence that we could point to in order to extrapolate that it is in fact an Illusion . Dreaming is one such example where ordinary people are fooled into believing a simulated reality (a dream) is the "true" reality. However, given practice or even chance, it is possible for one to realize that they are dreaming whilst they dream, thus entering a Lucid Dream . The existence of dreams resolves the questions of whether simulations indistinguishable from "true" reality are possible and if humans are too intelligent to be easily fooled by them. As a result the "dream hypothesis" cannot be ruled out, although it has been argued that Common Sense and considerations of Simplicity rule against it."There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations." Bertrand Russell , ''The Problems of Philosophy'' The philosophical underpinnings of this argument begin with is posed by Zhuangzi in which Chuang Chou dreamed he was a butterfly and woke up wondering how to tell the difference between the real world and the dream. Chalmers (2003) discusses the dream hypothesis, and notes that this comes in two distinct forms:
Both the Dream Argument and the Simulation hypothesis can be regarded as Skeptical Hypotheses ; however in raising these doubts, just as Descartes noted that his own thinking led him to be convinced of his own existence, the existence of the argument itself is testament to the possibility of its own truth. Another state of mind in which an individual's perceptions have no physical basis in the real world is called Psychosis . Quasi-religious arguments Prayers. A simulation may have been built for the purpose of its inhabitants, and so it may respond to their wishes if properly expressed. (This is the secular version of having one's prayers answered if delivered using the correct ritual.) If any sort of prayer or wishing is found to be effective, and is verified to be scientifically inexplicable, then it is grounds to suspect that reality is being simulated. Interventions. The director of the simulation may choose to intervene from time to time in a way that violates the simulation's normal rules. The director may even choose to manifest him/her/itself to the inhabitants. (This is another secular version of a common religious Meme .) Past lives. The inhabitants may have entered the simulation after living for a period of time in an outer world or in a previous simulation, and so they may possess Recoverable "past Life" Memories . If such memories can be proven to be both accurate and inexplicable, then reality may be simulation which inhabitants can visit multiple times. Déjà Vu is a similar concept such inhabitants may experience for the same reasons. All three arguments suffer from the same two problems.
We are not living in a simulation Computability of physics A decisive refutation of any claim that our reality is computer-simulated would be the discovery of some un Computable physics, because if reality is doing something no computer can do, it cannot be a computer simulation. In fact, known physics is held to be computable. ''PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY AND QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY'' The objection could be made that the simulation does not have to run in ", a machine more powerful than a Turing machine ''Hypercomputation'', Toby Ord . Unfortunately, there is no way of working out if computers running a simulation are capable of doing things that computers in the simulation cannot do. No one has shown that the laws of physics inside a simulation and those outside it have to be the same, and simulations of different physical laws have been constructed."The Cosmology Machine takes data from billions of observations about the behaviour of stars, gases and the mysterious dark matter throughout the universe and then calculates, at ultra high speeds, how galaxies and solar systems evolved. By testing different theories of cosmic evolution it can simulate virtual universes to test which ideas come closest to explaining the real universe." ''Cosmology Machine creates the Universe'' The problem now is that there is no evidence that can conceivably be produced to show that the universe is ''not'' any kind of computer, making the Simulation Hypothesis Unfalsifiable and therefore scientifically unacceptable, at least by Popperian standards. Popper, K. ''Science as Falsification'' CantGoTu Environments The concept of a CantGoTu Environment takes the ideas embedded in the Diagonal Argument of George Cantor , the Undecidability theorems of Kurt Gödel , and the limits of Computability highlighted by Alan Turing , and applies them to Virtual Reality environments. The argument is set out in The Fabric Of Reality (1997) by David Deutsch , and runs thus: :Imagine a computer built to render every possible Virtual Reality . Suppose all possible environments produced by this generator can be laid out sequentially, as Environment 1, Environment 2, etc. Take time slices through each of these of equal duration. (Deutsch specifies one minute, but this could, in principle be anything, e.g. Planck Time .) Now construct a new environment as follows. In the first time-period, generate in the environment anything which is different from Environment 1, and in the second time period, anything different from Environment 2, and so on. This new environment cannot be found in the sequential layout of environments specified earlier, as it differs from all possible environments by what happens in one particular time-slice. Hence this means that no such universal VR generator can be created, and there are environments which effectively can ''never'' be rendered by any means. Deutsch, D. (1997), The Fabric of Reality, Penguin Books: in particular see pages 123-131 However, later on in the book, Deutsch goes on to argue for a very strong version of the Turing Principle , namely: "It is possible to build a virtual reality generator whose repertoire includes every ''physically possible'' environment." However, in order to include ''every physically possible environment'', the computer would have to be able to include a full simulation of the environment containing ''itself''. Computational load ;Virtual people As of 2007 , the computational requirements for Molecular Dynamics are such that it takes several months of computing time on the world's fastest computers to simulate 1/10th of one second of the folding of a single protein molecule.
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