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Platonic realism is a Philosophical term usually used to refer to the idea of Realism regarding the existence of Universals after the Greek Philosopher Plato who lived between c. 427 –c. 347 BC , student of Socrates , and the teacher of Aristotle . Confusingly, this stance is also called Platonic Idealism . Plato 's own articulation of the Realism regarding the existence of Universals is expounded in his '' The Republic '' and elsewhere, notably in the '' Phaedo '', the '' Phaedrus '', the '' Meno '', and the '' Parmenides ''. UNIVERSALS In Platonic realism, '' Universals '' do not exist in the way that ordinary physical objects exist, but were originally thought to have a sort of ghostly or heavenly mode of existence. However, more modern versions of the theory do not apply such potentially misleading descriptions to universals. Instead, such versions maintain that it is meaningless (or a Category Mistake ) to apply the categories of space and time to ''universals''. Regardless of their description, Platonic realism holds that ''universals'' do exist in a broad, abstract sense, although not at any spatial or temporal distance from people's bodies. Thus, people cannot see or otherwise come into sensory contact with ''universals'', but in order to conceive of universals, one must be able to conceive of these abstract forms. Most modern Platonists avoid the possible ambiguity by never claiming that ''universals'' exist, but "merely" that they ''are''. Theories of ''universals'' Theories of ''universals'', including Platonic realism, are challenged to satisfy the certain Constraints On Theories Of ''universals'' . Of those constraints, Platonic realism strongly satisfies one, in that it is a theory of what general terms refer to. ''Forms'' are ideal in supplying meaning to referents for general terms. That is, to understand terms such as ''applehood'' and ''redness'', Platonic realism says that they refer to ''forms''. Indeed, Platonism gets much of its plausibility because mentioning ''redness'', for example, seems to be referring to something that is apart from space and time, but which has lots of specific instances. Forms One type of ''universal'' defined by Plato is the '' Form '' or ''idea''. Although some versions of Platonic realism regard Plato's ''forms'' as ideas in the mind of God , most take ''forms'' not to be mental entities at all, but rather Archetype s (original models) of which particular objects, properties, and relations are copies. Due to the potential confusion of the term ''idea'', philosophers usually use the terms ''form'', ''Platonic form'', or ''universal''. PARTICULARS In Platonic realism, ''forms'' are related to ''particulars'' (instances of objects and properties) in that a ''particular'' is regarded as a ''copy'' of its form. For example, a particular apple is said to be a ''copy'' of the ''form'' of ''Applehood'' and the apple's redness is a ''copy'' of the ''form'' of ''Redness''. ''Participation'' is another relationship between ''forms'' and ''particulars''. ''Particulars'' are said to ''participate'' in the ''forms'', and the ''forms'' are said to '' Inhere '' in the ''particulars''. According to Plato, there are some ''forms'' that are not instantiated at all, but, he contends, that does not imply that the forms ''could not'' be instantiated. ''Forms'' are capable of being instantiated by many different ''particulars'', which would result in the ''form's'' having many copies, or ''inhering'' many ''particulars''. CRITICISM Two main criticisms with Platonic realism relate to ''inherence'' and difficulty of creating concepts without sense-perception. Despite its criticisms, though, realism has strong defenders. Its popularity through the ages is cyclic. Criticism of inherence Critics claim that the terms ''instantiation'' and ''copy'' are not further defined and that ''participation'' and ''inherence'' are similarly mysterious and unenlightening. They question what it means to say that the ''form'' of ''applehood'' ''inheres'' a particular apple or that the apple is a ''copy'' of the ''form'' of ''applehood''. To the critic, it seems that the ''forms'', not being spatial, cannot have a shape, so it cannot be that the apple ''is the same shape as'' the ''form''. Likewise, the critic claims it is unclear what it means to say that an apple ''participates'' in ''applehood''. Arguments refuting the ''inherence'' criticism, however, claim that a ''form'' of something spatial can lack a concrete (spatial) location and yet have ''in abstracto'' spatial qualities. An apple, then, can have the same shape as its ''form''. Such arguments typically claim that the relationship between a ''particular'' and its ''form'' is very intelligible and easily grasped; that people unproblematically apply Platonic theory in everyday life; and that the ''inherence'' criticism is only created by the artificial demand to explain the normal understanding of ''inherence'' as if it were highly problematical. That is, the supporting argument claims that the criticism is with the mere illusion of a problem and thus could render suspect any philosophical concept. Criticism of concepts without sense-perception A criticism of ''forms'' relates to the origin of concepts without the benefit of sense-perception. For example, to think of redness in general, according to Plato, is to think of the ''form'' of redness. Critics, however, question how one can have the concept of a ''form'' existing in a special realm of the universe, apart from space and time, since such a concept cannot come from sense-perception. Although one can see an apple and its redness, the critic argues, those things merely ''participate'' in, or are ''copies'' of, the ''forms''. Thus, they claim, to conceive of a particular apple and its redness is not to conceive of ''applehood'' or ''redness-in-general'', so they question the source of the concept. Plato's Doctrine Of Recollection , however, addresses such criticism by saying that souls are ''born'' with the concepts of the ''forms'', and just have to be ''reminded'' of those concepts from back before birth, when the souls were in close contact with the ''forms'' in the Platonic heaven. Plato is thus known as one of the very first Rationalists , believing as he did that humans are born with a fund of '' A Priori Knowledge '', to which they have access through a process of reason or intellection — a process that critics find to be rather mysterious. A more modern response to this criticism of ''concepts without sense-perception'' is the claim that the universality of its qualities is an unavoidable given because one only experiences an object by means of general concepts. So, since the critic already grasps the relation between the abstract and the concrete, he is invited to stop thinking that it implies a contradiction. The response reconciles Platonism with empiricism by contending that an abstract (and thus not real) object is ''real'' and knowable by its instantiation. Since the critic has, after all, naturally understood the abstract, the response suggests merely to abandon prejudice and accept it. SEE ALSO EXTERNAL LINKS REFERENCES |
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