Information AboutOmaha Beach |
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Omaha Beach was the Codename for one of the principal landing points of the Allied invasion of German-occupied France in the Normandy Landings on June 6 1944 , during World War II . The beach was located on the northern coast of France , facing the English Channel , and was 5 miles (8 km) long, from east of Sainte-Honorine-des-Pertes to west of Vierville-sur-Mer . Landings here were necessary in order to link up the British landings to the east with the American landing to the west, thus providing a continuous lodgement on the Normandy coast. Taking Omaha was to be the responsibility of United States Army troops, with sea transport provided courtesy of the U.S. Navy and elements of the Royal Navy . On D-Day , the untested 29th Infantry Division , joined by 8 companies of U.S. Rangers redirected from Pointe Du Hoc , was to assault the western half of the beach. The battle-hardened 1st Infantry Division was given the eastern half. The initial assault waves, comprising of tanks, infantry and combat engineer forces, were carefully planned to reduce the coastal defences and allow the larger ships of the follow up waves to land. The primary objective at Omaha was to secure a Beachhead of some five miles (eight kilometers) depth, between Port-en-Bessin and the Vire River , linking up with the British landings at Gold Beach to the east and reaching the area of Isigny ready to link up with VII Corps landing at Utah Beach to the west. Very little went to plan at Omaha. Difficulties in navigation caused the majority of landing craft to miss their targets throughout the day. The defenses were unexpectedly strong and inflicted heavy casualties on US troops as they crossed the beach. Under heavy fire the engineers struggled to clear the beach obstacles, causing later landings to bunch around the few available channels that had been cleared. Weakened by the casualties taken just to land, the surviving assault troops could not clear the heavily defended exits off the beach, causing further problems and delays for later landings. Small penetrations were eventually made by random groups of survivors improvizing assaults by scaling the bluffs between the most heavily defended points. By the end of the day two small isolated footholds had been won which were subsequently exploited to achieve the original D-Day objectives over the following days. "BLOODY OMAHA" Terrain Bounded at either end by rocky cliffs, the Omaha Beach crescent presented a gently sloping tidal area averaging 300 yards (275 m) between low and highwater marks. Above the tide line was a bank of Shingle 8 feet (2.4 m) high and up to 15 yards (14 m) wide in some places. At the western end the shingle bank rested against a stone (further east becoming wood) constructed sea wall which ranged from 4-12 feet (1.5-4 m) in height. For the remaining two thirds of the beach after the seawall ended the shingle lay against a low sand embankment. Behind the sand embankment and sea wall lay a level shelf of sand, narrow at either end and extending up to 200 yards (180 m) inland in the center. Steep escarpments or bluffs then rose 100-170 feet (30-50 m), dominating the whole beach and cut into by small wooded valleys or draws at five points along the beach, codenamed west to east D-1, D-3, E-1, E-3 and F-1. Defenses The German defensive preparations and the lack of any defense in depth indicated that their plan was to stop the invasion at the beaches.1 Four lines of obstacles were constructed in the water. The first, a non-contiguous line with a small gap in the middle of Dog White sector and a larger gap across the whole of Easy Red sector, was 270 yards (250 m) out from the highwater line and consisted of 200 Belgian Gates with mines lashed to the uprights. Some 32 yards (30 m) behind these was a continuous line of logs driven into the sand pointing seaward, every third one capped with an anti-tank mine. Another 32 yards (30 m) shoreward of this line was a continuous line of 450 ramps sloping towards the shore, also with mines attached and designed to force flat-bottomed landing craft to ride up and either flip or detonate the mine. The final line of obstacles was a continuous line of Hedgehogs 165 yards (150 m) from the shoreline.2 The area between the shingle bank and the bluffs was both wired and mined with the latter also scattered on the bluff slopes. Coastal troop deployments, comprising five companies of infantry, were concentrated mostly at 15 strong points called ''Widerstandsnester'' ("resistance nests"), numbered WN-60 in the east to WN-74 near Vierville in the west, located primarily around the entrances to the draws and protected by minefields and wire.3 Positions within each strong point were interconnected by trenches and tunnels. As well as the basic weaponry of rifles and machine guns a total of over 60 light artillery pieces were deployed at these strong points. The heaviest pieces were located in eight gun Casemates and four open positions whilst the lighter guns were housed in 35 Pillbox es. A further 18 anti-tank guns completed the disposition of artillery targeting the beach. Areas between the strong points were less lightly manned with occasional trenches, rifle pits and a further 85 machinegun emplacements.45 No area of the beach was left uncovered, and the disposition of weapons meant that Flanking Fire could be brought to bear anywhere along the beach. Allied intelligence identified the coastal defenses as being manned by a reinforced battalion (800 – 1000 men) of the 716th Division.6 This was a static defensive division estimated to comprise up to 50% of non-Germanic troops, mostly Russian volunteers and German '' Volksdeutsche ''. The more experienced and offensively capable 352nd Division was indentified as being located 20 miles (30 km) inland at St. Lo and was regarded as the most likely force to be committed to a counter attack. However, as part of Rommel's strategy to concentrate defenses at the water's edge the 352nd was ordered forward in March,7 taking over responsibility for the defense of the Normandy coast in which Omaha Beach was located. As part of this reorganization the 352nd also took under command the two battalions of the 726th Grenadier Regiment as well as the 439th Ost Battalion that had been attached to the 726th.8 Omaha beach fell mostly within 'Coast Defense Sector 2', stretching westwards from Coleville and allocated to the 916th Grenadier Regiment with the third battalion 726th Grenadier Regiment attached. Two companies of the 726th manned strong points in the Vierville area whilst two companies of the 916th occupied the St.Laurent area strongpoints in the center of Omaha. These positions were supported by the artillery of the first and fourth battalions of the 352nd Artillery Regiment (twelve 105mm and four 150mm howitzers respectively). The two remaining companies of the 916th formed a reserve at Formigny two miles (4km) inland. East of Coleville 'Coast Defense Sector 3' was the responsibility of the remainder of the 726th Grenadier Regiment. Two companies were deployed at the coast, one in the most easterly series of strongpoints, with artillery support provided by the third battalion of the 352nd Artillery Regiment. The area reserve, comprising the two battalions of the 915th Grenadier Regiment and known as 'Kampfgruppe Meyer', was located south east of Bayeaux outside of the immediate Omaha area.9 The failure to identify the reorganization of the defenses was a rare intelligence failure for the allies. Even post action reports still documented the original estimate and assume that the 352nd had been deployed to the coastal defences by chance only a few days previously as part of an anti-invasion exercise.1011 Plan of attack Omaha was divided into ten sectors codenamed, from west to east: Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog Green, Dog White, Dog Red, Easy Green, Easy Red, Fox Green, and Fox Red. The initial assault was to be made by two Regimental Combat Teams (RCT), supported by two tank Battalion s and with two battalions of Rangers attached. The infantry regiments were organized into three battalions each of around 1,000 men. These battalions were organized as three rifle companies each of up to 240 men and a support company up to 190 men.12 Infantry companies A through D belonged to the 1st battalion of a regiment, E through H to the 2nd, I through M (excluding ‘J’) to the 3rd. (Individual companies will be referred to by company and regiment, e.g. Company A of the 116th RCT will be A/116). In addition each battalion had a headquarters company of up to 180 men. The tank battalions consisted of three companies, A through C, each of 16 tanks whilst the Ranger battalions were organized into six companies, A through F, of around 65 men per company. The 116th RCT of the 29th Infantry Division was to land two battalions in the western four sectors, to be followed 30 minutes later by the third battalion. Their landings were to be supported by the tanks of the 743rd tank battalion; two companies swimming ashore in DD Tank s and the remaining company landing directly onto the beach from assault craft. To the left of the 116th RCT the 16th RCT of the 1st Infantry Division was also to land two battalions with the third following 30 minutes after, on Easy Red and Fox Green at the eastern end of Omaha. Their tank support was to be provided by the 741st tank battalion, again two companies swimming ashore and the third landed conventionally. Three companies of the 2nd Rangers were to take a fortified battery at Pointe Du Hoc , three miles (5 km) to the west of Omaha. Meanwhile C company 2nd Rangers was to land on the right of the 116th RCT and take the positions at Pointe de la Percee. The remaining companies of 2nd Rangers and the 5th Ranger battalion were to follow up at Pointe du Hoc if that action proved to be successful, otherwise they were to follow the 116th into Dog Green and proceed to Pointe du Hoc overland.13 The landings were scheduled to start at 06:30, " H-Hour ", on a flooding tide, preceded by a 40 minute naval and 30 minute aerial bombardment of the beach defenses, with the DD tanks arriving five minutes before H-Hour. The infantry were organized into specially equipped assault sections, 32 men strong, one section to a landing craft, with each section assigned specific objectives in reducing the beach defenses. Immediately behind the first landings the Special Engineer Task Force was to land with the mission of clearing and marking lanes through the beach obstacles. This would allow the larger ships of the follow up landings to get through safely at high tide. The landing of artillery support was scheduled to start at H+90 minutes whilst the main build up of vehicles was to start at H+180 minutes. At H+195 minutes two further Regimental Combat Teams, the 115th of the 29th Infantry Division and the 18th of the 1st Infantry Division were to land, with the 26th RCT of the 1st Infantry Division to be landed on the orders of the V Corps commander..14 The objective was for the beach defenses to be cleared by H+2 hours whereupon the assault sections were to reorganize into and continue the battle as battalion formations. The draws were to be opened to allow traffic to exit the beach by H+3 hours. By the end of the day the forces at Omaha were to have established a bridgehead five miles (8 km) deep, linked up with the British XXX Corps landed at Gold Beach to the east and be in position to move on Isigny the next day and link up with the American VII Corps landed at Utah Beach to the west.15 To execute this plan the Omaha assault force totaled 34,000 men and 3,300 vehicles with naval support provided by 2 Battleship s, 3 Cruiser s, 12 Destroyer s and 105 other ships provided predominantly by the US Navy but also including Free French and British warships.16 The 16th RCT (swollen by 3,502 men and 295 vehicles attached only for landing at the beach) numbered 9,828 personnel, 919 vehicles and 48 tanks. To move this force required 2 transport ships, 6 Landing Ship, Tank (LST), 53 LCT's , 5 Landing Craft Infantry (Large) LCI(L), 81 LCVP's , 18 LCA's , 13 other landing craft, and about 64 DUKW’s .17 Assault craft were manned by US Navy, US Coastguard and British Royal Navy crews.18 INITIAL ASSAULT ]] Very little went according to plan throughout the landings. Ten landing craft were lost before they reached the beach, swamped by the rough seas, and seasickness was prevalent amongst the troops. On the 16th RCT front the boats passed men struggling in life preservers and on rafts, survivors of the DD tanks which had sunk.19 For the assault craft, navigation was made difficult by smoke and mist obscuring the landmarks they were using to guide themselves in, whilst a heavy current served to push them to the east.20 As the boats came to within a few hundred yards of the shore the ineffectiveness of the pre-landing bombardments became clear when the landing craft came under increasingly heavy fire from automatic weapons and artillery. Forced by the weather to delay the dropping of bombs in order to avoid hitting the landing craft as they ran in, the aerial bombardment fell too far inland to have any real effect on the coastal defenses.21 Tank landings Concluding that the sea condition was too rough, the DD tanks of the 743rd battalion on the 116th RCT front were carried all the way to the beach. Coming in opposite the heavily defended Vierville draw, company B of the 743rd tank battalion (B/743) lost all but one of its officers and half of its tanks. The other two companies landed to the left of B/743 without initial loss. On the 16th RCT front, the two DD tanks that survived the swim ashore were joined by three others that had to be landed directly onto the beach when their LCT suffered damage to its ramp. The remaining tank company managed to land 14 of its 16 tanks, although three of these were quickly knocked out.2223 Infantry landings "''I was the first one out. The seventh man was the next one to get across the beach without being hit. All the ones in-between were hit. Two were killed; three were injured. That’s how lucky you had to be.''" Richard Merrill, 2nd Ranger Battalion. 24 Of the nine companies landing in the first wave only Company A of the 116th RCT (A/116) at Dog Green and the Rangers to their right landed where they were supposed to. E/116, aiming for Easy Green, ended up scattered across the two sectors of the 16th RCT beach.25 G/116, aiming for Dog White, opened up a 1,000 yard gap between themselves and A/116 to their right when they landed at Easy Green. I/16 drifted so far east it did not land for another hour and a half.26 As infantry disembarked from the landing craft, they found themselves almost everywhere on sandbars 50 to 100 yards out. Before they could even reach the beach they had to wade through water sometimes neck deep, and they still had a 200 yard or more journey to go when they did reach the shore. Those that made it to the shingle did so at a walk, so heavily laden were they. Most sections had to brave the full weight of fire from small arms, mortars, artillery and the heavy interlocking fields of machine gun fire.27 Where the naval bombardment had set grass fires burning, as it had at Dog Red opposite the Les Moulins strong point, the resulting smoke obscured the landing troops and prevented effective fire from being laid down on them.28 Some sections of G/116 and F/116 were able to reach the shingle bank relatively unscathed, though the latter became disorganized after the loss of their officers. G/116 was able to retain some cohesion, but this was soon lost as it made its way westwards under fire along the shingle in an attempt to reach its assigned objectives.29 The scattering of the boats was most evident on the 16th RCT front where some sections of E/16, F/16 and E/116 became intermingled. This made it difficult for sections to come together to improvize company assaults that might have retrieved the situation caused by the mis-landings. Those scattered sections of E/116 landing at Easy Red were also able to escape heavy casualties, though having encountered a deep runnel after being landed on a sandbank they were forced to discard most of their weapons in order to be able to swim ashore.30 Casualties were heaviest amongst the troops landing at either end of Omaha. In the east at Fox Green and the adjacent stretch of Easy Red scattered elements of three companies were reduced to half strength by the time they gained the relative safety of the shingle, many of them having crawled the 300 yards of beach just ahead of the incoming tide. Within 15 minutes of landing at Dog Green on the western end of the beach, A/116 had been cut to pieces, the leaders amongst the 120 or so casualties,313233Official estimates put the casualties for A/116 as high as two thirds, but of the more than 200 strong company Neillands and De Normann report that the unit "''...had 91 men killed and almost as many wounded. Less than 20 men got across the beach.''" Stephen Ambrose reports that the company "''...had lost 96 percent of its effective strength.''" the survivors reduced to seeking cover at the water's edge or behind obstacles. The smaller Ranger company to their right fared a little better, having made the shelter of the bluffs, but already down to half strength. L/16 eventually landed 30 minutes late to the left of Fox Green, taking casualties as the boats ran in and more as they crossed the 200 yards of beach. The terrain at the very eastern end of Omaha however gave them enough protection to allow the 125 survivors to organize and begin an assault of the bluffs, the only company in the first wave able to operate as a unit.34 All the other companies were at best disorganized, mostly leaderless and pinned down behind the shingle with no hope of carrying out their assault missions. At worst they simply ceased to exist as a fighting unit. Nearly all had landed at least a few hundred yards off target, and in an intricately planned operation where each boat section had been assigned a specific task this was enough to throw the whole plan out. Engineer landings Pushed off their targets just as the infantry were, only 5 of the 16 engineer teams arrived at their assigned locations. Three teams came in where there were no infantry or armor to cover them. Working under heavy fire the engineers set about their task of clearing gaps through the beach obstacles, their work made more difficult by loss of equipment and infantry passing through or taking cover behind the obstacles they were trying to blow. They suffered grievous casualties when enemy fire set off the explosives they were working with. Eight men of one team were dragging their pre-loaded rubber boat off the LCM when it was hit by artillery fire. The explosives on their boat were detonated; one man survived. Another team had just finished laying their explosives when the area was struck by mortar fire. The premature explosion of their charges killed or wounded 19 engineers as well as some infantry nearby. The engineers nevertheless succeeded in clearing six gaps; one each at Dog White and Easy Green on the 116th RCT front, the other four at Easy Red on the 16th RCT front. It cost them over 40% casualties.35 SECOND ASSAULT WAVE With the initial assault missions unaccomplished the second, larger wave of assault landings, designed to bring in reinforcements, support weapons and headquarter elements, started coming ashore at 07:00 to similar conditions experienced by the first. Some relief against the largely unsuppressed defensive fire was gained simply by virtue of the fact that with more troops landing the concentration of fire was spread more about the many targets available. The survivors amongst the initial forces were not however able to give much covering fire, and the landing troops still suffered in places the same high casualty rates as those in the first wave. The failure to clear sufficient paths through the beach obstacles added to the difficulties of the second wave now that the tide was beginning to cover those obstacles. The loss of landing craft as they hit these defenses before they reached the shore began to feature in the rate of attrition. As in the initial landings, difficulties in navigation and the consequent mis-landings proved most disruptive, serving to scatter the infantry and to separate headquarters elements from their units.36 116th RCT sectors The remainder of the 1st battalion 116th RCT; B/116, C/116 and D/116, were due to land in support of A/116 at Dog Green. Three boats carrying the battalion’s headquarters elements and Dog Green beach master group landed too far west, under the cliffs. There are no exact details of the casualties they took getting across the beach, but the one-third to one-half that did make it spent the rest of day pinned down by snipers. Dog Green remained a lethal sector. Not all sections of the badly scattered B/116 landed there, but those that did quickly joined the survivors of A/116 in their fight for survival at the water’s edge.37 Two companies of 2nd Rangers coming in later on the edge of Dog Green did manage to reach the sea wall, but it cost them half their strength to do so.38 To the left of Dog Green the Dog White sector sitting between the Vierville and Les Moulins strong points (defending the draws codenamed D-1 and D-3 respectively) was a different story. As a result of earlier mis-landings and now because of their own mis-landing, the troops of C/116 found themselves alone there, only a handful of tanks from the first wave in sight. The smoke from the grass fires covered their advance up the beach, and they gained the sea wall with few casualties and in better shape than any unit on the 116th RCT front so far.39 Whilst the 1st battalion was effectively disarmed of its heavy weapons when D/116 suffered a disastrous landing, the build up at Dog White continued when C/116 was joined by the 5th Ranger battalion pretty much in its entirety. The Ranger commander, recognizing the situation at Dog Green on the run in, ordered the assault craft to divert into Dog White (the 2nd Rangers still got caught out on the right flank of the Ranger landing). This was also the sector where the 116th RCT regimental command group, including the 29th Division assistant commander Brigadier General Norman Cota was able to land relatively unscathed.40 Further east a similar picture of the effectiveness of the strong point defenses emerges. On the Dog Red/Easy Green boundary the defenses around the Les Moulins strong point took a heavy toll as the remainder of the 2nd battalion; H/116 and headquarters elements, struggled ashore there. The survivors joined the remnants of F/116 behind the shingle where the battalion commander was able to organize 50 men in an improvized advance across the shingle. A further advance up the bluffs just east of Les Moulins was too weak to have any effect and was forced back down.41 To their left, mainly between the draws on the Easy Green/Easy Red boundary, the 116th RCT support battalion landed without too much loss, though in the process becoming scattered and too disorganized to play any immediate part in an assault against the bluffs.42 16th RCT sectors On the 16th RCT front, the eastern end of Easy Red was another area between strong points that allowed G/16 and the support battalion to escape destruction in the advance up the beach. Nevertheless, most of G/16’s 63 casualties for the day were suffered before this company reached the shingle. The other 2nd battalion company landing in the second wave; H/16 came in a few hundred yards to the left opposite the E-3 draw and suffered for it, being put out of action for the next few hours.43 The situation on the eastern most beach (Fox Green) where elements of five different companies had become mixed up was little improved by the equally disorganized landings of the second wave. Two more companies of the third battalion joined the melee, and I/16, part of the first wave that had drifted east, finally made a traumatic landing there at 08:00. A captain from this company found himself senior officer in charge of the badly out of shape 3rd battalion.44Two of I/16’s six boats were swamped on their detour to the east. As they eventually came in under fire at Fox Green, three of the four remaining boats were damaged by artillery or mines whilst the fourth got hung up on an obstacle. American situation Infantry were not the only troops to be landed in the second wave. Supporting arms began to arrive and experienced the same chaos and destruction as the rifle companies. Combat engineers tasked with clearing the exits and marking beaches landed without their equipment and a long way from their targets. The half tracks, jeeps and trucks that did not founder in deep water became jammed up on the narrowing beach, easy targets for artillery and mortar. The loss of the majority of radios made the task of organizing the scattered and dispirited troops even more difficult, and those command groups that did make the shore were limited in their effect to their immediate locality. With the exception of a few surviving tanks or a heavy weapons squad here or there the assault troops had only their personal weapons, and these invariably required cleaning first after having been dragged through surf and sand.45 The survivors at the shingle, the first time in combat for many, were relatively well protected from small arms fire but still exposed to artillery and mortars. To their front lay exposed and mined flats and the bluffs still active with enemy fire. Morale was a problem.46 Many groups were without leaders and were able to witness the fate of neighboring troops and the landings coming in behind them. Wounded men out on the beach were being drowned as the tide came in, and out to sea landing craft were being pounded and set ablaze. German situation As late as 13:35 the German 352nd division was reporting that the assault had been hurled back into the sea.47 From their vantage point at Pointe de la Percee overlooking the whole of the beach from the western end the German perception was that the assault had been stopped at the beach. An officer there noted that troops were seeking cover behind obstacles and counted ten tanks burning.48 However, as early as 07:35 the third battalion 726th Grenadier Regiment, defending Draw F-1 on Fox Green beach, was reporting that 100-200 American troops had penetrated its front, with enemy inside the wire at WN-62 and WN-61 under attack from the rear.49 Casualties amongst the defenders were mounting and at the same time that the 916th regiment, defending the centre of the 352nd zone, was reporting that the landings had been frustrated, it was also requesting reinforcement. The request could not be met because the situation elsewhere in Normandy was becoming more urgent for the defenders. The reserve regiment, the 915th of the 352nd division, which had earlier been ordered against the American Airborne Landings to the west of Omaha, was diverted to the Gold Beach zone east of Omaha when the defenses there crumbled.50 BREAKTHROUGH
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| Following The Penetrations Inland, Confused Hard Fought Individual Actions Pushed The Foothold Out Barely A Mile And A Half (25 Km) Deep In The Coleville Area To The East, Less Than That West Of St Laurent, And An Isolated Penetration In The Vierville Area Pockets Of Enemy Resistance Still Fought On Behind The American Front Line, And The Whole Beachhead Remained Under Artillery Fire At 21:00 The Landing Of The 26th RCT Completed The Planned Landing Of Infantry, But Losses In Equipment Were High, Including 26 Artillery Pieces, Over 50 Tanks, About 50 Landing Craft And 10 Larger Vessels | "#ref_82">82 Of the 2,400 tons of supplies scheduled to be landed on D-Day, only 100 tons was actually landed83 Casualties for V Corps were estimated at 3,000 killed, wounded and missing The heaviest casualties were taken by the infantry, tanks and engineers in the first landings The 16th and 116th RCT’s lost about 1,000 men each84 Only five tanks of the 741st tank battalion were ready for action the next day85 The German 352nd division suffered 1,200 killed, wounded and missing about 20% of its strength Its deployment at the beach caused such problems that General Bradley , commander of the US First Army, at one stage considered evacuating Omaha,86 whilst Field Marshal Montgomery considered the possibility of diverting V Corps forces through Gold Beach {{cite book last= Badseyfirst= Stephen coauthors= Bean, Timtitle= Omaha Beach year= 2004publisher= Sutton Publishing |
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| Image:Bunker Overlooking Omaha BeachjpgPresent Day View Of Omaha Beach From Inside An Intact German Artillery Bunker Note How The Bunker Faces Not Towards The Ocean, But Down The Beach This Allowed Multiple Bunkers To Create Deadly Crossfire Patterns That Caused High Numbers Of Allied Casualties On | "http://wwwinformationdelightinfo/information/entry/D-Day" class="copylinks">D-Day |
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