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''Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA)'' is a rather weak institution, dependent on international support to hold back the enemies in the current Civil War . Its disloyalty to the president came to the fore during the mutinies in 1996-1997, but ever since then it has faced internal problems. It has been strongly criticised by human rights organisations due to its Terror , including Killing s, Torture and Sexual Violence . HISTORY Role of military in domestic politics The military has played an important role in the history of Central African Republic . The current president, General François Bozizé is a former army chief-of-staff and his government includes several high-level military officers. Among the country’s five presidents since independence in 1960, three have been former army chiefs-of-staff, who have taken power through coups d’état. No president with military background has however been succeeded by a new military president. The country’s first president, David Dacko was overthrown by his army chief-of-staff, Jean-Bédel Bokassa in 1966. Following Bokassa, David Dacko was restored in 1981, only to be overthrown once again by his new army chief of staff, General André Kolingba after only a few months in power. In 1993, Ange-Félix Patassé became the first elected president of the country. He became soon impopular within the army, resulting in violent mutinies in 1996-1997. In May 2001, there was an unsuccessful coup attempt by Kolingba and once again Patassé had to turn to friends abroad for support, this time Libya and DR Congo were helpful. Some months later, in the end of October, Patassé sacked his army chief-of-staff, François Bozizé, and tried to arrest him. Bozizé then fled to Chad and gathered a group of rebellions. In 2002, he seized Bangui for a short period. In March 2003 Bozizé took power through a coup d’état . – Histoire: République centrafricaine . Importance of ethnicity When General Kolingba became president in 1981, he implemented an ethnicity-based recruitment policy for the administration. Kolingba was a member of the Yakoma tribe from the south of the country, which made up approximately 5% of the total population. During his rule, members of Yakoma were granted all key positions in the administration and made up a majority of the military. This later had disastrous consequences, when Kolingba was replaced by a member of a northerner tribe, Ange-Félix Patassé. Army mutinies of 1996 -1997 Soon after the election 1993, Patassé became unpopular within the army, not least because of his inability to pay their wages (partly due to economic mismanagement and partly because France suddenly ended its economic support for the soldiers’ wages). Another reason for the irritation was that most of FACA consisted of soldiers from Kolingba’s ethnic group, the Yakoma. During Patassé’s rule they were becoming increasingly marginalised, while Patassé created militias favouring his own Gbaya tribe, as well as neighbouring Sara and Kaba. This resulted in army mutinies in 1996-1997, where fractions of the military clashed with the presidential guard, the ''Unité de sécurité présidentielle (USP)'' and militias loyal to Patassé. – UNDP: Fiche Pays: République centrafricaine (2005) .
On 6 December, a negotiation process started, facilitated by Gabon, Burkina-Faso , Chad and Mali . The military – supported by the opposition parties – keeps claiming that Patassé has to resign. In January, 1997, however, the Bangui Agreements were signed and the French EFAO troop was replaced by the 1,350 soldiers of the ''Mission interafricaine de surveillance des Accords de Bangui (MISAB)''. In March, all mutineers were granted amnesty. The fighting between MISAB and the mutineers continued with a large offensive in June, resulting in up to 200 casualties. After this final clash, the mutineers stayed calm. After the mutinies, President Patassé suffered from a typical “dictator’s paranoia”, resulting in a period of cruel terror executed by the presidential guard and various militia within the FACA loyal to the president, such as the Karako. It was directed against the Yakoma tribe , of which it is estimated that 20,000 persons fled during this period. But the oppression also targeted other parts of the society. The president accused his former ally France of supporting his enemies and seeks new international ties. When he strengthened his presidential guard (creating the FORSIDIR, see below), he is granted 300 additional soldiers from Libya for his own personal safety. When former President Kolingba attempted a coup d’état in 2001 (which was, according to Patassé, supported by France), the Movement For The Liberation Of Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba in DR Congo came to his rescue. – Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2002 Crimes conducted by Patassé’s militias and Congolese soldiers during this period are now being investigated by the International Criminal Court . It says that “Sexual violence appears to have been a central feature of the conflict”, having identified more than 600 rape victims. – Yahoo News: ICC to investigate Central African Republic sexual violence, 22 May 2007 PRESENT SITUATION The FACA has been dominated by soldiers from the Yakoma ethnic group since the time of Kolingba. It has hence been considered disloyal by the two northerner presidents Patassé and Bozizé, both of whom have equipped and run their own militias outside FACA. The military also proved its disloyalty during the mutinies in 1996-1997. Although Francois Bozizé has a background in FACA himself (being its chief-of-staff from 1997 to 2001), he has been cautious by retaining the defence portfolio, as well as by appointing his son Jean-Francis Bozizé cabinet director in charge of running the Ministry of Defence. He kept his old friend General Antoine Gambi as Chief of Staff. Due to failure to curb deepening unrest in the northern part of the country, Gambi was in July 2006 replaced with Bozizé’s old friend from the military academy, Jules Bernard Ouandé. – AFRIK: Un nouveau chef pour l’armée centrafricaine, July 6, 2006 Military’s relations with the society The forces assisting Bozizé in seizing the power in 2003 were not paid what they were promised and started looting, terrorising and killing ordinary citizens. Summary executions have taken place with the implicit approval of the government. The situation has deteriorated since early 2006 and the regular army and the presidential guard regularly execute exertion, torture, killings and other human rights violations. There is no possibility for the national judicial system to investigate these cases. At the end of 2006, there were an estimated 150,000 internally displaced people. During a UN mission in the northern part of the country in November 2006, the mission had a meeting with a prefect who said that he could not maintain law and order over the military and the presidential guards. The FACA conducts summary executions and burn houses. Only on the route between Kaga-Bandoro and Ouandago, some 2,000 houses have been burnt, leaving an estimated 10,000 persons homeless. – Internal displacement in Central African Republic: a protection crisis, January 26, 2007 Reform of the army Both the ''Multinational Force in the Central African Republic'' (FOMUC) and France are assisting in the current reform of the army. One of the key priorities of the reform of the military is make it more ethnically diversified. It should also integrate Bozizé’s own rebel group (mainly consisting of members of his own Gbaya tribe). Many of the Yakoma soldiers who left the country after the mutinies in 1996-1997 have now returned and must also be reintegrated into the army. At the same time, BONUCA holds seminars in topics such as the relationship between military and civil parts of society. – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Central African Republic, March 31, 2003 Foreign military presence in support of the Government Peacekeeping and peace enforcing forces Since the mutinies, a number of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcing international missions have been present in Central African Republic. There has been a discussion of the deployment of a regional United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in both Chad and Central African Republic. But it is considered to shore up the ineffectual Darfur Peace Agreement. The missions deployed in the country during the last 10 years are the following: – Sudan Issue Brief: A widening war around Sudan - The proliferation of armed groups in the Central African Republic, January 2007 Chad In addition to the multilateral forces, there have been bilateral support from other African countries, such as the Libyan and Congolese support to Patassé, mentioned above. Bozizé is in many ways dependent on Chad support. Chad has an interest in CAR, since it needs to ensure calmness close to its oil fields and The Pipeline Leading To The Cameroonian Coast , close to the troubled northwest CAR. Before seizing power, Bozizé built up his rebel force in Chad, trained and augmented by the Chadian. President Déby assisted him actively in taking the power in March 2003 (his rebel forces included 100 Chadian soldiers). After the coup, another 400 soldiers were sent. Current direct support includes the 150 non-FOMUC Chadian troops that patrol the border area near Goré, the Chadian soldiers patrolling Bangui, but most of all the Chadian soldiers within the presidential lifeguard. The CEMAC Force includes 121 Chadian soldiers. France There has been an almost uninterrupted French military presence in Central African Republic since independence, regulated through agreements between the two Governments. The French troops were allowed to be based in the country and to intervene in cases of destabilisation. This was particularly important during the cold war era, when Francophone Africa was regarded as a natural French sphere of influence. Additionally, the strategic location of the country made it a more interesting location for military bases than its neighbours and Bouar and Bangui were hence two of the most important French bases abroad. However, in 1997, following , Dakar , Djibouti , Libreville and N’Djamena and the deployment of a ''Force d’action rapide'', based in France. – Guy Martin: France’s African policy in transition: disengagement and redeployment, University of Virginia, 2000 However, due to the situation in the country, France has retained a military presence. During the mutinies, 2,400 French soldiers were patrolling the streets of Bangui. Their official task was to evacuate foreign citizens, but this did not prevent direct confrontations with the mutineers (resulting in French and mutineer casualties). The level of French involvement resulted in protests among the Central African population, since many took party for the mutineers and accused France of defending a dictator against the people’s will. Voices were also heard in France where some blamed France for its protection of a discredited ruler, totally incapable of exerting power and managing the country. – Francis Laloupo: Centrafrique, un destin confisqué After the mutinies in 1997, the MISAB was a multilateral force, but it was armed, equipped, trained and managed by France. The Chadian, Gabonese and Congolese soldiers of the current ''Force multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC)'' mission in the country also enjoys logistical support from French soldiers. A study carried out by the US Congressional Research Service reveals however that France has again increased its arms sales to Africa and during the 1998-2005 period, France was the leading supplier of arms to the continent. – William Church: Africa: France Increases Arms Sales and Intervention, November 6, 2006 COMPONENTS AND UNITS Air Force The to buy two old MI 8 helicopters from Ukraine and one Hercules C 130 , built in the 1950s, from USA. – Centrafrique : Bozizé ou la chronique d’une chute annoncée, 2004 The air force operates otherwise 7 light aircraft, including a single helicopter: Garde républicaine (GR) GR consists of so called patriots that fought for Bozizé when he seized power in 2003 (mainly from the gbaya tribe), together with soldiers from Chad. They are guilty of numerous assaults on the civil population, such as terror, aggression, sexual violence. Only a couple of months after Bozizé’s seizure of power, in May 2003, taxi and truck drivers conducted a strike against these outrages. New amphibious force Bozizé has created an Amphibious Force . It is called the Second Battalion of the Ground Forces and it patrols the Ubangi river. The staff of the sixth region in Bouali (mainly made up of members of the former president’s lifeguard) was transferred to the city of Mongoumba, located on the river. This city had previously been plundered by forces from MLC, that had crossed the border. – Actualité Centrafrique de sangonet - Dossier 16: Le président Bozizé crée deux nouveaux bataillons, April 25, 2003 Veteran Soldiers A program for disarmament and reintegration of veteran soldiers is currently taking place. A national commission for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration was put in place in September 2004. The commission is in charge of implementing a program wherein approximately 7,500 veteran soldiers will be reintegrated in civil life and obtain education. Discontinued groups and units that are no longer part of FACA
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