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March 2
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1992
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June 29
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1992
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David H Lucas, v South Carolina Coastal Council
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505
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1003
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12 S Ct 2886 120 L Ed 2d 798 1992 US LEXIS 4537 60 USLW 4842 34 ERC (BNA) 1897 92 Daily Journal DAR 9030 22 ELR 21104 6 Fla L Weekly Fed S 715
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On certiorari from the South Carolina Supreme Court
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On remand at the South Carolina Supreme Court: Lucas v SC Coastal Council, 309 SC 424 (SC 1992)
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A regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of land constitutes a taking unless the proscribed use interests were not part of the title to begin with In other words, a law or decree with the effect of depriving all economically beneficial use must do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts under the law of nuisance
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1991-1993
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Scalia
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Kennedy
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Blackmun
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Stevens
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US Const amends V, XIV
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'', established the "total takings" test for evaluating whether a particular regulatory action constitutes a
Regulatory Taking that requires compensation.
;Plaintiff/Petitioner : David H. Lucas, owner of two beachfront properties in South Carolina.
;Defendant/Respondent :
South Carolina Coastal Council, a body that grants permits for the use of beachfront land.
South Carolina's Coastal Zone Management Act (1977) required owners of coast land in "critical areas" near beaches to obtain permits from Respondent South Carolina Coastal Council before committing the land to new uses. The state's Beachfront Management Act (1988), S.C. Code Ann. ยง 48-39-10 et seq. (1989 Cum. Supp.), increased the regulations on the use of coastal land.
Petitioner Lucas purchased beachfront properties in 1986 for $975,000. David H. Lucas owned two vacant oceanfront lots in the Beachwood East Subdivision of the Wild Dunes development on the
Isle Of Palms in
Charleston County ,
South Carolina . The Beachfront Management Act effectively deprived Petitioner Lucas of his ability to erect homes on his properties.
Lucas filed suit asserting that the restrictions on the use of his lots was a
Taking of his property without just compensation. The lower court agreed and awarded Lucas $ 1,232,387.50 as just compensation for the regulatory taking. The government of South Carolina appealed, and was reversed by the
Supreme Court Of South Carolina , ''Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'', 304 S.C. 376 (S.C. 1991).
Petitioner Lucas seeks reversal of the South Carolina Supreme Court judgment, reinstatement of the trial court judgment, and declaration that the Beachfront Management Act constituted a taking.
Whether the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the Beachfront Management Act was a valid exercise of the police power and did not constitute a taking.
;Petitioner : Not stated, presumed reflected in holding and reasoning.
;Respondent : (1) The Beachfront Management Act is a valid exercise of the police power, as the beach/dune area of the shores is a valuable public resource, and the erection of structures on that land contributes to erosion and destruction of that resource. (2) All property is held subject to the limitation that the state may regulate the property in such a way as to remove all value.
A regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of land constitutes a
Taking unless the proscribed use interests were not part of the title to begin with. In other words, a law or decree with the effect of depriving all economically beneficial use must do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts under the law of nuisance. As a result, "total takings" analysis requires a consideration of (1) the degree of harm to public lands or adjacent property posed by the regulated activities, (2) the social value of such activities, and (3) the relative ease with which the alleged harms can be avoided through measures taken by either the claimant or the government.
The South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the Beachfront Management Act was a valid exercise of the police power and did not constitute a taking.
The majority argued as follows: (1) Deprivation of all economically beneficial use is, from the perspective of a property owner, deprivation of the property itself. (2) When all economically beneficial use is restricted, it is difficult to assume that the legislature is simply "adjusting" economical benefits and burdens. (3) Regulations that restrict all economically beneficial use may often be a guise of pressing that land into public service. (4) Lucas's lands have been deprived of all economically beneficial use. (5) There is no way to distinguish regulation that "prevents a harmful use" and confers benefits on nearby property. (6) Contrary to Respondent South Carolina's assertion, title is not held subject to the limitation that the state may regulate away all the property's economically beneficial use.
;Kennedy, J., concurring. : The determination of no value must be considered with reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
;Souter, J. : The case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted, as the decision of the trial court that a total taking had occurred is highly questionable based on the facts presented.
;Blackmun, J., dissenting. :
;Stevens, J., dissenting. :
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for determination of whether regulation could be enacted under state nuisance law.
On remand at the South Carolina Supreme Court: Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424 (S.C. 1992), the court granted the parties leave to amend their pleadings to determine what the
Actual Damages were.
Established the modern "total takings" test.
