Information AboutIdealism |
| CATEGORIES ABOUT IDEALISM | |
| idealism | |
| philosophical theories | |
| philosophy of mindidealism | |
| philosophical theories | |
| philosophy of mind | |
| metaphysics | |
| philosophy of mind | |
|
Idealism is the doctrine that Idea s, or thought, make up either the whole or an indispensable aspect of any full reality, so that a world of material objects containing no thought either could not exist as it is experienced, or would not be fully "real." Idealism is often contrasted with '' Materialism '', both belonging to the class of Monist as opposed to Dualist or Pluralist Ontologies . (Note that this contrast between idealism and materialism has to do with the question of the nature of reality as such — it has nothing to do with advocating high moral standards, or the like.) Subjective Idealists and Phenomenalists (such as George Berkeley ) hold that minds and their experiences constitute existence. Transcendental Idealists (such as Immanuel Kant ) argue from the nature of knowledge to the nature of the objects of knowledge--without suggesting that those objects are composed of ideas or located in the knower's mind. Objective Idealists hold either that there is ultimately only one perceiver, who is identical with what is perceived (this is the doctrine of Josiah Royce), or that thought makes possible the highest degree of self-determination and thus the highest degree of reality (this is G.W.F. Hegel's ''Absolute Idealism''). Panpsychists (such as Leibniz ) hold that all objects of experience are also subjects. That is, plants and minerals have subjective experiences--though very different from the Consciousness of animals. Idealism in general is the metaphysical doctrine sketched in the previous paragraph. A separate doctrine, epistemological idealism (also known as the "way of ideas"), asserts that minds are aware of or perceive only their own ideas, and not external objects. This was held by (for example) John Locke, who was certainly not a metaphysical idealist. Berkeley's argument for his metaphysical idealism was indeed built around the difficulties in Locke's epistemological position. But other influential metaphysical idealisms, such as those of Plotinus, Leibniz, and Hegel, are not based primarily on epistemological considerations. So "idealism" in general--that is, metaphysical idealism--should not be defined in a way that makes it depend on epistemological considerations. The approach to idealism by Western Philosophers has been different from that of Eastern thinkers. In much of Western thought (though not in such major Western thinkers as Plato and Hegel ) ''the ideal'' relates to direct Knowledge of Subjective mental ideas, or Image s. It is then usually juxtaposed with '' Realism '' in which the Real is said to have Absolute Existence prior to and independent of our knowledge. Epistemological idealists (such as Kant ) might insist that the only things which can be directly ''known for certain'' are ideas. In Eastern thought, as reflected in Hindu Idealism , the concept of ''idealism'' takes on the meaning of Higher Consciousness , essentially the living consciousness of an all-pervading '' God '', as the basis of all Phenomena . A type of Asian idealism is Buddhist Idealism . HISTORY Idealism names a number of philosophical positions with quite different tendencies and implications. Idealism in the East Several Hindu Traditions and Schools Of Buddhism can be accurately characterized as idealist. Some of the Buddhist schools are called " Consciousness-only " schools as they focus on consciousness without any deity. Idealism in the West Antiphon In his chief work ''Truth'', is a Thought or a Measure , not a Substance ". This presents time as an ideational, internal, mental operation, rather than a real, external object. Plato See Also: Platonic idealism In common discussion, Plato is often referred to as an "idealist," because of his doctrine of the "Forms," which are certainly "ideals," in a broad sense. But Plato doesn't describe the Forms as being in any mind. Instead, he regularly describes them as having their own, independent existence.See especially Plato, ''Parmenides'' 132b3-c8. So it seems clear that Plato is not, at any rate, a "subjective" idealist, like Berkeley. Plato's Allegory Of The Cave is sometimes interpreted as drawing attention to the problem of knowing "external objects"--the problem that concerned Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and other modern philosophers. But the Forms that the Cave-dwellers are ignorant of aren't "external" to them in the way that material objects are for these modern thinkers. The Forms are the true realities, but they aren't spatially outside us, as material objects are. So the issue that Plato's allegory addresses--which is, roughly, how can we know what is truly real (and truly good)?--is quite different from the modern issue of our knowledge of the "external world." However, even if Plato doesn't share the specific concerns of modern philosophy, and of George Berkeley, in particular, Plato could still be a ''non-subjective'' idealist. He could believe that matter has no independent existence, or that full "reality" (as distinct from mere existence) is achieved only through thought. Bernard Williams and Myles Burnyeat have maintained that Greek philosophers never conceived of idealism as an option, because they lacked Descartes's conception of an independently existing mind.Bernard Williams, "Philosophy," in M.I. Finley, ed., ''The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal'' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 204-5; and Myles Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," ''Philosophical Review'' 91 (1982), pp. 3-40. But Williams and Burnyeat didn't consider the possibility that Plato could have held an idealism like Kant's, which argues from the nature of knowledge to the nature of the objects of knowledge, or like Hegel's, which denies that matter is fully "real"--without (in either case) reducing material objects to ideas in a mind or minds. The German Neo-Kantian scholar, Paul Natorp, argued in his ''Plato's Theory of Ideas. An Introduction to Idealism'' (first published in 1903)Paul Natorp, ''Plato's Theory of Ideas. An Introduction to Idealism'', edited with an introduction by Vasilis Politis, translated by Vasilis Politis and John Connolly (Sankt Augustin: Akademia, 2005). that Plato was a non-subjective, "transcendental" idealist, somewhat like Kant, and Natorp's thesis has received support from some recent scholars.See Vasilis Politis, "Non-Subjective Idealism in Plato (''Sophist'' 248e-249d)," and John Dillon, "The Platonic Forms as ''Gesetze'': Could Paul Natorp Have Been Right?", both in Stephen Gersh and Dermot Moran, eds., ''Eriugena, Berkeley, and the Idealist Tradition'' (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). Plotinus no other place than the soul or Mind ' (neque est alter hujus universi locus quam anima), indeed the ideality of time is expressed in the words: 'We should not accept time outside the soul or mind' (oportet autem nequaquam extra animam tempus accipere)." (''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Volume I, "Fragments for the History of Philosophy," § 7) Similarly, professor Ludwig Noiré wrote: "For the first time in Western philosophy we find idealism proper in Plotinus (''Enneads'', iii, 7, 10), where he says, "The only space or place of the world is the soul," and "Time must not be assumed to exist outside the soul." Ludwig Noiré, Historical Introduction to Kant 's '' Critique Of Pure Reason '' It is worth noting, however, that like Plato but unlike Schopenhauer and other modern philosophers, Plotinus does not worry about whether or how we can get beyond our ideas in order to know external objects. Descartes Writing about Descartes , Schopenhauer claimed, "… he was the first to bring to our consciousness the problem whereon all philosophy has since mainly turned, namely that of the ideal and the real. This is the question concerning what in our knowledge is objective and what subjective, and hence what eventually is to be ascribed by us to things different from us and what is to be attributed to ourselves." (''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Vol. I, "Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real") According to Descartes, we really know only what is in our own consciousnesses. We are immediately and directly aware of only our own states of mind. The whole external world is merely an idea or picture in our minds. Therefore, it is possible to doubt the reality of the external world as consisting of real objects. “I think, therefore I am” is the only assertion that can’t be doubted. This is because self-consciousness and thinking are the only things that are unconditionally experienced for certain as being real. In this way, Descartes posed the issue of epistemological idealism, which is awareness of the difference between the world as an ideational mental picture and the world as a system of external objects. Malebranche Malebranche a student of the Cartesian School of Rationalism disagreed that if the only things that we know for certain are the ideas within our mind, then the existence of the external world would be dubious and known only indirectly. He declared instead that the real external world is actually God . All activity only appears to occur in the external world. In actuality, it is the activity of God. For Malebranche, we directly know internally the ideas in our mind. Externally, we directly know God's operations. This kind of idealism led to the Pantheism of Spinoza . Leibniz Leibniz expressed a form of Idealism known as Panpsychism in his theory of monads, as exposited in his Monadologie . He held Monads are the true atoms of the universe, and are also entities having sensation. The monads are "substantial forms of being" They are indecomposable, individual, subject to their own laws, un-interacting, and each reflecting the entire universe. Monads are centers of force; substance is force, while space, matter, and motion are phenomenal. For Leibniz, there is an exact Pre-established Harmony or parallel between the world in the minds of the alert Monad s and the external world of objects. God , who is the central monad, established this harmony and the resulting world is an idea of the monads’ perception. In this way, the external world is ideal in that it is a spiritual phenomenon whose motion is the result of a dynamic Force . Space and Time are ideal or phenomenal and their form and existence is dependent on the simple and immaterial monads. Leibniz's cosmology, with its central monad, embraced a traditional Christian Theism and was more of a Personalism than the naturalistic Pantheism of Spinoza . George Berkeley Bishop Berkeley , in seeking to find out what we could know with certainty, decided that our knowledge must be based on our Perception s. This led him to conclude that there was indeed no "real" knowable object behind one's perception, that what was "real" was the perception itself. This is characterised by Berkeley's slogan: "Esse est aut percipi aut percipere" or "To be is to be perceived or to perceive", meaning that something only exists, in the particular way that it is seen to exist, when it is being perceived (seen, felt etc.) by an observing subject. This Subjective Idealism or Dogmatic Idealism led to his placing the full weight of Justification on our perceptions. This left Berkeley with the problem of explaining how it is that each of us apparently has much the same sort of perceptions of an object. He solved this problem by having God intercede, as the immediate cause of all of our perceptions. Schopenhauer wrote: "Berkeley was, therefore, the first to treat the subjective starting-point really seriously and to demonstrate irrefutably its absolute necessity. He is the father of idealism...." (''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Vol. I, "Fragments for the History of Philosophy," § 12) Schopenhauer could have said, instead, that Berkeley was the "father" of the modern variety of idealism that is motivated, primarily, by epistemological considerations--as distinct from the more purely metaphysical idealism of (for example) Plotinus or Hegel. Bishop Berkeley therefore is considered the first modern philosopher known as an idealist. His ''immaterialism'' held that objects exist by the good quality of our perception of them. In other words, they are ideas residing in our awareness - as well as in the consciousness of the Divine Being. Arthur Collier Arthur Collier published the same assertions that were made by Berkeley . However, there seemed to have been no influence between the two contemporary writers. Collier claimed that the represented image of an external object is the only knowable reality. Matter, as a cause of the representative image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us. An external world, as absolute matter, unrelated to an observer, does not exist for human perceivers. As an appearance in a mind, the universe cannot exist as it appears if there is no perceiving mind. Collier was influenced by John Norris 's ( 1701 ) ''An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World''. The idealist statements by Collier were generally dismissed by readers who were not able to reflect on the distinction between a mental idea or image and the object that it represents. Jonathan Edwards Jonathan Edwards , an American theologian, went to Yale University in 1716 at the age of thirteen. After reading Locke 's doctrine of ideas, he kept a notebook entitled "Mind." In it, he wrote, at the age of fourteen, that the only things that are real are minds. He contended that Matter exists only as an Idea in a mind. Due to his theological manner of thinking, he asserted that space is God, due to its infinity. After adolescence, he never elaborated on these early idealistic notes. Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant held that the mind shapes the world as we perceive it to take the form of space-and-time. Kant focused on the idea drawn from British Empiricism (and its philosophers such as Locke , Berkeley , and Hume ) that all we can know is the mental impressions, or '' Phenomena '', that an outside world, which may or may not exist independently, creates in our minds; our minds can never perceive that outside world directly. Kant emphasized the difference between things as they appear to an observer and things in themselves, "… that is, things considered without regard to whether and how they may be given to us … ."'' Critique Of Pure Reason '', A 140 Kant's postscript to this added that the mind is not a ''.) Kant distinguished his transcendental or critical idealism from previous varieties: Fichte Johann Fichte denied Kant's Noumenon , and made the claim that consciousness made its own foundation, that the mental ego of the self relied on no external, and that an external of any kind would be the same as admitting a real material. He was the first to make the attempt at a presuppositionless theory of knowledge, wherein nothing outside of thinking would be assumed to exist outside the initial analysis of concept. So that conception could be solely grounded in itself, and assume nothing without deduction from there first, what he called a Wissenschaftslehre . (This stand is very similar to Giovanni Gentile 's Actual Idealism , except that Gentile's theory goes further by denying a ground for even an ego or self made from thinking.) Hegel Hegel , another philosopher whose system has been called ''idealism'', argued in his ''Science of Logic'' (1812-1814) that finite qualities are not fully "real," because they depend on other finite qualities to determine them. Qualitative ''infinity'', on the other hand, would be more self-determining, and hence would have a better claim to be called fully real. Similarly, finite natural things are less "real"--because they're less self-determining--than spiritual things like morally responsible people, ethical communities, and God. So any doctrine, such as materialism, that asserts that finite qualities or merely natural objects are fully real, is mistaken. Hegel called his philosophy '' Absolute Idealism '', in contrast to the " Subjective Idealism " of Berkeley and the " Transcendental Idealism " of Kant and Fichte, which were not based (like Hegel's idealism) on a critique of the finite. The "idealists" listed above whose philosophy Hegel's philosophy most closely resembles are Plato and Plotinus. None of these three thinkers associates their idealism with the epistemological thesis that what we know are "ideas" in our minds.An account of Hegel's critique of the finite, and of the "absolute idealism" that Hegel bases on that critique, can be found in Robert M. Wallace, ''Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). It is a noteworthy fact that many commentators on Hegel, and even some who admire Hegel's philosophy, fail to distinguish his type of idealism from Berkeley's and Kant's.A book that is devoted to showing that Hegel is neither a Berkeleyan nor a Kantian idealist is Kenneth Westphal, ''Hegel's Epistemological Realism'' (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). Hegel certainly intends to preserve what he takes to be true in Kant's idealism, in particular Kant's insistence that ethical reason can and does go beyond finite "inclinations".See Wallace, ''Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God'', chapter 3, for details on how Hegel intends to preserve something resembling Kant's dualism of nature and freedom while defending it against skeptical attack. But Hegel doesn't endorse Kant's conception of the "thing-in-itself," or the type of epistemological argument that led Kant to that conception. Still less does Hegel endorse Berkeley's notion that things exist only by being perceivers or being perceived. The guiding idea behind Hegel's "absolute idealism" is the observation, which he shares with Plato, that the exercise of reason enables the reasoner to achieve a kind of reality (namely, self-determination, or reality as ''oneself'') that mere physical objects like rocks can't achieve. By giving this observation a central role in his thinking, Hegel contributes to a philosophical tradition, beginning with Plato, that has been obscured by the modern preoccupation with the epistemological problem of the subject's access to the "external world." Schopenhauer In the first volume of his ''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Schopenhauer wrote his "Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real ". He defined the ideal as being mental pictures that constitute subjective Knowledge . The ideal, for him, is what can be attributed to our own minds. The images in our head are what comprise the ideal. Schopenhauer emphasized that we are restricted to our own Consciousness . The World that appears is only a Representation or mental picture of objects. We directly and immediately know only representations. All objects that are external to the mind are known indirectly through the mediation of our Mind . Schopenhauer's history is an account of the Concept of the "ideal" in its meaning as "ideas in a subject's mind." In this sense, "ideal" means "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image." He does not refer to the other meaning of "ideal" as being qualities of the highest perfection and excellence. In his '' On The Freedom Of The Will '', Schopenhauer noted the ambiguity of the word "idealism" by calling it a "term with multiple meanings."
|
|
|