Evolutionary Game Theory

The common methodology to study the evolutionary dynamics in games is through Replicator Equation s. Replicator equations assume Infinite Populations , Continuous Time , Complete Mixing and that Strategies Breed True . The Attractor s (stable fixed points) of the equations are equivalent with Evolutionarily Stable State s.

SEE ALSO

REFERENCES

P. Hammerstein and R. Selten , "Game theory and evolutionary biology", in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Eds. (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 929-993

Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998) ''Evolutionary games and population dynamics'', Cambridge University Press

Taylor, P. D. (1979). ''Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players'' J. Appl. Prob. 16, 76-83.

Taylor, P. D., and Jonker, L. B. (1978). ''Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics'' Math. Biosci. 40, 145-156.

EXTERNAL LINKS

	CATEGORIES ABOUT EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY

	evolutionary game theory

	evolutionary dynamicsevolutionary game theory

	evolutionary dynamics

	game theory

	evolutionary biology

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