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Electronic voting (also known as '''e-voting''') is a term encompassing several different types of Voting , embracing both electronic means of casting a vote and electronic means of counting votes. Electronic voting technology can include Punch Card s, Optical Scan Voting System s and specialized voting kiosks (including self-contained Direct-recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Systems ). It can also involve transmission of Ballot s and votes via telephones, private Computer Network s, or the Internet . Electronic voting technology can speed the counting of ballots and can provide improved Accessibility for disabled voters. However, there has been controversy, especially in the United States , that electronic voting, especially DRE voting, can facilitate Electoral Fraud . OVERVIEW Electronic voting systems for electorates have been in use since the 1960sBellis, Mary. The History of Voting Machines . ''About.com''. when Punch Card systems debuted. The newer Optical Scan Voting System s allow a computer to count a voter's mark on a ballot. DRE Voting Machine s which collect and tabulate votes in a single machine, are used by all voters in all elections in Brazil , and also on a large scale in India , the Netherlands , Venezuela , and the United States . Internet voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government elections and referendums in the United Kingdom , Estonia and Switzerland as well as municipal elections in Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France . REMOTE VOTING TECHNOLOGY , Chris Backert e-Government Consulting There are also hybrid systems that include an electronic ballot marking device (usually a touch screen system similar to a DRE) or other Assistive Technology to print a Voter-verifiable Paper Ballot , then use a separate machine for electronic tabulation. Paper-based electronic voting system Sometimes called a " Document Ballot Voting System ," paper-based voting systems originated as a system where votes are cast and Counted By Hand , using paper ballots. With the advent of Electronic Tabulation came systems where paper cards or sheets could be marked by hand, but counted electronically. These systems included Punch Card Voting , Marksense and later Digital Pen Voting Systems . Most recently, these systems can include an Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM), that allow voters to make their selections using an Electronic Input Device , usually a Touch Screen system similar to a DRE. Systems including a ballot marking device can incorporate different forms of Assistive Technology . Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system A Direct-recording Electronic (DRE) voting system records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components like a Touchscreen that can be activated by the voter; that processes data by means of a computer program; which records voting data and ballot images in memory components. It produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as printed copy. The system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location. These systems use a precinct count method that tabulates ballots at the polling place. They typically tabulate ballots as they are cast and print the results after the close of polling. In 2002, in the United States, the Help America Vote Act mandated that one handicapped accessible voting system be provided per polling place, which most jurisdictions have chosen to satisfy with the use of DRE voting machines, some switching entirely over to DRE. Public network DRE voting system A public network DRE voting system is an election system that uses electronic ballots and transmits vote data from the polling place to another location over a public network. Vote data may be transmitted as individual ballots as they are cast, periodically as batches of ballots throughout the election day, or as one batch at the close of voting. This includes Internet voting as well as telephone voting. Public network DRE voting system can utilize either precinct count or central count method. The central count method tabulates ballots from multiple precincts at a central location. Internet voting can use remote locations (voting from any Internet capable computer) or can use traditional polling locations with voting booths consisting of Internet connected voting systems. Corporations and organizations routinely use Internet voting to elect officers and Board members and for other proxy elections. Internet voting systems have been used privately in many modern nations and publicly in the United States , the UK , Ireland , Switzerland and Estonia . In Switzerland , where it is already an established part of local referendums, voters get their passwords to access the ballot through the postal service. Most voters in Estonia can cast their vote in local and parliamentary elections, if they want to, via the Internet, as most of those on the electoral roll have access to an e-voting system, the largest run by any European Union country. It has been made possible because most Estonians carry a national identity card equipped with a computer-readable microchip and it is these cards which they use to get access to the online ballot. All a voter needs is a computer, an electronic card reader, their ID card and its PIN, and they can vote from anywhere in the world. Estonian e-votes can only be cast during the days of Advance Voting . On election day itself people have to go to polling stations and fill in a paper ballot. ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC VOTING Electronic voting systems may offer some advantages over traditional voting techniques. An electronic voting system can be involved in any one of a number of steps in distributing, voting, collecting, and counting ballots, and thus may or may not introduce advantages into any of these steps. Charles Stewart of the In May 2004 the U.S. Government Accountability Office released a report titled "''Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges''"Government Accountability Office (May 2004) " Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges ", analyzing both the benefits and concerns created by electronic voting. A second report was released in September 2005 detailing some of the concerns with electronic voting, and ongoing improvements, titled "''Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed''"Government Accountability Office (September 2005) " Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed ". Others also challenge the use of electronic voting from a theoretical point of view, arguing that humans are not equipped for verifying operations occurring within an electronic machine and that because people cannot verify these operations, the operations cannot be trusted. Furthermore, some computing experts have argued for the broader notion that people cannot trust any programming they did not author.Thompson, Ken (August 1984) Reflections on Trusting Trust Under a secret ballot system, there is no known input, nor any expected output with which to compare electoral results. Hence, electronic electoral results and thus the accuracy, honesty and security of the entire electronic system cannot be verified by humans.Lombardi, Emanuele electronic voting and Democracy . Critics of electronic voting, including security analyst Bruce Schneier , note that "computer security experts are unanimous on what to do (some voting experts disagree, but it is the computer security experts who need to be listened to; the problems here are with the computer, not with the fact that the computer is being used in a voting application)...DRE machines must have a voter-verifiable paper audit trails... Software used on DRE machines must be open to public scrutiny"Schneier, Bruce {September 2004), openDemocracy What’s wrong with electronic voting machines? to ensure the accuracy of the voting system. Verifiable ballots are necessary because computers can and do malfunction, and because voting machines can be compromised. Electronic ballots Electronic voting systems may use electronic ballots. When electronic ballots are used there is no risk of exhausting the supply of ballots. Additionally, these electronic ballots remove the need for printing of paper ballots, a significant cost, though there is debate over whether the Total Cost Of Ownership is lower than other systems. When administering elections in which ballots are offered in multiple languages (in some areas of the United States, public elections are required by the National Voting Rights Act Of 1965 ), electronic ballots can be programmed to provide ballots in multiple languages for a single machine. The advantage with respect to ballots in different languages appears to be unique to electronic voting. For example, King County, Washington 's demographics require them under U.S. federal election law to provide ballot access in Chinese . With any type of paper ballot, the county has to decide how many Chinese-language ballots to print, how many to make available at each polling place, etc. Any strategy that can assure that Chinese-language ballots will be available at all polling places is certain, at the very least, to result in a lot of wasted ballots. (The situation with lever machines would be even worse than with paper: the only apparent way to reliably meet the need would be to set up a Chinese-language lever machine at each polling place, few of which would be used at all.) Critics argue the need for extra ballots in any language can be mitigated by providing a process to print ballots at voting locations. They argue further, the cost of software validation, compiler trust validation, installation validation, delivery validation and validation of other steps related to electronic voting is complex and expensive, thus electronic ballots aren't guaranteed to be less costly than printed ballots. Accessibility Electronic voting machines can be made fully accessible for persons with disabilities. Punchcard and optical scan machines are not fully accessible for the blind or visually impaired, and lever machines can be difficult for voters with limited mobility and strength." Protecting the Integrity and Accessibility of Voting in 2004 and Beyond ". '' People For The American Way ''Electronic machines can use headphones and other Adaptive Technology to provide the necessary Accessibility . Critics note that accessibility can be achieved in a variety of ways, and that computers do not need to be involved. Cryptographic verification Electronic voting systems can offer solutions that allow voters to verify their vote is recorded and tabulated with mathematical calculations. These systems can alleviate concerns of incorrectly recorded votes. One feature to mitigate such concerns could be to allow a voter to prove how they voted, with some form of electronic receipt, signed by the voting authority using Digital Signatures . This feature can conclusively prove the accuracy of the tally, but any verification system that cannot guarantee the anonymity of voter's choice, can enable Voter Intimidation or Vote Selling . Some cryptographic solutions aim to allow the voter to verify their vote personally, but not to a third party. One such way would be to provide the voter with a digitally signed receipt of their vote as well as receipts of other randomly selected votes. This would allow only the voter to identify her vote, but not be able to prove her vote to anyone else. Furthermore, each vote could be tagged with a randomly generated voting session id, which would allow the voter to check that the vote was recorded correctly in a public audit trail of the ballot. Voter intent Electronic voting machines are able to provide immediate feedback to the voter detecting such possible problems as Undervoting and Overvoting which may result in a Spoiled Ballot . This immediate feedback can be helpful in successfully determining Voter Intent . Transparency It has been alleged by groups such as the UK-based ". Audit trails and auditing A fundamental challenge with any Voting Machine is assuring the votes were recorded as cast and tabulated as recorded. Non-document Ballot Voting System s can have a greater burden of proof. This is often solved with an independently auditable system, sometimes called an Independent Verification, that can also be used in recounts or audits. These systems can include the ability for voters to verify how their votes were cast or further to verify how their votes were tabulated. Various technologies can be used to assure voters that their vote was cast correctly, detect possible fraud or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the original machine. Some systems include technologies such as cryptography (visual or mathematical), paper (kept by the voter or only verified), audio verification, and dual recording or witness systems (other than with paper). Dr. Rebecca Mercuri , the creator of the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) concept (as described in her Ph.D. dissertation in October 2000 on the basic voter verifiable ballot system), proposes to answer the auditability question by having the voting machine print a paper ballot or other paper facsimile that can be visually verified by the voter before being entered into a secure location. Subsequently, this is sometimes referred to as the " Mercuri Method ." To be truly ''voter''-verified, the record itself must be verified by the voter and able to be done without assistance, such as visually or audibly. If the voter must use a bar-code scanner or other electronic device to verify, then the record is not truly voter-verifiable, since it is actually the electronic device that is verifying the record for the voter. VVPAT is the form of Independent Verification most commonly found in Elections In The United States . End-to-end Auditable Voting Systems can provide the voter with a receipt she can take home. This receipt does not allow her to prove to others how she voted, but it does allow her to verify that her vote is included in the tally, all votes were cast by valid voters, and the results are tabulated correctly. End-to-end (E2E) systems include Punchscan and ThreeBallot . These systems have not yet been used in U.S. elections. Systems that allow the voter to prove how they voted are never used in U.S. public elections, and are outlawed by most state constitutions. The primary concerns with this solution are Voter Intimidation and Vote Selling . An audit system can be used in measured random recounts to detect possible malfunction or fraud. With the VVPAT method, the paper ballot is often treated as the official ballot of record. In this scenario, the ballot is primary and the electronic records are used only for an initial count. In any subsequent recounts or challenges, the paper, not the electronic ballot, would be used for tabulation. Whenever a paper record serves as the legal ballot, that system will be subject to the same benefits and concerns as any paper ballot system. To successfully audit any voting machine, a strict Chain Of Custody is required. Other Other benefits can include reduced tabulation times and an increase of participation ( Voter Turnout ), particularly through the use of Internet voting. Those in opposition suggest alternate Vote Counting System s, citing Switzerland (as well as many other countries), which uses paper ballots exclusively, suggesting that electronic voting is not the only means to get a rapid count of votes. A country of a little over 7 million people, Switzerland publishes a definitive ballot count in about six hours. In villages, the ballots are even counted manually. Critics also note that it becomes difficult or impossible to verify the identity of a voter remotely, and that the introduction of public networks become more vulnerable and complex. ELECTRONIC VOTING EXAMPLES Australia Approximately 300,000 impaired Australians will vote independently for the first time in the 2007 elections. The Australian Electoral Commission has decided to implement Voting Machine s in 29 locations. Blind and visually impaired will be able to cast secret ballots , Macey, Jennifer. ABC's The World Today In October of 2001 electronic voting was used for the first time in an Australian parliamentary election. In that election, 16,559 voters (8.3% of all votes counted) cast their votes electronically at polling stations in four places. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network The Victorian State Government introduced electronic voting on a trial basis for the 2006 State election. Victorian Electoral Commission Electronic Voting Pilot Belgium Electronic Voting In Belgium started in 1991. It is widely used in Belgium for general and municipal elections and has been since 1999. Brazil Electronic Voting In Brazil was introduced in 1996, when the first tests were carried in the state of Santa Catarina, Brazil. Since 2000, all Brazilian elections have been fully electronic. By the 2000 and 2002 elections more than 400 thousand electronic voting machines were used nationwide in Brazil and the results were tallied electronically within minutes after the polls closed. Joao Abud Jr. who was with the original Brazilian company and has served as president of Diebold Procom Industria Electronica since April 2003, has been promoted to vice president of the company's Latin American Division. Canada Electronic Voting In Canada has been used since at least the 1990s at the municipal level in many cities, and there are increasing efforts in a few areas to introduce it at a provincial level. In the Canadian Province of Ontario, from November 5 to November 10 2003, 12 municipalities from the Prescott Russell and Stormont Dundas & Glengarry Counties held the first full municipal and school board electronic elections in North America using either the Internet or the phone but no paper ballots. Peterborough , Ontario used Internet voting in 2006 in addition to the paper ballots. City of Peterborough 2006 Municipal Election Website Estonia Electronic Voting In Estonia began in October 2005 local elections when Estonia became the first country to have legally binding general elections using the Internet as a means of casting the vote and was declared a success by the Estonian election officials. In 2007 Estonia held its and the world's first National Internet election. Voting was available from February 26 to 28. Estonia to hold first national Internet election , February 28, 2007 EU CyberVote Project In September 2000, the European Commission launched the CyberVote project with the aim of demonstrating "fully verifiable on-line elections guaranteeing absolute privacy of the votes and using fixed and mobile Internet terminals". Trials were performed in Sweden, France, and Germany. EU CyberVote project France Elections In France utilized remote Internet voting for the first time in 2003 when French citizens living in the United States elected their representatives to the Assembly of the French Citizens Abroad. Over 60% of voters chose to vote using the Internet rather than paper. The Forum des droits sur l'Internet (Internet rights forum), published a recommendation on the future of electronic voting in France, stating that French citizens abroad should be able to use Internet voting for Assembly of the French Citizens Abroad elections. WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING IN FRANCE? , The Internet rights forum 26 September 2003 Germany In Germany the only accredited voting machines after testing by the PTB http://www.berlin.ptb.de/8/85/851/votingmachines.htm for national and local elections are the ESD1 and ESD2 from the Dutch company , like reading the software from the EPROM to compare it with the original and Sealing the machines afterwards. Wahlcomputer in Cottbus geprüft und versiegelt The city Cottbus later decided not to buy Nedap voting computers. Cottbus verabschiedet sich von Wahlcomputern heise.de, 29 January 2007 At the moment there are several lawsuits in court against the use of electronic voting machines in machines are DRE systems without a Paper Trail . In the 2008 state elections of Hamburg an Optical Scan Voting System based on Digital Paper will be used.[http://fee.iavoss.org/2006/papers/fee-2006-iavoss-New-Generation-of-Voting-Machines-in-Germany.pdf New Generation of Voting Machines in Germany] Ulrich Wienser, Hacking the Electoral Law, Page 37ff India Electronic Voting In India was first introduced in 1982 and was used on an experimental basis in the North Parur assembly constituency in the State of Kerala. However the Supreme Court of India struck down this election as against the law in A C Jose v. Sivan Pillai case. Amendments were made to the Representation of Peoples Act to legalise elections using Electronic Voting Machines. In 2003, all state elections and By-elections were held using EVMs. Ireland Ireland bought voting computers from the Dutch company Nedap for about 50 million euro. The machines were used on a 'pilot' basis in some constituencies in two elections in 2002. Due to campaigning by ICTE , Joe McCarthy, and the work of the Commission on Electronic Voting , the machines have not been used since, and their future is uncertain. Cullen rules out use of e-voting in June ''See also Electronic Voting In Ireland '' Italy The 9th and 10th of April 2006 the Italian municipality of Cremona used Nedap Voting machines during the national elections. The pilot involved 3000 electors and 4 polling stations were equipped with Nedap systems. The electoral participation was very high and the pilot was successful. During the same elections (April 2006) the Ministry of New Technologies in cooperation with two big American companies organized a pilot only concerning e-counting. The experiment involved four regions and it cost 34 million of euro. Cremona municipality wrote a report about the experience, download it here: http://www.electionsystems.eu/website/Read.php?PageID=1182 Press articles about the Pilot: http://www.comune.cremona.it/Article1485.phtml http://www.comune.cremona.it/Article1538.phtml http://www.repubblica.it/2003/e/gallerie/politica/voto-elettronico/1.html http://www.welfarecremona.it/wmview.php?ArtID=6029 http://www.comune.cremona.it/Article1526.phtml http://www.popolis.it/SezioneEspansa.aspx?EPID=1!0!0!0!45202 {Link without Title} Netherlands Since the late nineties, voting machines are used extensively during elections. Most areas in the Netherlands use electronic voting in polling places. The most widely used voting machines are produced by the company Nedap . Security of Systems Group of the Nijmegen Institute for Computing and Information Sciences In the parliamentary elections of 2006, 21,000 persons will be using the RIES Internet voting system to cast their vote. On 5. October 2006 the group "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" ("We do not trust voting machines") demonstrated on Dutch television how the Nedap ES3B machines could be manipulated in 5 minutes. The exchange of the software would not be recognisable by voters or election officials. Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer, a security analysis Dutch citizens group cracks Nedap's voting computer Apparently there was a case of an election official misinforming voters of when their vote is recorded and later recording it himself during municipality elections in could be found because the voting machine was a Direct-recording Electronic Voting Machine , in a poll by a local newspaper the results were totally different. The case is still under prosecution. Raadslid Landerd is stuk minder populair in schaduwverkiezing (dutch) Van Eck Phreaking might also compromise the secrecy of the votes in an election using electronic voting. This made the Dutch government ban the use of computer voting machines manufactured by SDU in the 2006 national elections, fearing that Secret Ballot s may not be kept secret. [http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/30/europe/EU_GEN_Netherlands_Voting_Machines.php Dutch government scraps plans to use voting computers in 35 cities including Amsterdam (Herald tribune, 30. October 2006)] See also: Norway The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development of Norway carried out pilots in three municipalities at local elections in 2003 on voting machines in the polling stations using touch screens. Romania Romania first implemented electronic voting systems in 2003 Romanian General Inspectorate for Communications and Information Technology , on a limited basis, to extend voting capabilities to soldiers and others serving in Iraq, and other theaters of war. Despite the publicly stated goal of fighting corruption, the equipment was procured and deployed in less than 30 days European Commission finding on Romania 2003 after the government edict passed. Switzerland Several cantons ( Geneva , Neuchâtel and Zürich ) have developed Internet Voting test projects to allow citizens to vote via the Internet http://www.geneve.ch/evoting/english/welcome.asp. United Kingdom England Voting pilots have taken place in May 2006 , June 2004 , May 2003 , May 2002, and May 2000. In 2000, the London Mayoral and Assembly elections were counted using an Optical Scan Voting System with software provided by DRS plc of Milton Keynes. In 2004, the London Mayoral, Assembly and European Parliamentary elections were scanned and processed using Optical Character Recognition from the same company. Both elections required some editing of the ballot design to facilitate electronic tabulation, though they differed only slightly from the previous 'mark with an X' style ballots. Scotland Scanners supplied by DRS Data Services Limited of '', 19 April, 2006 "Green light for DRS & ERS to deliver e-Count for 2007 Scottish Elections" , press release, DRS Data Services Limited DOCUMENTED PROBLEMS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT In December of 2005 the US Election Assistance Commission unanimously adopted the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines , which significantly increase security requirements for voting systems and expand access, including opportunities to vote privately and independently, for individuals with disabilities. The guidelines will take effect in December 2007 replacing the 2002 Voting System Standards (VSS) developed by the Federal Election Commission . Some groups such as the Open Voting Consortium believe that to restore voter confidence and to reduce the potential for fraud, all electronic voting systems must be completely available to public scrutiny. In the summer of 2004, the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Association Of Information Technology Professionals issued a nine-point proposal for national standards for electronic voting. "Legislative Committee Resolution Awaiting BOD Approval" . (July 2004). '' Information Executive In an accompanying article, the committee's chair, Charles Oriez, described some of the problems that had arisen around the country.Oriez , Charles (July 2004). "In Search of Voting Machines We Can Trust" . '' Information Executive SEE ALSO
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