| Dualism (philosophy Of Mind) |
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Ideas on mind/body dualism originate at least as far back as Plato and Aristotle and deal with speculations as to the existence of an incorporeal Soul which bore the faculties of intelligence and wisdom. Plato and Aristotle maintained, for different reasons, that people's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, their physical body.Plato (390s-347 BC) ''Platonis Opera'', vol. 1, ''Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus'', ed. E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson and J.C.G. Strachan, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Aristotle (c. mid 4th century BC) ''Metaphysics (Metaphysica)'', ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924, 2 vols; Books IV-VI, trans. C.A. Kirwan, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971; Books VII-VIII trans. D. Bostock, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Books XIII-XIV trans. J. Annas, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. A generally well known version of dualism is attributed to , including Physicalism and Phenomenalism . Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms of Materialism , but Property Dualism may be considered a form of Emergent Materialism and thus would only be contrasted with Non-emergent Materialism . Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Fall 2003 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/dualism/. This article discusses the various forms of dualism and the arguments which have been made both for and against this thesis. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Plato and Aristotle In the dialogue '' Phaedo '', Plato formulated his famous Theory Of Forms as distinct and immaterial substances of which the objects and other phenomena that we perceive in the world are nothing more than mere shadows. Plato's doctrine was the prototype of all future manifestations of substance dualism in Ontology . But Plato's doctrine of the Forms is not to be considered some sort of ancient and superseded Metaphysical notion because it has precise implications for the Philosophy Of Mind and the mind-body problem in particular. Plato makes it clear, in the ''Phaedo'', that the Forms are the ''universalia ante rem'', i.e. they are universal concepts (or ideas) which make all of the phenomenal world intelligible. Consequently, in order for the intellect (the most important aspect of the Mind in philosophy up until Descartes ) to have access to any kind of knowledge with regard to any aspect of the universe, it must necessarily be a non-physical, immaterial entity (or property of some such entity) itself. So, it is clear on the basis of the texts that Plato was a very powerful precursor of Descartes and his subsequent more stringent formulation of the doctrine of substance dualism. Aristotle strongly rejected Plato's notion of Forms as independently existing entities. In the '' Metaphysics '', he already points to the central problems with this idea. On the one hand, if we say that the particulars of the phenomenal world participate or share in the Form, we seem to be destroying the Form's essential and indispensable unity. However, if we say that the particulars merely resemble, or are copies of, the Form, we seem to need an extra form to explain the connection between the members of the class consisting of the-particulars-and-the-form, and so on, leading to an infinite regress. This argument, originally formulated by Plato himself in the Parmenides , was later given the name of the " Third Man Argument " by Aristotle. For these reasons, Aristotle revised the theory of forms so as to eliminate the idea of their independent existence from concrete, particular entities. Aristotle (c. mid 4th century BC) ''On the Soul (De anima)'', ed. R.D. Hicks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907; Books II-III trans. D.W. Hamlyn, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. The ''form'' of something, for Aristotle, is the ''nature'' or Essence (''ousia'', in Greek) of that thing. To say that Socrates and Callias are both men is not to say that there is some transcendent entity "man" to which both Socrates and Callias belong. The form is indeed substance but it is not substance over and above the substance of the concrete entities which it characterizes. Aristotle rejects both ''universalia in rebus'' as well as ''universalia ante rem''. Some philosophers and thinkers have taken this to be a form of Materialism and there may be something to their arguments. However, what is important from the perspective of philosophy of mind is that Aristotle does not believe that ''intellect'' can be conceived of as something material. He argues as follows: if the intellect were material then it could not receive all of the forms. If the intellect were a specific material organ (or part of one) then it would be restricted to receiving only certain kinds of information, as the eye is restricted to receiving visual data and the ear is restricted to receiving auditory data. Since the intellect is capable of receiving and reflecting on all forms of data, then it must not be a physical organ and, hence, it must be immaterial. From Neoplatonism to Scholasticism Early Christianity seems to have struggled to come to terms with the identification of a unique position with regard to the question of the relationship between mind and body, just as it struggled to define the relationship of the Ontological status of Christ himself (see Homoousian ism, Homoiousian ism, Arianism , etc). In the early Middle Ages, a consensus seemed to emerge around what is now called Neoplatonism . The doctrines of Neoplatonism were essentially minor modifications on Plato's general ideas about the immortality of the soul and the nature of the Forms. The Neoplatonic Christians identified the Forms with souls and believed that the soul was the substance of each individual human being, while the body was just a shadow or copy of these eternal phenomena.Whittaker (1901) ''The Neo-Platonists'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Later philosophers, following in the neo-Aristotelian trail blazed by Thomas Aquinas , came to develop a trinitarian notion of forms which paralleled the Trinitarian doctrine of Father, Son and Holy Spirit: forms, intellect and soul were three aspects or parts of the same singular phenomenon. For Aquinas, the soul (or intellect) remained the substance of the human being, but, somewhat similarly to Aristotle's proposal, it was only through its manifestation inside the human body that a person could be said to be a person. While the soul (intellect or form) could exist independently of the body the soul ''by itself'' did not constitute a person. Hence, Aquinas suggested that instead of saying "St. Peter pray for us" one should rather say something like "soul of St. Peter pray for us", since all that remained of St. Peter, after his death, was his soul. All things connected with the body, such as personal memories, were cancelled out with the end of one's corporeal existence.Aquinas, Thomas (1266-71) ''Summa Theologica''. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2d, rev. ed., 22 vols., London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1912-36; reprinted in 5 vols., Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981. |
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