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Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan ( September 27 , 1840 – December 1 , 1914 ) was a United States Navy officer, Geostrategist , and educator. His ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world, and helped prompt naval buildups before World War I . Several ships were named USS ''Mahan'' , including the lead vessel of a Class Of Destroyers . His research into naval History led to his most important work, '' The Influence Of Seapower Upon History,1660-1783 '', published in 1890. EARLY LIFE AND SERVICE Born at West Point, New York to Dennis Hart Mahan (a professor at the United States Military Academy ) and Mary Helena Mahan, he attended Columbia for two years where he was a member of the Philolexian Society debating club and then, against his parents' wishes, transferred to the Naval Academy , where he graduated second in his class in 1859 . Commissioned as a Lieutenant in 1861, Mahan served the Union in the American Civil War as an officer on ''Congress'' , ''Pocahontas'' , and ''James Adger'' , and as an instructor at the Naval Academy. In 1865 he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander , and then to Commander ( 1872 ), and Captain ( 1885 ). Despite his success in the Navy, his skills in actual command of a ship were not exemplary, and a number of vessels under his command were involved in collisions, with both moving and Stationary objects. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AND WRITINGS In 1885, he was appointed lecturer in naval history and tactics and the Naval War College. Before entering on his duties, College President Rear Admiral he met and befriended a young visiting lecturer named Theodore Roosevelt , who would later become President Of The United States . During this period Mahan organized his Naval War College lectures into his most influential books, '' The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 '', and ''The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812'', published 1890 and 1892 , respectively. Upon being published, Mahan struck up a friendship with pioneering British naval historian Sir John Knox Laughton , the pair maintaining this relationship through correspondence and visits when Mahan was in London. Mahan was later described as a 'disciple' of Laughton, although the two men were always at pains to distinguish between each other's line of work, Laughton seeing Mahan as a theorist while Mahan called Laughton 'the historian'.Knight, Roger (2000) The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession, Review of book by Professor Andrew Lambert in the Institute for Historical Research's Reviews in History series. (London: Institute for Historical Research) http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/knight.html - URL last accessed 3 April 2007 STRATEGIC VIEWS AND INFLUENCE Mahan believed that control of seaborne commerce was critical to domination in war. If one combatant could manage to Deny the use of the sea to the other, the others' economy would inevitably collapse, leading to victory. Ironically, however, a Mahanian fleet was not made up mostly of Commerce Raiders . This was because commerce raiders could not establish Command Of The Sea , while a fleet of Battleship s and other heavily armed warships could. The Mahanian objective was to build a fleet capable of destroying the enemy's main force in a single decisive battle. After this victory was won, it would be easy to enforce a Blockade against enemy merchants and hunt down their remaining lighter vessels, since with their heavy assets gone, the enemy would be incapable of rebuilding. For the weaker combatant, meanwhile, the goal was to delay such a climactic battle for as long as possible. While their fleet still posed any threat, the enemy could not risk splitting their forces to close off trade routes. This led to the strategy of a Fleet In Being , a naval force kept deliberately in port to threaten rather than act. Mahan's views were shaped by the contests between France and England in the 18th Century , where British naval superiority had eventually won out over France, consistently preventing a French invasion or a successful blockade (see Napoleonic War , especially Battle Of Trafalgar and Continental System ). To a Modern reader his emphasis on sea-borne commerce may seem commonplace, but the notion was much more radical in Mahan's time, especially in a nation entirely obsessed with landward Expansion To The West . After the Civil War, the United States Navy initially opposed replacing its Sailing Vessels with more advanced Steam-powered Engines for ideological reasons. Mahan's work encouraged a technological upgrade by convincing those opposed that naval knowledge and Tactics remained as necessary as ever, but that domination of the seas dictated that the speed and predictability of steam-powered engines could not be sacrificed. His books were received with great acclaim, and closely studied in Britain and Germany , influencing their buildup of forces in the years prior to World War I . Mahan's influence sowed the seeds for events such as the naval portion of the Spanish-American War and the battles of Tsushima , Jutland and The Atlantic . His work also influenced the doctrines of every major navy in the Interwar period. Mahan was translated and extensively read in Japan ,Mark Peattie & David Evans, Kaigun (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1997) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) used ''Influence'' as a textbook. This strongly affected IJN conduct in the Pacific War , with emphasis on "decisive battle", even at the expense of Trade Protection . Ironically, Mahan's premise that a reserve force being incapable to recover after initial overwhelming defeat was refuted by the US Navy's own recovery after Pearl Harbor . But the IJN pursuit of the "decisive battle" was carried out to such an extent that it contributed to Japan's Defeat in 1945.Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, ''The Pearl Harbor Papers'' (Brassey's, 1993)Marc Parillo, ''The Japanese Merchant Marine in WW2'' (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1993) LATER CAREER Between 1889 and 1892 Mahan was engaged in special service for the Bureau Of Navigation , and in 1893 he was appointed to command the powerful new Protected Cruiser ''Chicago'' on a visit to Europe , where he was received and feted. He returned to lecture at the War College and then, in 1896 , he retired from active service, returning briefly to duty in 1898 to consult on naval strategy for the Spanish-American War . Mahan continued to write voluminously and received honorary degrees from Harvard , Yale , Columbia , Dartmouth , and McGill . In 1902 Mahan invented the term " Middle East ", which he used in the article "The Persian Gulf and International Relations", published in September in the '' National Review ''.Adelson, Roger. ''London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902-1922.'' New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. ISBN 0-300-06094-7 p. 22-23 He became Rear Admiral in 1906 by an act of Congress promoting all retired captains who had served in the Civil War . The United States Naval Academy has Mahan Hall named in his honor. TRIVIA
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