| Thorp Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant |
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| CATEGORIES ABOUT THORP NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT | |
| radioactive waste | |
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| nuclear reprocessing | |
| nuclear accidents | |
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DESIGN FEATURES The chemical flowsheet for THORP is designed to add less involtile matter to the first cycle PUREX Raffinate , one way in which this is done is by avoiding the use of ferrous compounds as Plutonium reducing agents. In this plant the reduction is done using either Hydrazine or HAN ( Hydroxylamine Nitrate ). 2005 LEAK On May 9 , 2005 it was announced that THORP suffered a large leak of a highly radioactive solution, which first started in July 2004. British Nuclear Group's board of inquiry determined that a design error led to the leak, while a complacent culture at the plant delayed detection for nine months. Operations staff did not discover the leak until safeguards staff reported major fluid accountancy discrepencies. Altogether 83 Cubic Metre s (18250 Imperial Gallon s) of Nitric Acid solution leaked from a small fractured feedpipe, which was discovered when a remote camera was sent in to examine THORP's Feed Clarification Cell on April 19 2005 . All the fluids collected under gravity into the Secondary Containment , which is a swimming-pool sized Stainless Steel tub embedded in 2 Metre thick Reinforced Concrete , capable of holding 250 cubic metres of fluids. The solution from the spill was estimated to contain 20 Metric Ton s of Uranium and 160 Kilogram s of Plutonium . The leaked solution was safely recovered into primary containment using originally installed steam ejectors. Radiation levels in the building preclude entry of humans and robotic repair of the fractured pipe is expected to be difficult. Officials are considering bypassing the faulty tank to resume operations. The pipe fractured due to lateral motion of an accountancy tank, which measures volume by weight and moves horizontally and vertically in the process. The tank's original design had restraint blocks to prevent lateral motion, but these were later removed from the design for seismic uncoupling. However it appears this design change was not evaluated for fatigue, and it is inconceivable a proper review would have permitted this change. The incident was classified as Level 3 out of 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), a "serious incident", due to the amount of radioactive inventory that leaked from primary to secondary containment without discovery over a number of months {Link without Title} . This was initially considered by BNFL to be surprisingly high, but the specifications of the scale required it. No radiation leaked to the environment and no one was injured. Return to service will be dependent on appropriate modification proposals and any further regulatory requirements resulting from the ongoing investigations. As of March 2006 various restart and closure options were still being considered. {Link without Title} Much larger reprocessing accidents occurred in Mayak in 1957, and in Japan in 1999 at Tokai, Ibaraki . EXTERNAL LINKS
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