| Revolution In Military Affairs |
Article Index for Revolution |
Website Links For Revolution |
Information AboutRevolution In Military Affairs |
| CATEGORIES ABOUT REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS | |
| military strategy | |
| politics of the united states | |
|
INTERESTED NATIONS While the original theorizing about RMA was largely done within the American military and American Think Tanks like the Rand Corporation , other nations are exploring similar shifts in organization and technology. Interest in RMA and the structure of future US forces is strong within the Chinese People's Liberation Army and incorporated to current Chinese Strategic Thinking . Many other militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organizational concept, including Canada , United Kingdom , the Netherlands , Sweden , Australia , New Zealand , South Africa , Singapore , Taiwan , India , and Russia . However, the infrastructure and investment demands are very expensive for developing countries and nations unwilling to invest substantial sums in defense. ORIGINS Renewed interest was placed on RMA theory and practice after what many saw as a stunning, one-sided victory by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. US dominance through superior satellite, weapons-guiding, and communications technology emphasized the enormous relative power of US through technological advances, even against an Iraqi military that was by no means an insignificant rival. After the Kosovo War where the United States did not lose a single life, others suggested that war had become too sanitized, creating an almost Virtual War . Furthermore, US difficulties capturing Osama Bin Laden and problems in the US Occupation Of Iraq have caused some to question RMA's build-up as a military nirvana. US foes may increasingly resort to Asymmetrical Warfare to counter the advantages of RMA. AREAS OF FOCUS One of the central problems in understanding the current debate over RMA is due to many theorists' use of the term as referring to the revolutionary technology itself, which is the driving force of change. Concurrently, other theorists tend to use the term as referring to revolutionary adaptations by military organisations that may be necessary to deal with the changes in technology. Other theorist place RMA more closely inside the specific political and economic context of Globalization and the End Of The Cold War . When reviewing the gamut of theories, three fundamental versions of Revolution in Military Affairs come to the forefront. The first perspective focuses primarily upon changes in the nation-state and the role of an organised military in using force. This approach highlights the political, social, and economic factors worldwide, which might require a completely different type of military and organisational structure to apply force in the future. Author's such as RAND 's Sean J. A. Edwards (advocate of BattleSwarm tactics), Carl H. Builder and Lt. Col. Ralph Peters (Ret.) emphasize:
The second perspective—most commonly assigned the term RMA—highlights the evolution of Weapons Technology , Information Technology , Military Organisation , and Military Doctrine among advanced powers. This "System of Systems" perspective on RMA has been ardently supported by Admiral William Owens , former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who identifies three overlapping areas for force assets. These are:
Advanced versions of RMA incorporate other sophisticated technologies, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or ''UAVs'', Nanotechnology , Robotics , and Biotechnology . Recently, the RMA debate focussed on Network-centric Warfare which is a doctrine that aims to connect all troops on the battlefield. Finally, the third concept is that a "true" revolution in military affairs has not yet occurred or is unlikely to. Authors such as Michael O’Hanlon and Frederick Kagan , point to the fact much of the technology and weapons systems ascribed to the contemporary RMA were in development long before 1991 and the flashy Internet/information technology boom. Several critics point out that a "revolution" within the military ranks might carry detrimental consequences, produce severe economic strain, and ultimately prove counterproductive. Such authors tend to profess a much more gradual "evolution" in military affairs, as opposed a rapid revolution. FURTHER READING
EXTERNAL LINKS
|
|
|