| Norwegian 2. Division |
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First of all it has to be mentioned that the term division in the Norwegian Army in 1940 in general did not mean the same as a division in British terms (a tactical formation consisting of two or more manouvre (infantry or armour) brigades with command and staff units and supporting troops). The only Norwegian division living up to this in 1940 was the 6. Division at Narvik fielding two brigades (6. and 7. brigades). In the 1940 Norwegian Army the term Division signified a geographical area of military responsibility. The division was, in pre-war planning, supposed to field one brigade and one or more local defence battalions (landvernbataljoner). The 2. Divisions area of responsibility was the central parts of Southern Norway (Østlandsområdet). The Divisional commander was gnl. Hvinden-Haug. The division suffered great losses of materiel when the Germans captured several of the divisions depots and stores in the first 24 hours of the invasion, but in spite of this the division was able to mobilise the following formations: -4. Infantry rgt. (2 battalions) -5. Infantry rgt. (one line battalion, one local defence battalion) -6. Infantry rgt. (two line battalions, one local defence battalion) -2. Dragoons rgt. (5 squadrons - dismounted) -Engineers rgt. (three pioneer companies, two signals companies) -One improvised artillery regiment (named Hegstad after the CO) -Two improvised infantry battalions (Thorkildsen and Larsen) The division was later reinforced by 11. Infantry rgt.'s two line battalions in Gudbrandsdalen, but at that time most of the original units had been worn out and not more existing as fighting formations. Due to the critical situation in Østlandet the brigade of the 4. Division was transferred to Valdres (2. Division area of responsibility) and was soon heavily engaged against the Germans in Bagn and at Tonsåsen. All in all this represented a not insignificant number of men to confront the German advance. However, the majority of the troops were poorly equipped even before the losses of critical equipment on the 9. April. The Norwegian Army of 1940 was basically equipped to WW 1 standard. There were no tanks, no modern artillery, no anti-tank weapons and no effective anti-aircraft guns. With the exception of a number of the splendid Colt heavy machine guns, there were no effective automatic weapons available to the soldiers which had to rely on the 1894 vintage Krag Jørgensen Rifle. In addition to this the average soldier was poorly trained, some had only received 48 days of basic training, although there also were soldiers with longer service (guardsmen, soldiers who had been mobilised at the outbreak of the war between Germany and England and some who had served as volunteers in the Finnish Winter war). Adding to this already formidable problems came the fact that the geographical area the division had to cover was to large to make a proper consentration possible, and consequently the campaign tended to be a number of battalion sized actions fought over a large area. In the middle of April the Germans started to advance out of Oslo to break the so-called (somewhat overambisously named) "iron ring" around the capital. Norwegian troops fought the Germans to a standstill in Nittedalen and at Strandlykkja by he lake Mjøsa blocking two out of three main routes out of Oslo going northwards. However this proved futile as German tanks and Stukas, against which there were no effective defence, routed the Norwegians at the third exit at Klekken near the city of Hønefoss. The Norwegians were pushed back northwards desperately trying to slow the German advance waiting for allied reinforcements. The first British units arrived at Lillehammer around 21. April, but this proved to late, for at the same day the Germans decisively defeated the Norwegians at the battles of Lundehøgda and Bråstad and achieved a breakthrough to the Gudbrandsdalen, the heartland of Østlandet. For the rest of the campaign in Gudbrandsdalen the brunt of the fighting had to be borne by British units, even though Norwegian units continued to contribute for the rest of the campaign, notable examples are the 2.Dragoons winnning the battle honour "Furnes-Ringsaker" for the rear guard action fought to cover the retreat of British and Norwegian formations from Lillehammer and the defeat inflicted on German Fallschirmjäger by the battalions of 11. Infantry rgt. when they were dropped to severe the communication links in Gudbrandsdalen. Gnl. Hvinden-Haug surrendered the remains of his division at Åndalsnes on the 2. mai 1940. |
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