| Message Authentication Code |
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While MAC functions are similar to Cryptographic Hash Function s, they possess different security requirements. To be considered secure, a MAC function must resist Existential Forgery under Chosen-plaintext Attack s. This implies that an attacker be unable to find any two messages M and M' which both produce the same MAC under some unknown secret key, even when the attacker has access to an "oracle" which possesses the secret key and generates MACs for messages of the attacker's choosing. Note that this differs from the property of Collision Resistance required by a Cryptographic Hash Function : a MAC may be considered secure even if the key-holder can efficiently find collisions. MACs differ from Digital Signature s, as MAC values are both generated and verified using the same secret key. This implies that the sender and receiver of a message must agree on keys before initiating communications, as is the case with Symmetric Encryption . For the same reason, MACs do not provide the property of Non-repudiation offered by signatures: any user who can verify a MAC is also capable of generating MACs for other messages. MAC algorithms can be constructed from other cryptographic primitives, such as Cryptographic Hash Function s (as in the case of HMAC ) or from Block Cipher algorithms ( OMAC , CBC-MAC and PMAC ). SEE ALSO
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