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2002
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May 20
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2002
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Alabama v LeReed Shelton
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00-1214
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535 US 654, 122 SCt 1764, 152 LEd2d 888, 02 Cal Daily Op Serv 4307, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 5472, 15 Fla L Weekly Fed S 281
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Defendant convicted, Alabama Circuit Court affirmed, 851 So 2d 83 (Ala Crim App 1998) sentence reversed, 851 So 2d 96 (Ala 2000) certiorari granted, 532 US 1018 (2001)
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535 U.S. 654 , decided by the
Supreme Court on May 20, 2002, upheld the
Alabama State Supreme Court 's ruling that counsel (a
Lawyer ) must be provided for the accused in any criminal prosecution that could result in
Imprisonment for a brief period of time.
Shelton was accused of
Third-degree Assault , which, in Alabama, carries a maximum sentence of one year in prison and a $2,000 fine. The court repeatedly warned Shelton of the dangers of representing himself during the trial, yet failed to offer him counsel. He represented himself both in the local court, where he was convicted, and the Alabama
Circuit Court , where he was also convicted. However, the Circuit Court suspended his prison sentence for 2 years.
The Criminal
Court Of Appeals found that it was not compulsory to offer the defendant counsel for a suspended sentence because the sentence did not result in actual confinement.
The Supreme Court of Alabama stated that: (1) a defendant may not be sentenced to a term of imprisonment absent provision of counsel; and (2) for purposes of this rule, a suspended sentence constitutes a "term of imprisonment," even though incarceration is not immediate or inevitable.
The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Alabama's decision.
"A suspended sentence that may end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the prosecution for the crime charged."
"It is not true that only those criminal proceedings result-ing in immediate actual imprisonment trigger an indigent defendant's right to state-appointed counsel under the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, for (1) no per-son may be imprisoned for any offense unless the person was represented by counsel at trial; and (2) the Sixth Amendment inquiry trains on the stage of the proceed-ings where the defendant's guilt is adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment established, and prison sentence de-termined."
"...does the Sixth Amendment permit activation of a suspended sentence upon the defendant's violation of the terms of probation? We conclude that it does not. A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction."