True

Common dictionary definitions of truth mention some form of accord with '' Fact '' or '' Reality ''. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree. Numerous theories of truth have been proposed and continue to be widely debated. Standing beside the issue of definition are many other issues about which scholars have various views. What sorts of things can properly be called true or false? What tests can establish a claim as being true? How do we ''know'' something to be true? Which truths, if any, are subjective, relative, objective, or absolute?

OVERVIEW

The subjects of meaning and truth are commonly treated together, the common notion being that only meaningful things can be true or false. This association is found in ancient times, and has become standard in modern times under the heading of '' Semantics '', especially '' Formal Semantics ''. Another association of longstanding interest is the relation between truth and '' Logical Validity '', "because the fundamental notion of logic is validity and this is definable in terms of truth and falsehood" (Kneale & Kneale, 16). Though not the main subjects of this article, meaning and validity are truth's neighbors, and incidental inquiries of them can serve to cast light on truth's character.

In an ancient fragment of text called the ''Dissoi Logoi'', the writer is evidently trying to prove the impossibility of speaking consistently about truth and falsehood. One of the conundrums put forward to confound the reader cites the case of the verbal form, "I am an initiate", which is true when ''A'' says it but false when ''B'' says it. Escape from befuddlement seems easy enough if one observes that it is not the verbal expression, the sentence, to which the predicates of truth and falsity apply but what the sentence expresses, the proposition that it states. (Cf. Kneale & Kneale, 16). This same tension between strings of characters and their meanings remains with us to this day.

PHILOSOPHY OF TRUTH

Predicates of truth

Philosophical discussions of truth can be classified according to what they take as their subject matter and what they allow as legitimate to say about their subject matter. The two kinds of terms involved in this are the ''subjects'' and the ''predicates'' of the discussion, respectively.
# ''Subject terms''. Most discussions of truth have a general term for a type of entity that is meaningful enough to be judged true or false. In some branches of philosophy and fields of science these may be almost any kind of informative or significant element — the generic terms ''sign'' or ''representation'' will do for these — but recent trends in linguistic-analytic philosophy tend to focus on ''sentences'' and their corresponding abstract contents, called ''propositions''. A proposition is the content expressed by a sentence, held in a belief, or affirmed in an assertion or judgment.
# ''Predicate terms''. Most discussions of truth allow for a number of phrases that are used to say in what ways signs or sentences or their abstract senses are regarded as true, either by themselves or in relation to other things. Theorists who admit the term call these phrases '' Truth Predicate s''. A truth predicate that is used to ascribe truth to something, in and of itself, in effect treating truth as an Intrinsic Property of the thing, is called a ''one-place'' or ''monadic'' truth predicate. Other forms of truth predicates may be used to say that something is true in relation to specified numbers and types of other things. These are called ''many-place'' or ''polyadic'' truth predicates.

In ordinary parlance, the things that one says about a subject are expressed in predicates. If one says that a sentence is true, then one is predicating truth of that sentence. Is this the same thing as asserting the sentence? This question serves as useful touchstone for sorting out various accounts of truth.

Bearers of truth

'' Truthbearer '' is used by a number of writers to refer to any entity that can be judged true or false. The term ''truthbearer'' may be applied to Proposition s, Sentence s, Statement s, Idea s, Belief s, and Judgment s. Some writers exclude one or more of these categories, or argue that some of them are true (or false) only in a derivative sense.''See, e.g.,'' http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#2 Other writers may add additional entities to the list. ''Truthbearer'', in the context of modern philosophical discussion, is not applied to a person or group of persons; instead, the term is applied to entities that are specific enough that they can reasonably be subjected to analysis of whether or not they are true.

Truthbearers typically have two possible values, true or false. Fictional forms of expression are usually regarded as false if interpreted literally, but may be said to bear a species of truth if interpreted suitably. Still other truthbearers may be judged true or false to a greater or lesser degree.

Propositional attitudes

What a proposition is, is one thing. How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another. We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so. Different attitudes toward propositions are called '' Propositional Attitude s'', and they are also discussed under the headings of '' Intentionality '' and '' Linguistic Modality ''.

Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in many different modalities are in the air at once. In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves. Thus we are brought back to matters of language and logic. Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interaction.

One topic of central concern is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, perhaps with intention thrown in for good measure. For example, we frequently find ourselves faced with the question of whether a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs. Discrepancies here can occur for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is intentional, we usually call that a '' Lie ''.

Other comparisons of multiple modalities that frequently arise are the relationships between belief and knowledge and the discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as '' Surprise s'', phenomena that call for '' Explanation s'' to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as '' Problem s'', situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to '' Inquiry '' (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995).

Some theorists consider assertions and propositions to be the raw material of their analyses, while others suppose beliefs and thoughts to be the focus of their examination. In either case, the ensuing analyses of concrete situations can be quite complex, and philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. In day to day life, both assertions and beliefs commonly come into play in our attempts to discern truth from falsehood. One often hears things like: "How could she possibly ''believe'' what she just said?" or "He obviously believes it, but he's wrong", and so on. Both assertions and beliefs must be compared with concepts of what the ''facts'' are, or what is ''known'' to be the case. What makes a statement a "factual" statement, what exactly are the "facts," and how we might be able to discern truth from falsehood, truth from partial truth, mistaken belief from warranted assertion, are not at all simple questions.

INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR THEORIES OF TRUTH

Questions about what is a proper basis upon which to decide whether, and to what extent, belief is in accordance with fact, and to what extent statements and the ideas they convey are in accord with real things, whether for a single person or an entire community or society, are among the many important questions dealt with by the theories introduced in this section.

Traditional theories of truth share the claim that truth is a property that certain types of things may have, perhaps in relation to other things, and so the assertion that something is true makes a substantive, significant claim about it (Blackburn & Simmons, 1999). There have more recently arisen so-called '' Deflationary '' or ''minimalist'' theories of truth that are based on the idea that the application of a term like ''true'' to a statement does not assert anything significant about it, for instance, anything about its ''nature'', but that the label ''truth'' is a tool of discourse used to express agreement, to emphasize claims, or to form certain types of generalizations (Horwich, 1988; Field, 2001). As always with classification schemes, a caution against cut-and-dried categories needs to be observed. There are perspectives on truth that combine selected elements from one or more of the identified types. For example, Susan Haack (1993) proposes a theory of ''foundherentism'' that seeks a middle ground between the perspectives on knowledge known as '' Foundationalism '' and '' Coherentism '', closely related to the correspondence and coherence theories of truth, respectively.

Traditional theories of truth

Traditional theories of truth treat truth as a meaningful concept, taking it to refer to significant properties of meaning-bearing entities, to Relation s that connect them to each other, and to relations that involve them with other things in the world. According to these theories, ascribing truth to meaning-bearing elements says something significant about them. Such theories analyze truth as a descriptive property with a nature that can be discovered through philosophical investigation and reflection. The task for such theories is to explain the alleged nature of truth.

Coherence theory

See Also: Coherentism

There is no single Coherence Theory Of Truth , but rather an assortment of distinct perspectives that are commonly collected under this title. A pervasive tenet is the idea that truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions and can be ascribed to individual propositions only derivatively according to their coherence with the whole. Where theorists differ is mainly on the question of whether coherence entails many possible true systems of thought or only a single absolute system. In general, then, truth requires a proper fit of elements within the whole system. Very often, though, coherence is taken to imply something more than simple logical consistency. For example, the completeneass and comprehensiveness of the underlying set of concepts is considered to be critical factor in judging its utility and validity.

According to one view, the coherence theory of truth is the "theory of knowledge which maintains that truth is a property primarily applicable to any extensive body of consistent propositions, and derivatively applicable to any one proposition in such a system by virtue of its part in the system" (Benjamin 1962). Ideas like this are a part of the philosophical perspective known as '' Theoretical Holism '' (Quine & Ullian 1978). However, coherence theories of truth do not claim merely that coherence and consistency are important features of a theoretical system — they claim that these properties are ''sufficient'' to its truth.

According to another version of coherence theory, championed especially by H.H. Joachim , truth is a ''systematic coherence'' that involves more than logical consistency. In this view, a proposition is true to the extent that it is a necessary constituent of a systematically coherent whole. Others of this school of thought, for example, Brand Blanshard , hold that this whole must be so interdependent that every element in it necessitates, and even entails, every other element. Exponents of this view infer that the most complete truth is a property solely of a unique coherent system, called the ''absolute'', and that humanly knowable propositions and systems have a degree of truth that is proportionate to how fully they approximate this ideal. (Baylis 1962).

Some versions of coherence theory have been claimed to characterize the essential and intrinsic properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth:Alan R. White, p130-131 (Macmillan, 1969) A claim like this needs to be qualified by the observation that formal reasoners are perfectly content to contemplate axiomatically independent but contradictory systems side by side, for a paradigmatic example, the various alternative geometries. On the whole, coherence theories have been criticized as lacking justification in their application to other areas of truth, especially with respect to assertions about the Natural World , Empirical data in general, assertions about practical matters of psychology and society, especially when used without support from the other major theories of truth.Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth:Alan R. White, p131-133, ''see'' esp., section on "Epistemological assumptions" (Macmillan, 1969)

Coherence theories distinguish the thought of , notably Otto Neurath and Carl Hempel .

Correspondence theory

See Also: Correspondence theory of truth

Correspondence theories claim that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs.Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth:Arthur N. Prior, p223 Macmillan, 1969) This type of theory, in essence, attempts to posit a relationship (a "truth relation") between thoughts or statements on the one hand, and things or objects on the other, as it might theoretically exist independently of the persons involved in the exchange and independently of other issues. It is a traditional model which goes back at least to some of the classical Greek philosophers.Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth:Arthur N. Prior, p223-224 Macmillan, 1969) This class of theory holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined in prinicple solely by how it relates to objective reality, by whether it accurately describes (that is, corresponds with) that reality.

Correspondence theory has traditionally operated on the assumption that there ''is'' an objective truth relation with which it is the human task to become properly aligned. In practice, however, more recent theorists have articulated that this ideal cannot be achieved independently of some analysis of additional factors. For example, analyses of correspondence that are cast within particular languages are forced to admit the particular language in question as an additional parameter at the outset of theoretical work, and only gradually construct a language-independent Truth Predicate by means of a careful theory of translation among different languages. There are strong theoretical limitations on the extent to which this can be done. Commentators and proponents of several of the theories introduced below also have widely asserted that the correspondence theory neglects the role of the persons involved in the "truth relation."

Constructivist theory

See Also: Constructivist epistemology

Social Constructivism holds that truth is constructed by social processes, is historically and culturally specific, and that it is in part shaped through the power struggles within a community. Constructivism views all of our knowledge as "constructed," because it does not reflect any external "transcendent" realities (as a pure correspondence theory might hold). Rather, perceptions of truth are viewed as contingent on convention, human perception, and social experience. It is believed by constructivists that representations of physical and biological reality, including Race , Sexuality , and Gender are socially constructed ( Hegel , Garns, and Marx were among the first to suggest such an ambitious expansion of Social Determinism ).

Consensus theory

See Also: Consensus theory of truth

The Consensus Theory holds that truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. The label "consensus theory" of is variously attached to a number of otherwise very diverse philosophical perspectives. Some variants of "pragmatic theory of truth" have been included as consensus theory, though the range of "pragmatic theories" is sufficiently broad that it merits its own classification. Among the current advocates of consensus theory as a useful accounting of the concept of "truth" is Jürgen Habermas . Among its current strong critics is the philosopher Nicholas Rescher .

Pragmatic theory

See Also: Pragmatic theory of truth

Three influential versions of the pragmatic theory of truth are due to Charles Peirce , William James , and John Dewey .

Peirce defines truth as follows: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth" (1901, CP 5.565). This statement emphasizes Peirce's view that ideas of approximation, incompleteness, and partiality, what he describes elsewhere as '' Fallibilism '' and "reference to the future", are essential to a proper conception of truth. Although Peirce uses words like ''concordance'' and ''correspondence'' to describe one aspect of the pragmatic Sign Relation , he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than ''nominal'' definitions, which he accords a lower status than ''real'' definitions.

Peirce's theory of truth depends on his theories of '' Signs '' and '' Inquiry ''. Inquiry is a process that transforms signs in regard to an object, for example, any form of Belief Revision or Logical Inference , and it includes '' Scientific Method '', "the right method of transforming signs". A transaction that turns signs into signs in respect of an object is a three-place relation, known in logic as a '' Triadic Relation ''. In sum, pragmatism involves a triadic theory of truth.

, less broadly than James but more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time ''if'' openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and/or refute proposed truths. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Dewey, John", auth Richard J. Bernstein, p383 (Macmillan, 1969)

Deflationary (minimalist) theories

See Also: Deflationary theory of truth

Other philosophers reject the idea that truth is a robust concept in the sense discussed in the previous section. From this point of view, to say "''2 + 2 = 4'' is true" is to say no more than to say "2 + 2 = 4", and that there is no more to say about truth than this. These positions are broadly called "deflationary" theories of truth (because the concept has been "deflated" of importance) or "disquotational" theories (to draw attention to the mere "disappearance" of the quotation marks in cases like the above example), or alternately, "minimalist" views.Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'' in the Introductory section of the book.Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth:Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996) Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that " {Link without Title} he predicate 'true' is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep analysis."

In addition to highlighting this formal feature of the predicate "is true", some deflationists point out that the concept enables us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely long sentences. For example, one cannot express confidence in Michael's accuracy by asserting the endless sentence:

Michael says, 'snow is white' and snow is white, or he says 'roses are red' and roses are red or he says ... etc.

But it can be expressed succinctly by saying:

Whatever Michael says is true

Once we have identified the truth predicate's formal features and utility, deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. The primary theoretical concern of these views is to explain away those special cases where it appears that the concept of truth does have peculiar and interesting properties. (See Semantic Paradox es, and below.)

Performative theory of truth

Attributed to P. F. Strawson is the performative theory of truth which holds that to say ''"Snow is white" is true'' is to perform the Speech Act of signalling one's agreement with the claim that snow is white (much like nodding one's head in agreement). The idea that some statements are more actions than communicative statements is not as odd as it may seem. Consider, for example, that when the bride says "I do" at the appropriate time in a wedding, she is performing the act of taking this man to be her lawful wedded husband. She is not ''describing'' herself as taking this man. In a similar way, Strawson holds that "to say a statement is true is not to make a statement about a statement, but rather to perform the act of agreeing with, accepting, or endorsing a statement. When one says 'It's true that it's raining,' one asserts no more than 'It's raining.' The function of statement 'It's true that...' is to agree with, accept, or endorse the statement that it's raining." Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.6: ''Performative Theory of Truth'', auth:Gertrude Ezorsky, p88 (Macmillan, 1969)

Redundancy and related theories

According to the Redundancy Theory Of Truth , asserting that a statement is true is completely equivalent to asserting the statement itself. For example, asserting the sentence " 'Snow is white' is true" is equivalent to asserting the sentence "Snow is white". Redundant theorists infer from this premiss that truth is a redundant concept, that is, a mere word that is conventional to use in certain contexts of discourse but not a word that points to anything in reality. The theory is commonly attributed to Frank P. Ramsey . Ramsey held that to think of truth as any sort of property is mere "linguistic muddle".

Cases of controversy are perhaps best clarified by choosing core arguments from primary sources and following the steps of their reasoning as closely as possible. In that spirit, the quotations that follow are taken in order from Ramsey's paper "Facts and Propositions" (1927), as reprinted in (Ramsey 1990, 34–51).

But before we proceed further with the analysis of judgment, it is necessary to say something about truth and falsehood, in order to show that there is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle. (p. 38).

Starting in a context of discussion that is concerned with analyzing judgment, in effect, the matter of asserting or denying propositions, Ramsey turns to the question of truth and falsehood, and suggests that these words add nothing of substance to the analysis of judgment already in progress.

Truth and falsity are ascribed primarily to propositions. The proposition to which they are ascribed may be either explicitly given or described.

Suppose first that it is explicitly given; then it is evident that 'It is true that Caesar was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered.

In the course of his argument, Ramsey observes that there are many different ways of asserting what is really the same proposition, at least, so far as the abstract logical meanings of sentences are concerned. In his first examples, he uses the verbal forms (1) 'It is true that ___' and (2) 'It is false that ___', for the sake of concreteness filling in the blanks with the sentential clause 'Caesar was murdered'. He says that assertions mediated by these forms are not distinct in meaning from the corresponding direct assertions.

They are phrases which we sometimes use for emphasis or for stylistic reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by the statement in our argument.

So also we can say 'It is a fact that he was murdered' or 'That he was murdered is contrary to fact'.

In the same context and by the same token, Ramsey cites the verbal forms (3) 'It is a fact that ___' and (4) '___ is contrary to fact' as further examples of dispensible, otiose, redundant, or purely stylistic verbiage.

In the second case in which the proposition is described and not given explicitly we have perhaps more of a problem, for we get statements from which we cannot in ordinary language eliminate the words 'true' and 'false'.

The strategy of Ramsey's argument is to demonstrate that certain figures of speech — those in which truth and falsehood seem to figure as real properties of propositions, or as logical values that constitute real objects, however abstract, of discussion and thought — can always be eliminated in favor of paraphrases that do not Reify ''truth'' and ''falsehood'' as nouns, nor even use ''true'' and ''false'' as adjectives. The plausibility of this tactic going through is fairly evident in the case of verbal forms that introduce direct or indirect quotations. But the feasibility of the conversion is less clear in the case of propositions whose contents are not given in full, but only by indirect or partial description.

Thus if I say 'He is always right', I mean that the propositions he asserts are always true, and there does not seem to be any way of expressing this without using the word 'true'.

But suppose we put it thus 'For all ''p'', if he asserts ''p'', ''p'' is true', then we see that the propositional function ''p'' is true is simply the same as ''p'', as e.g. its value 'Caesar was murdered is true' is the same as 'Caesar was murdered'.

The type of ''propositional function'' that Ramsey is referring to here is a Function that takes a proposition as input and gives a proposition as output. In this case, the propositional function of interest is one that takes any proposition ''p'' and returns a proposition of the form '''p'' is true'.

We have in English to add 'is true' to give the sentence a verb, forgetting that ' ''p'' ' already contains a (variable) verb.

This may perhaps be made clearer by supposing for a moment that only one form of proposition is in question, say the relational form ''aRb''; then 'He is always right' could be expressed by 'For all ''a'', ''R'', ''b'', if he asserts ''aRb'', then ''aRb'' ', to which 'is true' would be an obviously superfluous addition.

When all forms of proposition are included the analysis is more complicated but not essentially different; and it is clear that the problem is not as to the nature of truth and falsehood, but as to the nature of judgment or assertion, for what is difficult to analyse in the above formulation is 'He asserts ''aRb'' '.

It is, perhaps, also immediately obvious that if we have analysed judgment we have solved the problem of truth; for taking the mental factor in a judgment (which is often itself called a judgment), the truth or falsity of this depends only on what proposition it is that is judged, and what we have to explain is the meaning of saying that the judgment is a judgment that ''a'' has ''R'' to ''b'', i.e. is true if ''aRb'', false if not. We can, if we like, say that it is true if there exists a corresponding fact that ''a'' has ''R'' to ''b'', but this is essentially not an analysis but a periphrasis, for 'The fact that ''a'' has ''R'' to ''b'' exists' is no different from ' ''a'' has ''R'' to ''b'' '.

A variant of redundancy theory is the disquotational theory which uses a modified form of , first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and Nuel Belnap as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims. They argue that sentences like "That's true", when said in response to "It's raining", are Prosentence s (see Pro-form ), expressions that merely repeat the content of other expressions. In the same way that ''it'' means the same as ''my dog'' in the sentence ''My dog was hungry, so I fed it'', ''That's true'' is supposed to mean the same as ''It's raining'' — if you say the latter and I then say the former. These variations do not necessarily follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is ''not'' a property, but rather can be understood to say that, for instance, the assertion "P" may well involve a substantial truth, and the theorists in this case are minimalizing only the redundancy or prosentence involved in the statement such as "that's true."

Proponents of pragmatic, constructivist and consensus theories would differ with all of these conclusions, however, and instead assert that the second person making the statement "that's true" is actually participating in further verifying, constructing and/or achieving consensus on the proposed truth of the matter — e.g., the proposition that "it's raining".

Deflationary principles do not apply to representations that are not analogous to sentences and they do not apply to many other things that are commonly judged to be true or otherwise. Consider the analogy between the sentence "Snow is white" and the person Snow White, both of which can be true in a sense. To say "Snow is white" is true is to say "Snow is white", but to say Snow White is true is not to say Snow White.

TYPES OF TRUTH

Subjective versus objective

Metaphysical Subjectivism holds that the truth or falsity of all propositions depends, at least partly, on what we believe. In contrast, Metaphysical Objectivism holds that truths are independent of our subjective beliefs. Except for propositions that are actually about our beliefs or sensations, what is true or false is independent of what we think is true or false.

Relative versus absolute

The concept of absolute truth, as understood in philosophy, should not be confused with the concept of absolute truth as it is used in religious traditions, as discussed in the section below on Truth In Religion .

Relative truths are statements or propositions that are true only relative to some standard or convention or point-of-view, such as that of one's own culture. Many would agree that the truth or falsity of ''some'' statements are relative: That the Fork is to the left of the Spoon depends on where one stands. Relativism is the doctrine that ''all'' truths within a particular domain (say, morality or aesthetics) are of this form, and entails that what is true varies across cultures and eras. For example, Moral Relativism is the view that moral expectations are socially determined.

Relative truths can be contrasted with absolute truths. The latter are statements or propositions that are taken to be true for all cultures and all eras. For example, for the microeconomist, that the laws of Supply And Demand determine the value of any consumable in a market economy is true in all situations; for the Kantian, "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" forms an absolute moral truth. They are statements that are often claimed to emanate from the very nature of the universe, God, human nature, or some other ultimate essence or transcendental signifier.

Absolutism in a particular domain of thought is the view that all statements in that domain are either absolutely true or absolutely false: none is true for some cultures or eras while false for other cultures or eras.

FORMAL DEFINITIONS OF TRUTH

There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it. This does not mean that there is general agreement as to the precise nature of the distinction. Although there are many ways of talking about the distinction, words alone do not guarantee clarity, and they often lead to the problem of having to decide which descriptions say the same thing and which say something different.

For example, formal logic provides symbolic operators for indicating the assertion of a sentence, or the assertion of the proposition that comes from interpreting the sentence relative to a particular context of discussion. Another way of saying something about a sentence or the corresponding proposition is by means of various semantic predicates, including truth predicates as a special case. This raises the question of how these operators and predicates are related to one another. As noted before, one of the first questions of this sort is whether asserting a proposition amounts to the same thing as predicating truth of that proposition.

Semantic relations

A ''denotation relation'', or a ''name relation'', is a Relation between symbols (formulas, words, phrases) and the things that they are interpreted as denoting or naming in a particular context of discussion (Church, 1962a). The things denoted, which may be quite literally anything that can be talked about or thought about, are called the ''objects'' of denotation.

Different theories of meaning vary in their use of denotation relations and the properties that they require of them. The following are two criteria that serve to distinguish particular theories of denotation:
# How many things can a symbol denote? For instance, can a symbol denote more than one thing, or must a symbol always denote at most one thing?
# Is denoting the same sort of relation as ''being true of'', and thus a state of affairs that can be described by a particular type of truth predicate, or is denoting a very different sort of relation than that?

Propositional attitudes

What sort of name shall we give to verbs like 'believe' and 'wish' and so forth? I should be inclined to call them 'propositional verbs'. This is merely a suggested name for convenience, because they are verbs which have the ''form'' of relating an object to a proposition. As I have been explaining, that is not what they really do, but it is convenient to call them propositional verbs. Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that because it is a psychological term, and although all the instances in our experience are psychological, there is no reason to suppose that all the verbs I am talking of are psychological. There is never any reason to suppose that sort of thing. (Russell 1918, 227).

In linguistics and logic, the formal properties of verbs like ''assert'', ''believe'', ''command'', ''consider'', ''deny'', ''doubt'', ''hunt'', ''imagine'', ''judge'', ''know'', ''want'', ''wish'', and a host of others, are treated under the headings of '' Intentionality '', '' Modality '', and '' Propositional Attitude ''.

Semantic theory of truth

The Semantic Theory Of Truth has as its general case for a given language:
:'P' is true if and only if P
where 'P' is a reference to the sentence (the sentence's name), and P is just the sentence itself.

Logician and philosopher . As a result Tarski held that the semantic theory could not be applied to any natural language, such as English, because they contain their own truth predicates. Tarski thought of his theory as a species of correspondence theory. Donald Davidson used it as the foundation of his Truth-conditional Semantics and linked it to Radical Interpretation in a form of Coherentism .

Bertrand Russell is credited with noticing the existence of such paradoxes even in the best symbolic formalizations of mathematics in his day, in particular the paradox that came to be named after him, Russell's Paradox . Russell and Whitehead attempted to solve these problems in '' Principia Mathematica '' by putting statements into a hierarchy of Types , wherein a statement cannot refer to itself, but only to statements lower in the hierarchy. This in turn led to new orders of difficulty regarding the precise natures of types and the structures of conceptually possible Type System s that have yet to be resolved to this day.

Kripke's theory of truth

Saul Kripke contends that a natural language can in fact contain its own truth predicate without giving rise to contradiction. He showed how to construct one as follows:

Begin with a subset of sentences of a natural language that contains no occurrences of the expression "is true" (or "is false"). So ''The barn is big'' is included in the subset, but not ' ''The barn is big'' is true', nor problematic sentences such as ''"This sentence is false"''.

Define truth just for the sentences in that subset.

Then extend the definition of truth to include sentences that predicate truth or falsity of one of the original subset of sentences. So ' ''The barn is big'' is true' is now included, but not either ''This sentence is false'' nor "' ''The barn is big'' is true' is true".

Next, define truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for ''The barn is big''; then for ' ''The barn is big'' is true'; then for "' ''The barn is big'' is true' is true", and so on.

Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like ''This sentence is false'', since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the Principle Of Bivalence : every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.

TRUTH IN MATHEMATICS

In formal, abstract mathematics "truth", also represented as "T" or "1", is an undefined constant. "False" is also an undefined constant, which can be represented as "F" or "0". In Propositional Logic , these symbols can be manipulated according to a set of axioms, often given in the form of Truth Table s.

TRUTH IN RELIGION

Most religious traditions hold a body of truths that are part of the particular tradition. Such truths may be considered to be spiritually revealed, or may be developed through tradition, or may be a combination of both. Whatever these truths are for the particular religious tradition, they can be called part of the ''doctrine'' of that tradition.

Christian traditions

Some Christian traditions hold a doctrine called Biblical Inerrancy , which asserts that the Bible is without error, that is, it can be said to be true as to all issues contained within, whether Old Testament or New. Various interpretations have been applied, depending on the tradition. According to some interpretations of the doctrine, ''all'' of the Bible is without error, i.e., is to be taken as true, no matter what the issue. Other interpretations hold that the Bible is always true on important matters of faith, while yet other interpretations hold that the Bible is true but must be specifically interpreted in the context of the language, culture and time that relevant passages were written.

Double truth

In thirteenth century Europe, the Roman Catholic Church denounced what it described as theories of "double truth," i.e. theories to the effect that although a truth may be established by reason, its contrary ought to be believed as true as a matter of faith. The condemnation was aimed specifically at a "Latin Averroist," (see Averroës ), Siger Of Brabant , but it was more broadly an attempt to halt the spread of Aristotle 's ideas, which the reconquest of Spain and, accordingly, access to the libraries of the Moors had re-introduced into the Latin literate world. At the time, much of the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church was based upon Neoplatonic ideas, and Aristoteleanism struck many as Heresy . Siger and others seem to have conceded this, and to have used the sharp reason/faith distinction that came to be known as "double truth" as a way of legitimizing discussion of Aristotle despite that concession.

Buddhism

The Two Truths Doctrine of Buddhism distinguishes between statements which reflect ultimate reality and relatively true statements. The Jain Doctrine of '' Anekantavada '' ( Sanskrit for "non-onesidedness") dictates that statements be considered from many points of view. The contemporary writer Ken Wilber has used these ideas to develop a Four-fold Conception Of Truth .

TRUTH IN LAW

True testimony

Witness es who Swear under Oath to Testify truthfully in Court s of Law , are not expected to make infallibly true statements, but to make a Good Faith attempt to recount an observed Event from their Memory or provide Expert Testimony . That what one witness says may differ from true accounts of other witnesses is a commonplace occurrence in the practice of law. Triers-of-fact are then charged with the responsibility to determine the Credibility or Veracity of a witness's testimony.

TRUTH IN POLITICS

Dialectical materialism

Karl Marx argues that the sole factor which determines the truth of something is its practical efficacy. In his own words:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. ("Theses on Feuerbach", 2)

TRUTHFULNESS

Truthfulness refers to when one says what he thinks is the Truth in good faith. Even though a habitual Liar may say the truth for Deception purposes, he would not be characterized as truthful. However, someone who is truthful may unwillfully say something false, thinking it is true.

Buddha : “Herein someone avoids false speech and abstains from it. He speaks the truth, is devoted to truth, reliable, worthy of confidence, not a deceiver of people. Being at a meeting, or amongst people, or in the midst of his relatives, or in a society, or in the king's court, and called upon and asked as witness to tell what he knows, he answers, if he knows nothing: "I know nothing," and if he knows, he answers: "I know"; if he has seen nothing, he answers: "I have seen nothing," and if he has seen, he answers: "I have seen." Thus he never knowingly speaks a lie, either for the sake of his own advantage, or for the sake of another person's advantage, or for the sake of any advantage whatsoever.” Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood

OTHER USES OF "TRUTH"

In addition to its use in reference to propositions, there are other uses of "truth" and "true" in the English Language :
# most often applied to people, and is used as a commendation, Synonym ous with " Loyal ", as in ''she is true to her friends''. This sense of truth should be contrasted with being fake, insincere, misleading and so on.
# True can mean "in accordance with a standard or archetype," which is how it is used in "He is a true Englishman."
# True in Engineering and Construction can be used as meaning "straight", not Warped but in the same flat Plane - as the Spoke s of a Wheel .

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), "Interpretation as Action: The Risk of Inquiry", ''Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'', 15, 40–52. Eprint

Baldwin, J.M. (1901–1905), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', 3 volumes in 4, New York, NY.

Baylis, Charles A. (1962), "Truth", pp. 321–322 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.

Benjamin, A. Cornelius (1962), "Coherence Theory of Truth", p. 58 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.

Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Includes papers by James, Ramsey, Russell, Tarski, and more recent work.

Church, Alonzo (1962a), "Name Relation, or Meaning Relation", p. 204 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.

Church, Alonzo (1962b), "Truth, Semantical", p. 322 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.

(ed.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986.

Field, Hartry (2001), ''Truth and the Absence of Fact'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Garfield, Jay L., and Kiteley, Murray (1991), ''Meaning and Truth: The Essential Readings in Modern Semantics'', Paragon House, New York, NY.

Haack, Susan (1993), ''Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.

Horwich, Paul, (1988), ''Truth'', 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

James, William (1904), ''A World of Pure Experience''.

James, William (1907), ''Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy'', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.

James, William (1909), ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism''', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.

James, William (1912), ''Essays in Radical Empiricism''. Cf. Chapt. 3, "The Thing and it's Relations", pp. 92–122.

Kneale, W. , and Kneale, M. (1962), ''The Development of Logic'', Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1962. Reprinted with corrections, 1975.

Le Morvan, Pierre (2004), "Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey", ''British Journal for the History of Philosophy'', 12 (4) 2004, 705–718, PDF .

Peirce, C.S., Bibliography .

Peirce, C.S. , ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Cited as CP vol.para.

Peirce, C.S. (1877), "The Fixation of Belief", ''Popular Science Monthly'' 12 (1877), 1–15. Reprinted (CP 5.358–387), (CE 3, 242–257), (EP 1, 109–123). Eprint .

Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', vol. 2. Reprinted, CP 5.565–573.

Quine, W.V. (1956), "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", ''Journal of Philosophy'' 53 (1956). Reprinted in Quine, ''Ways of Paradox'', 1976.

Quine, W.V. (1976), ''The Ways of Paradox, and Other Essays'', 1st edition, 1966. Revised and enlarged edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1976.

Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", ''Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7'', 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, ''Philosophical Papers'', David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990.

Ramsey, F.P. (1990), ''Philosophical Papers'', David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

Rorty, R. (1979), ''Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Runes, Dagobert D. (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ, 1962.

Russell, Bertrand (1912), ''The Problems of Philosophy'', 1st published 1912. Reprinted, Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1959. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988.

Russell, Bertrand (1918), "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", ''The Monist'', 1918. Reprinted, pp. 177–281 in ''Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950'', Robert Charles Marsh (ed.), Unwin Hyman, London, UK, 1956. Reprinted, pp. 35–155 in ''The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'', David Pears (ed.), Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985.

Russell, Bertrand (1956), ''Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950'', Robert Charles Marsh (ed.), Unwin Hyman, London, UK, 1956. Reprinted, Routledge, London, UK, 1992.

Russell, Bertrand (1985), ''The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'', David Pears (ed.), Open Court, La Salle, IL.

Tarski, A. , ''Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938'', J.H. Woodger (trans.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1956. 2nd edition, John Corcoran (ed.), Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, IN, 1983.

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