Ketuanan Melayu

''Ketuanan Melayu'' ( belief that the Malay People are the "''tuan''" (masters) of Malaysia or Malaya ; Chinese Malaysian s and Indian Malaysian s are considered beholden to the Malays, who have granted them citizenship in return for the Malays' special privileges as set out in Article 153 of the Constitution Of Malaysia . This '' Quid Pro Quo '' arrangement is usually referred to as the Social Contract . The concept of ''ketuanan Melayu'' is often referenced by politicians, especially among those from the influential United Malays National Organisation (UMNO).

Although the idea itself predates Malaysian independence, the phrase ''ketuanan Melayu'' did not come into vogue until the early 2000s. The most vocal opposition towards the concept has come from non-Malay-based parties, such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP). During the 1960s, there was a substantial effort challenging ''ketuanan Melayu'' led by the People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore — which was a state in Malaysia from 1963 to 1965 — and the DAP after Singapore's secession. However, the portions of the Constitution related to ''ketuanan Melayu'' were "entrenched" after the Racial Riots of May 13 1969 , which followed an election campaign focused on the issue of non-Malay rights and ''ketuanan Melayu''. This period also saw the rise of " Ultras " who advocated a one-party government led by UMNO, and an increased emphasis on the Malays being the "definitive people" of Malaysia — i.e. a Malay being one and the same as a Malaysian.

The riots caused a major change in the government's approach to racial issues, and led to the introduction of an aggressive Affirmative Action policy strongly favouring the Malays, the New Economic Policy (NEP). The National Culture Policy , also introduced in 1970, emphasised an assimilation of the non-Malays into the Malay ethnic group. However, during the 1990s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad rejected this approach, with his '' Bangsa Malaysia '' policy emphasising a Malaysian instead of Malay identity for the state. During the 2000s politicians began stressing ''ketuanan Melayu'' again, and publicly chastised government ministers who questioned the social contract.

PRE-INDEPENDENCE

Early Malay nationalism

Malay nationalism as a united and organised political movement did not exist prior to '' (Youth Group) — a group of Malay Islamic scholars — publishing articles advocating independence for Malaya and Indonesia as one Greater Indonesia .

Although the Malaya was effectively governed by the British, '' De Jure '' the Malays were sovereign over Malaya. A former British High Commissioner, Hugh Clifford , urged ''"everyone in this country {Link without Title} be mindful of the fact that this is a Malay country, and we British came here at the invitation of Their Highnesses the Malay Rulers, and it is our duty to help the Malays to rule their own country."'' Keith, Patrick (2005). ''Ousted!'', p. 140. Media Masters. ISBN 981-05-3865-0. The British government adopted an open "Pro-Malay" policy so that, in the words of High Commissioner Sir Laurence Guillemard , the Malays could be equipped ''"to take their proper place in the administrative and commercial life of these States."'' Roff, W.R. (1974). ''The Origins of Malay Nationalism'', pp. 114, 118. Penerbit Universiti Malaya. No ISBN available.

However, the local-born non-Malay communities soon began agitating against the government's policies, and began demanding political representation. In 1936, the Malayan-born Indian community asked the British High Commissioner, Sir Shenton Thomas , to grant them a share of administrative appointments. Thomas rejected the request, stating, ''"...I do not know of any country in which what I might call a foreigner ... has ever been appointed to an administrative post."'' Roff, pp. 109–110. Later, some commentators attributed this to ignorance on the British' part of the increasing size of local-born non-Malays. Although 1.5 million Chinese migrated to Malaya to work as manual labourers — with a million Chinese workers in Malaya in turn emigrating back to China — between 1911 and 1921, these critics contend that during the same period, the locally-born Chinese community grew from 8% to 17% of the Chinese population domiciled in Malaya. The British nevertheless appeared to view the entire Chinese community as — according to one academic — a ''"transient labor force"'', with one government official insisting it would be dangerous to consider the Chinese as having ''"a tendency to permanent settlement"'' despite such figures. The locally-born Indian community — comprising 20% of the Indian population — was likewise largely ignored. Roff, pp. 110–111.

However, the British at the same time took the stance that the Malays were to be left alone to their traditional peasant lifestyle as far as possible, involving only the Malay ruling class in government and administrative issues. Despite the policy of excluding non-Malays from positions of authority, much of the rank and file of the civil service was comprised of non-Malays, many of them Indians who the government had specifically brought in for this purpose.

In the 1920s, the local-born Chinese community began pushing for a greater role in Malayan government. However, they remained in the minority, with much of the Chinese community — which by now made up 39% of the Malayan population — still comprising transient labourers. Nevertheless, the Straits Chinese — which comprised the bulk of local-born Chinese — wanted to be given government positions and recognised as Malayans. One Straits Chinese leader asked, ''"Who said this is a Malay country? ... When Captain {Link without Title} Light arrived, did he find Malays, or Malay villages? Our forefathers came here and worked hard as Coolie s — weren't ashamed to become coolies — and they didn't send their money back to China. They married and spent their money here, and in this way the Government was able to open up the country from jungle to civilisation. We've become inseparable from this country. It's ours, our country..."'' Irked Malay intellectuals objected to this reasoning, and proposed an analogy with the Chinese as masons and Malaya as a house. A paid mason, they argued, was not entitled to a share in the ownership rights to a home he built. As such, they opposed any attempt to grant the Chinese citizenship or other political rights. Roff, pp. 207–210.

In 1938, the Leftist '' Kesatuan Melayu Muda '' (KMM) was formed, with its main goal ostensibly being the formation of Greater Indonesia. During this period, Malay nationalism began to focus on ''ketuanan Melayu'', which in the past had been taken for granted. Some Malays began to worry that the British policies appeared geared towards the creation of a common Malayan nationality inclusive of the Chinese and Indians. Ironically, some of them thus sought to preserve the status quo with the British as a bulwark against the non-Malays, while others began agitating for an independent and sovereign Malay nation, such as Greater Indonesia. Roff, pp. 235–236. There exists some dispute over which goal KMM actually sought, with some former members alleging that the only interest of KMM had been preserving the special position of the Malays, whatever the cost, and others claiming that there had been real plans to overthrow the British. Historians have been unable to verify either claim due to a lack of documentation from the period. Roff, pp. 232–233.

Shortly before the outbreak of World War II in Asia, the British detained several influential KMM leaders. However, most of them were freed during World War II, when the Japanese invaded and occupied Malaya. The former KMM leaders then formed '' Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung '' (KRIS) to carry on KMM's work. However, the planned Greater Indonesia never materialised due to the sudden Japanese surrender after the Bombing Of Hiroshima And Nagasaki . With the return of the British, the KRIS leaders formed the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) to achieve their goals through democratic means. However, the MNP was soon banned by the government as part of a crack-down on left-wing parties, ending the early phase of Malay nationalism. Jawan, Jayum A. (2003). ''Malaysian Politics & Government'', pp. 32–33. Karisma Publications. ISBN 983-195-037-2.

The Malayan Union

After World War II , the British announced the establishment of the Malayan Union , which would have loose immigration policies, reduce the sovereignty of the Malay rulers both in name and reality, and not recognise Malay sovereignty over Malaya. It would also establish Malaya as a protectorate of the United Kingdom . A large percentage of the Chinese and Indians — 83 and 75 percent, respectively — would qualify for citizenship. With equal rights guaranteed to all, the Malays feared that what little power they had left would soon be taken away from them. Even their traditional stronghold, the civil service, would be open to all Malayans. Hwang, p. 37.

A group of Malay royalists and civil servants formed the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to protest the Malayan Union's formation. Led by Dato' Onn Ja'afar , UMNO organised a campaign and co-ordinated several previously divided Malay organisations against the Union's creation. Hwang, p. 38. Although the Union was established as planned, the campaign continued; in 1948, the British retired the Malayan Union in favour of the Federation Of Malaya , whose constitution restored sovereignty to the Malay rulers, tightened immigration and citizenship restrictions, and gave the Malays special privileges. Hwang, p. 39.

Prior to the formation of the Federation, the non-Malays were generally uninvolved in Malayan politics and nationalism, which was essentially Malay in nature. During the tenure of the Malayan Union, there was never any major political backing from either the Chinese or Indians, both of which were more interested in the politics of their respective homelands. Jawan, p. 37. As a result, some historians have pinpointed the failure of the Malayan Union as the incident that made Chinese keenly aware of the need for political representation in Malaya, attributing to it the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) — a communal political party which desired the Chinese to have equal political rights as the Malays over Malaya, directly challenging the concept of ''ketuanan Melayu''. Ye, p. 34. Others, however, argue that the main driving force behind non-Malay involvement in Malayan politics, and their assertion of certain rights, was the increasing number of local-born non-Malays. The same report from the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies cited earlier said that ''"Those who have been born in Malaya themselves, or whose children have been born there ... state that in a great many cases those concerned have never seen the land of their origin and they claim that their children and their children's children should have fair treatment."'' Hwang, p. 25.

Towards independence

Having achieved their initial goals, UMNO's leaders decided to become more involved in the political process, and to establish their organisation as a political party to fight for independence. Onn Ja'afar also wanted to open the party's membership to all Malayans, and to rename the party the United Malayan National Organisation. He was defeated, however, in an internal power struggle, and resigned in 1951 to found the Independence Of Malaya Party (IMP). He was succeeded by Tunku Abdul Rahman (often known as "the Tunku").

Upon succeeding to the UMNO Presidency, the Tunku insisted that sovereignty over the Malaya be given to the Malays, and expressed concern over a lack of loyalty to Malaya among non-Malays, demanding that they clarify their allegiance before they were accorded citizenship. He went on to say that ''"For those who love and feel they owe undivided loyalty to this country, we will welcome them as Malayans. They must truly be Malayans, and they will have the same rights and privileges as the Malays."'' Putra, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1986). ''Political Awakening'', pp. 30, 31. Pelanduk Publications. ISBN 967-978-136-4. Not long after, in 1952, however, he appeared to contradict himself, and insisted that ''"Malaya is for the Malays and it should not be governed by a mixture of races."'' Malays, he argued, would have to safeguard their rights over Malaya, ''"which is ours, for the benefit of our future generation."'' Josey, Alex (1980). ''Lee Kuan Yew: The Crucial Years'', pp. 83–84. Times Books International. ISBN 981-204-448-5.

During this period, some to be banished to their ancestral homeland. This was a revolting idea for most of the Straits Chinese. They were also uncomfortable about the merger of the Straits Settlements with Malaya, as they did not feel a sense of belonging to what they considered a "Malaya for the Malays", where they were not considered '' Bumiputra '' ("sons of the soil"). One Straits Chinese leader indignantly declared, ''"I can claim to be more ''anak Pulau Pinang'' son of Penang than 99 per cent of the Malays living here today."'' Sopiee, pp. 61 – 62. The secessionist movement eventually petered out, however, because of the government's stout refusal to entertain the idea of Penang seceding from the Federation. Sopiee, p. 69.

Possible causes of ''ketuanan Melayu''

According to many historians, the root cause of this strife between the ethnic communities and ''ketuanan Melayu'' was the lack of assimilation or amalgamation between the Malays and non-Malays. Because most of the migrants came as "guest workers" of the British, they felt little need to integrate into Malay society. (The Straits Chinese, most of whom were rich merchants instead of manual labourers, were an exception and managed to assimilate reasonably well, with many of them habitually speaking Malay at home, dressing in the Malay style, and preferring Malay cuisine.) Few bothered to even learn the Malay language; the census taken at independence showed that only 3% of Chinese aged ten and over, and 5% of Indians in the same age group, were literate in Malay. The comparable figure for the Malays stood at 46%. Hwang, pp. 25–26. The British educational policies, which segregated the different races — providing minimal public education for the Malays, and leaving the non-Malays to their own devices — did little to help matters. The Malays, who were predominantly rural-dwellers, were not encouraged to socialise with the non-Malays, most of whom resided in towns. Hwang, pp. 30–31. The economic impoverishment of the Malays, which set them apart from the better-off Chinese, also helped fan racial sentiments.

Another contributing factor to ''ketuanan Melayu'', according to historians, was the Japanese occupation during World War II . One states that the war ''"awakened a keen political awareness among Malayan people by intensifying communalism and racial hatred."'' This was widely attributed to the Japanese policies which ''"politicised the Malay peasantry"'' and intentionally fanned the flames of Malay nationalism. Racial tension was also increased by the Japanese practice of using Malay paramilitary units to fight Chinese resistance groups. Two Malay historians wrote that ''"The Japanese hostile acts against the Chinese and their apparently more favourable treatments of the Malays helped to make the Chinese community feel its separate identity more acutely ... it was also the beginning of racial tension between the Malays and Chinese."'' Hwang, p. 34. A foreign commentator agreed, stating that ''"During the occupation period ... Malay national sentiment had become a reality; it was strongly anti-Chinese, and its rallying cry {Link without Title} 'Malaya for the Malays'..."'' Hwang, p. 35.

The Alliance

Although UMNO took up the cause of ''ketuanan Melayu'', it formed an "Alliance" with the MCA and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) to contest the 1955 Federal Legislative Council elections. This took many by surprise, as the MCA had strenuously insisted on equal political rights for all citizens. Its President, Tan Cheng Lock , was himself a Straits Chinese, albeit not as extreme in his views as the secessionists. Although the Alliance was initially dismissed as a marriage of convenience, it crushed the opposition in the election, winning 51 out of the 52 seats available. The IMP was entirely routed, with the sole remaining seat going to a candidate from the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP; later known as PAS). This defeat led the Alliance politicians to conclude that the political atmosphere was inhospitable for multi-racial parties. It was felt that the Alliance's solution of forming a coalition government comprising mono-racial parties, in which the party leaders would broker compromise decisions in private, would be more stable and better suited to Malayan politics. Keith, pp. 31–33. Dato' Onn Ja'afar changed his approach and formed the Parti Negara , which advocated stronger and more overt pro-Malay government policies that recognised Malay political dominance. This approach also failed to shake the Alliance's grip on power, although some believe that Parti Negara's proposals helped sway UMNO politicians towards more radically pro-Malay policies. Lee, Hock Guan (2001). "Political Parties and the Politics of Citizenship and Ethnicity in Peninsular Malay(si)a, 1957-1968" . Retrieved March 17, 2006. The British themselves insisted on handing over power only to a multiracial government, and the Alliance — which engendered close co-operation between the UMNO Malays and MCA Chinese — was considered to meet this requirement. Keith, pp. 142–143.

INDEPENDENCE AND MALAYSIA

Independence and the Constitution

The and Islam were enshrined as the national language and official religion, respectively. This was taken to mean that the Malays were accorded deference as the definitive people of Malaya — e.g. being a Malayan would be the same as being a Malay — and in the eyes of many, gave Malaya a Malay identity. The preservation of the traditional Malay rulers was also seen as another form of deference to the Malays. Milne, R.S. & Mauzy, Diane K. (1999). ''Malaysian Politics under Mahathir'', p. 34. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-17143-1. An academic from the University Of Malaya , R.K. Vasil , suggested that ''"The Malays have a deep-rooted feeling that they alone are the bumiputras, the sons of the soil, and as such have certain special rights over the land."'' Indeed, the Tunku said in a 1964 interview that ''"It is understood by all that this country by its very name, its traditions and character, is Malay. ... In any other country where aliens try to dominate economic and other fields, eventually there is bitter opposition from the indigenous people. But not with the Malays. Therefore, in return, they must appreciate the position of the Malays..."'' One critic has suggested that ''"cohesion for the society as a whole"'' failed to come about because ''"all the national symbols in Malaysia were derived from the Malay tradition"''. Hwang, p. 49.

The constitutional provisions evoked little sentiment from the non-Malay population of Malaya, despite most of them gaining citizenship and thus becoming theoretically equal to Malay citizens under the Constitution. This could be attributed to acceptance of the in Southeast Asia had dreamed of — equal citizenship, political participation and office holding, unimpaired economic opportunity, and tolerance for their language, religion, and cultural institutions."'' Hwang, p. 67.

Merger

In 1961, when the Malayan government began discussing a possible merger with neighbouring Singapore , Sabah and Sarawak , problems of ethnic power relations arose yet again. The "Malaysia" proposal — sans Sabah and Sarawak — had been on the backburner for more than a decade, with earlier negotiations proving fruitless. The Singaporeans themselves were not anxious to be ruled by what they considered a Malay government. In the early 1950s, one prominent Singaporean politician declared, ''"We do not want to be ruled by Malays any more than they want to be ruled by the Chinese."'' Sopiee, p. 102. By 1961, however, Singapore had grown receptive to the idea of joining Malaysia, largely because of the prevailing idea at the time that an industrial Singapore could not survive without access to the Malayan markets. Sopiee, p. 146.

The Malayan government was not keen on having the predominantly Chinese population of Singapore pushing the Malays into a minority — albeit still a Plurality — position in the new Malaysia. Many Malays felt that by upsetting the Malay-dominated nature of the armed forces and police, they might place themselves in a dangerous position. It was also argued that the inferior economic position of the Malays would be emphasised by the entry of even more rich Chinese, setting the stage for major discontent among the Malays. Keith, p. 21. The Malayans decided to resolve this by merging with Sabah and Sarawak, both of which were British colonies at the time, and had large native populations who the government considered "Malay". Under Article 160 Of The Constitution , most of these natives were emphatically not Malay — with a majority of them being Animist s or Christian s, not Muslims as required by the Constitution. To resolve this issue, the government expanded its informal definition of "Malay" to include these people.Sopiee, p. 144.

While the Singaporeans were interested in a merger for economic reasons, however, the Sabahans and Sarawakians could not see how they would benefit. Many regarded Malaya as being only for the Malays, a group in which they did not include themselves. The spectre of "Malaysia" — the mere inclusion of the phrase "Malay" being considered frightening — with its official religion of Islam and official language of Malay, did nothing to soothe their fears of "Malay domination". If merger was to come about, they insisted, the natives of Sabah and Sarawak must be awarded the same privileges as Malays. Sopiee, p. 150. After much negotiation and a show of support from the British for the proposal, the impasse was resolved, although natives of Borneo were denied the privileges of Malays. The merger was accomplished on September 16 1963 .

A "Malaysian Malaysia"?

In the 1963 Singapore State Elections , the Alliance decided to challenge the governing People's Action Party (PAP) through the Singapore Alliance Party . UMNO politicians actively campaigned in Singapore for the Singapore Alliance, contending that Singaporean Malays were being treated as second-class citizens under the Chinese-dominated, though ostensibly multiracial, PAP government. This challenge was decisively defeated as all of the UMNO-backed Malay candidates lost to the PAP. Angered, UMNO Secretary-General Syed Jaafar Albar travelled to Singapore to address the Malay populace. At one rally, he called the PAP Malay politicians un-Islamic and traitors to the Malay race. The PAP politicians, who saw this as a betrayal of an earlier agreement with the Alliance not to contest elections in Malaysia and Singapore (respectively), decided to run on the mainland in the 1964 General Election . Although the PAP contested nine Parliamentary seats and attracted large crowds at its rallies, it won only one seat. It is thought by some historians that Tan Siew Sin's public appeal to the Chinese to avoid challenging the special rights of the Malays and risk merger with Indonesia helped the MCA retain its status as the ''"undisputed leader of the Chinese in the Malayan peninsula"''. Keith, p. 149. Nevertheless, UMNO leaders were furious with the PAP. Goh, Cheng Teik (1994). ''Malaysia: Beyond Communal Politics'', pp. 36–37. Pelanduk Publications. ISBN 967-978-475-4. Goh, Jenny (July 23, 1997). "Small spark can create big mess" . ''Straits Times''.

New problems soon cropped up. Lee Kuan Yew , the leader of the Singaporean government and the PAP, declare his open opposition to ''ketuanan Melayu'', and called for a " Malaysian Malaysia ", whereby ''"Malaysia was conceived as belonging to Malaysians as a whole and not to any particular community or race"''. He argued, ''"According to history, Malays began to migrate to Malaysia in noticeable numbers only about 700 years ago. Of the 39% Malays in Malaysia today, about one-third are comparatively new immigrants like the secretary-general of UMNO, Dato' Syed Jaafar Albar , who came to Malaya from Indonesia just before the war at the age of more than thirty. Therefore it is wrong and illogical for a particular racial group to think that they are more justified to be called Malaysians and that the others can become Malaysian only through their favour."'' Ye, p. 143.

Lee would later lament, ''"Malaysia — to whom does it belong? To Malaysians. But who are Malaysians? I hope I am, Mr Speaker, Sir. But sometimes, sitting in this chamber, I doubt whether I am allowed to be a Malaysian. This is the doubt that hangs over many minds, and ... {Link without Title} nce emotions are set in motion, and men pitted against men along these unspoken lines, you will have the kind of warfare that will split the nation from top to bottom and undo Malaysia."'' Keith, pp. 115–116. At other times, however, Lee himself worsened the situation by making racial comments of his own. Many of his speeches harped on the ethnic composition of Malaysia, reminding listeners that it was the non-Malays who were now in the majority, with 61% of the population against the Malays' 39%. In one statement, he said, ''"Let us be quite frank. Why should we go back to old Singapore and once again reduce the non-Malays in Malaya to a minority?"'' Sopiee, p. 204. Lee exacerbated deteriorating PAP-UMNO Relations by constantly demanding that the federal government "smack down their ' Ultras '", whose ranks included prominent UMNO leaders such as Syed Jaafar Albar and Syed Nasir Ismail , who considered it his duty to restore "the sovereignty" of the Malay language, and by extension, the Malay race. Sopiee, p. 194. Keith, p. 118.

Lee's statements upset many, especially politicians from the Alliance. Finance Minister and MCA President 2005 . Lee's statement about the allegedly recent migration of Malays drew harsh rebuttals from people such as Syed Jaafar Albar, who declared that ''"To say that the Malays are in the same category as other races is an insult..."'' The UMNO newspaper, ''Malaya Merdeka'', warned that ''"If the Malays are hard-pressed and their interests are not protected, they will be forced to merge the country with Indonesia ."'' Keith, p. 124. It was this that the Tunku feared the most. To him, the ultras were not the real extremists — it was those who sought a "Greater Indonesia" to "fix" the Chinese that were the real threat. Keith, pp. 66–67.

was forced to lead Singapore out of Malaysia due to his criticism of the federal government and its policies.]]

The strain in race relations caused by the communal lines along which the political factions had been drawn led to the of the Constitution."'' Keith, p. 128.

Lee insisted that despite his dream of a "Malaysian Malaysia", he was not opposed to the concept of Malay special rights such as those set out by Article 153. In a speech he had made during a tour of Australia , Lee said that ''"...I don't think that the issue at the moment is the clause providing for special rights for the Malays ... And if the immigrant communities ... do not see the problems, if they can't feel what it is like to be a poor Malay, and don't feel for him, then I can say very soon he will manifest his disaffection in a very decisive way and the whole country will be thrown into turmoil."'' Lee, Kuan Yew (1998). ''The Singapore Story'', p. 598. Marshall Cavendish Editions. ISBN 981-204-983-5. Few from the Alliance, however, took this claim seriously. Keith, p. 121. UMNO politicians insisted that a "Malaysian Malaysia" implied total equality, which would entail the removal of the Malays' privileges. Keith, pp. 72–73.

, who insisted ''"we are co-owners, not lodgers, not guests."'' Lee, p. 620.Keith, p. 115.

A few politicians, such as Ismail Abdul Rahman went against the common view held in UMNO. Ismail told Parliament that ''"...both the Alliance and the PAP subscribe to the concept of a Malaysian Malaysia, but they differ in their approach to make it a living entity. It is this difference in approach which generates a great deal of heat..."'' This statement was dimissed by Lee as Lip Service that could not be taken seriously unless the ultras were reined in. Josey, pp. 269–270.

Separation

Lee continued his campaign against the Alliance, forming the Malaysian Solidarity Council (MSC), comprising multi-racial parties such as the PAP, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) in 1965. At the MSC's first — and only — general meeting, several leaders from these parties gave speeches in support of Lee's campaign for a Malaysian Malaysia. D.R. Seenivasagam of the PPP accused the Alliance of using Article 153 of the Constitution to "bully non-Malays", while Ong Kee Hui of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) said that ''"We see an attitude of intolerance and mounting signs of denial of political equality to people who are non-Malays. For the sake of our country and ourselves, this must be stopped and the drift to narrow racialism checked. Political equality should be accorded to all who live here and make this country their home, irrespective of their racial origin."'' Lee, pp. 616–617.

Soon after the MSC's launch, Mahathir Bin Mohamad , an UMNO backbencher in Parliament, attacked Lee during the debate on the motion of thanks for the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong 's (the King) address to Parliament. Mahathir said, ''" Singaporean Chinese have never known Malay rule and cannot bear the idea that the people they have so long kept under their heels should now be in a position to rule them."'' Keith, pp. 128–129. Lee hit back at Mahathir and other Alliance MPs in an unscripted speech, made entirely in the Malay Language . Lee stated: ''"Of course there are Chinese millionaires in big cars and big houses. Is it the answer to make a few Malay millionaires with big cars and big houses? ... If we delude people into believing that they are poor because there are no Malay rights or because opposition members oppose Malay rights, where are we going to end up? You let people in the kampongs believe that they are poor because we don't speak Malay, because the government does not write in Malay, so he expects a miracle to take place in 1967 [the year Malay would become the national and sole official language in Malaysia . The moment we all start speaking Malay, he is going to have an uplift in the standard of living, and if doesn't happen, what happens then? Meanwhile, whenever there is a failure of economic, social and educational policies, you come back and say, oh, these wicked Chinese, Indian and others opposing Malay rights. They don't oppose Malay rights. They, the Malay, have the right as Malaysian citizens to go up to the level of training and education that the more competitive societies, the non-Malay society, has produced. That is what must be done, isn't it? Not to feed them with this obscurantist doctrine that all they have got to do is to get Malay rights for the few special Malays and their problem has been resolved."'' Lee, pp. 612–613.

Eventually, the Tunku — fed up with all the politicking — decided to ask Singapore, through Lee and some of his closest confidantes, to secede from Malaysia. Lee was persuaded, and Singapore became an independent nation in 1965, with Lee as its first 2005 . The Constitution Of Singapore contains an article, Article 152, that names the Malays as "indigenous people" of Singapore and mandating special safeguarding of their rights and privileges as such. However, the article specifies no policies for such safeguarding.

MAY 13 AND THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Issues of language

The Constitution had initially specified a ten-year delay after independence in changing the national language from English to Malay. As the scheduled date for the change, 1967, drew near, however, some Chinese began to agitate for a more liberal language policy that would permit some instances of Mandarin in public affairs. Extremist Malay politicians from UMNO and PAS , an Islamic party, lashed out against these campaigners, but the Alliance managed to hammer out a compromise in the form of the National Language Bill. This established Malay as the official language, permitted English under certain circumstances, and allowed the use of non-Malay languages for non-official purposes. The Tunku described it as "a course guaranteeing peace" that was "''opposed to attitude of the chauvinists, as represented by the non-Malay opposition parties, and the ' Ultras ' as represented by the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PAS)''". Hwang, pp. 66–67. The Bill was widely derided, however, by many Malays, who formed the National Language Action Front in the hope of repealing or amending it. The leadership of the Tunku was also openly questioned. Hwang, p. 71.

May 13

In 1969, a General Election was held. It was the first to be contested on a major scale by non-Malay-based opposition parties — previous elections had seen Dato' Onn Ja'afar's failed IMP and Parti Negara, as well as the Islamic party, PAS, but there had been little non-Malay opposition to the Alliance, save in 1964 when the PAP attempted to challenge the Alliance in Peninsular Malaysia. The two main opposition parties on this front in 1969 were the Democratic Action Party (DAP) — the Malaysian successor to the PAP, and widely seen as Chinese-based — and the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), an ostensibly multiracial party led by former MCA stalwart, Lim Chong Eu , and other Middle-class intellectuals like Tan Chee Khoon and Syed Hussein Alatas . Both proposed policies on language, education, and Malay rights that were diametrically opposed to those of the government, with the DAP continuing where Lee Kuan Yew had left off with the "Malaysian Malaysia" campaign. Some, mostly from the DAP, called for the elevation of English , Mandarin and Tamil to official language status, along with Malay. Stronger government support for the Chinese education stream was also demanded. Hwang, p. 74, 89.

, led by Lim Chong Eu and Syed Hussein Alatas , won several Parliamentary Seats in the 1969 General Election .]]

PAS, on the other hand, attempted to garner votes by accusing UMNO of selling out the Malays' indigenous rights to "'' Pendatang Asing ''" (aliens). When the results were released, PAS had made minor inroads, but the DAP and Gerakan managed to topple the Alliance from power in three states, and nearly eradicated the Alliance's traditional two thirds majority in Parliament. Hwang, p. 75. A large part of these gains came at the expense of the MCA, which soon announced that it would not participate in the new government after the election, as the purpose of the MCA was to represent Chinese interests in the government. If the MCA was not supported by a majority of Chinese, Alliance politicians did not think it proper for it to remain in the government. The jubilant DAP and Gerakan organised victory parades in the national capital of Kuala Lumpur on May 11 and May 12 , where participants taunted the Malays while bearing slogans such as "Semua Melayu kasi habis" ("Finish off all the Malays"). An apology was issued soon after the rallies. Nevertheless, the shocked Malays blamed Chinese voters for betraying "the Alliance formula by voting for an opposition that had revived fundamental questions of language and Malay special rights," noting that most of the Alliance's losses came from the MCA. Hwang, pp. 77–78. The MCA President, Tan Siew Sin , stated as much a few months before the election, when he said that should the opposition manage to ''"wrest key seats from the MCA ... {Link without Title} t would mean in effect a confrontation between a government without Chinese participation and a practically all-Chinese opposition."'' Hwang, p. 98.

Malay extremists welcomed the MCA's move not to participate in the government, as they felt a government dominated by UMNO — and by extension the Malays — would better serve their purposes. Khoo, Boo Teik (1995). ''Paradoxes of Mahathirism'', p. 22. Oxford University Press. ISBN 967-65-3094-8.Maidin, Zainuddin (1994). ''The Other Side of Mahathir'', pp. 19–21. Utusan Publications & Distributors. ISBN 967-61-0486-8. UMNO retaliated to the DAP and Gerakan rallies with its own on May 13, which soon degenerated into rioting. This would later be euphemistically labeled as the "s ( Machete s) and other weapons. Some leaders made speeches condemning the "insults" of the "infidels" at the previous victory parades, and called the counter-rally a means ''"to teach the Chinese a lesson"'' for challenging Malay supremacy. Soon, the crowd began attacking passing Chinese motorists, and launching Arson attacks on Chinese homes and shops. The rioting soon spread, and, despite the military being called in, continued for another two days. Kamarudin, Raja Petra (2000). "A Reporter’s Account of an Interview With Tunku Abdul Rahman On the 13 May Incident" . Retrieved April 10, 2006.Means, pp. 6–7.

As a result of the riots, Parliament was suspended, and a state of national emergency was declared. Although the rioting had died down, tensions continued to simmer. A non-Malay boycott of Malay goods and services received "near total" support, while many Malays, such as Mahathir Mohamad and Raja Muktaruddin Daim — a lecturer at the University Of Malaya — began calling for an Autocracy led by UMNO alone. According to some sources, one group of "ultras", comprising Syed Nasir Ismail , Musa Hitam , and Tengku Razaleigh , felt that the Constitution had failed, and agreed that the country had to be "returned" to the Malays. They allegedly agreed to summon Mahathir to Kuala Lumpur, where he led a campaign to topple the Tunku as Prime Minister and institute an UMNO-based Autocracy . Von Vorys, Karl (1975). ''Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia'', p. 317. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691075719.

Mahathir wrote an Open Letter to the Tunku, accusing him of ''"giving the Chinese what they demand ... you have given them too much face. The responsibility for the deaths of these people, Muslims and infidels, must be shouldered by a leader who was under a misconception."'' Soon, students at higher educational institutions across the country began to hold mass demonstrations, calling for the Tunku to step down in favour of a leader who would restore "Malay sovereignty". On June 28 , another riot broke out in the Sentul area of the capital, with some 15 Indians losing their lives. It was believed to have been instigated by those supporting the campaign against the Tunku. Means, pp. 8–9.

Instead of bowing to their demands, the Tunku had Mahathir and another alleged ultra, Musa Hitam , expelled from UMNO. The Minister of Home Affairs, Ismail Abdul Rahman , issued a statement alleging that ''"These ultras believe in the wild and fantastic theory of absolute dominion by one race over the other communities, regardless of the Constitution. ... Polarisation has taken place in Malaysian politics and the extreme racialists among the ruling party are making a desperate bid to topple the present leadership. ...if the anti-Tengku campaigns or activities are carried out in such a manner ... as to cause undue fear and alarm among members of any community ... I will not hesitate to exercise my powers under the law against those responsible."'' Means, p. 10.

''The Malay Dilemma'' and New Economic Policy

Mahathir spent his political exile writing ''.) Mohamad, Mahathir bin (1970). ''The Malay Dilemma'', p. 133. Times Books International. ISBN 9812043551. He also stated that:

''"Settlers willing to conform to the characteristics of the definitive citizen will in fact become definitive citizens and will exercise the same rights and privileges. But these rights and privileges do not include changing the characteristics of the definitive race. This emphasis on definitive characteristics rather than ethnic origin is an important principle and its application is also seen in the limitation of the rights of newer citizens to change these characteristics."'' Mohamad, p. 135.

Mahathir also expressed discomfort with ''"far too many non-Malay citizens who can swamp the Malays"'' Mohamad, p. 31. in a land that was ''"no more ''Tanah Melayu (land of the Malays)''"''. Mohamad, p. 121. Mahathir's approach to defending Malay rights was two-pronged, focusing both on the "definitive people" line of reasoning and the argument in favour of affirmative action, which the Reid Commission had chosen. For instance, he stated ''"It is not... for reasons of Malay superiority that preferential treatment for Malays in scholarship awards was insisted upon. ... They are a means of breaking down the superior position of the non-Malays in the field of education. The Malays are not proud of this treatment."'' Mohamad, p. 76. In an interview with former opposition politician Tan Chee Khoon shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Mahathir denied he had altered any of his views since he wrote the book. Khoo, p. 25.

purchases — even of luxury Condominium s — were subsidised.]]

Mahathir and Musa Hitam later rejoined UMNO and the government under Tun Abdul Razak , the second Prime Minister, whose New Economic Policy (NEP), was based on some of the reforms Mahathir's book had advocated. The NEP's stated goal was elimination of ''"the identification of race with economic function"''. Musa, M. Bakri (1999). ''The Malay Dilemma Revisited'', p. 113. Merantau Publishers. ISBN 1-58348-367-5. To achieve this, it targeted a 30% share of the economy for the "Bumiputra" —"sons of the soil," a term used to describe Malays and other indigenous peoples — by 1990. This became known as the "30 per cent solution", which set the "Bumiputra quota" for many items, including new public share listings and new private housing schemes. Certain commentators alleged that this fostered "a close to ' Zero-sum ' attitude chiefly between the Malays and Chinese". Khoo, p. 105. The NEP's stated aim, however, was not to redistribute wealth by taking from the non-Malays and giving to the Malays; instead, it hoped to enlarge the economic pie and then allocate a larger share of the gains for the Malays, thus increasing participation in the economy for all. Musa, p. 115.

The main rationale for the NEP as set out in the Second Malaysia Plan was to address the "the problem of economic imbalance" between the Chinese and Malays. It was reported that in 1969, the Malays held only 1.5% of the Malaysian economy, as opposed to 22.8% for the Chinese. Foreign interests held much of the rest. Hwang, p. 80. Some detractors argued that while the Chinese share of the economy had increased at the Malays' expense, more significant growth in inequality had occurred between the richest and poorest Malays. It was reported that between 1957 and 1970, the wealthiest 20% of Malays' share in the Malay portion of the economy increased from 42.5% to 52.5%. The comparable figure for the poorest 40% of the Malays was a decrease from 19.5% to 12.7%. Hilley, John (2001). ''Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition'', p. 33. Zed Books. ISBN 1-85649-918-9.

According to the Second Malaysia Plan, the NEP would aim to "create a Malay commercial and industrial community". This would be achieved through direct government participation in the private sector, with "wholly owned enterprises and joint ventures". Prior to this, the government had, in the words of a local economist, played "administrative, supportive, and regulatory" roles in attempting to address the economic imbalance, but avoided "represent {Link without Title} direct and active efforts in promoting the interests" of the Malays. Hwang, p. 113. One criticism of this increased intervention was that UMNO allegedly ''"became a major beneficiary of the expanded role of the state"''. Hwang, p. 114.

Prior to the NEP, the government had already established limited Affirmative Action programs. However, these were mostly focused on the civil service, as Article 153 of the Constitution was. Although Quota s for university admissions were in theory permitted under Article 153, admission to higher education was in practice mostly based on Meritocracy . The Alliance government led by the Tunku preferred '' Laissez-faire '' policies, keeping intervention in the economy to a minimum. There did exist some agencies, such as the Rural Industrial Development Agency (RIDA), which attempted to aid Malay Entrepreneurs . Their programs, however, were criticised as being based on Handout s and favouring the politically-connected. RIDA was renamed as the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (The People's Trust Council) or MARA in 1965. Musa, pp. 97–100. It was during the Parliamentary debate on the establishment of MARA that the term " Bumiputra " was first used. Tan, Chee Koon & Vasil, Raj (ed., 1984). ''Without Fear or Favour'', p. 10. Eastern Universities Press. ISBN 967-908-051-X.

Although the NEP was aimed at addressing economic imbalances, it soon became associated with ''ketuanan Melayu''. While the two were rarely directly equated, they were often mentioned together, with the implication that the NEP was derived from ''ketuanan Melayu''. The NEP's greater intervention in the economy led some to ''"equate UMNO's monolithic image as the undisputed champion of Malay supremacy with the party's ability to shore up lucrative business deals."'' Kamarudin, Raja Petra (Aug. 1, 2005). Umno’s relevance lies in ''Ketuanan Melayu'' . '' Malaysia Today ''.Kamarudin, Raja Petra (Sept. 26, 2005). Article 153 of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution . ''Malaysia Today''.Mohamad, Maznah (1999). "Can UMNO Survive?" . Retrieved Feb. 2, 2006.

Constitutional amendments and other policy changes

passed several amendments to the Constitution soon after the May 13 Incident , limiting Free Speech and "entrenching" certain articles related to Bumiputra special rights.]]

Parliament finally reconvened again in 1971. Although the NEP was passed without its approval, Parliament's consent was nevertheless required for amending the Constitution. The government-tabled Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 limited freedom of speech on "sensitive issues", which included those Articles of the Constitution thought by some to enshrine ''ketuanan Melayu'', namely Article 152, which provided for the national language, Article 153, which provided for special rights, and Article 181, which defended the sovereignty of the Malay rulers. It was also forbidden to question Part III of the Constitution, which discussed matters of citizenship. These restrictions were applied even to Members of Parliament, overruling the Parliamentary Immunity that had been available to them before. The Act additionally defined what "official purposes" meant under the Constitution, in order to clarify Article 152 and its provisions for the national language. Article 153 was amended to include the "natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak", thus extending the formerly Malay-only rights to all Bumiputra . Khoo, p. 104– 106. In addition, the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (King) was now empowered to direct any University or College to implement a proportion-based quota system favouring the Bumiputra for any course of study deemed reasonable. This ensured that the previously lenient quota system would now be more rigidly adhered to. All higher educational institutions in Malaysia immediately enacted quota systems on the orders of the Education Ministry, although the constitutionality of this move was questioned by a few on the grounds that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong himself had not issued any directive to the universities. Trinidade, F.A. & Lee, H.P. (eds., 1986). ''The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments'', pp. 48–49. Penerbit Fajar Bakti. ISBN 967-65-0030-5.

To cap all this, clause 5 of Article 159 — which governs amendments to the Constitution — was itself amended to prohibit the amendment of all "sensitive issues" mentioned, as well as Article 159(5) itself, without the consent of the Conference of Rulers. This effectively "entrenched" the "sensitive" Articles, and was heavily criticised by opposition Members of Parliament. It was claimed that if Parliament could be prevented from speaking on a particular issue, the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty was undermined. It was also unclear if the ban from speaking on "sensitive issues" applied to the ban itself. Nevertheless, the provisions were passed.

To complete the criminalisation of discussing "sensitive" topics, Parliament amended the Sedition Act, banning the questioning of "Part III of the Federal Constitution or Article 152, 153, or 181 of the Federal Constitution". The Constitutional amendments had only permitted Parliament to illegalise such questioning, and did not in themselves ban it. Khoo, p. 108. The Internal Security Act (ISA), which effectively allows the government to detain anyone it deems a threat to national security for an indefinite period without trial, has also been invoked at times for similar purposes. It was amended in 1971 to stress the "preservation of intercommunal harmony". Khoo, p. 107.

Another important policy change came in the field of education. In 1970, the government announced that all new students beginning Primary School in English-medium schools would now be taught in Malay. Eventually, Malay would become the medium of instruction for primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Although the Chinese and Tamil education streams — many of whose schools were partially or completely funded by the government — were permitted to continue, many non-Malays considered this new education policy to be "the most discriminatory" policy that had been adopted thus far. The government's rationale was that this would provide better opportunities for the Malays educationally, especially for those who formerly had to make the transition from Malay-medium primary and secondary schools to English-medium universities. It was also argued that uniting students under one language would provide for greater racial harmony, while indirectly underscoring the "Malay nature of the state".

The same year that the medium of instruction was changed to Malay, the National Culture Policy (NCP) was announced. Syed Nasir Ismail described the government's policies as aimed towards creating a values system based on a "Bumiputra Muslim identity" (''identiti Islam Kebumiputraan''). b. Maaruf, p. 122. The NCP was based on three principles, namely, that the national culture must be based on the indigenous culture of the region; that it would be possible to accept suitable elements from other cultures; and that Islam would be an important component of the national culture. In essence, its goal was to eventually assimilate the non-indigenous peoples into an indigenous Malaysian identity. Despite stiff opposition from Chinese pressure groups, the government refused to withdraw the NCP. Hilley, p. 129. To foster national unity, the Rukunegara or national ideology was introduced around the same time. Although the Rukunegara itself contains no references to ''ketuanan Melayu'' or the social contract, a government commentary mentioned the ''"position of Malays and other Natives, the legitimate interests of the other communities, and the conferment of citizenship"'' as key aspects of the Constitution. The commentary also insisted that ''"No citizen should question the loyalty of another citizen on the ground that he belongs to a particular community."'' One political pundit described it as a formal declaration of the social contract or "Racial Bargain". Means, p. 13.

Politics and "Malay dominance"

The old Alliance model, where each race was represented by one party, was repudiated with the formation of the Barisan Nasional (BN, or the National Front) in 1974. Several former opposition parties, including Gerakan, the PPP and PAS, joined the UMNO-led BN. Although the MCA and MIC were included as well, their influence was diluted by the number of other non-Malay parties in the coalition. In 1977, PAS was expelled, leaving UMNO as the sole representative of the Malays in BN, although some ostensibly multiracial parties also provided token Malay representation. Hwang, pp. 115, 117. After its departure from BN, PAS took a different approach to Malay privileges, denouncing the NEP as racial discrimination and "unIslamic". Musa, p. 81.

In 1974, Mahathir was appointed as a Minister in Tun Razak's Cabinet. He became the Deputy Prime Minister just two years later, under Tun Hussein Onn , who had succeeded Tun Razak upon the latter's sudden death. Khoo, p. 35.

During the 1970s — the heyday of the NEP — "Malay dominance" was a largely accepted fact of life for Malaysians. Whereas the 1957 to 1969 period was viewed as a time when "Malay dominance" was at least tempered by a form of "inter-ethnic bargaining" within the Alliance government, from the May 13 Incident onwards, political pundits argued that the political environment was now markedly under "hegemonic control" from the Malays and UMNO. Hwang, pp. 10–11. The "ultras" who had allegedly plotted to exploit the chaos after the 1969 elections were now in control of the country. Razaleigh, an influential Minister, was responsible for implementing government policies such as the Third Malaysia Plan which aimed to increase the Malay share of the economy. He would later be hailed as the "Father of the Bumiputra Economy" for his work as Finance Minister. Khoo, p. 49. Musa Hitam and Mahathir, both rising stars on the political scene, maintained their image as "ultras", although it is unclear if this was their intention. Journalist K. Das — who the Tunku later permitted to write his authorised Biography — once claimed that in a discussion with Musa, he had been told ''"that a young Malaysian politician has to play the race card to the hilt even if there was not a single chauvinistic bone in his body."'' Khoo, p. 24. After retiring from politics, Musa said that ''"the national leaders tend to look for a Scapegoat when faced with a desperate crisis situation"'' and use racial tactics to fill their "empty stomach". Hwang, p. 145.

The UMNO Youth wing, in particular, maintained its "ultra" image from the 60s. One of its Vice-Presidents — Haji Suhaimi Bin Haji Kamaruddin — said in response to discussion of opening different teams in UMNO based on political ideology that ''"The original cause of UMNO is to fight for the interests of the Malay race and this must continue. We do not want factions in UMNO."'' b. Maaruf, p. 121. In 1980, Tun Hussein Onn announced that he would be handing power over to his Deputy Prime Minister, Mahathir, due to poor health. Mahathir took office in 1981, with Musa Hitam as his deputy.

MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION

Affirmative action and Chinese protests

threatened to bathe a '' Keris '' with Chinese blood.]]

The affirmative action policies of the NEP continued under Mahathir's administration. Political pundits considered this administration, in its early period, to be a continuation of the "hegemonic control" of Malaysian politics by the Malays, and by UMNO in particular. During this time, Mahathir focused on consolidating his power within UMNO and the government. Hwang, pp. 134–135. As a result, there was little active confrontation between the Malays and the non-Malays on the issue of ''ketuanan Melayu'' at the time.

In 1981 the MCA had held the Malaysian Chinese Convention to assess the NEP and other government policies from a Chinese point of view. The convention expressed concern over a number of problems, including alleged disrespect of the Chinese' citizenship, with the Immigration Department refusing to issue Passports to Chinese citizens or "giving them unwarranted problems in their passport applications". Fears were also expressed about the overwhelmingly Malay-dominated civil service, with the Chinese charging that the goal of the NEP to eradicate the identification of race with economic function had been abrogated. Tan, Koon Swan (1982). Introduction. In Federal Territory MCA Liaison Committee (Ed.), ''Malaysian Chinese'', pp. vii–xi. Eastern Universities Press. No ISBN available. In addition, the convention's report argued that the non-Malay communities had been greatly under-represented in Parliament and the Cabinet. This was allegedly caused by Gerrymandering , with mostly Malay rural Parliamentary constituencies outnumbering the heterogenous urban constituencies, despite the total population of the urban constituencies exceeding that of the rural ones. Yeoh, Michael Oon Kheng (1982). The Politics of Under-Representation. In Federal Territory MCA Liaison Committee (Ed.), ''Malaysian Chinese'', pp. 61–71. Eastern Universities Press. No ISBN available. However, UMNO avoided directly confronting the MCA over the issue.

Tensions began to rise after the '' (foreign immigrants, or aliens) in Parliament. The DAP then attempted to enquire about the distribution of economic equity among the races, so that an evaluation of the NEP's progress could be made. Instead, the Standing Orders of Parliament were amended to forbid such inquiries. This led the DAP to allege that the goals of the NEP had already been met, and that it could be allowed to expire in 1990. Means, pp. 187–189.

Ethnic tension continued to grow shortly after Mahathir narrowly defeated Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah for the UMNO Presidency in 1987. Around this time, poor management and an Economic Recession led to the collapse of many Deposit-taking Co-operative s (DTCs), some of which were associated with the MCA. To save Chinese investors, the MCA asked the government to bail out the DTCs, citing the Mahathir government's bailout of Bumiputra financial institutions such as Bank Bumiputra , where a similar scheme to rescue Malay investors had been implemented. UMNO appeared reluctant to acquiesce, however, leading MCA Deputy President Lee Kim Sai to warn that the MCA might withdraw from the Barisan Nasional government. Najib Tun Razak , then acting UMNO Youth Chief, responded by stating that UMNO would review the MCA's position in BN before it pulled out. Later that year, the government posted several non-Chinese-educated staff to senior positions in Chinese vernacular schools. Anwar Ibrahim , then Education Minister, refused to yield to protests from the MCA, and stated that the decision was final, despite an informal understanding between the Malay and Chinese communities that non-Chinese-educated teachers would not be posted to Chinese schools. Hwang, pp. 149–150, 153.

On (the son of Tun Razak) threatened to bathe a ''keris'' with Chinese blood. Kamarudin, Raja Petra (Aug. 1, 2005). "Umno's relevance lies in ''Ketuanan Melayu''" . ''Malaysia Today''. The flames were fanned further when in an unrelated incident, a Malay soldier ran amok in a predominantly Chinese area, killing one and injuring another two.

On October 27 , the government launched Operation Lallang (Weeding Operation), detaining 55 people under the ISA. More were arrested over the next few months — by mid-January 1988, the number of detainees stood at 106. Although most of those arrested were politicians from PAS and the DAP, a few from UMNO, MCA and Gerakan were included. All BN politicians, however, were released from detention after two months, while those from the opposition remained in custody for much longer. The government later claimed that these detentions were justified for security reasons, stating that the politicians in question had played up the issue of Chinese education in such a way as to incite racial sentiment. The ISA arrests, it was argued, had managed to defuse the tense political and racial situation. Hwang, pp. 151–152. Some of Mahathir's supporters saw the events pre- and post-Operation Lallang as a vindication of his rejection of the Tunku's method of seeking "compromise" with the non-Malays. '' The Star '', a daily published by a company headed by the Tunku himself, had been accused of pandering to the non-Malays and criticising the government's racial policies. The withdrawal of its publishing permit due to Operation Lallang was considered to have taught the non-Malays not to criticise the government and its pro-Malay approach to governance. Maidin, pp. 179–180.

Many critics did not take this explanation seriously. UMNO was in crisis at the time, with Mahathir narrowly defeating Razaleigh 's challenge for the party Presidency in 1987. His chosen candidate for the Deputy Presidency (and by extension the Deputy Prime Ministership), Ghafar Baba , also narrowly defeated Musa Hitam , who had sided with Razaleigh. Eleven of Razaleigh's supporters filed a Lawsuit , alleging irregularities in the election process. It initially appeared that this suit would succeed and new party elections would be held. In this context, one MCA politician charged that the government had pursued a "hidden agenda," seeking to deflect public attention from the leadership crisis through a ''"deviation in the implementation of the Chinese education policy."'' The Tunku himself claimed that Mahathir used the Chinese education issue to mobilise the Malays ''"as a united force to a common enemy — and the imaginary enemy in this case was the Chinese community."'' Lim Kit Siang , the Parliamentary Opposition Leader and an ISA detainee from the DAP, argued that ''"Mahathir used the racial sentiment and even allowed the escalation of the situation so that he could crack down to consolidate his position against his internal challenge."'' Hwang, pp. 153–154.

, was sacked by Mahathir soon after he agreed to hear the appeal of Mahathir's opponents within UMNO.]]

In the end, Mahathir's camp "won" the court case when Justice Harun Hashim held that as the party was an illegal organisation under the Societies Act due to some of its branches not being formally registered, the Plaintiff s' case was invalid; an illegal society could not hold new elections for its leaders. Mahathir immediately moved to set up "UMNO (Baru)" (New UMNO), and managed to transfer all of the old UMNO's assets to the new party. Most of his supporters also joined UMNO (Baru), and eventually it was decided by the party leadership to drop the "(Baru)" from the name, making it, for all intents and purposes, the same as the old UMNO. The new party's flag and logo were also nearly identical, and the party continued to celebrate its founding anniversary on May 11 — the founding date of the old UMNO — instead of February 4 , when the new party had been officially formed. As UMNO (Baru) also joined the Barisan Nasional, and most of the old UMNO Members of Parliament (MPs) rejoined the party, the government's status was not threatened. Despite these developments, the eleven plaintiffs appealed their case to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case with a full panel of all nine Supreme Court judges — a first in Malaysian history. This heightened the tension between Mahathir's government and the judiciary, which had been increasingly asserting its independence in recent years. Four days after Lord President Salleh Abas agreed to hear the case, he was suspended and later sacked, triggering the 1988 Malaysian Constitutional Crisis . Five other Supreme Court judges soon followed in his footsteps. The UMNO case was eventually heard by the three remaining Supreme Court justices and two judges from the High Court who were nominated by the Acting Lord President, Abdul Hamid Omar , who agreed to dismiss the case. Hwang, pp. 161–162, 164–165, 168–169.

With no more legal options left, Razaleigh and his supporters formed the Semangat 46 (Spirit of '46) party to challenge the government. In the 1990 General Election , ''ketuanan Melayu'' was reportedly used as an issue during the campaign, with Mahathir's UMNO accusing Semangat 46 , PAS , the DAP and other opposition parties of conspiring to end Malay supremacy in politics. The government also repeatedly warned that the May 13 riots would be repeated if it did not maintain its two-thirds majority in Parliament. Full-page graphic advertisements depicting bloodshed and carnage were published in major national newspapers. Tensions rose further when the Tunku called on voters to support Semangat 46 instead of the new UMNO, with several UMNO politicians demanding that his title of "Bapa Kemerdekaan" (Father of Independence) be withdrawn, and his statue be removed from Parliament House. Despite this, the government retained its two-thirds Parliamentary majority, with Semangat 46 winning only eight seats. Hwang, pp. 186, 192–194, 205.

The National Development Policy

Prior to the expiration of the NEP in 1990, there was much debate over whether the policy should be renewed, replaced, or scrapped altogether. The government organised an official review of the NEP in the years leading up to its expiration. The NEP had been faced with a number of criticisms throughout its lifetime, most of them related to Political Corruption and other inefficiencies.

One point of dispute was the calculation of Malay equity. Although officially, as of 1992, the Malays controlled 18% of the economy, some dismissed this figure as misleading. It was argued that in reality, much of this amount was comprised of wealth held by government agencies such as Perbadanan Nasional (Pernas), Amanah Saham , MARA, and other similar bodies, and as such belonged to Malaysians as a whole. Musa, pp. 217–218.

The practice of awarding public works contracts mainly to Bumiputras was argued to be stifling Malay competency by providing little incentive to improve. Many Bumiputra contractors in turn subcontracted their jobs to others, who were in some cases Chinese. In one case, a privatised water treatment company changed hands three times. The quotas were criticised for allegedly hiding problems among poorly qualified Malay students, whose admission rates could not decrease below the quota level even if their performance dropped. Some said that the disbursement of shares favoured the politically-connected, many of whom immediately sold the shares at market price, reaping the Arbitrage instead of holding on and increasing the Malay share of equity, which the policy was intended to do. Although the NEP managed to create a class of Malay Millionaire s, it was charged that this was mainly due to Cronyism , benefiting only the politically-connected. Musa, pp. 178, 180, 181–182, 187, 259, 261. Some, such as PAS politician and Journalist Subky Latiff , agreed that political corruption was rife in Bumiputra financial institutions such as Bank Bumiputra , but argued against taking legal action. Subky wrote: ''"The Malays do not want justice to affect their interests."'' b. Maaruf, p. 58.

Some of these allegations were later proven when during an UMNO leadership crisis in 1998, Mahathir released a list of beneficiaries from government contracts, privatisation projects, and the disbursement of Bumiputra shares. Most of the beneficiaries listed, such as Ahmad Zahid and Anwar Ibrahim — Mahathir's deputy — were Politician s or their cronies instead of businessmen or entrepreneurs. (Ironically, Zahid and Anwar had been among the most vocal critics of cronyism and political corruption.) Musa, pp. 187, 260.

During the 1980s, concern continued to grow about possible discrimination in higher education. At this point, the Education Minister told Parliament that ''"one of the matters that cannot be denied ... is the problem of dissatisfaction, especially among non-Bumiputra parents over the question of lessening opportunities for their children to enter universities ... No one, especially the parents, can be blamed for this feeling of disappointment ... many students of non-Bumiputra origin were disappointed in not getting places although they were highly qualified."'' Trindade & Lee, p. 50. Later in 1997 while defending the government's policies in education, then Education Minister Najib Tun Razak claimed that only 5% of all local undergraduates would be Malays if the quotas were abolished. He in turn argued that the quotas were necessary to improve the number of qualified Malays. Musa, p. 182.

Another criticism was that the NEP and other affirmative action had actually reduced the Malays' self-confidence, despite Mahathir's proclaimed intention to raise the Malays' confidence in themselves by building a Malay business class who could serve as 2005 .

Eventually, the government announced its decision to replace the NEP with the National Development Policy (NDP). The NDP continued most of the policies that had been introduced during the NEP's tenure. Malay ownership in the economy, although increased drastically since 1970, was not near the 30% target set by the NEP, according to government figures. In its review of the NEP, the government found that although income inequality had been reduced, some of the important targets related to overall Malay corporate ownership had not been met. Both Mahathir and the Tunku expressed concern that the Malays were too reliant on the Chinese economically. The Tunku argued that if the Chinese all closed their shops on the same day, the Malays would be stuck in a hopeless situation. Mahathir opined that the Malays needed to be self-sufficient in manufacturing so they would not need to buy clothing and other Consumer Good s from the Chinese. Maidin, pp. 252–253.Putra, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1986). ''Political Awakening'', pp. 97–99. Pelanduk Publications. ISBN 967-978-136-4. Although some asserted that the NEP had retarded economic growth, this was dismissed; it was posited that the NEP had managed to avert further racial rioting, which would have detrimentally impacted economic growth more than the NEP. The NEP was also defended as having been largely successful in creating a Malay Middle Class and improving Malaysian Standards Of Living without compromising the non-Bumiputra share of the economy in absolute terms; statistics indicated that the Chinese and Indian middle classes also grew under the NEP, albeit not as much as the Malays'. It was also argued that Ethnic Stereotype s had been largely stamped out due to the NEP's success in creating a Malay upper class. Although many of the NEP's goals were restated by the NDP, the new policy appeared to be geared more towards wealth retention and creation, as opposed to simple redistribution. Ye pp. 85, 92, 94, 156.Milne & Mauzy, pp. 72–74. Nevertheless, many of the policies from the NEP era were retained under the NDP, which was set to expire in 2020 . Musa, p. 113.

''Bangsa Malaysia''

'' policy.]]

During the 1990s, Mahathir and UMNO made a public about-face on the government's cultural policies, with the formation of the '''' (the Malaysian or Malay language) ''and accept the Constitution. To realise the goal of ''Bangsa Malaysia'', the people should start accepting each other as they are, regardless of race and religion."'' Hwang, pp. 245–246.

In an interview with '' TIME '', Mahathir explained that ''"The idea before was that people should become 100 per cent Malay in order to be Malaysian. We now accept that this is a multi-racial country. We should build bridges instead of trying to remove completely the barriers separating us."'' Such a dramatic change in the government's approach was perceived by the non-Malay communities as a "complete retraction" of the UMNO-led government's policies from the 1970s and 80s, which had focused on assimilating the non-Malays into the Malay race. Hwang, pp. 246–247. Other steps taken by the government to stress this change included the decreasing emphasis on Malay as the one and only national language, when the government permitted local universities to use English as the medium of instruction for certain subjects. Hwang, pp. 248–249. Diploma s from the MCA-sponsored and Chinese-majority Tunku Abdul Rahman College (TARC) were officially recognised by the government for employment in the civil service. Hwang, p. 250. For the first time, religions other than Islam were given airtime on state Radio and Television , although they were not allowed to proselytise. Milne & Mauzy, p. 96. Lion Dance s — a traditional Chinese performance which had been banned for decades — were not only permitted but even attended by Mahathir and other top government officials. Hwang, p. 249.

Although the 1990s were marked by a period of marked economic growth, commentators suggested that Mahathir's liberal policies had played the key role in gaining him popularity with the populace, who gave Mahathir and the Barisan Nasional a landslide victory in the 1995 general election. One political pundit wrote that ''"Most Malaysians could not remember a time of greater prosperity or lesser inter-ethnic recrimination. ... Economic indicators alone would not have captured the pride that Malaysians had discovered, perhaps for {Link without Title} first time, in being Malaysian."'' Hilley, p. 65.

Lim Kit Siang attributed the defeat of the opposition — the DAP in particular — in the election to Mahathir being "more liberal" and the government adopting the DAP's stance on ''" issues, like language, culture and education"''. Some were cynical about Mahathir's sincerity in his new approach, however. One UMNO Youth official said ''"I don't think that UMNO is implementing greater liberalisation as a way of giving away everything. The Barisan government's flexible move ... only shows that we are enjoying the highest level of tolerance [which is purely based on the level of confidence in terms of political and economic position of the Malays. We share the political power with the Chinese. When need to increase their political support from their community it is very important for them to serve the main concerns of the Chinese. So, why shouldn't we allow that? We can ... achieve a win-win situation. This is a purely political move. ... Similarly we [UMNO Youth have to be often seen as a very racialist political group fighting for the Malay interests. In politics, we cannot be simply static but have to be flexible. However, those finished agendas that we have done, such as Islam, ''Bahasa Melayu'' Malay language and the special status of the Malays, should not be questioned in any circumstance because these are very sensitive issues."'' Hwang, pp. 209, 258.

Indeed, the government's stance was not always consistent. In 1997 Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (who was then Acting Prime Minister), who was often cited as an example of amicable Malay-Chinese relationships , attempted to force non-Muslim undergraduate students to take courses in Islam. Musa, p. 68. During the early 1990s, Mahathir also launched a '' Melayu Baru '' (New Malay) movement, where the "New Malay" was epitomised as a corporate man, ''"a new 'class' of Malay capitalists"''. Hisham, Badrul (1998). "Where have the 'New Malays' gone?" . Retrieved April 15, 2006. Mahathir viewed the New Malay as a culmination of the affirmative action policies he had designed to cultivate the Malay middle class, emphasising the newfound confidence and self-reliance of the Malays as a result. Although some expected this independence to lead to an eventual repeal of the affirmative action policies, the government did not enact any such changes. A few expressed regret that some instead used the New Malay as a rationale for emphasising Malay unity and solidarity while ignoring Mahathir's goal of a ''Bangsa Malaysia''. By 1997, however, the ''Melayu Baru'' promotional campaign had died out. Muhammad, Amir (1997). The Malay/Sian Dilemma. In Muhammad, Amir, Raslan, Kam & Stothard, Sheryll (Eds). ''Generation: A Collection of Contemporary Malaysian Ideas'', pp. 103–106. Hikayat Press. ISBN 983-99339-0-6.

The following year, Anwar was sacked as Mahathir's deputy due to persistent disagreements over policymaking. After Anwar's sacking, he led the '' Reformasi '' (reformation) campaign — comprising mostly street demonstrations — against Mahathir and the government. As a political commentator, Musa Hitam remarked that ''"If the ''reformasi'' movement and demonstrations could be given any significance in terms of Malaysian politics — if there is anything that I could unhesitatingly come to {Link without Title} a positive conclusion — it never turns racial. It's amazing. ... It is more issue-based than racial. I'm fascinated."'' Musa commented that prior to ''reformasi'', ''"any demonstration of any nature in Kuala Lumpur or Penang would always turn racial. Even if they were against the government, they would burn the Chinese shops."'' Hwang, p. 318. Anwar was later jailed for Sodomy and was then convicted of tampering with a police investigation into allegations of homosexuality against him. Mahathir later appointed Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as his deputy, and officially resigned as Prime Minister in 2003.

ABDULLAH AHMAD BADAWI, MERITOCRACY, AND ''KETUANAN MELAYU''

A new Prime Minister

succeeded Mahathir as Prime Minister, ''ketuanan Melayu'' was introduced into the national Secondary School Curriculum .]]

Abdullah, as Mahathir's deputy, succeeded him as Prime Minister. Prior to Abdullah's ascension in 2003, although ''ketuanan Melayu'' had been enunciated by several prominent Malay leaders, it had not been given a proper name. Around this time, the term "''ketuanan Melayu''" — "tuan" being the Malay word for "lord" or "master" — came into common usage, even entering the government-approved secondary school Curriculum . Lim, Guan Eng (2005). "'Merdeka' Constitution Driving Force Towards National Unity" . Retrieved Feb. 19, 2006.

A government-approved Secondary School History Textbook published in 2004 by Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka , the government-owned publishing company, defined ''ketuanan Melayu'' as:

Semangat cinta akan apa saja yang berkaitan dengan bangsa Melayu seperti hak politik, bahasa, kebudayaan, warisan, adat istiadat dan tanah air. Semenanjung Tanah Melayu dianggap sebagai tanah pusaka orang Melayu.

Its English translation is as follows:

:A passion for all that is related to the Malay race, such as political rights, language, culture, tradition and the homeland. The Malay Peninsula is regarded as the Malays' land.

In 2003 , the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) Political Party Youth Information Chief Azimi Daim stated: ''"In Malaysia, everybody knows that Malays are the masters of this land. We rule this country as provided for in the federal constitution. Any one who touches upon Malay affairs or criticizes Malays is our sensitivities."'' Gatsiounis, Ioannis (Oct. 2, 2004). [http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FJ02Ae05.html "Abdullah stirs a hornets' nest" . ''Asia Times''.

Although its proponents claimed that ''ketuanan Melayu'' was directly derived from Article 153 of the Constitution, the ''" (foreign immigrants).

Meritocracy

Before leaving office, Mahathir had made several statements condemning the attitude of Malays who relied on their privileges. Abdullah continued this, warning Malays that if they did not learn to live without crutches, they would end up in wheelchairs. Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad (2004). "Moving Forward — Towards Excellence" . Retrieved 11 November 2005 . His administration began the practice of " Meritocracy ", which Mahathir had discussed before leaving office. Under meritocracy, quotas were eliminated in university admissions.

This program, however, was dismissed as a sham by a number of critics, who argued that it was unfair to consider — for the purposes of admission — the 2005 .

Previously, the constitutionality of Malay- or Bumiputra-only matriculation courses had been questioned, as the 1971 amendments to Article 153 of the Constitution specifically prohibited the refusal of admission to students based solely on race. As a result, matriculation courses were eventually opened to non-Bumiputra. However, some felt meritocracy was too harsh on rural Malay students, who were at a disadvantage to those from urban areas. A few in UMNO called for the restoration of quotas, so as to avoid an "uneven playing field". "Johor Umno Says Meritocracy A Form Of Discrimination" . ( July 9 2005 ). ''BERNAMA''.

At the UMNO General Assembly in 2004, the Deputy Permanent Chairman, also declared at the assembly that non-Bumiputras would never be permitted to enter the Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), which is Bumiputra-only: ''"I will not compromise on this matter."''

Then at the following year's General Assembly, Education Minister and UMNO Youth head Hishamuddin Hussein — the son of Tun Hussein Onn , the third Prime Minister — brandished the '' Keris '' while calling for the restoration of the NEP as part of the National Development Policy (NDP) that Mahathir had initiated. According to Hishamuddin, the ''keris'' — named ''Panca Warisan'' — symbolised the role of UMNO Youth in championing the Malay race. Meanwhile, his deputy, Khairy Jamaluddin — Abdullah Badawi's Son-in-law — discussed the revival of the NEP in the form of a separate entity titled as the New National Agenda (NNA). Abdullah said he would discuss this with the Economic Planning Unit of his office. Kumar, R. Surenthira & Yusop, Husna (Jul. 29, 2005). Rebranding the NEP . ''The Sun''.

"Racial politics"

Later in 2005, the issue of the Constitution and its provisions were brought up by Chinese politicians within the government itself. ' national anthem are rituals, while true love for the nation lies in the heart."''

A year earlier, Abdullah had given a speech where he mentioned the most "significant aspect" of the social contract as ''"the agreement by the indigenous peoples to grant citizenship to the immigrant Chinese and Indians"''. Although Abdullah went on to state that the character of the nation changed to ''"one that Chinese and Indian citizens could also call their own,"'' Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad (2004). "The Challenges of Multireligious, Multiethnic and Multicultural Societies" . Retrieved 2005 ). '' BERNAMA ''.

In January 2006, the government announced that it would be launching a campaign to raise awareness about the ''.

Then in February, Abdullah personally led a procession in Johor to commemorate the 60th anniversary of an anti-Malayan Union rally organised by Dato' Onn Ja'afar. The procession was greeted with shouts of "Hidup Melayu" ("Long Live the Malays") from party faithful, and broadcast live on RTM1 . At the rally, a ''Sumpah Melayu'' (Malay vow) calling for the constant defense of "Malay interests and sovereignty" was read. "PM Leads Procession To Commemorate Anti-Malayan Union Rally" . (Feb. 26, 2005). ''BERNAMA''.

The following month, the ''.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Information About

Ketuanan Melayu