Substance Theory

Substance theory, or '''substance attribute theory''', is an Ontological theory about Objecthood , positing that a ''substance'' is distinct from its Properties .

Substance is a core concept of ontology and Metaphysics . Indeed, philosophies may be divided into Monist philosophies, and Dualist or Pluralist philosophies. Monistic views, often associated with Immanence , hold that there is only one substance, sometimes called God or Being . Dualist and pluralist views hold that to be various types of substances exist, and that these can be placed in an ontological Hierarchy . Platonism or Aristotelianism considers that they are various substances, while Stoicism and Spinoza hold that there is only one substance.

THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

In the millennia-old '' ("God is Nature").

CRITICISMS OF THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE

Friedrich Nietzsche and, after him, Martin Heidegger , Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze rejected the notion of "substance", and in the same movement the concept of Subject . For this reason, Althusser 's "anti-humanism" and Foucault's statements were criticized, by Jürgen Habermas and others, for misunderstanding that this led to a fatalist conception of social determinism. For Habermas, only a subjective form of Liberty could be conceived, to the contrary of Deleuze who talks about "''a'' life", as an impersonal and Immanent form of liberty.

For Heidegger, Descartes means by "substance" that by which "we can understand nothing else than an entity which ''is'' in such a way that it need no other entity in order to ''be''." Therefore, only God is a substance as ''ens perfectissimus''. Heidegger showed the inextricable relationship between the concept of substance and of subject, which explains why, instead of talking about "man" or "humankind", he speaks about the '' Dasein '', which is not a simple subject, nor a substance. {Link without Title}

PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS OF SUBSTANCE THEORY

Two primitive concepts (i.e. ''genuine notions'' that cannot be explained in terms of something else) in substance theory are the ''bare particular'' and the ''inherence relation''.

Bare particular

In substance theory, a '' Bare Particular '' of an Object is the element without which the object would not exist, that is, its ''substance'', which exists independent from its properties, even if it is physically impossible for it to lack properties entirely. It is "bare" because it is considered without its properties and "particular" because it is not Abstract . The properties that the substance has are said to ''inhere'' in the substance. In substance theory of the mind, the objects are minds.

Inherence relation

Another primitive concept in substance theory is the Inherence Relation between a ''substance'' and its properties. For example, in the sentence, "That the apple is red," substance theory says that redness ''inheres'' in the apple. Substance theory considers to be clear the meaning of the apple having the property of redness or the property of being juicy, and that a property's inherence in a substance is similar to, but not identical with, being part of the substance. The theory thus grants ''inherence'' the status of a primitive concept and requires no further definition of the word "inhere".

ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THEORY

Two common arguments supporting substance theory are the '' Argument From Grammar '' and the '' Argument From Conception ''.

Argument from grammar

The ''argument from grammar'' uses Traditional Grammar to support substance theory. For example, the sentence, "Snow is white," contains a subject, ''snow'', and the assertion that the subject is white. The argument holds that it makes no grammatical sense to speak of "whiteness" disembodied, without snow or some other subject that ''is'' white. That is, the only way to make a meaningful claim is to speak of a subject and to predicate various properties of it. Substance theory calls this subject of predication a ''substance''. Thus, in order to make claims about physical objects, one must refer to substances, which must exist in order for those claims to be meaningful.

Many ontologies, including Bundle Theory , rejects the ''argument from grammar'' on the basis that a ''grammatical subject'' does not necessarily refer to a ''metaphysical subject''. Bundle theory, for example, maintains that the grammatical subject of statement refers to its properties. For example, a bundle theorist understands the grammatical subject of the sentence, "Snow is white", as a referrent to a bundle of properties, including perhaps the containing of ice crystals, being cold, and being a few feet deep. To the bundle theorist, the sentence then modifies that bundle of properties to include the property of being white. The bundle theorist, then, maintains that one can make meaningful statements about bodies without referring to ''substances'' that lack properties.

Argument from conception

Another argument for the substance theory is the ''argument from conception''. The argument claims that in order to conceive of an object's properties, like the redness of an apple, one must conceive of the object that has those properties. According to the argument, one cannot conceive of redness, or any other property, distinct from the thing that has that property. The thing that has the property, the argument maintains, is a ''substance''. The ''argument from conception'' holds that properties (e.g. redness or being four inches wide) are inconceivable by themselves and therefore it is always a ''substance'' that has the properties. Thus, it asserts, substances exist.

A criticism of the ''argument from conception'' is that properties' being ''of substances'' does not follow from inability to think of isolated properties. The bundle theorist, for example, says that properties need only be associated with a bundle of other properties, which bundle is called an ''object''. The critic maintains that the inability for an individual property to exist in isolation does not imply that ''substances'' exist. Instead, he argues, bodies may be bundles of properties, and an individual property may simply be unable to exist separately from such a bundle.

BUNDLE THEORY

In direct opposition to substance theory is ''bundle theory'', whose most basic premise is that all concrete particulars are merely constructions or 'bundles' of attributes, or qualitive properties:

Necessarily, for any concrete entity, $a$ , if for any entity, $b$ , $b$ is a constituent of $a$ , then $b$ is an attribute.

The Bundle Theorist's principal objections to substance theory concern the '' Bare Particular s'' of a ''substance'', which substance theory considers independently of the ''substance's'' properties. The bundle theorist objects to the notion of a thing with no properties, claiming that one cannot conceive of such a thing and citing John Locke, who described a substance as "a something, I know not what." To the critic, as soon as one has the any notion of a substance in mind, a property accompanies that notion. That is, to the critic it is not only physically impossible to encounter a ''bare particular'' without properties, but the very ''notion'' of a thing without properties is so strange that she cannot even form such a notion.

Indiscernibility

The ''indiscernibility'' argument from the substance theorist targets those bundle theorists who are also metaphysical realists. Metaphysical realism uses repeatable entities known as ''universals'' exemplified by concrete particulars to explain the phenomenon of attribute agreement. Substance theorists then say that bundle theory and metaphysical realism can only coexist by introducing an ''identity of indiscernibles'' creed, which substance theorists suggest is incoherent. The ''identity of indiscernibles'' says that any concrete particular that is numerically different from another must have its own qualitive properties, or attributes.

Since bundle theory states that all concrete particulars are merely constructions or 'bundles' of attributes, or qualitive properties, the substance theorist's ''indiscernibility'' argument claims that the ability to recognize numerically different concrete particulars, such as concrete objects, requires those particulars to have discernable qualitve differences in their attributes and that the metaphysical realist who is also a bundle theorist must therefore concede to the existence of ''discernable (numerically different) concreate particulars'', the ''identity of indiscernibles'', and a ''principle of constituent identity''.

Discernable concrete particulars

Necessarily, for any complex objects, $a$ and $b$ , if for any entity, $c$ , $c$ is a constituent of $a$ if and only if $c$ is a constituent of $b$ , then $a$ is numerically identical with $b$ .

The ''indiscernibility'' argument points out that if ''bundle theory'' and ''discernable concrete particulars'' theory explain the relationship between attributes, then the ''identity of indescernibles'' theory must also be true:

Identity of indiscernibles

Necessarily, for any concrete objects, $a$ and $b$ , if for any attribute, Φ, Φ is an attribute of

The ''indiscernibles'' argument then asserts that the ''identity of indiscernibles'' is false. For example, two different pieces of printer paper can be side by side, numerically different from each other. However, the argument says, all of their qualitive properties can be the same (e.g. both can be white, rectangular-shaped, 9 x 11 inches...). Thus, the argument claims, bundle theory and metaphysical realism cannot both be correct.

However, bundle theory combined with ''trope theory'' (as opposed to metaphysical realism) is immune to the ''indiscernibles'' argument. The immunity stems from the fact that each ''trope'' (attribute) can only be held by one concrete particular, thus qualitive indiscernible objects can exist while being numerically identical and the ''identity of indiscernibles'' therefore does not hold.

SEE ALSO

Bare Particular

Bundle Theory

Inherence Relation

Ontology

EXTERNAL LINKS

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry

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Substance Theory