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| CATEGORIES ABOUT COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM | |
| personal identification | |
| security | |
| aviation in the united states | |
| terrorism | |
| lockheed martin | |
| SHOPPER'S DELIGHT | |
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It was first administered by the FBI and FAA . In November 2001, control was transferred to the TSA, where it has "...expanded almost daily as Intelligence Community (IC) agencies and the Office of Homeland Security continue to request the addition of individuals..." {Link without Title} In 2003 , the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) presented a proposal for an expanded system (CAPPS II), which was reviewed by Congress and later canceled by the United States Department Of Homeland Security (DHS). OVERVIEW These systems rely on what is known as a Passenger Name Record, often abbreviated PNR. When a person books a plane ticket, certain identifying information is collected by the airline: full name, address, etc. This information is used to check against some data store (i.e., a TSA No-Fly list, the FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitive List , etc.) and assign a terrorism "risk score" to that person. High risk scores behoove the airline to subject the person to extended baggage and/or personal screening, and to contact law enforcement if necessary. CAPPS II CAPPS II was a proposal for a new CAPPS system, designed by the Office Of National Risk Assessment (ONRA), a subsidiary office of the TSA, with the contracted assistance of Lockheed Martin . Congress presented the TSA with a list of Requirements, for a successor to CAPPS I. Some of those requirements were:
Like its predecessor, the CAPPS II proposal would rely on the PNR to uniquely identify people attempting to board aircraft. It would expand the PNR field to include a few extra fields, like a full street address, date of birth, and a home telephone number. It would then cross-reference these fields with government records and private sector databases to ascertain the identity of the person, and then determine a number of details about that person. Law enforcement would be contacted in the event that the person:
Otherwise, the software would calculate a "risk score" and then print a code on the boarding pass indicating the appropriate "screening level" for that person: green (no threat) indicates no additional screening, yellow (unknown or possible threat) indicates additional screening, and red (high risk) indicates no boarding and deferral to law enforcement. How this risk score would be calculated was never disclosed nor subject to public oversight of any kind outside of the TSA. The system was jeapordized in a critical report (pdf) by the U.S. General Accounting Office in early 2004 and increased opposition from watchdog groups like the ACLU , ReclaimDemocracy.org and EPIC . Advocacy groups that believed it would undermine both privacy and safety (because terrorists allegedly could use it to their advantage), and may be unconstitutional. CAPPS II was cancelled by the TSA in the summer of 2004. Shortly thereafter, the TSA announced a successor program, called Secure Flight , that would work much the same as CAPPS II. TSA hoped to test Secure Flight in August 2005 using two airlines. In February of 2006 Secure Flight was cancelled for being potentially insecure. (Guardian) . NO-FLY LIST The No-Fly List has raised obvious Civil Liberties concerns, due in part to the potential for ethnic, religious, economic, or Racial Profiling and Discrimination . Particular concern has been raised about the use of Credit Report s in calculating the risk score. In response to the controversy, the TSA stated that it would not use a person's Credit Score to determine its risk score, also it would try to comply with all rights guaranteed by the first and fourth amendments. The No-Fly List has been under heavy fire recently about its productivity, but according to Stuart Taylor (Sr. Columnist, National Journal): The No-Fly List has contributed to catching over 1,800 terrorists. CAPPS I, CAPPS II, and the No-Fly List have contributed greatly to the War on Terror. Stuart Taylor went on to explain the controversy; Government entities external to the U.S., such as the European Union , expressed concerns about allowing the CAPPS II proposal to be implemented within their respective borders. During the early testing of the No-Fly list, and CAPPS II, the TSA privately requested that airlines disclose massive amounts of private information about their passengers. Though intended only for testing, this action was likely a gross violation of the Privacy Act Of 1974 , which forbids the government from compiling secret databases on Americans. Though spokespeople from several major airlines initially denied these allegations, they later reneged and admitted that they had disclosed the information, revealing that they had not only lied to their own customers, but also to the government and the public. These admissions were followed by further admissions from the Transportation Security Administration and the United States Department Of Homeland Security , revealing that the government had in fact inappropriately requested and used this information. In the midst of this controversy, the " program. They have also begun testing of another program called "Secure Flight", which is supposed to solve some of the problems of CAPPS I while avoiding the privacy issues of CAPPS II. SIZE It is known that the size of the FBI/FAA list on September 11 was 16 names. By December 2001, the list had grown to 594 names, and a year later (December 2002), there were over 1000 names. Current estimates vary greatly, ranging from 30000 to 120000 names, but the actual number is not public. According to the TSA, as of November, 2005, 30000 people in 2005 alone had complained that their names were matched to one on the list. FALSE POSITIVES AND ALLEGED MISUSES
LAWSUITS On April 6 , 2004 the American Civil Liberties Union "filed a nationwide class-action challenge to the government's 'No-Fly' list", in which they charge that "many innocent travelers who pose no security risk whatsoever are discovering that their government considers them terrorists – and find that they have no way to find out why they are on the list, and no way to clear their names." The case was settled in 2006 {Link without Title} .nng EXTERNAL LINKS
CAPPS II
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