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President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed the blockade on April 19 , 1861 . His strategy, part of the Anaconda Plan of General Winfield Scott , required the closure of 3500 miles of Confederate coastline and twelve major ports, including New Orleans , Louisiana and Mobile, Alabama , the top two cotton-exporting ports prior to the outbreak of the war, (Greene, Jack; Ironclads at War, Combined Publishing, 1998), as well as the Atlantic ports of Richmond, Virginia , Charleston, South Carolina , Savannah, Georgia , and Wilmington, North Carolina . To this end, he commissioned 500 ships, which eliminated about 1500 blockade runners over the course of the war; nonetheless, five out of six ships evading the blockade were successful.[http://www.americanpresident.org/history/abrahamlincoln/biography/ForeignAffairs.common.shtml] Despite the success of blockade runners, Confederate cotton exports were reduced from 10 million bales in the three years prior to the war to just five hundred thousand bales in the blockade period.[http://www.americanpresident.org/history/abrahamlincoln/biography/ForeignAffairs.common.shtml]


PROCLAMATION OF BLOCKADE AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

On April 19 , 1861 , President Abraham Lincoln issued a ''Proclamation of Blockade Against Southern Ports'' {Link without Title} :
"Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States...have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid...For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach, or shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the Commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will endorse on her register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable."



Recognition of the Confederacy?


Some have contended that the announcement of a and Maritime Law , however, nations had the right to search neutral vessels on the open sea if they were suspected of violating a blockade, something port closures would not allow. In an effort to avoid conflict between the United States and Britain over the searching of British Merchant Marine vessels thought to be trading with the Confederacy, the Union needed the privileges of international law that came with the declaration of a blockade.

Under the Declaration Of Paris , 1856 , international law held that a blockade must be (1) formally proclaimed, (2) promptly established, (3) enforced, and (4) effective, in order to be legal. {Link without Title}


International legal status of the South

However, by effectively declaring the Confederate States Of America to be Belligerent s rather than Insurrection ists (who under international law would not be legally eligible for recognition by foreign powers), Lincoln opened the way for European powers such as Britain and France to recognize the Confederacy. Britain's proclamation of neutrality was consistent with the position of the Lincoln Administration under international law - the Confederates were belligerents - giving them the right to obtain loans and buy arms from neutral powers - and giving the British the formal right to discuss openly which side, if any, to support. {Link without Title}


OPERATION OF THE BLOCKADE

In the initial phase of the blockade, Union forces concentrated on the Atlantic coast gradually extending its reach into the Eastern Gulf Of Mexico and the Texas coastline. Important Confederate ports included Galveston and Sabine Pass, Texas . Apalachicola, Florida received Confederate goods travelling down the Chattahoochee River from Columbus, Georgia , and was an early target of Union blockade efforts on Florida's Gulf Coast[http://www.cr.nps.gov/seac/benning-book/ch15.htm .


Union Navy


Both at the time of the war and in subsequent historical analysis, the concept of the blockade met with harsh criticism. The United States Navy, with a strength of only 90 vessels, of which half were sailing ships was grossly inadequate for the task at hand, but the Union quickly attempted to correct this deficiency. In 1861 , nearly 80 Steamers and 60 sailing ships were brought into service, and the number of blockading vessels rose to 160.[http://www.tcr.org/tcr/essays/CB_Blockade.pdf While as noted above, a large proportion of blockade runners did manage to evade the Union ships, as the blockade matured, the type of ship likeliest to find success in evading the naval cordon was a small, light ship with a short draft - qualities that facilitated blockade running but were poorly suited to carrying large amounts of heavy weaponry, metals, and other supplies badly needed by the South. To be successful in helping the Confederacy a blockade runner had to make many trips; sooner or later most were captured or sank.


Blockade Service

Blockade service was attractive to seamen and landsmen alike. Blockade stations were the most boring job in the war--but also the most attractive. The task was for the fleet to sail back and forth to intercept any Blockade Runners . Over 50,000 volunteered for the boring duty, because food and living conditions on ship were much better than the infantry offered, it was safer, and especially because of the real (albeit small) chance for big money. Captured ships and their cargoes were sold at auction and the proceeds split among the sailors. When the USS Aeolus seized the hapless ''Hope'' off Wilmington in late 1864, the captain won $13,000, the chief engineer $6,700, the seamen over $1,000 each, and the cabin boy $533, rather better than infantry pay of $13 a month for the lucky sailors. While the little ''Alligator'' sold for only $50, bagging the ''Memphis'' in a morning's work was like winning the lottery--it brought in $510,000 (about what 40 civilian workers could earn in a lifetime of work.) In four years, $25 million in prize money was awarded.


Blockade runners

Ordinary ships were too slow and visible to escape the Navy. The South therefore relied mainly on new ships built in England with low profiles, shallow draft and high speed. Their paddle-wheels, driven by steam engines that burned smokeless coal, could make 17 knots. Since the South lacked sailors, skippers and shipbuilding capability, the runners were built and partly manned by Britons. Private British investors spent perhaps £50 million on the runners ($250 million in US dollars, equivalent to about $2.5 billion in 2006 dollars). The pay was amazingly high: a Royal Navy officer on leave might earn several thousand dollars (in gold) in salary and bonus per round trip, with ordinary seamen getting several hundred dollars. On dark nights they ran the gauntlet to and from the British islands of Bermuda and the Bahamas, or Havana, Cuba, (Spanish), 500-700 miles away. They carried several hundred tons of compact, high-value cargo--such as cotton, turpentine or tobacco outbound, and rifles, medicine, brandy, lingerie and coffee inbound. They charged from $300 to $1000 per ton of cargo brought in; two round trips a month would generate perhaps $250,000 in revenue (and $80,000 in wages and expenses). In November, 1864, a wholesaler in Wilmington asked his agent in the Bahamas to stop sending so much chloroform; please send instead "essence of cognac" because that perfume would sell "quite high." Confederate patriots held "Rhett Butler" and the other nouveau riche blockade runners in contempt for profiteering on luxuries while Lee's soldiers were in rags. On the other hand, their bravery and initiative was necessary for the nation's survival, and many women in the back country flaunted imported $10 gew gaws and $50 hats as patriotic proof that the "damn yankees" had failed to isolate them from the outer world. Richmond eventually regulated the traffic, requiring half the imports to be munitions; it even purchased and operated some runners on its own account, and made sure they loaded vital war goods. By 1864 Lee's soldiers were eating imported meat. Blockade running was reasonably safe for both sides. It was not illegal under international law; captured foreign sailors were released, while Confederates went to prison camps. The ships were unarmed (cannon would slow them down), so they posed no danger to the Navy warships.


Impact on CSA

The Union blockade of the Confederacy was a powerful weapon that ruined the southern economy, at the cost of very few Union lives. The blockade not only stopped cotton exports, it choked off munitions imports as well. The measure of the blockade's success was not the few ships that slipped through, but the thousands that never tried it. Ordinary freighters stopped calling at southern ports. The interdiction of coastal traffic meant that long-distance travel depended on the rickety railroad system, which never overcame the devastating impact of the blockade. The blockade caused other hardships as well, especially the maldistribution of food. Throughout the war the South produced enough food for civilians and soldiers, but it had growing difficulty in moving surpluses to areas of scarcity and famine. Lee's army, at the end of the supply line, always went short. Occasional bread riots in Richmond and other cities showed that patriotism was not sufficient to satisfy the demands of housewives. Land routes remained open for cattle drovers, but after the Federals seized control of the Mississippi River in summer 1863, it became impossible to ship horses, cattle and swine from Texas and Arkansas to the eastern Confederacy. Never had a major seacoast been so completely shut down; never before had a navy solved the challenge of numbers, vigilance, discipline and replenishment. The blockade was a triumph of the US Navy, and a major factor in winning the war.


Confederate response

The Confederacy constructed a number of Torpedo Boat s, generally small, fast steam launches equipped with Spar Torpedo es, to attack the blockading fleet. Some torpedo boats were refitted steam launches, others, such as the David class, were purpose-built. The torpedo boats would attack under cover of night by ramming the spar torpedo into the hull of the blockading ship, then backing off and detonating the explosive. The torpedo boats were not very effective and were easily countered by simple measures such as hanging chains over the sides of ships to foul the screws of the torpedo boats, or encircling the ships with wooden booms to trap the torpedoes at a distance.

One historically notable naval action was the attack of the H. L. Hunley a submarine launched from Charleston, South Carolina against Union blockade ships. The ''Hunley'' made her first and only attack on the night of February 17 , 1864 , against the USS ''Housatonic'' . The ''Housatonic'' sank with the loss of 5 crew; the ''Hunley'' also sank, taking her crew of 9 to the bottom.


Major Engagements

Early battles in support of the blockade included the Blockade of , and the Blockade of the Carolina Coast, August-December 1861. {Link without Title}

The Battle Of Mobile Bay , August 5 , 1864 closed the last major Confederate port in the Gulf of Mexico.


END OF THE BLOCKADE

As the Union fleet grew in size, speed and sophistication, more and more ports came under Federal control. After 1862, only three ports-- Wilmington, North Carolina , Charleston, South Carolina , and Mobile, Alabama --remained open for the 75 to 100 blockade runners in business. Charleston was shut down by Admiral John A. Dahlgren 's South Atlantic Blockading Squadron in 1863. Mobile Bay was captured in August, 1864, by Admiral David Farragut (tied to the rigging of his flagship, he cried out, "Damn the Torpedo es! Full steam ahead!"). Blockade runners faced an increasing risk of capture--in 1861 and 1862, one sortie in 9 ended in capture; in 1863 and 1864, one in 3. By war's end, imports had been choked to a trickle as the risk of capture soared to 50% per sortie. Some 1,100 blockade runners were captured (and another 300 destroyed) in the most effective blockade the world had ever seen. British investors frequently made the mistake of reinvesting their profits in the trade; when the war ended they were stuck with useless ships and rapidly depreciating cotton. In the final accounting, perhaps half the investors took a profit, and half a loss.

In , 1865 , closing the last major Confederate port.

"The Union victory at Vicksburg in July of 1863 opened up the Mississippi River and effectively cut off the western Confederacy as a source of troops and supplies. The fall of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina early in 1865 closed the last major port for blockade runners, and in quick succession Richmond was evacuated, the Army of Northern Virginia disintegrated, and General Lee surrendered. Thus, most economists give the Union blockade a prominent role in the outcome of the war." (Elekund, 2004)



SQUADRONS OF THE UNION BLOCKADE

The Union naval ships enforcing the blockade were divided into Squadron s based on their area of operation.


Gulf Blockading Squadron

The Gulf Blockading Squadron was a Squadron of the United States Navy in the early part of the American Civil War . The squadron was the largest in operation.

It was split into the East and West Gulf Blockading Squadrons in early 1862.


Commanders



West Gulf Blockading Squadron

The West Gulf Blockading Squadron was a Squadron of the United States Navy during the American Civil War . It was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops.

It was created early in 1862 when the Gulf Blockading Squadron was split between the East and West Gulf Blockading Squadron . Admiral David Farragut 's USS ''Hartford'' was the Flagship .

The squadron was merged into the Gulf Squadron on July 13 1865 .


Commanders



North Atlantic Blockading Squadron

The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was a Squadron of the United States Navy during the American Civil War . It was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops.

It was created when the Atlantic Blockading Squadron was split between the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadron s on 29 October 1861 . After the end of the war, the squadron was merged into the Atlantic Squadron on 25 July 1865 .

The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was based at Hampton Roads, Virginia and was tasked with coverage of Virginia and North Carolina .


Commanders



Ships



South Atlantic Blockading Squadron

The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was a Squadron of the United States Navy during the American Civil War . It was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops.

It was created when the Atlantic Blockading Squadron was split between the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons on 29 October 1861 . After the end of the war, the squadron was merged into the Atlantic Squadron on 25 July 1865 .


EXTERNAL LINKS

  • American Civil War Research & Discussion Group - [http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FieldsOfConflict/ Fields Of Conflict] - Containing 1500+ Links And 400+ Articles.

  • http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm

  • http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/autumn/art5-a98.htm

  • http://www.sc.edu/uscpress/1993older/9799.html

  • http://www.tcr.org/tcr/essays/CB_Blockade.pdf



REFERENCES

  • Browning Robert M., Jr. ''From Cape Charles to Cape Fear. The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War.'' Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993.

  • Buker George E. ''Blockaders, Refugees, and Contrabands: Civil War on Florida's Gulf Coast, 1861-1865''. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993.

  • Elekund, RB, Jackson JD, Thornton M. "The 'Unintended Consequences' of Confederate Trade Legislation." ''Eastern Economic Journal'', Spring 2004) {Link without Title}

  • Wise Stephen R. ''Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running during the Civil War''. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988.