Information AboutDieppe Raid |
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1942 . A scout car has been abandoned.]] The Dieppe Raid, also known as '''The Battle of Dieppe''' or '''Operation Jubilee''', during World War II , was an Allied attack on the German -occupied port of Dieppe, France on August 19 , 1942 . Over 6,000 Infantry men, predominantly Canadian , were supported by large British Naval and Air contingents. Intended to seize and hold a major port for a short period, both to prove it was possible and to gather intelligence from prisoners and captured materials while assessing the German responses, the raid was also intended to use air power to draw the '' Luftwaffe '' into a large, planned encounter. The raid was generally considered to be an unmitigated tactical disaster, with no major objectives accomplished and 4,384 of the 6,086 men who made it ashore killed, wounded, or captured. The RAF and RCAF failed to lure the ''Luftwaffe'' into open battle, and lost 119 planes, whilst the Royal Navy suffered 555 casualties. The catastrophe at Dieppe may have later influenced Allied preparations for Operation Torch and D-Day . THE PLAN The origins of the raid are rather unusual. Various raids had been planned, but the Dieppe raid was brought into reality only by the desires of the new Chief of Combined Operations, Louis Mountbatten . One of Mountbatten's principal assistants, Captain John Hughes-Hallett , served as Naval Commander of the raid. The actual raid was undertaken ''without'' the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and many elements in the planning suffered from the unofficial nature of the raid. The previous Chief of Combined Operations , Roger Keyes , who had commanded the famous raid on Zeebrugge in 1918 , had been ordered to organize raids on occupied Europe. He was replaced by Mountbatten in 1941 , through the direct intervention of Winston Churchill , and a number of raids took place – notably on Vaagso , Bruneval , and the larger attack on St Nazaire . Detractors of Mountbatten have contended that all the raids prior to Dieppe were originated under the leadership of Keyes. ''Operation RUTTER'' The 1942 raid on Dieppe was initially planned for July and '' into a large, planned encounter and the use of Canadian troops would, it was hoped, satisfy the Canadian commanders following the long inactivity of Canadian forces in England. Churchill grew more supportive as the Defeats In Northern Africa incited a wave of press and parliamentary criticism. RUTTER was approved in May 1942. It consisted of a main attack onto the Dieppe town beach, two flanking attacks by Paratroops , a thousand sorties by Allied air forces and a naval bombardment. The Canadian 2nd Division would lead the attack, elements advancing as far as Arques . The operation was scaled down, especially the RAF bombing support as destruction of the town was not desired, but the troops boarded their ships on 5 July . The weather became much worse while the ships were still in harbour and on 7 July the operation was cancelled. ''Operation JUBILEE'' Almost all concerned believed that a raid on Dieppe was now out of the question; however, though Montgomery wanted it cancelled indefinitely, Mountbatten did not. He began reorganising the raid from 11 July as ''Operation JUBILEE''. Despite not receiving Combined Chiefs of Staff authorisation, Mountbatten instructed his staff to proceed in late July. This lack of top-level go-ahead resulted in certain dislocations in the planning. For example, the failure to inform the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Inter-Service Security Board meant none of the intelligence agencies were involved, so no current information was added. It was later suggested detailed information was communicated to the Germans by their agents in Britain and by Eduard Hempel in Ireland . Post-war examination of German and British intelligence records has failed to substantiate this; while it did find British intelligence lacking in its assessment of Dieppe, particularly its defences. No comprehensive security measures were considered for the troops involved after the original ''Operation RUTTER'' was cancelled. Order of battle See Also: Operation Jubilee order of battle Operation JUBILEE still relied on the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division to attack Dieppe, Puys and Pourville , while the paratroop assault on the flank gun batteries was replaced by an Amphibious Assault by Commandos . No.4 Commando to attack Varengeville and Quiberville to the west and No.3 Commando to attack Berneval to the east. 50 Men of the new US Rangers were interspersed among the Commandos, and a small composite special section from SSRF , SOE , SIS and No.10 (Inter Allied) Commando conducted limited intelligence. Ground support was provided by thirty of the new Churchill Tank s, delivered using the new LCT s. Dieppe was weakly defended in terms of quality of soldiers, though in numbers was up to strength. In respect of Machine Gun s, Mortar s and Artillery it was adequately protected with a concentration on the main approach, (particularly in the myriad of cliff caves), and with a reserve at the rear. The 571st Infantry Regiment, 302nd Static Infantry Division , was firmly category two and their commander, '' Generalmajor '' Conrad Haase, wisely kept them concentrated in the town with the heavier guns carefully concealed. Elements of the 571st defended the Radar Station near Pourville and the battery over the Scie at Varengeville. To the west the 570th Infantry Regiment manned a battery at Berneval. The Air Forces The massive Allied air support for the operation amounted to about 70 s and about 100 bombers from ''Kampfgeschwader 2'' (KG2), KG45 and KG77, mostly Dornier 217 s. On paper at least, the Allies would have a significant numerical advantage. However, the air battle would be fought entirely over German-controlled territory. THE ATTACK Almost 252 ships left various ports on the night of 18 August and as they approached the French coast. Early on the 19th things began to go wrong. Left Flank, Yellow Beaches: No. 3 Commando The ships carrying No. 3 Commando, approaching to the east, and due to the '' Ad Hoc '' nature of the operation not warned of its known schedule, ran into a German Convoy . German S-boat s Torpedo ed some of the LCT s; coastal defences were alerted and 80% of the attacking force was destroyed. Only a handful of the scattered Allied craft landed and from these only 18 Commandos reached and engaged their target. Unable to destroy any of the guns, they were able to snipe on gun crews and prevent them firing on the main assault. Right Flank, Orange Beaches: No. 4 Commando No. 4 Commando landed in force and destroyed their targets, providing the only success of the operation. Most of No. 4 safely returned to England. This portion of the raid was considered a model for future commando raids. Lord Lovat became famous as an officer here on Orange Beach. Main Assault: Canadians The Canadians in the centre suffered greatly, at least in part due to the inexperience of Roberts, who unwisely committed the reserve force to the main beaches. Poor small unit leadership has also been blamed for failures once men went ashore. The landing at Puys by the Royal Regiment Of Canada was delayed and the potential advantages of surprise and darkness were lost. The well-placed German forces held the Canadians that did land on the beach with little difficulty. 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 made it back to England. The beach was defended by just 60 Germans, who at no time felt the need to reinforce their position. Several platoons of the Black Watch were also employed at Blue Beach; some of their casualties were suffered in a Grenade-priming accident on the transport ships during the channel crossing. On the other side of the town at Pourville the South Saskatchewan Regiment and The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders Of Canada made it ashore with few losses. The Saskatchewan advance on Dieppe was soon halted while the Camerons were halted just short of their objective. Both regiments suffered more as they withdrew; the bravery of the landing craft crew allowed 341 men to embark but increasing pressure meant that the rest were left to surrender. Another 141 had died. The main attack was at three points: the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (Calgary Tanks) in the middle with the Essex Scottish to the east and The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry to the west. Attacking thirty minutes after the flanking assaults and onto a steep pebble beach all the groups were met with intense fire. The eastern assault was held at the beach. The western assault gained a hold in a shore-front casino but few soldiers made it across the road and they were soon held. The tanks arrived a little late to discover their landing point was difficult. Twenty-nine tanks disembarked but only fifteen managed to climb the beach and cross the sea-wall onto the esplanade under unrelenting fire. However, they were completely stopped by Anti-tank blocks, were immobilized, or returned to the beach. The Engineers whose job it was to clear such obstacles were unable to do so because of heavy fire which the tanks could not suppress. Back on the beach, the tanks provided fire support as they could and covered the retreat. The supporting Naval Bombardment was supplied by Destroyer s, which did not have sufficient weight of broadside or range to destroy the German strongpoints without themselves coming under heavy fire. They were also not able to communicate directly with the those on shore to make their bombardment effective. The debacle was compounded when, acting on fragmentary messages, the reserve were committed to the Dieppe beach at around 07.00. The 584 men of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal took fire all the way to the beach and on it. Only 125 made it back to England. The other part of the reserve comprised 369 men of No.40 Commando Royal Marines, ''(their first engagement and at this time termed 'A' Commando Royal Marines)'', who were ordered to White Beach. The first of their craft landed under withering machine gun fire and their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph "Tiger" Phillips, donned white gloves to Semaphore away the following craft, being hit and killed in the process. All but one saw the signal and complied, though several craft were already hit. None ashore achieved more than a matter of yards. At 10:50 a general order to retreat was issued. AFTERMATH Heavy losses Casualty figures vary: according to one source, of 6,090 men, 1,027 were killed and 2,340 captured. The Official History of the Canadian Army: Six Years of War (Vol 1 2nd ed) gives the figures of 907 Canadians being killed (including while In Captivity ) while about 2,210 Canadians out of the 4,963 that were sent made it back to England (it must be noted that nearly 1,000 of these never landed). (The Canadian source took mainly into account Canadian losses) The total number of fatal and non-fatal casualties, some of whom were evacuated off the beach, is given as 3,367. Overhead the Allied air forces lost 119 aircraft while the ''Luftwaffe'' lost just 46. The German commanders were impressed by the bravery displayed but condemned the attack, as it "mocked all rules of military strategy and logic." POW policies It transpired that a senior Canadian officer, Brigadier William Southam, had brought ashore his copy of the assault plan, which was a secret document. Though he attempted to bury it under the pebbles at the time of the surrender, Southam's action was spotted and the plan retrieved by the Germans. The plan (later criticized for its size and needless complexity) contained orders to shackle prisoners. In addition there were reports of German POWs’ bodies washing ashore with their hands tied. When this was brought to Hitler 's attention he ordered the shackling of Canadian prisoners, which led to a reciprocating order by Churchill for German prisoners in Canada. Both orders quickly lost momentum in Prison Camps till being abandoned after intercession by the Swiss . It is however, believed to have contributed to Hitler's decision to issue his Commando Order later that year. Second Front There have been various attempts to re-evaluate the raid against larger objectives. Picknet, Prince & Prior ("Friendly Fire" 2005) describe the raid's origins arising from fundamental disagreements between the Allies over strategy. Russia was demanding a Second Front Be Opened Immediately, To Relieve The Pressure On Them Of German Attack . They suspected the West of being quite happy to see the Communist and Nazi destroy each other. Roosevelt in reality was eager to accommodate Stalin, and also motivated by Domestic Politics . Left-wingers were following the Soviet line, former anti-war Isolationist s were asking pointedly why Japan was not to be dealt with first, and the Press were impatient for action either way. Without consulting his other ally he therefore promised to Molotov during meetings in Washington May/June 1942, that he was prepared to hazard up to 120,000 men that year to help relieve pressure on the Russian Front (knowing well that they could not and would not be American forces, still organizing and building up). Churchill was aghast. While he fully appreciated the need to keep Russia in the war and America focused on the European Theatre , and therefore saw the political logic for a show of force, understandably he balked at a full-scale strategic commitment uncertain of success. One Gallipoli in a lifetime was quite enough. Playing for time, he agreed to countersign their Washington Communique promising a second front in 1942, on the understanding it was to be "misinformation". The raid became the British response to this American and Russian '' Fait Accompli '', a counterpart, unasked for "compromise". No evidence has ever come to light to support the dark rumours the operation was deliberately sabotaged. Nevertheless its failure had a desirable effect for the British on American overconfidence. One example of this retrospective justification was the presence by 1943 of 33 divisions on the Atlantic Wall . Lessons Learned Some have argued that the hard lessons learned at Dieppe in 1942 were put to good use later in the war. The Amphibious Assault s at North Africa were only 3 months away. The more successful Normandy Landings would occur later in 1944. Others still maintain amphibious assaults had already been developed in a modern sense as early as Gallipoli , and the lessons allegedly learned at Dieppe would have been made in subsequent operations such as Operation HUSKY or the landings at Salerno and Anzio . Regardless, due to experience at Dieppe, the British developed a whole range of specialist armoured vehicles to allow their engineers to perform many if not all of their tasks under armour. These vehicles were used to great effect in the British and Canadian landing in Normandy in 1944. There were also huge improvements made in shore-to-sea communications, and many more and bigger ships available for ship-to-shore bombardment support. Trivia
SEE ALSO FILMS ''Dieppe,'' Television Docudrama , 1993. Critical of Mountbatten and another planner, General Montgomery , and based on Brian Loring-Villa's book, listed below. Discussion of the film and the raid here . The film is an excellent portrayal of life for the common soldier of the Canadian Army in England. Low budget means only the attack on Blue Beach is depicted, but is done so accurately. Acting and script is well above average. ''Dieppe: Don't call it a failure'' Documentary . Rebuttal to the above. Film manuscript ''Dieppe'', Bell Canada television commercial (?2003) depicts a modern-day Canadian traveler calling his grandfather at home in Canada from France. When the grandfather inquires about Paris, the traveler reports that he is actually in Dieppe, and called to offer his thanks. Broadcast in the days prior to Remembrance Day (November 11), this has been both hailed (for its emotional recognition of past sacrifice) and criticized for exploiting same for commercial gain. POPULAR CULTURE The song "Nautical Disaster" by the Canadian rock band The Tragically Hip from their 1994 album Day For Night uses what is believed to be imagery of the Dieppe raid as a metaphor for a difficult or failing relationship between the singer and his counterpart, a woman named Susan. The singer describes a dream about a battle "off the coast of France." Details which bear resemblance to the Dieppe raid are the location, the casualty count, and the description of a panicked evacuation. The song "Dieppe", by French-Canadian folk-rock band ''Vilain Pingouin'' (appearing on their 1990 epoynmous album) speaks indirectly of the sacrifice of war and the proud, combative and fatally stubborn French-Canadian attitude of the time, as well as the disagreement between the Allied forces command. The lyrics of longest song on the album (4:36), "Dieppe", are in French, and never include any direct name references. Only concepts are explored. The lyrics are written by singer Rudy Caya. REFERENCES
While dozens of books have been written on the subject, the three titles above are generally considered the best. The first contains a great deal of first person detail; the second is a detailed and very scholarly look at high level planning almost exclusively, and the last is a mixture of both first person account (Whitaker was the only officer of his brigade to return from the main beach unwounded and later commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in Northwest Europe) and scholarly history. Villa's book offers up tantalizing theories on deliberate leaks of information to the Germans, and attempts to prove the thesis that Admiral Mountbatten mounted the raid without approval from above. Whitaker's book attempts to prove that valuable lessons were learned at Dieppe and may be forgiven for some measure of bias due to his personal involvement in the historical action. Robertson's book is the most even-handed but suffers from being written before many files were available to researchers, especially those relating to Ultra . FURTHER READING
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