| British European Airways Flight 548 |
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| airliner crashes caused by pilot incapacitation | |
| aviation accidents and incidents in 1972 | |
| 1972 in the united kingdom | |
| history of surrey | |
| aviation accidents and incidents in the united kingdom | |
| SHOPPER'S DELIGHT | |
On June 18 , 1972 , British European Airways Flight 548, a Hawker-Siddeley Trident 1B operated by British European Airways (BEA), crashed two minutes after takeoff from Heathrow Airport , killing all 118 passengers and crew on board. The crash occurred close to the town of Staines in Surrey , United Kingdom , and was until the Lockerbie Disaster of 1988 the worst air accident to have occurred on British soil. The aircraft, registered as G-ARPI and known familiarly as "Papa India", was on a scheduled flight from London to Brussels under the command of Captain Stanley Key, one of BEA's most senior captains. 22-year-old Second Officer J.W. Keighley sat in the right-hand seat, while the slightly more experienced 24-year-old Second Officer S. Ticehurst acted as monitoring pilot. During the climb-out from Heathrow, while the aircraft was flown at the correct speed for the configuration, the leading-edge lift-augmentation droop was prematurely retracted. This led to a series of Stall s. The condition was not rectified by the pilots despite the operation of the Stick Shaker , and the aircraft entered a Deep Stall from which there was no possibility of recovery. The aircraft rapidly descended in a high nose-up attitude until striking the ground close to the A30 near the King George VI Reservoir on the outskirts of Staines. There was no fire on impact, which was unusual for the flat descent crash the plane committed. The question facing the Air Accidents Investigation Branch was the underlying cause of the crash. Although the immediate cause of the stall was easily determined, detailed examination of the wreckage and Flight Recorder revealed no evidence of any mechanical or Structural Failure . Investigators soon discovered, however, that Human Factors likely played a major role. At the time of the accident, BEA was involved in a labour dispute with the British Air Line Pilots Association . Approximately one hour before the flight, the vehemently anti-union Captain Key had entered into a heated argument with another captain about the desirability of strike action. Both of Key's subordinate officers on the flight were present during the confrontation. Also, among the wreckage of Papa India, investigators found a crew table on which the following offensive graffiti directed at the captain had been scribbled:
A handwriting examiner testified at the inquiry that neither S/O Ticehurst or S/O Keighley were responsible for the graffiti. It is not known if Captain Key saw it on the day of the accident. Post-mortems of the accident victims showed that all on board had died from injuries received in the accident. However, the Autopsy of Captain Key also revealed undiagnosed Coronary Artery Disease , including evidence of a small healed and possibly silent Heart Attack . More telling, a recent tear was found in the inner lining of the left descending Coronary Artery . Two Cardiologists who examined the Captain's remains testified that the tear probably occurred during or after his outburst in the flight crew room. The cardiologists were not agreed as to the level of incapacitation likely experienced by Captain Key in the minutes and seconds preceding his death, but both felt that the Captain would have been distracted to some extent by the developing cardiac event. The AAIB also examined a number of crew interaction aspects which it found wanting, including Captain Key's forbidding personality and S/O Keighley's previously documented lack of initiative in simulated emergency situations. The Board also examined how BEA's training schedule for new hires had been disrupted by the labour dispute, leaving inexperienced pilots like S/O Keighley unable to undertake the more complicated but less critical duties of monitoring pilot and in effect forcing them into the role of first officer long before they were ready for that position. The main questions remained, however: who moved the droop retraction lever, and why was action not taken to correct the error? Furthermore, did the crew override the automatic stall warning system because prior experience with false activations led them to believe it was unreliable, or did a medical emergency in the cockpit distract the crew from its duties? The AAIB ultimately could not determine a probable cause for the accident. Based on evidence presented during the inquiry, the Board made a series of recommendations with respect to operation of the Trident, crew training, cockpit resource management, Cockpit Voice Recorder s, and effective medical examinations. The Board's findings were confirmed by a judicial inquiry under Mr Justice Lane . SEE ALSO EXTERNAL LINKS AND REFERENCES
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