| Battle Of The Coral Sea |
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The Battle of the Coral Sea, in early May 1942 , was one of the major turning points of the Pacific War . It was the first battle in which Aircraft Carrier s engaged each other, and the first naval battle in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon each other. The engagement ended with no clear victor, but the damage suffered, and experience gained by both sides, during and after the conflict, set the stage for the Battle Of Midway one month later. BACKGROUND In early 1942, having conquered nearly all of Southeast Asia in just a few months, Imperial Japan was at the apex of its power. Still reeling from a long series of humiliating defeats, the Allies were just beginning to develop the skills and organize the material assets needed to survive and, eventually, to strike back. Allied strategy at this time was focused on a defensive build-up of the United States Army and Marine strength on New Caledonia (well to the south of the Solomon Islands ), and Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force units in the south and east of the Australian Territory of New Guinea , just north of Australia itself. On March 12 the Prime Minister of Japan, General Hideki Tojo , said: ''Australia and New Zealand are now threatened by the might of the Imperial forces, and both them should know that any resistance is futile. If the Australian Government does not modify her present attitude, their continent will suffer the same fate as the Dutch East Indies .'' {Link without Title} In April 1942, Japanese forces left their new stronghold of (Operation "MO"), and another against Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. The intention was threefold: to establish control of the Solomons, initially with a seaplane base; to destroy, and then occupy Port Moresby (the last Allied base between Japan and Australia); and in doing these things, to bring the American aircraft carrier fleet to battle for the first time in the war. Historians remain divided about Japanese longer-term intentions. There seems little doubt Japan planned to greatly strengthen their hold on the Solomon Islands, as a bastion against any future US counter-attacks; a reasonable probability northern Australia would be invaded; and considerable doubt about the following strategies, if any were planned. In practice, Japanese military planning structure was complex, had ill-defined areas of responsibility, and was crippled by endless, bitter debates between the army and navy. Regarding longer-term Japanese plans in the South Pacific, there is only one firm deduction: whatever strategy the navy put forward would be challenged by an army counter-plan. Three Japanese fleets set sail: the invasion forces for the Solomons and Port Moresby, and a covering force of two large modern aircraft carriers, already in the Coral Sea under the command of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher , USS ''Lexington'' (CV-2) en route, and a joint Allied surface fleet. The carriers USS ''Hornet'' (CV-8) and USS ''Enterprise'' (CV-6) were heading south, after the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo , but arrived too late to take part in the battle. THE BATTLE ''Lexington'' arrived to join ''Yorktown'' on May 1 st. The Japanese occupied Tulagi without incident on May 3rd, and construction of a seaplane base began. After fuelling, ''Yorktown'' closed on Tulagi and, on May 4 , launched three successful strikes against Japanese shipping and aircraft there — revealing the presence of an American carrier to the enemy, but sinking the destroyer ''Kikuzuki'' , sinking 5 merchant ships, crippling the island's Seaplane reconnaissance capability, and damaging other vessels, before retiring to the south to rendezvous with the ''Lexington'' and the newly-arrived cruisers. Meanwhile, the two large Japanese carriers were approaching from south of the Solomons — neatly placing the Allied fleet between the two Japanese fleets. Land-based B-17 's attacked the gradually-approaching Port Moresby invasion fleet on May 6 , with the usual lack of success. Almost another year would pass before air forces realized that high-level bombing raids upon moving naval targets were pointless. Although both carrier fleets flew extensive searches on the 6th, cloudy weather kept them hidden from each other, and the two fleets spent the night only 70 miles apart. Other allied aircraft joined the battle, from airbases at Cooktown and Iron Range on Cape York Peninsula Australia. That night Fletcher, mindful that his primary role was to protect Port Moresby, took the difficult decision to detach the Allies' main surface fleet, under the Australian Rear Admiral John Crace , to block the probable course of an invasion fleet. Crace's force consisted of the cruisers HMAS ''Australia'' , USS ''Chicago'' , HMAS ''Hobart'' , and the destroyers USS ''Perkins'' , USS ''Walke'' and USS ''Farragut'' . Fletcher and Crace knew that exposing surface ships to attack by land-based aircraft, without air cover was to risk a repeat of the Sinking Of HMS ''Prince Of Wales'' And HMS ''Repulse'' five months before. Their fears were realised when the cruisers were located by a squadron of Japanese Torpedo Bomber s, and came under intense air attack, on the afternoon of May 7 . Whether as a result of luck or skill, the Allied ships escaped with few casualties and little damage. Only a matter of minutes after the Japanese raid, Crace's force was inadvertently attacked by friendly B-17s, and ''Farragut'' and ''Perkins'' once again survived narrow misses. On the 7th, both fleets flew off all available aircraft, but neither found the main body of the other, and both mistakenly attacked subsidiary forces. Japanese aircraft found and attacked the US fleet oiler USS ''Neosho'' (AO-23) and the escorting destroyer USS ''Sims'' (DD-409) , mistaking them for a carrier and a cruiser. ''Sims'' was sunk, while ''Neosho'' was crippled. Meanwhile, the US aircraft had missed ''Shokaku'' and ''Zuikaku'' but found the invasion fleet, in company with the small carrier ''Shoho'', which was soon sunk with heavy casualties. In the previous five months, the Allies had lost a dozen battleships and carriers, and had been unable to sink a single major Japanese unit in return. ''Shoho'' was small by carrier standards, but the laconic "scratch one flattop", radioed back to the ''Lexington'', brought news of the first Allied naval success of the Pacific war. Finally, with dawn searches on May 8 , the main carrier forces located one another, and launched maximum effort raids, which passed each other in the air. Hidden by rain, ''Zuikaku'' escaped detection, but ''Shokaku'' was hit three times by bombs. Listing, and on fire, ''Shokaku'' was unable to land her aircraft, and effectively, was put out of action. Both American carriers were hit by the Japanese strike: ''Yorktown'' by a bomb; the larger, less maneuverable ''Lexington'', by both bombs and torpedoes. Although she survived the immediate damage, and was thought to be repairable, leaking aviation fuel exploded a little over an hour later. The ''Lexington'' had to be abandoned and torpedoed, to prevent her capture. Crace's force continued to stand between the invasion force, and Port Moresby. Inoue was misled by returning fliers' reports, as to the strength of the Allied cruiser-destroyer force, and ordered the invasion fleet to return. With ''Shokaku'' damaged and ''Zuikaku'' short of aircraft, neither was able to take part in the crucial Battle Of Midway a month later. The damaged ''Yorktown'' returned to Pearl Harbor. SIGNIFICANCE In tactical terms, the Japanese had had a narrow victory: one small carrier lost and a large carrier severely damaged, against the Americans' loss of a large carrier and significant damage to another. But from the Allied point of view, after five months of continuous defeat, a battle that came out almost even was close enough to a victory as not to matter. In strategic terms, the Allies had won as the seaborne invasion of Port Moresby was averted. Moresby was vital to Allied strategy, and could not have been defended by the ground forces then stationed there. Without a toehold in New Guinea, the subsequent Allied advance, difficult though it was, would have been much harder still. As a result of the Coral Sea battle, the Japanese were forced to attempt taking Moresby overland. The consequent delay was just long enough to permit the arrival of veteran AIF soldiers to fight the Kokoda Track Campaign and the Battle Of Milne Bay , which in turn relieved pressure on US forces at the Battle Of Guadalcanal . The US Navy learned a great deal from the Battle of the Coral Sea. From the loss of ''Lexington'', the Navy learned better ways to contain aviation fuel, and control defensive fighter aircraft; from the attacks on the Japanese carriers, it learned more about coordination of dive-bombers and torpedo bombers to best effect (too late to help with Midway, but of value longer-term), and, perhaps most importantly of all, it learned that the Japanese could perhaps be beaten. The loss of ''Lexington'' was a severe blow, but in time, the US was able to replace the ship, aircraft, and trained crew with others, superior in all respects. The damage to ''Yorktown'' was estimated to require months in port, but she could still operate aircraft, and in a miracle of improvisation, she was made more-or-less battle-worthy after just three days in Pearl Harbor, and was then able to play a vital part in one of the most important battle of the Pacific war: Midway. Although ''Zuikaku'' was only slightly damaged, with only 40 aircraft left, she was in no condition to fight, and had to return to Japan to replenish her wings. ''Shokaku'' had been severely damaged, unable to operate aircraft, and took six months to repair. Neither carrier was able to take part in the crucial battle of Midway—a very close-fought encounter that either carrier may have been able to have turned. SEE ALSO
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