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Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (born 1935 , Bhopal , India ) is a Pakistan i Metallurgical Engineer widely regarded as the founder of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons development programme. (His middle name is also, occasionally, rendered as '''Quadeer''', '''Qadir''' or '''Gadeer''' and his given names are often abbreviated to '''A.Q.'''). In January 2004 , he confessed to having been involved in a clandestine international network of Nuclear Weapons Technology Proliferation from Pakistan to Libya , Iran and North Korea . On February 5 , 2004 , the President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf , announced that he had Pardon ed Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan.

In an August 23 , 2005 interview with Kyodo News General Pervez Musharraf confirmed that Dr. A.Q. Khan had supplied Gas Centrifuge s and gas centrifuge parts to North Korea and, possibly, an amount of Uranium Hexafluoride gas. {Link without Title}


EARLY CAREER

Born in 1935 into a middle-class Muslim family in Bhopal , India , Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's family migrated to Pakistan in 1952 following the country's separation from India five years earlier. He qualified as an engineer at the University Of Karachi , Pakistan before moving, after graduation, to Germany , The Netherlands and Belgium for further studies, earning a Ph.D. from the Catholic University Of Leuven in Belgium in 1972 .

That same year, he joined the staff of the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, or FDO, in Amsterdam , The Netherlands. FDO was a subcontractor for URENCO, the Uranium enrichment facility at Almelo in the Netherlands , which had been established in 1970 by the United Kingdom , Germany and the Netherlands to assure a supply of Enriched Uranium for European Nuclear Reactor s. The URENCO facility used secret Zippe-type Centrifuge technology to separate fissionable U-235 from U-238 by spinning a mixture of the two isotopes at up to 100,000 revolutions a minute. The technical complexity of this system is the main obstacle to would-be nuclear weapons powers developing their own Uranium enrichment facilities.

In May 1974 , India tested a Nuclear Bomb , to the great alarm of the Government of Pakistan. Around this time, Dr. A.Q. Khan had privileged access to the most secret areas of the URENCO facility as well as to documentation on the gas centrifuge technology. A subsequent investigation by the Dutch authorities found that he had passed highly-classified material to a network of Pakistani intelligence agents, although, they found no evidence that he was sent to the Netherlands as a spy, nor were they able to determine whether he approached his Government or whether it was the other way around. He left the Netherlands suddenly in January 1976 and was put in charge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development programme with the support of then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto .

The former Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers , revealed in early August 2005 that the Netherlands knew of Dr. A.Q. Khan stealing nuclear secrets but let him go on two occasions after the CIA expressed their wish to continue monitoring his movements. {Link without Title}


DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Dr. A.Q. Khan established the Engineering Research Laboratories at Kahuta , Rawalpindi in Pakistan in July 1976 , subsequently, renamed as the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), as it became the focal point for developing a Uranium Enrichment capability for Pakistan's nuclear weapons development programme. KRL also took on many other weapons development projects, including the development of the nuclear weapons-capable Ghauri Ballistic Missile . KRL occupied a unique role in Pakistani Industry , reporting directly to the Pakistani Prime Minister's Office , and having extremely close relations with the Pakistani military. The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto , has said that, during her term of office, even she was not allowed to visit the facility.

Pakistan, very rapidly, established its own Uranium enrichment capability and was, reportedly, able to produce highly-enriched Uranium by . "We did not receive any technical know-how from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in this connection."

In 1987 , a British newspaper reported that Dr. A.Q. Khan had openly confirmed Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. He was quoted as confirming that the U.S. intelligence report "about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is speculation of some foreign newspapers" and criticised Pakistan's detractors, who had "told the U.S. that Pakistan could never produce the [nuclear bomb and they now know we have done it." Dr. A.Q. Khan's statement was, subsequently, disavowed by the Government of Pakistan and Dr. A.Q. Khan, himself, initially, denied giving it, although, he, later, retracted his denial. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported in October 1991 that Dr. A.Q. Khan repeated his claim at a dinner meeting of businessmen and industrialists in Karachi, which "sent a wave of jubilation" through the audience.

During the 1980's and interview with the weekly ''Friday Times'' that "at no stage was the programme (of producing nuclear weapons-grade enriched Uranium) ever stopped" {Link without Title} .

The American clampdown may have prompted an increasing reliance on Chinese and North Korean nuclear and missile expertise. In 1995 , the U.S. learned that the Khan Research Laboratories had bought 5,000 specialized magnets from a Chinese Government-owned company, for use in the Uranium enrichment equipment. More worryingly, it was reported that Pakistani nuclear weapons technology was being exported to other states aspirant of nuclear weapons, notably, North Korea. In May 1998 , '' Newsweek '' magazine published an article alleging that Dr. A.Q. Khan had offered to sell nuclear know-how to Iraq, an allegation that he denied. A few weeks later, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests that, finally, confirmed both countries' development of nuclear weapons. The event was greeted with jubilation in both countries and Dr. A.Q. Khan was feted as a national hero. The President of Pakistan, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar , awarded a gold medal to him for his role in masterminding the Pakistani nuclear weapons development programme. The United States, immediately, imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan and, publicly, blamed China for assisting the Pakistanis.


INVESTIGATIONS INTO NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

Dr. A.Q. Khan's open promotion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities became something of an embarrassment to Pakistan's Government. The United States Government became increasingly convinced that Pakistan was trading nuclear weapons technology to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile technology. In the face of strong U.S. criticism, the Pakistani Government announced, in March 2001 , that Dr. A.Q. Khan was to be dismissed from his post as Chairman, KRL, a move that drew strong criticism from the religious and nationalist opposition to the President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf . Perhaps, in response to this, the Government of Pakistan, instead, appointed Dr. A.Q. Khan to the post of Special Science and Technology Adviser to the President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf , with a ministerial rank. While this could be presented as a promotion for Dr. A.Q. Khan, it removed him from hands-on management of KRL and gave the Government of Pakistan an opportunity to keep a closer eye on his activities.

Dr. A.Q. Khan came under renewed scrutiny following the September 11, 2001 Attacks in the U.S. and the, subsequent, US Invasion Of Afghanistan to oust the fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It emerged that Al-Qaeda had made repeated efforts to obtain nuclear weapons materials to build either a Radiological Bomb or a crude nuclear bomb. In late October 2001, the Pakistani Government arrested three Pakistani nuclear scientists, all with close ties to Dr. A.Q. Khan, for their suspected connections with the Taliban . Two of the nuclear scientists were, subsequently, said to have admitted having had talks with Osama Bin Laden .

The Bush Administration continued to investigate Pakistani nuclear weapons proliferation, ratcheting up the pressure on the Pakistani Government in 2001 and 2002 and focusing on Dr. A.Q. Khan's personal role. In 2002, the '' Wall Street Journal '' quoted unnamed "senior Pakistani Government officials" as conceding that Dr. A.Q. Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by the U.S. Government's suspicions of his involvement in nuclear weapons technology transfers with North Korea. It was alleged, in December 2002, that the U.S. intelligence officials had found evidence that an unidentified agent, supposedly, acting on Dr. A.Q. Khan's behalf had offered nuclear weapons expertise to Iraq in mid-1990, though Dr. A.Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation and the Pakistani Government declared the evidence as "fraudulent". The United States responded by imposing sanctions on KRL, citing concerns about ballistic missile technology transfers.


KHAN AND THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME

In August 2003 , reports emerged of dealings with Iran ; it was claimed that Dr. A.Q. Khan had offered to sell nuclear weapons technology as long ago as 1989 . The Iranian Government came under intense pressure from the United States and the European Union to make a full disclosure of its nuclear programme and, finally, agreed in October 2003 to accept tougher investigations from the International Atomic Energy Authority . The IAEA reported that Iran had established a large Uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the "stolen" URENCO designs, which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1987 ." The intermediary was not named but many diplomats and analysts pointed to Pakistan and, specifically, to Dr. A.Q. Khan, who was said to have visited Iran in 1986 . The Iranians turned over the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1's, the model developed by Dr. A.Q. Khan in the early 1980's. Two senior staff members at the Khan Research Laboratories were, subsequently, arrested in December 2003 on suspicion of having sold nuclear weapons technology to the Iranians.

That same month, on December 19 , Libya made a surprise announcement that it had weapons of mass destruction programmes which it would now abandon. The Libyan Government officials were quoted as saying that Libya had bought nuclear components from various black market dealers, including Pakistani nuclear scientists. In particular, the U.S. officials who visited the Libyan Uranium enrichment plants, shortly afterwards, reported that the gas centrifuges used there were very similar to the Iranian ones.

The Pakistani Government's blanket denials became untenable as evidence mounted of illicit nuclear weapons technology transfers. It opened an investigation into Dr. A.Q. Khan's activities, arguing that even if there had been wrongdoing, it had occurred without the Government of Pakistan's knowledge or approval. Although he was not arrested, Dr. A.Q. Khan was summoned for "debriefing". On January 25 , 2004 the investigators reported that Dr. A.Q. Khan and Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking manager at KRL, had provided unauthorised technical assistance - allegedly, in exchange for tens of millions of dollars - to Iran's nuclear weapons program in the late 1980's and early 1990's. General Mirza Aslam Beg , a former Chief of Army Staff at the time, was also said to have been implicated; the ''Wall Street Journal'' quoted the U.S. Government officials as saying that Dr. A.Q. Khan had told the investigators that the nuclear weapons technology transfers to Iran had been authorised by General Mirza Aslam Beg. On January 31 , Dr. A.Q. Khan was dismissed from his post as the Science Adviser to the President of Pakistan, ostensibly, to "allow a fair investigation" of the nuclear weapons technology proliferation scandal.

It remains to be seen whether Dr. A.Q. Khan, Mohammed Farooq and General Mirza Aslam Beg will face any charges. Dr. A.Q. Khan, however, remains an extremely popular figure in Pakistan. He is known as an outspoken nationalist and for his belief that the West is, inherently, hostile to Islam; in Pakistan's strongly anti-U.S. climate, tough action against him poses political risks for General Pervez Musharraf who, already, faces accusations of being too pro-U.S. An additional complicating factor is that few believe that Dr. A.Q. Khan acted alone and the affair risks gravely damaging the Pakistani Army, which oversaw and controlled the nuclear weapons development programme and of which General Pervez Musharraf is still the Commander-in-Chief. The same investigation also exposed South African businessman Asher Karni as having sold nuclear devices to Dr. A.Q. Khan's associates. Asher Karni is, currently, in a U.S. prison, awaiting trial.

It is widely believed that the reason Dr. A.Q. Khan was pardoned (and not executed as was the case with a previous Pakistani political leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) was because he had information hidden overseas with people he could trust, that would undermine or embarrass the current Pakistani leadership.


U.S. REACTION TO THE PARDON

The United States Government decided to leave the fate of Dr. A.Q. Khan in the hands of General Pervez Musharraf, imposing no penalties on the Pakistani Government or on individuals. The U.S. Government officials explained that in the War On Terrorism it was not their goal to denounce or imprison people, but "to get results." The White House chose not to Sanction Pakistan or to demand an independent investigation of the Pakistani Military. "It's just another case where you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar," a U.S. Government official explained.

However, in a speech to the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, the U.S. President, George W. Bush , proposed to reform the International Atomic Energy Agency : "No state, under investigation for proliferation violations, should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors - or on the new special committee. And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules." {Link without Title}

The Bush proposal was seen as targeted against Pakistan which, currently, serves a regular term on the IAEA's Board of Governors. It has not received attention from other Governments.


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