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There were three separate German attacks, codenamed ''Michael'', ''Georgette'' and ''Blucher-Yorck''. They were initially intended to draw forces away from the Channel ports that were essential for British supply and then attack the ports and other lines of communication. The planning process, however, diluted the strategy.


TACTICS

By this stage of the war, both sides had refined their tactics.

The German army had developed Stormtrooper units, with infantry trained in Hutier Tactics (after Oskar Von Hutier ) to infiltrate and bypass enemy front line units, leaving these strongpoints to be "mopped-up" by follow-up troops. The stormtroopers' tactic was to attack and disrupt enemy headquarters, Artillery units and supply depots in the rear areas, as well as to occupy territory rapidly.

Lieutenant Colonel Georg Bruchmuller {Link without Title} , a German artillery officer, developed the ''Feuerwalze'', an effective and economical artillery bombardment scheme. There were three phases: a brief attack on the enemy's command and communications, destruction of their artillery and lastly an attack upon the enemy front-line infantry defences. Bombardment would always be brief so as to retain surprise.

In their turn, the Allies had developed defences in depth, reducing the proportion of troops in their front line and pulling reserves and supply dumps back beyond German artillery range.


MICHAEL

On March 21 , 1918 the Germans launched a major offensive against British and British Imperial forces.

Erich Ludendorff , the German commander, failed to follow the correct stormtrooper tactics, as described above. His dilemma was that the most important parts of the allied line were also the most strongly held. Much of the German advance was achieved where it was not strategically significant. Because of this, Ludendorff continually exhausted his forces by attacking strongly entrenched British units and he was unable to attain victory, despite impressive advances into Allied territory.

The Allies reacted by appointing the French Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch to coordinate all Allied activity in France and then as Generalissimo of all Allied forces everywhere.

Ludendorff called off Operation ''Michael'' on March 25. By the standards of the time, there had been a substantial advance. It was, however, of little value - a Pyrrhic Victory , as Amiens , an important rail centre, remained in Allied hands. The newly-won territory would be difficult to traverse and defend against Allied counterattacks.

The Allies lost nearly 255,000 men (British, British Empire, French and American). Also lost were 1300 artillery pieces and 200 tanks. All of this could be replaced, either from British factories or from American manpower. German troop losses were 239,000 men, largely specialist shocktroops (''Stosstruppen'') who were irreplaceable.


GEORGETTE

''Michael'' had drawn British forces to defend Amiens, leaving the rail route through Hazebrouck and the approaches to the Channel ports of Calais , Boulogne and Dunkirk vulnerable. German success here could choke the British into defeat.

The attack started on April 4th after a ''Feuerwalze''. The Portuguese defenders at the point of attack were rapidly overrun but the British resistance on either flank held and threatened the German breakthrough. Despite this and other Allied actions, the Germans made rapid progress and, without French reinforcement, it was feared that the remaining 15 miles to the ports could be covered within a week. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig , issued an "Order of the Day" on April 11th stating, "With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end."

However, the German offensive had stalled because of logistical problems and exposed flanks. Counterattacks by British, French, American, Canadian and ANZAC forces had slowed and stopped the German advance. Ludendorff ended ''Georgette'' on April 30th.

As with ''Michael'', losses were roughly equal, approximately 110,000 men wounded or killed, each. Again, the results were disappointing for the Germans. Hazebrouck remained in Allied hands and the flanks of the German Salient were vulnerable.


BLUCHER-YORCK ( THIRD BATTLE OF THE AISNE )

While ''Georgette'' ground to a halt, a new attack on French positions was planned to draw forces further away from the Channel and allow renewed German progress in the north. The strategic objective remained to split the British and the French and gain victory before American forces could make their presence felt on the battlefield.

The German attack took place on May 27th, between Soissons and Rheims , after another ''Feuerwalze''. The bombardment was very effective and the Allied front, with a few notable exceptions, collapsed. Despite French and British resistance on the flanks, German troops advanced to the Marne River and Paris seemed a realistic objective. However, U.S. Army machine-gunners and Senegalese sharpshooters halted the German advance at Château-Thierry , with U.S. Marines also heavily engaged at Belleau Wood .

Yet again, losses were much the same on each side: 137,000 Allied and 130,000 German casualties (up to June 6th). German losses were again mainly from the difficult-to-replace assault divisions.

Ludendorff sought to extend ''Blucher-Yorck'' westwards with Operation ''Gneisenau'', intending to draw yet more Allied reserves south and to link with the German salient at Amiens.

The French had been alerted of this attack by information from German prisoners and their defence in depth reduced the impact of the artillery bombardment on June 9th. Nonetheless, the German advance was impressive, despite fierce French and American resistance. At Compiègne , a sudden French counter-attack on June 11th caught the Germans by surprise and halted their advance. ''Gneisenau'' was called off the following day.

Losses were approximately 35,000 (Allied) and 30,000 (German).


STRATEGIC IMPACT

The ''Kaiserschlacht'' series of offensives had yielded large, in First World War terms, territorial gains for the Germans. However, the strategic objective of a quick victory was not achieved and the German armies were severely depleted, exhausted and in exposed positions. In six months the strength of the German army had fallen from 5.1 million fighting men to 4.2 million. Manpower was exhausted. German High Command predicted they would need 200,000 men per month to make good the losses suffered, but even by drawing on the next annual class of eighteen year olds, only 300,000 recruits would be available for the year.

The Allies had been badly hurt but not broken. The lack of a unified high command was partly rectified and coordination would improve in later Allied operations. American troops were for the first time used as independent formations and had proved themselves. Their presence counterbalanced the serious manpower shortages that Britain and France were experiencing after four years of war.

Allied offensives in July ( Second Battle Of The Marne ) and August ( Hundred Days Offensive ) 1918 made rapid gains and pushed the Germans back to their original defence lines and beyond. This time, German reserves were inadequate and the German High Command advised their government to give up the war.


REFERENCES

  • John Keegan, ''The First World War''

  • Stanley Chodorow, ''Mainstream of Civilization''

  • Martin Marix Evans, ''1918 The Year of Victories''

  • Randal Gray, ''Kaiserschlacht 1918'', The Final German Offensive; Osprey Campaign Series #11, Osprey Publishing, 1991.



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