| Plan Colombia |
Article Index for Plan |
Website Links For Plan |
Information AboutPlan Colombia |
| CATEGORIES ABOUT PLAN COLOMBIA | |
| drug control law | |
| united states-south american relations | |
| government of colombia | |
| politics of colombia | |
| revolutionary armed forces of colombia | |
| military of colombia | |
|
ORIGINAL PLAN COLOMBIA The original version of Plan Colombia was officially unveiled by President Andres Pastrana in 1999 . Pastrana had first proposed the idea of a possible " Marshall Plan for Colombia" during a speech at Bogotá's Tequendama Hotel on June 8 , 1998 , nearly a week after the first round of that year's presidential elections. Pastrana argued that " crops are a social problem whose solution must pass through the solution to the armed conflict...Developed countries should help us to implement some sort of 'Marshall Plan' for Colombia, which will allow us to develop great investments in the social field, in order to offer our peasants different alternatives to the illicit crops." 2 During an August 3 , 1998 meeting, President Pastrana and U.S. President Bill Clinton discussed the possibility of "securing an increase in U.S. aid for counternarcotics projects, sustainable economic development, the protection of human rights, humanitarian aid, stimulating private investment and joining other donors and international finacial institutions to promote Colombia's economic growth". Diplomatic contacts regarding this subject continued during the rest of the year and into 1999 .Pastrana, p. 115-116; 120-122 For President Pastrana, it became necessary to create an official document that specifically "served to convene important U.S. aid, as well as that of other countries and international organizations" by adequately addressing US concerns. The Colombian government also considered that it had to patch up a bilateral relationship that had heavily deteriorated during the previous administration of President Ernesto Samper ( 1994 - 1998 ). According to Pastrana, Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering eventually suggested that, initially, the U.S. could be able commit to providing aid over a three year period, as opposed to continuing with separate yearly packages. Pastrana, p. 203 Critics and observers have referred to the differences between the earliest versions of Plan Colombia and later drafts. Originally, the focus was on achieving peace and ending violence, within the context of the ongoing peace talks that Pastrana's government was then holding with the FARC guerrillas, following the principle that the country's violence had "deep roots in the economic exclusion and...inequality and poverty." The final version of Plan Colombia was seen as considerably different, since its main focuses would deal with drug trafficking and strengthening the military. Ambassador Robert White stated: "If you read the original Plan Colombia, not the one that was written in Washington but the original Plan Colombia, there's no mention of military drives against the FARC rebels. Quite the contrary. (President Pastrana ) says the FARC is part of the history of Colombia and a historical phenomenon, he says, and they must be treated as Colombians... {Link without Title} come and ask for bread and you (America) give them stones." 9 White is the president of the Center for International Policy and former American ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador, and former No. 2 man with the U.S. Embassy in Bogota. In the final U.S. aid package, 78.12 percent of the funds for 2000 went to the Colombian military and police for counternarcotics and military operations. ''(See graph, below)'' President Pastrana admitted that most of the resulting US aid to Colombia was overwhelmingly focused on the military and on counternarcotics (68%), but argued that this was only some 17% of the total amount of estimated Plan Colombia aid. The rest, focusing mostly on social development, would be provided by international organizations, Europe, Japan, Canada, Latin America and Colombia itself. In light of this, Pastrana considered that the Plan had been unfairly labelled as "militarist" by national and international critics that focused only on the US contribution. Pastrana, p. 256-257 FINANCING In 2000 , the Clinton administration in the United States supported the initiative by committing $1.3 billion in Foreign Aid and up to five hundred Military personnel to train local forces. An additional three hundred Civilian personnel were allowed to assist in the eradication of coca. This aid was an addition to US$330 million of previously approved US aid to Colombia. US$818 million was earmarked for 2000, with US$256 million for 2001. These appropriations for the plan made Colombia the third largest recipient of foreign aid from the United States at the time. THE WAR ON DRUGS Although Plan Colombia includes components which address social aid and institutional reform, the initiative has come to be regarded by its critics as fundamentally a program of counternarcotics and military aid for the Colombian government. In the United States Plan Colombia is seen as part of the " War On Drugs ". Plan Colombia has numerous supporters in the United States Congress. Congressional supporters assert that over 1,300 square kilometres of mature coca were sprayed and eradicated in Colombia in 2003, which would have prevented the production over 500 metric tons of cocaine, stating that it eliminated upward of $100 million of the illicit income that supports drug dealers and different illegal organizations considered as terrorist in Colombia. Prominent in the aid package approved by former President Clinton is the "Push into Southern Colombia", an area that for decades has been a stronghold of Colombia's largest guerrilla organisation FARC , which is also a major Coca -producing region. This funding was earmarked for training and equipping new Colombian army counternarcotics battalions, providing them with helicopters, transport and intelligence assistance, and supplies for coca eradication. CRITICISM OF PLAN COLOMBIA Reasearch studies before Plan Colombia Plan Colombia itself didn't exist at the time of the second RAND study, but the U.S. aid package has been criticized as a manifestation of the predominant law enforcement approach to the drug trade as a whole. Guerrillas and Oil Human Rights Conditions In June 2000, Amnesty International issued a press release in which it criticized the implemented Plan Colombia initiative: During the late 1990s, Colombia was the leading recipient of US military aid in the Western Hemisphere , and due to its continuing internal conflict has the worst Human Rights record, with the majority of atrocities attributed (from most directly responsible to least directly responsible) to Paramilitary forces, Insurgent guerrilla groups and elements within the police and armed forces. A United Nations study reported that elements within the Colombian security forces, which have been strengthened due to Plan Colombia and U.S. aid, do continue to maintain intimate relationships with right-wing Death Squad s, help organize paramilitary forces, and either participate in abuses and massacres directly or, as it is usually argued to be more often the case, deliberately fail to take action to prevent them. Critics of the Plan and of other initiatives to aid Colombian armed forces point to these continuing accusations of serious abuse, and argue that the Colombian state and military should sever any persisting relationship with these illegal forces and need to prosecute past offenses by paramilitary forces or its own personnel. Supporters of the Plan assert that the number and scale of abuses directly attributable to the government's forces have been slowly but increasingly reduced. =SOA and human rights In addition, Livingstone also argues that the Colombian paramilitaries employ counter insurgency methods that US military schools and manuals have been teaching Latin American officers in Colombia and in the region at large since the 1960s, and that these manuals teach students to target civilian supporters of the guerrillas, because without such support the guerrillas cannot survive.Livingstone, p. 171 The Pastrana administration replied to critics by stating that it had publicly denounced military-paramilitary links, as well as increased efforts against paramilitaries and acted against questionable military personnel. President Pastrana argues that he implemented new training courses on human rights and on international law for military and police officers, as well as new reforms to limit the jurisdiction of military courts in cases of grave human rights abuses such as torture, genocide or forced disapperances. Pastrana, p. 87-88; 351-353 Pastrana claims that some 1300 paramilitaries were killed, captured or surrendered during his term, and that hundreds of members of the armed forces, including up to a hundred officers, were dismissed due to the existence of what it considered as sufficient allegations of involvement in abuses or suspected paramilitary activities, in use of a new presidential discretional faculty. These would include some 388 discharges in 2000 and a further 70 in 2001. Human Rights Watch recognized these events, but questioned the fact that the reasons for such discharges were not always made clear nor followed by formal prosecutions, and claimed that Pastrana's administration cut funds for the Attorney General's Human Rights Unit. 25 =Leahy Provision See Also: Leahy Law In 1997 the US Congress approved an Amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act which banned the US from giving anti-narcotics aid to any foreign military unit whose members have violated human rights. The Amendment was called the " Leahy Provision " or " Leahy Law " (named after Senator Patrick Leahy who proposed it). Partially due to this measure and the reasoning behind it, anti-narcotics aid was initially only provided to Police units, and not to the military during much of the 1990s. EXPANSION UNDER BUSH In 2001 , the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush expanded the program with the appropriation of $676 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative . Of this appropriation, approximately $380 million was targeted at Colombia. The rest went towards other South American countries covered by the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The 2001 initiative reduced the limitations on the numbers and the activities of civilian contractors, allowing them to carry and use military weapons which, according to the U.S. government, would be necessary to ensure the safety of personnel and equipment during spray missions. The United States Congress rejected amendments to the Andean initiative that would have redirected some of the money to demand reduction programs in the United States, primarily through funding of drug treatment services. Some critics have opposed the rejection of these modifications, claiming that the drug problem and its multiple repercussions would be structurally addressed by curbing the demand, and not the production, of illicit drugs, since drug crops can always be regrown and transplanted elsewhere, inside or outside Colombia and its neighboring countries, as long as there is a commercially viable market. In 2004, the United States appropriated approximately $727 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $463 million of which was targeted at Colombia. RESULTS Past results of Plan Colombia have been mixed. From the perspective of the U.S. and Colombian governments, the results of Plan Colombia have been positive. U.S. government statistics would show that a significant reduction in leftover coca (total cultivation minus eradicated coca) has been observed from peak 2001 levels of 1,698 square kilometres to an estimated 1,140 square kilometres in 2004 . It is said that a record high aerial herbicide fumigation campaign of 1,366 square kilometres in 2004 has reduced the total area of surviving coca, even as newer areas are planted. Despite this, effective reductions may appear to have reached their limits as in 2004, despite a record high aerial herbicide fumigation campaign of 1,366 square kilometres, the total area of surviving coca has remained constant, as an estimated 1,139 square kilometres in 2003 were followed by about 1,140 square kilometres in 2004. The U.S. and Colombian governments interpret this data to show a decline in potential production of cocaine, from a peak of 700 metric tons in 2001 to 460 in 2003 and 430 in 2004, as result of an increase in "newly planted fields in response to eradication," which should be less productive than mature coca. As an example of the above, it is claimed by critics that Peru and Bolivia, as countries which had earlier monopolized coca cultivations until local eradication efforts later led to the eventual transfer of that part of the illegal business to Colombia, have recently had small increases in coca production despite record eradication in Colombia, which currently accounts for about 80% of the coca base produced in South America. Supporters of the Plan and of drug prohibition in general consider that the increase has, as of yet, not been significant enough to be a sign of the above "balloon effect". QUOTES
SEE ALSO NOTES EXTERNAL LINKS Web sites Videos
FURTHER READING |
|
|