|
|
''
|
|---|
| Military Age | 18 (2005 est.)
|
| Availability | males age 18-49: 5,870,640 (2005 est.)
|
| Fit for military service | males age 18-49: 4,930,074 (2005 est.)
c |
| Reaching military age annually | males: 304,527 (2005 est.)
|
''
|
|---|
| Dollar Figure | 1.3 billion (2004 est.)
|
| Percent of GDP | N/A (Funding comes from U.S. Government)
|
''
|
|---|
| Personnel | 105,600Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - Februrary 2006 Report to Congress, 35 {Link without Title}
|
| Tanks | 10 T-55 (2005 est.) 77 T-72 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - Februrary 2006 Report to Congress, 43
|
| Armoured Personnel Carriers | 4 MT-LB , (2005 est.)180 M-113 , 600 Polish-made DZIK-3s, 36 BMP-1 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - Februrary 2006 Report to Congress, 43, 100 M1114 Jane's Defense Weekly Februrary 08th 2006, 21, 167 M1151 Jane's Defense Weekly Februrary 08th 2006, 21, 600 Turkish Oktar APC sJane's Defense Weekly Februrary 08th 2006, 21.
|
| Infantry Fighting Vehicles | 0 (2005 est.)
|
| Artillery | 0 (2005 est.)
|
| Aircraft | 0 (2005 est.)
|
The is a component of the
Iraqi Security Forces tasked with assuming responsibility for all Iraqi land-based military operations following the
2003 Invasion Of Iraq . It is currently being developed by the
Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I).
One of the many organizations created to replace the duties of the (headed by Maj. Gen.
Paul Eaton ) was the organization set up by the United States military with the responsibility of training and development of the new army. In June 2004, it was dissolved and forced to pass on that responsibility to the MNSTC-I (initially headed by Lt. Gen.
David Petraeus ) due to its focus on developing the military for traditional defense from a hypothetical invasion by its neighbors rather than providing security for the Iraqi people from the emerging threat posed by the
Iraqi Insurgency Kalev I. Sepp - Prepared Statement before the House Subcommitee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations regarding the training of Iraqi Security Forces, 2
{Link without Title} .
Training of Iraqi forces was initially done by private contractors, transitioned to coalition forces, and is now almost entirely done by Iraqi forces. In September 2004, NATO ambassadors agreed to send 200 trainers to rebuild the Iraqi army Iraqi Security and Military Force Developments: A Chronology, 4 [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060330_securityforceschronology.pdf]. This number was later increased to 300 on October 9th, 2004 Iraqi Security and Military Force Developments: A Chronology, 6 [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060330_securityforceschronology.pdf]. On November 2nd, 2004 NATO began its first eight-week training course for high level military personnel at its Joint Warfare Centre in Norway Iraqi Security and Military Force Developments: A Chronology, 7 [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060330_securityforceschronology.pdf].
According to
Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (April 2006), the Iraqi Army will ultimately be comprised of the following units.
- 91 Infantry battalions.
- 12 Special Iraqi Intervention Force battalions (highly-trained counter-insurgency battalions).
- 5 Mechanized Infantry battalions.
- 4 Tank battalions.
- 1 Special-duty security battalion.
- 9 Motor Transportation Regiments.
- 3 Mechanized combat service support battalions.
- 10 Base support units.
Iraqi Army recruits undergo a standard five-week basic training course that includes basic soldiering skills, weapons marksmanship and individual tactics. Former soldiers are eligible for an abreviated three week "Direct Recruit Replacement Training" course designed to replace regular basic training to be followed by more training once they have been assigned to a unit. Soldiers later go on to enroll in more specific advanced courses targeted for their respective fields. In addition, training is provided for aspiring Iraqi
Non-commissioned Officer s, while
Commissioned Officers receive training based on a
Sandhurst model.
CMATT's main recruiting stations are located in
Baghdad ,
Basra and
Mosul . The most desired recruits are individuals who have prior military service or are skilled in specific professions such as first aid, heavy equipment operation, food service and truck driving. A recruitment target of approximately one thousand men is desired to eventually form a 757-man battalion. Soldier fallout usually occurs due to voluntary withdrawal or failure to meet training standards.
Due to the current demand for these battalions to become active as soon as possible, the first four battalions' officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men are being trained simultaneously (in separate groups). Notable differences in training between CMATT and former training under
Saddam 's regime include schooling in human rights, the laws of land warfare, and tolerance in a multi-ethnic team.
Based on the philosophy used by the U.S. military to boost its own size in response to World War II — that an army can be built faster by focusing on the training on its leadership rather than enlisted men — CMATT has pursued a similar strategy of focusing recruitment and training on commissioned and non-commissioned officers for the remaining 23 Iraqi battalions. Upon successful completion of officer training, these groups of officers will form the battalion's leadership cadre, which will then be responsible for overseeing its own recruitment, training, and readiness of its enlisted men. It is hoped that having the Iraqi leadership train its own will overcome problems faced by CMATT's training process; namely recruitment, desertion, and unit loyalty.
When deployed, all Iraqi Army battalions have embedded U.S.
Military Transition Team s, according to the
National Strategy For Victory In Iraq . The MiTTs advise their Iraqi battalions in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics. Larger scale operations are often done jointly with American battalions. This operational training aims to make the battalion self-sustainable tactically, operationally and logistically so that the battalion will be prepared to take over responsibility for battle space.
On March 24, 2006,
MNSTC-I commander
LTG Martin E. Dempsey held a United States Department of Defense press conference on the training of the
Iraqi Security Forces .
{Link without Title} His points include
- 49 Iraqi Army battalions control battle space. So does 6 Iraqi Police battalions.
- By the end of 2006, Iraqi Security Forces will control 75 % of the country.
- By July 2006, Iraqi Security Forces will be responsible for security along all of Iraq's border.
- Iraqi Police are no longer running when police stations are attacked by insurgents.
- U.S. and Iraqi governments are creating a system to discourage and punish corruption and criminal conduct.
In an article in the
Armed Forces Journal {Link without Title} from the autumn of 2005, it is reported that
- The level of professionalism is uneven. Many soldiers are for instance stealing from civilians during patrols.
- In fighting spirit, the Iraqi Army has made substantial progress since 2003.
- The logistics system is in shambles. Ministry of Defence officials are corrupted and cannot even provide the troops with basics, such as boots or rifle ammunition.
- Young Non-commissioned Officer s are often performing very well. They are generally professional and brave. NCOs are mentored by MiTTs .
]]
Virtually all of the equipment used by the former Iraqi Army was either destroyed by the U.S. during
Operation Iraqi Freedom or was looted during the chaotic aftermath shortly after the fall of the Hussein regime. Four
T-55 tanks however have been recovered from an old army base in
Al-Muqdadiyah and are now in service with the
1st Mechanized Division .
On February 2, 2004 the U.S government announced that
Nour USA awarded $327,485,798 contract to procure equipment for both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard; however, this contract was cancelled in March 2004 when an internal Army investigation (initiated due to complaints from losing bidders) revealed that Army procurement officers in Iraq were violating procedures with sloppy contract language and incomplete paperwork.
On May 25th, 2004 the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) stated that they would award a contract worth $259,321,656 to
ANHAM Joint Venture in exchange for procuring the necessary equipment (and providing its required training) for a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 35 battalions. The minimum bid would begin to be delivered immediately and further orders could be placed until the maximum of 35 battalion sets or September of 2006 after the first order was fully delivered.
In 2005, Hungary agreed to give 77
T-72 Main Battle Tanks to the Iraqi Army, to be refurbished by
Defense Solutions . On July 29, 2005, the
United Arab Emirates gained approval to purchase 180
M113A1 APCs from Switzerland, with the intent to transfer them to Iraq as a gift.
The New Iraqi Army's adoption of American made weapons can be seen as a strategic move on the part of American foreign policy planners. It will allow the U.S. to retain significant influence over the country even after the bulk of its forces have left. Reliance on U.S. technical expertise for its sophisticated weapons systems will ensure continued American military presence in Iraq as well as handicap the New Iraqi Army from using its newly acquired technology to initiate aggression against its neighbors.
It is logically conceivable that if left to their own devices, the New Iraqi Army would likely have chosen to adopt a Russian or Russian-derivative arms platform due to cost as well as the familiarity that many (former members of Saddam's Army) have with Russian made equipment.
Iraqi National Guard, Intervention Force and Army have been consolodated and units renumbered:
Iraqi MOD/MOI units seen in press reporting/releases(ICOD 9 Mar 06):
1 Div (aka IIF): Eastern Al Anbar
- 1 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 2 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 3 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
2 Div: Ninawa
- 1 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 2 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 3 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (planned/forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
3 Div: Salah ad Din
- 1 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 2 Bde
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bde
- 3 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (planned/forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
4 Div: At Tamim
- 1 Bde
- 1 Bn (AirAslt trnd)
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bn
- 2 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bn
- 4 Bde
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (planned/forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
5 Div: Diyala
- 1 Bde
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 2 Bde
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (planned/forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
6 Div: Baghdad (Div certified)
- 1 (Cobra) Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn (AirAslt trnd)
- 4 Bn
- 5 Bn
- 2 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 3 (Muthanna) Bde
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bde
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- 5 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- 3 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
7 Div: West Al Anbar
- 1 Bde
-1 Bn
-3 Bn
- 2 Bde
-1 Bn
-2 Bn
-3 Bn
- 3 Bde (Formed/ Conducting Operations)
-1 Bn
-2 Bn
-3 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (planned/forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
8 Div: Wasit/Al Qadisiyah (Div certified)
- 1 Bde
- 2 Bn
- 2 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 3 Bde
- 3 Bn
- 4 Bde
- 1 Bn
- 2 Bn
- Mot Trans Rgt (forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
9 Mech Div: Taji/Baghdad
(current equip: 170x T72(HU)/10+x T55(IZ)/36x BMP1(GR)/32+x MTLB(IZ)/100x M113 (JO)/100x Spartan (JO))(64x BMP1(GR) enr)
- Spec Sec Inf Bn (planned)
- 1 Mech Bde (T55/MTLB equipped)
- 1 Arm Bn
- 2 Mech Bn
- 3 Mech Bn
- ? Mech Combat Service Support Bn (planned/forming)
- 2 Armor Bde (T72/BMP1 Equipped)
- 1 Arm Bn
- 2 Arm Bn
- 3 Mech Bn
- ? Mech Combat Service Support Bn (planned/forming)
- 3 Mech Bde (planned)
- ? Arm Bn (planned)
- ? Mech Bn (planned)
- ? Mech Bn (planned)
- ? Mech Combat Service Support Bn (planned/forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
10 Div: Basrah
- 1 Bde
(8x Bn formed, 2 forming)
- Mot Trans Rgt (planned/forming)
- base support unit (planned/forming)
Independent units:
- 1 SOF Bde (91 M1114 (US))
- 36 Cdo Bn
- 2 CT Bn
- 3 Service Support Bn
- 5 Spec Infrastructor Bde (5 Bn)
(3400 personnel trained)
- ? Spec Infrastructor Bde (second group training)
Equip (unk assignment):
600x DZIK3 (PL) (Purchased/unk rec)
44x Panhard M3 (TC) (rec)
713x M1114 (US) (del nlt 31 Jul 06)
16x UH1 (JO) (Under upgrade/4 rec)
20x W3 Sokol (PL) (Purchased/unk rec)
24x MI17 (RS) (Rec)
MOI Units (PO and SP Bdes being reorganized into 8x Police Bdes):
Border Guards:
? Region
? Region
? Region
? Region
? Region
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bde
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
- ? Bn
National Police Public Order Div:
- 1 Public Order Bde
- ? Public Order Bn
- ? Public Order Bn
- 3 Public Order Bn
- 2 Public Order Bde
- ? Public Order Bn
- 2 Public Order Bn
- ? Public Order Bn
- 3 Public Order Bde
- ? Public Order Bn
- ? Public Order Bn
- ? Public Order Bn
- 4 Public Order Bde
- ? Public Order Bn
- ? Public Order Bn
- ? Public Order Bn
National Police Cdo Div:
- 1 Special Police Cdo Bde
- 1 Special Police Cdo Bn
- 2 Special Police Cdo Bn
- 5 Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bde
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bde
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bde
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
- ? Special Police Cdo Bn
Independent MOI Police Units:
- 8 Police Mech Bde (current equip: 115x BTR80 (UP)/50x BTR94 (JO))
- 1 Police Mech Bn
- 2 Police Mech Bn
- 3 Police Mech Bn)
- Emergency Response Unit (Bde-)
- Highway Patrol
The New Iraq Army currently faces multiple challenges it must overcome to establish itself as the premier symbol of authority in Iraq. These include:
Based on CIA reports that coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators after the overthrow of the Hussein regime, prewar planners had only been expecting minimal if any resistance from Saddam loyalists. For a multitude of reasons, this ideal scenario has not materialized and now the New Iraqi Army faces an insurgency which has caused more coalition casualties than during the war itself. An increase in size as well as an increased sophistication in the nature of the attacks has
seriously weakened the efforts of the New Iraqi Army to maintain internal security.
As of October 5, 2005 the New Iraqi Army had 1 Battalion, or 750 soldiers, trained well enough to be "deployed independently," i.e. without the help of others such as the United States.
{Link without Title}
However, since June of 2004, the partnership between Coalition forces and Iraqi forces has increased due to the number of Battalions growing in the Iraqi army, which now stands are around 115. Out of this number, it has been deemed that 80 of them are able to carry out operations in the field with Coalition support limited to logistics and strategic planning, whilst another 20-30 battlions still need major Coalition support to carry out their operations.
Training has been impeded by domestic instability, infiltration by insurgents, and high desertion rates.
Whilst US troops have the most sophisticated and up to date equipment money can buy, the Iraqi troops have had to make do with a far lesser degree of sophistication and quality. One of the reasons for this is that the US administration is quite clearly worried about giving inexperienced Iraqi troops equipment which could end up in the hands of the insurgents. It is probably the case that once the US feels certain sections of the Iraqi Army are competent enough to take on the insurgency that they will be given superior firepower. Also, Saddam's troops used to use Russian made weapons. The new army may have to take some time to be trained for the use of American made weapons.
In 2005 the
UAE has agreed to give the Iraqi Army 132
M-113 APCs. In November of 2005 the Iraqi Army's 9th Division took delivery of 77 refurbished
T-72 's donated by
Hungary . In addition, they received 36
BMP 's at the same time, with another 64 to follow over the coming months. These gifts from allied nations will help the Iraqi army to overcome this difficulty.
Since its conception, nearly all aspects of the New Iraqi Army have been in a state of constant change to compensate for the growing insurgency. This has put additional stress on the bureaucratic and administrative elements of the army which has affected the training, equipping, and readiness of Iraqi forces.
The "de-baathification" process undertaken by CPA Chief Administrator Paul Bremer eliminated a large proportion of top leadership in the former Iraqi Army from being recruited. This absence of valuable leadership experience has severely slowed the development of the New Iraqi Army. Perhaps the most obvious example of this lack of leadership was seen when the infamous
Falluja Brigade mutinied and joined the ranks of the insurgency during the spring uprising in March of 2004.
While training of the New Iraqi Army is more or less on schedule, desertion coupled with the immediate threat posed by the insurgency has exposed how handicapped the New Iraqi Army is due to insufficient men. However, there are already thousands of Iraqi troops being trained. There are also about 5,000 new recruits every month. Some believe that by the end of the year, the Iraqi army will control as much as 75% of the country.
These are estimates compiled by the military research institute
Globalsecurity.org to predict what the New Iraqi Army needs in order to become a viable force. Numbers on the graph may change according to new developments with respect to the reconstruction of Iraq's armed forces which remain to be seen to this day.
Excluded from New Iraqi Army include:
- Former persons from regime security organizations
- Intel organizations
- Special Republican Guards
- SSO
- Ba’ath Party security and militia organizations
- Top-level Ba’ath Party members
- GlobalSecurity.org Iraq Military Guide
- GlobalSecurity.org article
- BBC article on the National Guard - Army merger
- Multi-National Force-Iraq Homepage
- DoD Press Release: ''Iraqis Eagerly Taking Responsibility for Country, General Says''
- Armed Forces Journal: ''Building an Iraqi Army''
- Kalev I. Sepp : Prepared Statement before the House Subcommitee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, March 14th, 2005
- Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq : Report to Congress, February 2006
- CIA - The World Factbook - Iraq
- Anthony H. Cordesman : Prepared Statement before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, March 14th, 2005
- [http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/02jun20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/20923.pdf Building Iraqi security forces : hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, March 14, 2005]
- Iraqi Security and Military Force Developments: A Chronology
