|
|
''
|
|---|
|
| Military age | 19 years of age
|
Availability
| males age 19-49: 5,883,828 (2005 est.)
|
Fit for military service
| males 4,749,537 (2005 est.)
|
Reaching military age annually
| males: 174,173 (2005 est.)
|
|
| Dollar figure | $7.574 billion (2003)
|
| Percent of GDP | 2.6% (2004)
|
Cited from 1
|
The (ROC) maintains a large '''
Military ''' establishment, which accounted for 16.8 % of the central budget in the
Fiscal Year of 2003. It is historically continuous with the
Nationalist Army that fled from
Mainland China to
Taiwan with the
Kuomintang at the end of the
Chinese Civil War , when the mainland was taken over by the
Communist Party Of China .
Until the 1970s, the military's primary mission was to retake mainland China.
2However, the military's current foremost mission is the defense of the islands of
Taiwan ,
Penghu ,
Kinmen ,
Matsu against an invasion by the Communists'
People's Liberation Army , which is seen as the predominant threat to the ROC
3 See page 60: "... the PLA is exploring assets and techniques for conducting information and asymmetric warfare, which are expected to diversify and sharpen the PRC's invasion into the ROC. The PRC's threat against the ROC's security is ever increasing."
4 Pages 89-90: "The PRC refusal to renounce using military power against Taiwan, its current emphasis on "enhancing
preparation for military struggle," its obvious intention of preparing a war against Taiwan reflected in operational deployment, readiness efforts, and annual military exercises in the Southeast China coastal region, and its progress in aerospace operations, information warfare, paralyzation warfare, and non-conventional warfare, all of these factors work together so that the ROC Armed Forces face an increasingly complicated and difficult situation in terms of self-defense and counterattack. These multiple daunting challenges are testing our defense security.", as the Communists have not renounced the use of military force against Taiwan in an ongoing dispute over the
Political Status Of Taiwan .
See Also: Conscription in the Republic of China
during a training exercise]]
The ROC's armed forces number approximately 300,000, and reserves reportedly total 3,870,000.
Conscription remains universal for qualified males reaching age 18. Force streamlining programs under way since 1997 are combining redundant institutions and steadily reducing the military to 270,000 personnel by 2012. However, even then there would be compulsory basic training for all males reaching 18. As the size of the force decreases, Taipei intends to gradually expand the number of volunteer soldiers with the eventual goal of forming an all volunteer military.
5
The ROC military's officer corps is generally viewed as being competent, capable, technically proficient, and generally pro-U.S. in outlook, displaying a high degree of professionalism. However, as a whole, the culture in the officer corps tends to be very cautious and conservative. The military also faces difficulties in the recruitment and retention of junior officers and NCO's due to competition with the private sector.
Morale in the enlisted corps is generally believed to be rather low, due in part to difficulties in retention of experienced NCO's, force reduction, antiquated management and a traditional military culture with very rigid command structures which discourages lower-level risk-taking, and competition with the private sector which is generally viewed as offering better opportunities, especially for the technically savvy.
6
There are, however, reports that this is changing as military benefits have been increased to compete more favourably with the private sector. In 2005 the MND exceeded its recruitment goal of volunteer enlisted personnel by almost twice the required amount. This may be indicative of changing cultural perceptions of military service as well as more experience on the part of MND recruiting officers.
Because of the historical legacy having once controlled
Mainland China , the army has traditionally been the most important of Taiwan's military forces, although this has declined in recent years with the realization that the army's role in defending against a PRC invasion is limited. For the same reason, more emphasis is being placed on the development of the navy and air force.
7 See "Reforming the Armed Forces", page 5.
The following service commands are directly subordinate to the General Staff, which in turn answers to the Minister of Defense and the ROC President:
2004 National Defense Report . See Part 3: Organization of National Defense and Armed Forces.
The
Republic Of China Coast Guard was created as a separate branch in 2001 from related police and military units and is administered by the
Executive Yuan .
''Kang Ding''-class (''Lafayette''-class) frigate with S-70C helicopter]]
Acquisitions over the next several years will emphasize modern C 4 ISR equipment that will vastly improve communications and data-sharing among services. These and other planned acquisitions will gradually shift the island’s strategic emphasis to offshore engagement of invading Chinese forces. It is hoped that this will serve to reduce civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure in the event of armed conflict.
2004 National Defense Report . See Part 2: Defense Policy and Military Strategy.
The ROC's armed forces are equipped with weapons obtained primarily from the
United States which has supplied it with 150
F-16A/B Block-20 MLU fighters,4
E-2 Hawkeye s, the licence production of
''Oliver Hazard Perry''-class Frigate s, 60
AH-1W Attack Helos , 39
OH-58D Scout Helos and 200
Patriot PAC-II SAM s among others. The United States has also authorized the sale of eight diesel submarines in 2001, although it is not clear if and how these subs are to be delivered since the United States does not build diesel submarines and other nations are unlikely to sell these weapons because of PRC pressure. As consequence Taiwan might get a modernised
''Babel''-class design. But Taiwan will take delivery of four
''Kidd''-class Destroyer s starting from late 2005. Also delivery of M109A6 units started in 2003 together with two additional E2C Hawkeyes and nine
Chinook heavy transport helos in 2004.
In 1992 the USA also agreed to sell the
AEGIS SPY 1F to Taiwan to be installed on a special version of the ''Perry''. However due to technical difficulties this plan was later given up by Taiwan.
10 In light of the continuous ballistic missile buildup by the PRC, Taipei has also expressed interest in participating in or developing
Ballistic Missile Defense capibilities, possibly in conjunction with the U.S. or Japan, though it is unclear whether the U.S. would permit such collaboration to take place.
Swaine, M., Mulvenon, J. [2001], "5", 147-152, "...BMD systems became more attractive in
some quarters in Taiwan, as they were increasingly seen as potent political
symbols of enhanced U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation."
The ROC has also procured 2 Zwaardvis MK2 class
Submarines from the
Netherlands , and 60
Mirage 2000-5Di/Ei fighters from
France together with six French
La Fayette Stealth Frigates . Also Taiwan acquired four minesweepers from Germany. These sales were made in the late 1980s/early '90s and because of PRC pressure, future large scale sales from Europe appear unlikely.
The military has also stressed military "self-reliance," which has resulted in the growth of indigenous military production in certain fields most notably the .
11 In addition the PRC has consistently attempted to block communications between the ROC military and other militaries and this has led some observers to fear that this is causing ROC's military to fall behind doctrinally.
s]]
The primary goal of the ROC Armed Forces is to provide a credible deterrent against hostile action by establishing effective counterstrike and defense capabilities. Should hostilities occur, current ROC military doctrine centers upon the principle of "offshore engagement" where the primary goal of the armed forces in any conflict with the PRC would be to keep as much of the fighting away from Taiwan proper for as long as possible to minimize damage to infrastructure and civilian casualties. The military has also begun to take the threat of a sudden "decapitation attack" by the PRC seriously. Consequently, these developments have seen a growing emphasis on the role of the Navy and Air Force (where the Army had traditionally dominated); as well as the development of rapid reaction forces and quick mobilization of local reserve forces.
2004 National Defense Report . See Part 2: Defense Policy and Military Strategy.
A series of computer simulations conducted by the ROC Ministry of National Defense in 2004 predicted that, in the event of a full scale invasion by the PRC,
Taipei would fall after almost three weeks. It also showed that the ROC Air Force would be eliminated by about the fifth day. However, the simulation results indicate that the PRC would lose about two-thirds of all its military forces in the process. The results of the simulation are hotly debated since they came at a time when the Legislative Yuan was debating one of the largest arms procurement packages in recent years.
12 Example of a simulated wargame of a cross-straits conflict.
While some reports have also indicated the presence of retired
JSDF personnel as advisors, there is no official cooperation between the ROC military and the JSDF. It is believed that any Japanese involvement in a cross-Straits conflict would be very much contingent upon the US response, due to the
Nearest US Forces in the region being based in Japan and the
Treaty Of Mutual Cooperation And Security Between The United States And Japan .
Swaine, M., Mulvenon, J. [2001], "5", 142-147, "For Taiwan’s efforts to implement pragmatic diplomacy and expand its
international space, Japan is perhaps second only to the United States in
importance... its key role in the U.S.-Japan defense alliance does offer indirect
defense support."
