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| 2004 u.s. presidential election controversy and irregularities | |
| electronic voting | |
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After the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election there were allegations of data irregularities and systematic flaws which may have affected the outcome of both the presidential and local elections. Allegations range from significant exit poll and other data irregularities potentially characteristic of fraud, to complaints voting was not conducted equally for all citizens, for example, uneven voting machine distribution which might lead to long voting lines and disenfranchisement. As the below information indicates, there are significant concerns as to whether thousands, if not millions, of votes were fairly, reliably, and accurately recorded and reported by Electronic Voting machines and central vote tabulation computers in widespread use today. SPECIFIC ISSUES RELATED TO VOTING MACHINE COMPANIES Election Systems & Software (ES&S) (40-50%) and Diebold Election Systems (DES) (30-35%) are responsible for the integrity and processing of around 80% of United States election voting. Between them, these two companies alone provide voter registration, printing of ballots, the programming of the voting machines, the counting and tabulation of the votes, and the final reporting of the results for over 150 million Americans. Sequoia and Triad are two of the other major companies responsible for electronic voting machines. Control, ownership and political ties A very comprehensive and fully sourced summary of "Who's involved with Who" includes ownership, history, donations and connections of voting machine companies and those connected with them, including SEC criminal records and cross-investments. Bob Urosevich is currently president of Diebold and was the person who original produced Diebold's software {Link without Title} . Todd Urosevich (his brother) is vice president of ES&S. In 1999, American Information Systems (AIS), purchased Business Records Corporation (BRC) to become ES&S. AIS (1980) was formerly Data Mark (1979). Both AIS and Data Mark were founded by the Urosevich brothers. In 2002 Diebold acquired Global Election Systems. Global was founded 1991, which itself acquired the AccuVote system the same year. Bob Urosevich is a past president of Global. AIS was initially funded by which pushes Creationist Science and education in California. Chalcedon is a fundamentalist Christian ministry devoted to ''"nothing short of ... rebuilding the theological fortifications of Christian civilization ... eroded by the forces of humanism and secularism over the past three centuries"'', and is at the heart of Christian Reconstructionism, a ''"recently articulated philosophy which argues that it is the moral obligation of Christians to recapture EVERY institution for Jesus Christ"'' and ''"among other things 'mandating the death penalty for homosexuals ...'."'' and [http://www.opednews.com/fitrakis032204_diebold.htm ''Diebold:'' In 2003 Walden O'Dell CEO of Diebold said in a letter to Ohio Republican officials that he was ''"committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President"''. Diebold is the company which makes electronic touch screen voting machines used in Ohio and other states, most significantly Florida. Ohio and Florida were two of the "swing" states critical to the 2004 election. It is important to note that punch card (not electronic) voting took place in 68 of Ohio's 88 counties, including three of the four most populous, which include Cleveland, Dayton, and Cincinnati.[http://www.klkntv.com/Global/story.asp?S=2485180 Diebold’s political ties are not limited to Republicans. Mark Radke (Director of Marketing for Diebold Election Systems) "has an exclusive Democratic donation history"..."including the legal limit of $2000 to John Kerry in the recent campaign" [http://www.opensecrets.org/indivs/search.asp?NumOfThou=0&txtName=radke%2C+mark&txtState=%28all+states%29&txtZip=&txtEmploy=&txtCand=&txt2004=Y&txt2002=Y&txt2000=Y&Order=N]. However, according to campaign finance records at OpenSecrets.org, of the over $240,000 given by Diebold’s directors and chief officers to political campaigns since 1998, all has gone to Republican candidates or party funds. [http://www.southernstudies.org/reports/votingmachines-new.htm] Sep. 30, 2004 - Deborah Seiler, an "influential employee" of Diebold Election Systems changed jobs, and now works for Solano County California. The position puts her second in command of elections in the county. The person concerned was implicated (see comment by CVF in article) in the purchase by California of Diebold systems which later became the source of litigation when they turned out to be misrepresented and uncertified. wired news Aug. 31, 2004 - "Activists from TrueVote, a Maryland-based group, also protested against voting-machine companies sponsoring parts of the election officials' conference. Diebold Election Systems co-sponsored the opening-night reception. Sequoia Voting Sytems paid for a dinner cruise aboard a glass-topped boat on the Potomac, where many of its competitors took the opportunity to pitch their products to election officials. Election Systems and Software hosted a lunch, and Hart InterCivic printed the conference brochures." wired news ''ES&S:'' As noted elsewhere (Sources: [http://www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?ID=683 ,[http://www.ecotalk.org/UrosevichBrothers.htm], #Specific Issues Relating To ES&S ) Chuck Hagel , the previous chairman of ES&S , another major manufacturer of voting machines and still a $1m stock-holder in McCarthy & Co which owns a quarter of ES&S became a Republican candidate. Hagel's Democratic opponent made a formal protest to the state of Nebraska over the conflict of interest. Hagel had significant AIS holdings when the company counted the votes for his surprise election victory in 1996. Hagel has been scrutinized by the Senate Ethics Committee over his investments in the McCarthy Group. ES&S, which counted 80% [http://www.opednews.com/fitrakis032204_diebold.htm of the votes when Hagel was elected in 1996 and re-elected in 2002, is a subsidiary of the McCarthy Group, according to The Hill. [http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=24],[http://www.thehill.com/news/012903/hagel.aspx] When Hagel stepped down as head of this company to compete for the Senate, he became ''"...the first Republican in 24 years to win a Senate seat in Nebraska, nearly all on unauditable machines he had just sold the state ... including many largely black communities that had never before voted Republican"''. (Source {Link without Title} ) Hagel also was recently caught lying about his ownership of ES&S by the Senate Ethics Committee, and was on a short list of George W. Bush's vice-presidential candidates. {Link without Title} Jeb Bush's first choice as running mate in 1998 was Sandra Mortham, a paid lobbyist for ES&S who received a commission for every county that bought its touch-screen machines. The Hill's revelations of Hagel's conflict of interest was disturbing enough to cause Jan Baran, one of the most powerful Republican lawyers in Washington D.C., and Lou Ann Linehan, Senator Chuck Hagel's Chief of Staff, to walk into The Hill's offices to "discuss" the story. ''"According to the author of the article, Alex Bolton, nothing similar had happened in the three-and-a-half years he's worked for the paper."'' {Link without Title} Specific issues relating to Diebold machines and practices
::As summarised elsewhere below (California litigation, Blackbox, federal hearings), Diebold consistently hid major flaws, and stated machines had been certified and were secure when this was not the case. Some states have proposed or begun litigation in respect of these.
::The same source also claims that :::''"Experts have raised questions about the machines' security features, which some say can be easily defeated, making it possible to manipulate the actual vote count. '' :::''"In all of my consulting work and all of my work in industry I've never seen a system that I thought was this vulnerable to abuse," said Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University in Maryland, who, along with other security experts, analyzed Diebold's source code for the electronic voting machines."'' ::In at least one case it appears a voting machine was cracked during a primary election in King County Washington and a warning was issued to disconnect all voting machines from the internet. But this would not totally prevent the effects of cracking {Link without Title} . ::Nov. 12, 2004 : ''"Computer Science Professor Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins University analyzed Diebold's 47,609 lines of code and found it uses an encryption key (56-bit DES) that was hacked in 1997 and no longer is used in secure programs. The Digital Encryption Standard 56-bit encryption key used can be unlocked by a key embedded in all the source code, meaning all Diebold machines would respond to the same key. Rubin said Diebold has said it repaired the security flaws in subsequent programs, but that the company has not produced the code for analysis. Rubin, his graduate students and a colleague from Rice University found other bugs, that the administrator's PIN code was '1111' and that one programmer had inserted, 'This is just a hack for now.' The implication is that by hacking one machine could have access to all Diebold machines. Diebold did return a call for comment."'' (Source: [http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041112-112037-7263r.htm Washington Times/UPI ) ::''"Diebold, located in North Canton, Ohio, does its primary business in ATM and ticket-vending machines. Critics of Diebold point out that virtually every other machine the company makes provides a paper trail to verify the machine's calculations. Oddly, only the voting machines lack this essential function."'' {Link without Title}
::March 5, 2004 : ''" reform activist Bev Harris has also posted a post-mortem the 2000 election by CBS detailing how the network managed to call Volusia County for Bush early in the morning. The report states: "Had it not been for these [computer] errors, the CBS News call for Bush at 2:17:52 AM would not have been made." As Harris notes, the 20,000-vote error shifted the momentum of the news reporting and nearly led Gore to concede.'' ::''What's particularly troubling, Harris says, is that the errors were caught only because an alert poll monitor noticed Gore's vote count going down through the evening, which of course is impossible. Diebold blamed the bizarre swing on a "faulty memory chip," which Harris claims is simply not credible. The whole episode, she contends, could easily have been consciously programmed by someone with a partisan agenda. Such claims might seem far-fetched, were it not for the fact that a cadre of computer scientists showed a year ago that the software running Diebold's new machines can be hacked with relative ease. The crackers posted some 13,000 pages of internal documents Diebold's technical support database on various web sites -- documents that were pounced on by Harris and others. A desperate Diebold went to court to stop this "wholesale reproduction" of company material."'' ( "Students Fight E-Vote Firm" , also see "Libel Chill" below) ::''"If you strip away the partisan rancor over the 2000 election, you are left with the undeniable fact that a presidential candidate conceded the election to his opponent based on from a second card that mysteriously appears, subtracts 16,022 votes, then just as mysteriously disappears."'' ::(Sources for this section: 1) ABC News 2) [http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2004/03/03_200.html , 3) Diebold penetration and legal , 4) #Similar Anomalies In Recent History ::Voting Machine problems (including Diebold): Electronic Voting#Problems With Electronic Voting
: {Link without Title} , an US online encyclopedia similar to Wikipedia covering "people, issues, groups and the public agenda" describes the position under the title "Libel Chill" as follows: ::''On the above issues, most journalists within the media establishment have been silent. Given Diebold's history of libel chill and the Rathergate issue, it's not hard to guess why, though political motives may also be involved. There has been a report from a MMOB member on a 'lockdown' on covering the story, coming from executive levels within the media. However, MSNBC's Keith Olbermann featured a good story about the vote discrepancies on his Nov. 8th show."'' ::''"Libel chill in this case is highly strategic since there is only a short time window - from November 2, 2004 to December 13, 2004 - to contest the results."'' ::''"In such a legally and politically charged situation, accurate verifiable data is hard to come by. Bev Harris and her team at blackboxvoting.org {Link without Title} have filed the largest number of FOIA's - Freedom Of Information Act requests - in history. She is asking 3,000 counties for the internal audit logs of their voting machines, which are public records, as well as for other key data."'' ::From : LA Weekly : ''...At the same time, the internal memos reveal that Jones Day lawyers were exploring strategies to fend off legal challenges ... Legal machinations were eventually cited as a strike against Diebold. The company "raised frivolous legal objections to providing many [requested] documents and provided other documents in an untimely manner," according to a Secretary of State’s Office report on Diebold.'' ::From EFF (legal records here ): ''Diebold has delivered dozens of cease-and-desist notices to website publishers and ISPs demanding that they take down corporate documents revealing flaws in the company's electronic voting systems as well as difficulties with certifying the systems for actual elections. "Diebold's blanket cease-and-desist notices are a blatant abuse of copyright law," said EFF Staff Attorney Wendy Seltzer, "Publication of the Diebold documents is clear fair use because of their importance to the public debate over the accuracy of electronic voting machines."'' ::''Diebold threatened not only the ISPs of direct publishers ... but also the ISPs of those who merely publish links to the documents. In one such instance, ISP refused to comply with Diebold's demand that it '''prohibit Independent Media Network (IndyMedia) from linking''' to Diebold documents..."''
: LA Weekly reports (April 2004) that Diebold knowingly used uncertified voting machines in many elections, and misrepresented this to the State. ::''"Diebold has conceded that it violated California regulations by using uncertified software in the March 2 election. This misstep occurred even though the Diebold internal memos had previously warned the company precisely of this problem. These memos also talk of greater legal culpability if the company knowingly violated California election law. The documents offer a potentially damning indictment of a company that failed to fly right despite in-house warnings ... a former Diebold technician ... depicted a company that was running behind schedule, making untested, last-minute fixes and conjuring solutions on the spot.'' ::''The state report said Diebold "marketed and sold the TSx system before it was fully functional, and before it was federally qualified," "misrepresented the status of the TSx system in federal testing in order to obtain state certification" and "'''failed to obtain federal qualification of the TSx system despite assurances that it would'''." In addition, the company allegedly "'''installed uncertified software on election machines in 17 counties'''" and "jeopardized the conduct of the March primary." The secretary of state’s advisory panel noted that some voters were turned away when poll workers could not get machines started on time in San Diego and Alameda counties.'' ::The internal memos plainly confront the possibility of "multimillion-dollar liabilities". As one memo puts it, ''"Issue: Whether the use of an uncertified voting system is illegal? Short answer: Yes." The same memo then deals with whether the company had violated its contract with Alameda County. "Issue: Whether Diebold breached the Agreement if it provided Alameda County with an uncertified voting system? Short answer: '''Mostly likely''' ... If Diebold materially breached the Agreement, Alameda County can terminate the Agreement and sue for damages."'' :: Or as Diebold's own memo put it (Ken Clark, {Link without Title} ): "Strictly adhering to our release policies, the California change should also require a major version number bump to GEMS (because of the protocol change). We can't reasonably expect all of California to upgrade to 1.18 this late in the game though, so we'll slip the change into GEMS 1.17.21 and declare this a bug rather than a new feature. What good are rules unless you can bend them now and again."
:Source: Court papers filed in Maryland , Wired news , [http://thoughtcrimes.org/bbv/bbv_chapter-14.pdf] ::Dec. 17 2003 - "At least five convicted felons secured management positions at a manufacturer of electronic voting machines, according to critics demanding more stringent background checks for people responsible for voting machine software. ::"The programmer Jeffrey Dean wrote and maintained proprietary code used to count hundreds of thousands of votes as senior vice president of Global Election Systems, or GES. Diebold purchased GES in January 2002. According to a public court document released before GES hired him, Dean served time in a Washington State correctional facility for stealing money and tampering with computer files in a scheme that '''"involved a high degree of sophistication and planning in the use and alteration of records in the computerized ... system that defendant maintained for the victim."''' (23 counts of First Degree Theft, case 89-1-04034-1) ::"The other reported felons included a cocaine trafficker Elder and a man convicted of engaging in fraudulent stock transactions." ::Jeff Dean was specifically involved in the King County voting system, and is also mentioned specifically in the Diebold memos in connection with programming optical-scan software and the touch-screen Windows CE versions. King County provided him with a key to the computer room, the passcode to the GEMS computer and 24-hour access to the building. Diebold have indicated that he left when they took over GES, however internal records show he was retained, and continued to act as a "consultant". ::King County WA. is the same county which Diebold internal memos say "are famous" for illicit access to voting systems and where a 3 hour section is missing from a security log during the September 2004 Primary. Specific issues relating to ES&S machines and political links Thom Hartmann stated in CommonDreams.org (Nov 4 2004, {Link without Title} ): "About two years ago 2003 , I wrote a story for these pages, "If You Want To Win An Election, Just Control The Voting Machines," that exposed how Senator Chuck Hagel had, before stepping down and running for the U.S. Senate in Nebraska, been the head of the voting machine company (now ES&S) that had just computerized Nebraska's vote. The Washington Post (1/13/1997) said Hagel's "Senate victory against an incumbent Democratic governor was the major Republican upset in the November election." According to Bev Harris, Hagel won virtually every demographic group, including many largely black communities that had never before voted Republican. Hagel was the first Republican in 24 years to win a Senate seat in Nebraska, nearly all on unauditable machines he had just sold the state." :(The same author also notes in respect of audit trail that ''"Congressman Rush Holt introduced a bill into Congress requiring a voter-verified paper ballot be produced by all electronic voting machines, and it's been co-sponsored by a majority of the members of the House of Representatives. The two-year battle fought by Dennis Hastert and Tom DeLay to keep it from coming to a vote, thus insuring that there will be no possible audit of the votes of about a third of the 2004 electorate, has fueled the flames..."'') Bev Harris also traces significant control of ES&S back to Peter Kiewit Sons’ Inc, a company with strong political interests and ties to big industry, and a track record of bid-rigging and bans from State or Federal contracts, stating that ''"Peter Kiewit Sons’ Inc. and its subsidiaries have been tied to a string of bid-rigging cases in as many as 11 states and two countries"'' {Link without Title} : :Sample legal cases – (1) bid-rigging in New Orleans, pleaded no contest, fined $100,000 and $300,000 in civil settlement, (2) Bid-rigging on road contracts, South Dakota, pleaded guilty, fined $350,000, (3) bid-rigging and mail fraud on a federal highway project, Kansas, firm fined $900,000, company official sentenced to a year in jail, (4) bid-rigging of $1.8 million on state highway project, Nebraska, Kiewit vice-president jailed. :Official action – (1) Army Corps of Engineers “at one point decided to bar Kiewit from bidding on all federal projects but later changed its mind.” Kiewit builds munitions plants and military airstrips, (2) State of Oklahoma forbade Kiewit to bid anymore, Kiewit set up a different company called Gilbert Southern Corp. According to The Sunday Oklahoman, Gilbert Southern Corp. recently submitted a sworn affidavit to the transportation department saying it had no parent company, affiliate firms or subsidiaries." But "Kiewit owned Gilbert Southern Corp. lock, stock and barrel. When the state of Oklahoma found out, it yanked the contracts", (3) Took contracts in Washington State "under the guise of a minority-owned firm. The government thought it was giving contracts to a company owned by African-American women; actually, it was a bunch of white guys in Nebraska. Kiewit paid more than $700,000 in fines while denying liability or wrongdoing." :"Does Kiewit have a political agenda? Absolutely. Kiewit’s Jerry Pfeffer has spoken before Congress to ask for more privatization: 'Kiewit, based in Omaha, built more lane-miles of the Interstate Highway System than any other contractor,' he said. '...We’re active in toll roads, airports and water facilities...' Kiewit also owns CalEnergy Corp, and is a 'quiet giant' in telecommunications." Specific issues relating to Sequoia machines and practices Sequoia Pacific has a "long connection" with criminal activity, including connections to the Gambino Family. {Link without Title} :" respect of Sequoia there is clear and convincing evidence that the company has been run, perhaps for decades, as a Continuing Criminal Enterprise specializing in blatant and widespread bribery of public officials, with numerous felony convictions, Mob ties, and a history replete with stories of threats, coercion..." :Sample cases - (1) Sequoia attempted bribery at a luncheon hosted by Salvatore Reale, a Gambino underboss who later pled guilty to racketeering, New York City, (2) Company’s founder, Lloyd A. Dixon Jr. indicted by federal grand jury for bribing Buffalo election officials, (3) Company fined nearly $50,000 for bribing Texas and Arkansas officials, (4) Next owner of Sequoia Pacific, financier Louis Wolfson became convicted of bribing the only Supreme Court Justice ever forced to resign in disgrace, (5) Louisiana’s Commissioner of Elections Jerry Fowler convicted of taking as much as ten million dollars over a period of a decade from Sequoia’s Southeast Representative, a man named Pasquale "Rocco" Ricci, from New Jersey. (6) US Attorneys refused or unable to "confirm or deny" if Ricci was connected to organised crime. :Official action - Allegations of voting irregularities by Republican Jenkins led to a year-long investigation. The probe quickly came across evidence of massive bribery, which became the focus of the investigation that followed, leading to charges that an election officer (Fowler) had spent $8.6 million in state money on "worthless" election equipment, and taken kickbacks from voting machine contractors working for Sequoia Pacific, in a scheme engineered by that company's executives. Fowler sentenced to five years in prison. Media did not mention the name of the company on whose behalf he was being bribed, Sequoia Pacific. Sequoia and Riverside County (See 2004_U.S._election_controversies_and_irregularities#Riverside County CA., March 2004 Primary (litigation) ) :Litigation documents allege that "Experts said the company designed the machines and software so that vote totals could easily be altered without leaving a trace". :In this legal case, eye witnesses state that in the middle of the March 2004 primary, County officials "had halted vote counting for a period of time and allowed employees of the voting machine company, Sequoia Voting Systems, to access the computer containing the counting software" and that "CES had changed the computer's instructions for tallying votes on election night". :County officials "refused to hand over the audit logs and memory cartridges". Industry collusion A summary and transcript of a conference call between voting machine companies and ITAA lobbyist Harris Miller agreed that an industry action group was to be formed in order to jointly: # Lobby politically for the industry, # Set industry standards (including ethics) and collaborate on R&D, # Attain self-management and industry control of the voting machine certification process, # Turn around current negative public perception, # "...reduce substantially the level and amount of criticism from computer scientists and other security experts about ... fallibility" # "Eliminate side attacks" from people who are "somewhat credible", # Co-ordinate counter attacks against issues, # Provide a 3rd party to "hide behind" when individual companies "don't want to talk about the issues", # Avoid claims of collusion by giving the false impression of independence between the lobbyists and the industry, and by keeping communication to undocumented telephone meetings without written notes. # Avoid press awareness of these arrangements. An initial budget of around $150,000 - 200,000 was set. The meeting was apparently set up by R. Doug Lewis, executive director of The Election Center, whose charter states "The Election Center is a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting, preserving, and improving democracy. Its members are government employees..." No explanation is given for a government election employee taking such a role within a lobbyist group. {Link without Title} Agenda {Link without Title} :
Transcription extracts:
Follow-up: :December 9, 2003 - "Advanced Voting Solutions, Diebold Election Systems, Hart InterCivic, Sequoia Voting Systems, Election Systems & Software and UniLect announced that they had formed a trade group, called Election Technology Council, under the banner of the ITAA." Evidence of collusion has come out in other investigations {Link without Title} :
EVIDENCE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING BIAS Note: As with all statistics, it is very important to consider other causes of apparent anomalies, and to provide verifiable and neutral source data that can be checked in a neutral way by third parties. All the information and sources below appear ''prima facie'' to be statistically reasonable in terms of both analysis and assumptions, and to be based upon verifiable public data. #An analysis of Florida counties with 80,000 - 500,000 registered voters concluded (with a few caveats of a usual kind) that machine type (E-Touch vs Op-Scan) was a "significant predictor" of vote at the p < 0.001 level (less than one chance in a thousand of this degree of anomaly happening by chance) data and calculations [http://ustogether.org/Florida_Election.htm . Contrarily, the New York Times ran a story stating that ''"...three political scientists, from Cornell, Harvard and Stanford... out many of those Democratic counties in Florida have a long tradition of voting Republican in presidential elections".'' All these analyses show Bush with a higher percentage of the vote in areas using optical scan ballots (as opposed to touch screen machines). (This study was later used as a basis to test the "Dixiecrat / Op-Scan" hypothesis in smaller counties: [http://ustogether.org/election04/mitteldorf/Liddle.htm ) #An error with an electronic voting system gave President Bush 3,893 extra votes in suburban Columbus according election officials. Franklin County was the only Ohio county to use this particular electronic voting system. [http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&u=/ap/20041105/ap_on_el_pr/voting_problems #:One thread on the "democraticunderground" website discusses the results in Gahanna, Franklin Co. Ohio and notes that:
#:Source: source data from govt website [http://www.franklincountyohio.gov/boe/04UnofficialResults/Unofficial%20Abstract%20of%20Votes%20General%202004.pdf pdf #An analysis reported in the New Zealand press looks at the differences between exit polls and reported voting in more detail. It identifies that in a selection of non-swing states, the exit polls and final results match. However in a large proportion of what were identified before the election as key swing states (Wisconsin, Pennysylvania, Ohio, Florida, New Hampshire, ''etc.''), the exit polls and final votes do not match. #The error was in each case a statistically anomalous and electorally critical 4 - 15% swing (change between exit polls and electronic voting) and furthermore the anomalies were not random. In each of the above swing states, this variation between what voters said they voted and what the machines reported was in favour of Mr. Bush. Source article discussing [http://bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=4175 here , graphs here . #:An article comments that:
#There were additional reports of significantly large data irregularities with the "optical scan" type voting machines in at least Florida. In one county using optical scan voting machines for example, election records showed 77% registered democrats but Bush received 77% of the vote. # Wired News has examined this issue and reports that, ''"...according to academics, the internet pundits are reading the data out of context. Demographic figures and vote trends over several years show the numbers to be consistent with previous elections. According to University of California at Berkeley political scientist Henry Brady, the Republican vote share has been going up in Florida's rural optical-scan counties for years."'' #:Wired further reports that, ''" {Link without Title} hree professors of government also examined the numbers after being pressured by many people, including lawyers for the Democratic Party, and concluded the same thing."'' but that they also warned this ''"doesn't mean that nothing went wrong in this election. It just means this particular thing is not what went wrong."'' #Nov. 27 Oklahoma media report: #: ''"The respectable, conservative "Tulsa World" newspaper reported Nov 3rd that Kerry was winning in 57 of the states's rural counties, with 70% of the vote counted ... The "official" State of Oklahoma Election Board vote totals released later show Kerry not winning; but, losing in all the state's 77 counties, including the 57 rural counties. A simple comparison of total votes for Kerry between the staid establishment mouthpiece, the "Tulsa World" newspaper and the so-called "official" final vote totals at the State Election Board show fewer votes for Kerry in 57 counties than the "Tulsa World" does ... Sen Kerry lost 37,982 votes to the ES&S Optech Machines. During the same time period President Bush gained a whooping 393,825 votes. In other words, Kerry lost votes already cast counted by voters ... Who programs these things, eh? ... It turns out every vote in the state ... were counted on the same type of flawed machine, programmed originally by the Hagel's ES&S company..."'' # {Link without Title} examines Ohio counties and notes: #:''"...over 20,000 absentee ballots were added to Franklin County's total twice official canvas report ... Some candidate totals are identical in the two counts, and some differ by just one vote. Still others are reported as zero in the second count, which implies that only certain races were recounted..."'' #:Most of Ohio use punch cards. Most Ohio counties showed "dramatic increases" in voter turnout. Franklin and Mahoning counties showed ''fewer'' voters. Franklin and Mohoning are two of the few to use touch voting. Likewise the same two counties bucked the other trend: the normal pattern was for the increase in reported voters to be much higher than the increase in registered voters. In these two counties the opposite was true. Anectodtal evidence suggests rather puzzlingly that these were not undervoted, as they experienced the same extensive lines and intensive "get out the vote" as other counties. (Figures and stats in article) #::''"Out of all these counties, only Franklin and Mahoning use DRE voting systems. Out of all these counties, only Franklin and Mahoning show the odd pattern of having a greater increase in registered voters than in reported voters. Out of all these counties, Franklin and Mahoning have the lowest increase in turnout rate from 2000; the others average a much higher turnout rate increase of about 13-14%. Does that seem suspicious to anyone else? It is especially fishy when you consider the strategic importance of these two counties...If Franklin and Mahoning experienced the same 13-14% increase in turnout rate as the other blue states ... together that's about 108,000 votes ... I think we need to try to figure out where those votes went."'' #: "Warren County made the news twice... First, it was the last county in Ohio to complete its vote count. Second, the ballots were counted in secret by its Republican election officials. The media were not allowed to observe the counting process and were relegated to an area two floors below where the count was taking place. The justification Warren officials gave was that they had received a report of a terrorism threat, namely a level 10 (out of 10) warning specifically for Warren County. That was a lie. It was denied outright by both Homeland Security and the FBI. So just what were those Republican Warren County officials doing with the ballots they kept to just themselves all night long? One possibility is that they were destroying ballots..." #:"There is one more point to be examined here. The idea promoted by the media is that Bush won because "red" voters showed up in greater quantities than "blue" voters. But looking at Ohio, we see that the opposite is actually true. Blue counties in Ohio had a larger increase in turnout rate than red counties. Even dividing counties up into smaller and smaller groups does not change this: Strongly blue counties have better turnout rate increases than moderately blue counties. Moderately red counties have better turnout rate increases than strongly red counties. Where did all those votes for Bush come from? The election in Ohio stinks. Badly." UC Berkeley Data Archive Home page (report link [http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/new_web/VOTE2004/index.html Summary page PDF ) A large academic paper, with full data provided for verification. Although not formally yet peer reviewed, it has been examined by 7 professors (Source {Link without Title} ) "...researchers examined numerous variables that might have affected the vote outcome. These included the number of voters, their median income, racial and age makeup and the change in voter turnout between the 2000 and 2004 elections. Using this information, they examined election results for the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates in the state in 1996, 2000 and 2004 to see how support for those candidates and parties measured over eight years in Florida's 67 counties." They discovered that in the 15 counties using touch-screen voting systems, the number of votes granted to Bush far exceeded the number of votes Bush should have received -- given all of the other variables -- while the number of votes that Bush received in counties using other types of voting equipment lined up perfectly with what the variables would have predicted for those counties. The total number of excessive votes ranged between 130,000 and 260,000, depending on what kind of problem caused the excess votes. The counties most affected by the anomaly were heavily Democratic. " "Sociology professor Michael Hout, who chairs the university's graduate Sociology and Demography group, said the chance for such a discrepancy to occur was less than 1 in 1,000. 'No matter how many factors and variables we took into consideration, the significant correlation in the votes for President Bush and electronic voting cannot be explained...'" Executive summary: # ''Because many factors impact voting results, statistical tools are necessary to see the effect of touch-screen voting. Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique widely used in the social and physical sciences to distinguish the individual effects of many variables. This multiple-regression analysis takes account of the following variables by county: (1) number of voters, (2) median income, (3) Hispanic population, (4) change in voter turnout between 2000 and 2004, (5) support for President Bush in 2000 election, (6) support for Dole in 1996 election...'' # ''When one controls for these factors, the association between electronic voting and increased support for President Bush is impossible to overlook. The data show with 99.0% certainty that a county’s use of electronic voting is associated with a disproportionate increase in votes for President Bush.'' ::''(note - confidence levels are formally tested for significance at a predetermined level, typically 95% or 99%. So 99% would be quoted as the result of confidence testing, as a minimum. That said, the actual confidence figure can be calculated backwards, and when this is done turns out to be closer to 99.9%. Hence the two figures of 99.0% and 99.9% cited in the summary)'' Key findings: # ''Irregularities associated with electronic voting machines may have awarded 130,000 excess votes or more to President George W. Bush in Florida.'' # ''Compared to counties with paper ballots, counties with electronic voting machines were significantly more likely to show increases in support for President Bush between 2000 and 2004. This effect cannot be explained by differences between counties in income, number of voters, change in voter turnout, or size of Hispanic/Latino population.'' # ''In Broward County alone, President Bush appears to have received approximately 72,000 excess votes.'' # ''We can be 99.9% sure that these effects are not attributable to chance.'' However this study has been strongly criticized by two professors for apparently picking a statistical model that favored a predetermined outcome, despite the fact that other equally valid models produced different results. They construct an equally valid model which shows that electronic voting favored Kerry, to point out that both models are fatally flawed. They conclude that "the study is entirely without merit and its “results” are meaningless.". {Link without Title} CERTIFICATION AND LEGISLATION CONTROLS Certification of voting machines See Also: Certification of voting machines Irregularities in certification have been identified, with tests of system security repeatedly overlooked and marked as "Not tested". The certifying company Cipher]] was particularly implicated in this, for both Diebold and VoteHere Election systems, in which software (including Firmware ), and security, were marked "not reviewed" or "not applicable". Legislative regulatory regime for voting machines It is worth noting that other forms of machine often have strict regulatory backing for quality control and examination. For example, compare voting machine regulation with gaming (slot) machine regulation in the state of Nevada:
BLACKBOXVOTING.ORG INVESTIGATIONS Diebold Security and internal email Investigation Source for section: blackboxvoting.org #"How to hack a Diebold voting machine (1)" ( {Link without Title} ) #:"...Therefore, when I found that Diebold Election Systems had been storing 40,000 of its files on an open web site, an obscure site, never revealed to public interest groups, but generally known among election industry insiders, and available to any hacker with a laptop, I looked at the files. Having a so-called security-conscious voting machine manufacturer store sensitive files on an unprotected public web site, allowing anonymous access, was bad enough, but when I saw what was in the files my hair turned gray..." #:"The contents of these files amounted to a virtual handbook for vote-tampering: They contained diagrams of remote communications setups, passwords, encryption keys, source code, user manuals, testing protocols, and simulators, as well as files loaded with votes and voting machine software." #:''(Article goes on to show step by step with screen images, the ease with which it is possible to change the admin password on a voting machine, alter the audit trail, change voting data, etc)'' #"How to hack a Diebold voting machine (2)" ( {Link without Title} ) #:Bev Harris - "...Specifically the flaw was that you can get at the centralvote-counting database through Microsoft Access. They have the security disabled. And when you get in that way, you are able to overwrite the audit log ... and this is one of the key things they cite as a security measure when they sell the system." #:"...the Internet does connect to these GEMS computers, even though they deny it. A lot of the press watches election results come in on the Web and what they're watching is actually being uploaded directly off the GEMS computer ... they make a big point of the fact that there's no Internet connection to the voting machine, but that's sort of passing the issue. That's true, in the polling places there's no Internet connection, but the voting machines connect into the GEMS machine through modem ... also the GEMS machine then connects to the Internet..." #"How to hack a Diebold voting machine (3)" (same source) #:"...the GEMS program no referential integrity ... I got a call from one of our more brilliant computer programmers ... he said, "I want you to go to your computer." And he walked me through it just like a support tech does ... it was appalling how easy it was. Once you know the steps, a 10-year-old can rig an election. In fact it's so easy that one of our activists, Jim March in California, put together a "rig-a-vote" CD. He's been going around showing it to elections officials, and now this CD has been making its way to Congress members ... All you do is double-click the icon ... and if you have Microsoft Access on your machine you can walk right into that election database while it's open ... You can be in there changing things and you can change anything you want." - ''There's nothing, no security in this?'' - "No ... in the memo, Clark, an engineer at Diebold named two places where they were doing this, Gaston County, N.C., and King County, Wash." #In a public records request to the Elections Board dated November 2, 2004 Bev Harris {Link without Title} summarises the security on Diebold's central voting servers: #:All Diebold central voting servers are ''"...installed on unpatched, open Windows computers and use RAS (Remote Access Server) to connect to the voting machines through telephone lines. Since RAS is not adequately protected, anyone in the world, even terrorists, who can figure out the server's phone number can change vote totals without being detected by observers. The passwords in many locations are easily guessed, and the access phone numbers can be learned through social engineering or war dialing. Under some configurations, attacks by remote access are possible even if the modem appears to be turned off."'' #As noted here , RAS gives any external PC a high degree of control and trust, and permit access to and manipulation of files; Diebold support technicians (emails cited in source) have this ability and knowledge of the dial-up numbers and passwords required to do so. In addition, ''"everyone just logs in as user admin"'' according to another email in the same document, ie Diebold technicians all know and use the master password. # Diebold prevented certification of a customised version of Windows. #:Email from Talbot Iredale, head of Diebold’s technical team Source -- ''We do not want to get Wyle reviewing and certifying the operating systems. Therefore can we keep to a minimum the references to the WinCE 3.0 operating system."'' (WinCE is a highly customised manufacturers' version of Windows, intended for embedded use. Only non-customised "out of the box" systems can avoid certification) # The Washington voting system which lost 3 hours of audit trail is referred to earlier: #:Report here , audit log copy here , summary reports signed with date and time by King County elections chief now found to be missing from audit log here . #:(The audit log is a computer-generated automatic record similar to the "black box" in an airplane, that automatically records access to the Diebold central tabulator. The central tabulator audit log is an Federally (FEC) required security feature. The kinds of things it detects are the kinds of things you might see if someone was tampering with the votes: Opening the vote file, previewing and/or printing interim results, altering candidate definitions - a method that can be used to flip votes) #:Three hours between 9:52 pm and 1:31 am is missing altogether from the Sept. 14 2004 Washington State primary, King Co. WA. During this period, 4 summary reports were produced, each of which should have appeared in the audit log if complete and correct. According to King County records the log was complete, and as the article points out, ''"The audit log is 168 pages long and spans 120 days, and the 3 hours just happen to be missing during the most critical three hours on election night."'' #:A 2001 internal memo at the manufacturers cited below is referring to a vote or audit or similar database held on a voting machine when it says: #::''"Jane ... did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before."'' # According to blackboxvoting, ''"Diebold's own internal memos show they have known the audit log could be altered since 2001"'' #:Diebold internal email memos : From: owner-support@gesn.com On Behalf Of Nel Finberg Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2001 11:32 PM Subject: alteration of Audit Log in Access ''Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated that'' ''she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the Audit log'' ''without entering a password. What is the position of our development'' ''staff on this issue? Can we justify this? Or should this be anathema?'' To: Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access From: "Ken Clark" Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:55:02 -0700 In-reply-to: ...Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception. Of course everyone knows perception is reality... I've threatened to put a password on the .mdb before when dealers/customers/support have done stupid things with the GEMS database structure using Access. Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before. Note however that even if we put a password on the file, it doesn't really prove much. Someone has to know the password, else how would GEMS open it. So this technically brings us back to square one: the audit log is modifiable by that person at least (read, me). Back to perception though, if you don't bring this up you might skate through Metamor. There might be some clever crypto techniques to make it even harder to change the log ... We're talking big changes here though, and at the moment largely theoretical ones. I'd doubt that any of our competitors are that clever. Bottom line on Metamor is to find out what it is going to take to make them happy. You can try the old standard of the NT password gains access to the operating system, and that after that point all bets are off... I sense a loosing battle here though. The changes to put a password on the .mdb file are not trivial and probably not even backward compatible, but we'll do it if that is what it is going to take. Follow up
:"Ken tells a co-worker to convince the Federal Independent Testing Authority that WindowsNT security will be adequate, when he KNEW that “everyone just logs in as user admin password global” per an earlier email..." ''"Black Box Voting has taken the position that fraud took place in the 2004 election through electronic voting machines. We base this on hard evidence, documents obtained in public records requests, inside information, and other data indicative of manipulation of electronic voting systems. What we do not know is the specific scope of the fraud. We are working now to compile the proof, based not on soft evidence -- red flags, exit polls -- but core documents obtained by Black Box Voting in the most massive Freedom of Information action requests in history."'' [http://www.blackboxvoting.org] Volusia County Fraud Investigation ''"TUESDAY NOV 16 2004: Volusia County election records just got put on lockdown -- Dueling lawyers, election officials gnashing teeth, votergate.tv film crew catching it all. Poll tape discrepancies, stonewalling"'' blackboxvoting.org 's arrival in Volusia County for the purpose of investigating election fraud has been documented here and in more detail here . Summary of incident: :BBV attended Volusia County. They were given (under pressure) duplicate copies of voting records purporting to be as the originals but not signed by any official and without the official signatures from the election. During the return visit the next morning, they arrived well in advance of the meeting. The following incidents are reported to have taken place:
::Source here filmed by votergate.tv ::''(Sidenote - Volusia FL. was also the county at the heart of the single biggest identified suspect Voting Machine anomaly in Florida 2000 - see below)'' ''TUESDAY NOV 23 2004'' Black Box Voting report that a lawsuit has now been filed in Volusia County, Florida to set aside that county's 2004 general election. Susan Rose Pynchon vs. Volusia County Canvassing Board and Ann McFall SIMILAR ANOMALIES IN RECENT HISTORY The exploitation of security vulnerabilities in voting machines so as to change the outcome of elections has been alleged in a number of elections for the last decade. After the 2004 Presidential election, a paper by UC Berkeley sociology professor Michael Hout and three of his graduate students concluded "No matter how many factors and variables we took into consideration ... the data show with 99.0% certainty that a county's use of electronic voting is associated with a disproportionate increase in votes for President Bush". This study has been strongly criticized by 2 other professors, who say that it picked a statistical model that favored a predetermined outcome, although other valid models produced opposite results. {Link without Title} Volusia, Florida 2000 ""If you strip away the partisan rancor over the 2000 election, you are left with the undeniable fact that a presidential candidate conceded the election to his opponent based on from a second card that mysteriously appears, subtracts 16,022 votes, then just as mysteriously disappears." ::- Bev Harris, "Black Box Voting in the 21st Century", chapter 11, Florida 2000 election. A "faulty memory card" was cited as the cause by the manufacturer. Experts and Diebold's own technical staff dismissed this as implausible for substansively the same reasons cited by the author: "A memory card is like a floppy disk. If you have worked with computers for any length of time you will know that a disk can go bad. When it does, which of the following is most likely? In an Excel spreadsheet that you saved on a 'bad disk,' might it read a column of numbers correct the first time: '1005, 2109, 3000, 450...' but the second time, replace the numbers like this: '1005, 2109, -16022, 450...' Or is it more likely that the 'bad disk' will ... fail to read the file at all, crash your computer, give you an error message, or make weird humming and whirring noises." Diebold internal emails: ''Ken Clark (Diebold ES R&D Manager) – January 18, 2001 1:41 PM'' "My understanding is that the card was not corrupt after (or before) upload. They fixed the problem by clearing the precinct and re-uploading the same card. So neither of these explainations washes. That's not to say I have any idea what actually happened, its just not either of those ... The problem is its going to be very hard to collect enough data to really know what happened. The card isn't corrupt so we can't post-mortem it (its not mort)." ''John McLaurin - Diebold ES - 18 Jan 2001 15:44:50'' "...the negative numbers ... occurred when Lana attempted to reupload a card or duplicate card. Sophia and Tab may be able to shed some light here, keeping in mind that the boogie man may me reading our mail. Do we know how this could occur?" ''Tab Iredale - Diebold ES - 18 Jan 2001 13:31'' The problem precinct had two memory cards uploaded ... on the same port approx. 1 hour apart. As far as I know there should only have been one memory card uploaded. I asked you to check this out when the problem first occurred but have not heard back as to whether this is true. Given that we transfer data in ascii form not binary and given the way the data was 'invalid' the error could not have occurred during transmission. Therefore the error could only occur in one of four ways: ... {Link without Title} There is always the possiblity that the 'second memory card' or 'second upload' came from an un-authorised source. ''John McLaurin – Diebold ES - Thu, 18 Jan 2001 16:56:06'' I will be visiting with Lana on Monday and will ascertain the particulars related to the second memory card. One concern I’ve had all along is 'if' we are getting the full story from Lana. ("Lana" is Lana Hires, the Volusia election employee described by Blackboxvoting as "particularly unhappy about seeing the Black Box Voting investigators in the office" in Nov 2004, described by BBV as having initially rejected their request to visit the warehouse containing election voting data, and "ordered them out") BBV summary of Diebold memo's: "What we know from the memos can be summarised as follows...
Impact of errors on Presidential election: :"2:09 AM - VNS adds Volusia County's erroneous numbers to its tabulated vote. With 171 out of 172 precincts in the county reporting, Gore's vote drops by more than 10,000 while Bush's rises by almost the same amount. This 20,000-vote change in one county increases Bush's VNS statewide lead to more than 51,000 votes. source " :"What the news networks, and the Al Gore, camp do not realise at this point in the evening is that over 20,000 of votes that make up this significant lead are attributable to two Diebold Election Systems computer errors. First there are the 16,022 votes stolen from Gore in Volusia County by the "faulty memory card". Meanwhile over in Brevard County another error - also involving Global Elections System (the predecessor of Diebold) equipment is responsible for a further 4000 votes being lopped off the Gore total. And it is also worth noting that nobody knows whether the Brevard and Volusia County errors were the only ones in play at this time. These errors were both big ones." :"At 2.17am and 2.20am the remaining two major networks CBS and ABC called the race to Bush. Their decision continued to be bolstered by the VNS data stream - which even at 2.47am - was still recording a margin to Bush of close to 50,000 votes. Remarkably it was not till 2.51am that VNS fixed the Volusia error in its data. Meanwhile with all the networks showing the race for the White House won by Bush, the pressure is mounting on Gore to concede." :(Source: {Link without Title} ) "Al Gore happened to be in the staff room on the seventh floor when the votes spiked up in Bush's favor. Dressed casually, the vice president was watching television while lying on the floor, with his chin propped up in his hands. As a result of the Volusia votes, Fox News called Florida—and the presidency—for Bush at 2:16 a.m. CBS and NBC followed suit a minute later and ABC came in at 2:20 a.m. ... A moment later Gore told members of his campaign that he was ready to concede the election to Bush, which he did several minutes later over the telephone. Unwilling to take the television networks reports at face value, one of Gore’s campaign staffers did a little investigating and discovered that the networks erred in stating that 50,000 votes from Volusia County were cast for Bush. Turns out that Gore was ahead by 13,000 votes in Volusia and trailing Bush by 6,000 votes overall ... Gore was traveling in a motorcade en route to deliver a concession speech to his supporters. His staff stopped him." ::- Jeffrey Toobin, "Too Close to Call" :In its internal investigation the CBS inquiry team found the two Diebold County level errors, Volusia and Brevard, were conclusive in their networks decision to call the race to Bush. "The mistakes ... were critical, since there were only about 3 percent of the state's precincts outstanding at this time. They incorrectly increased Bush's lead in the tabulated vote from about 27,000 to more than 51,000. Had it not been for these errors, the CBS News call for Bush at 2:17:52 AM would not have been made." (Main source for this section including emails and impact: {Link without Title} , summarising Bev Harris' report in "Black Box Voting") Voter suppression and racial discrimination, Florida 2000 Source for this section globalresearch.ca , written July 2003: To understand how George W. Bush will win the next presidential election, it helps to understand how he won the last one. While all public attention rested on hanging chads, butterfly ballots and a skewed recount in the wake of the 2000 Presidential election, the root of the problem has been overlooked. As investigative reporter Greg Palast uncovered, the state of Florida purged over 90,000 people from their list of eligible voters under the guise that they were felons. In fact, almost none of the disenfranchised voters were felons...but almost all were blacks or democrats. Palast's investigation revealed that at the heart of this ethnic cleansing of voter lists was the creation of a new centralized database for the state of Florida. In 1999, the state fired the company they were paying to compile their "scrub" lists and gave the job to Database Technologies (DBT, now ChoicePoint). DBT, a private firm known to have strong Republican ties was paid $2.3 million to do the same job that had previously been done for $5,700. The first list of felons from DBT included 8,000 names of felons from Texas supplied by George Bush's state officials. The state government said they were all felons, and thus barred from voting under federal law. Local officials complained about the list and DBT issued a new one, this time naming 58,000 felons. Palast discovered that the one county that went through the process of checking the new list name by name found it was 95% wrong ... Florida voters whose names were similar to out-of-state felons were barred from voting. DBT didn't get names, birthdays or social security numbers right, but they were matched for race, so a felon named Joe Green only knocked off a black Joe Green, but not a white person with the same name. There was no need to guess about the race of the disenfranchised: a voter's race is listed next to his or her name in many Southern states including Florida because racial ID is required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. DBT's fee of $2.3 million was supposed to include verification that the individuals on their list were actually felons, but Palast's investigation showed that DBT could not provide any evidence that they made a single phone call to verify the identity of the names scrubbed prior to the 2000 Presidential Election. Unfortunately, nothing is preventing this purge from taking place again on a national scale ... Martin Luther King III and Greg Palast recently co-authored a piece on the dangers of such databases , recalling the Florida debacle. Their conclusion: "Jim Crow has moved into cyberspace -- harder to detect, craftier in operation, shifting shape into the electronic guardian of a new electoral segregation." Riverside County CA., March 2004 Primary (litigation) Source {Link without Title} (Currently in appeal): "...Experts said the company designed the machines and software so that vote totals could easily be altered without leaving a trace. Losing candidates in one race charged that when the computer acted up on election night, a CES employee inserted control cards into the machine. The plaintiffs sued to retrieve the source code, and the court, for once, consented. When computer experts examined the software, they determined that CES had changed the computer's instructions for tallying votes on election night. But because the program lacked adequate auditing mechanisms to track the nature of those changes, no one could determine if the company had rigged the election." "...There were also eyewitness reports that on election night Townsend had halted vote counting for a period of time and allowed employees of the voting machine company, Sequoia Voting Systems, to access the computer containing the counting software. Townsend refused to hand over the audit logs and memory cartridges, saying they were irrelevant to a recount. This was strange because Townsend had been telling e-voting critics for the past year that voters shouldn't worry about the security of touch-screen machines because they stored three redundant versions of votes which could always be examined in a recount." :Riverside County's official observers describe the observation process permitted to them:
:ElectionGuardians.org reports that a week after the Riverside March 2004 primary, it was discovered that "in at least three precincts around the Coachella Valley, the Sequoia Pacific touchscreen voting machines were sitting around in unlocked rooms, easily accessible by the public":
: Comment by Riverside county official Townsend during meeting to discuss the above and head off law suits: ::''"...she actually came right out and said: 'You need to trust me; I took an oath to the government'."'' : Dr Mercuri credentials and testimony of machine failure and irregularities in respect of Riverside irregularities: ::''"I have a copy of a videotape filmed at the warehouse after the election, showing numerous machines registering votes to some candidates when certain other candidates were selected. In another instance (that occurred in November 2000) brand new Sequoia DRE machines in North Brunswick, New Jersey registered zero votes for major party candidates in a local race. When the manufacturer was questioned about why their supposedly “fail-safe” system failed, the company representative indicated that votes were not “lost” - rather that votes were not “cast” - a semantic distinction that certainly has Equal Protection ramifications. Most recently, in a runoff primary election with only two candidates in Palm Beach, Florida, Sequoia machines registered no selection in 2.3% of the ballots cast (or attempted to be cast). In some precincts, the “no vote recorded” rate was as high as 10%. This matter is currently being litigated, and here again, the manufacturer has yet to provide any explanation for the failure to record votes, or the failure to detect and shut-down defective machinery (as per their own product specification claims)"'' Georgia 2002 :Sources and [http://www.pittsburghpulp.com/content/2003/11_06/news_essay.shtml : :In 2002, voters used new electronic systems to throw out a popular incumbent governor and a serving US senator, both Democrats, in favour of little-known Republican opponents. Polls right up to the election indicated that both Democrats would be re-elected comfortably, the tally on election night showed massive swings against them of up to 12-16%. The explanation, according to the winners, was that rural voters came out in force, but later analysis indicated that no more voters than normal came to the polls that day (source 1) and that there was no major demographic shift (source 2). :This was the first Republican elected Govenor of Georgia for 134 years, with a massive swing that pollsters were at a loss to explain, took place in an election based upon Diebold touch-screen voting systems that had just been sold to the state. Afterwards it emerged that Diebold software engineers had changed the programming in the state's machines "at least seven times" leading up to the election. :Before any investigation was possible, Diebold workers had already "formatted the memory flash cards from the state's voting machines, making any examination of the electoral record ... impossible". Other
"Despite repeated claims that he never used his influence to benefit his client, House Speaker Tom Feeney arranged at least one meeting between state officials and an Oviedo computer firm that was having trouble with its state contract. E-mails obtained by The Daytona Beach News-Journal through the state's public records law contradict statements made by the Oviedo Republican to the state Ethics Commission, which cleared him of ethical missteps surrounding his ties to his client, Yang Enterprises." EXPERT TESTIMONY ON QUALITY OF CURRENT VOTING MACHINES Dr. Professor Avi Rubin Testimony of Dr. Aviel D. Rubin to U.S. Federal Election Assistance Commission, on Electronic Voting Systems, May 2004: ::''(Witness credentials: Professor of Computer Science, Technical Director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University, served on SERVE security peer review group for Dept. of Defense, member of National Committee on Voting Integrity, Secure Systems Research Department at AT&T (cryptography, computer and internet security) {Link without Title} , 2004 election judge in local county)'' "On the spectrum of terrible to very good, we are sitting at terrible. Not only have the vendors not implemented security safeguards that are possible, they have not even correctly implemented the ones that are easy. If I had more time I would debunk the myth of the security of the so-called triple redundancy in the Diebold machines. I would explain the limitations of logic and accuracy testing in an adversarial setting, I would explain how easy it would be for a malicious programmer to rig the election with today's DREs machines , and I would describe the seriousness of the security flaws that we and others have found in the Diebold machines. These are all things that I could have done and would have been happy to do, before anybody started purchasing and using these DREs. But nobody asked." "Since our study came out, three other major studies ... all cited serious security vulnerabilities in DREs. RABA, which is closely allied with the National Security Agency, called for a "pervasive rewrite" of Diebold's code. Yet, the vendors, and many election officials ... continue to insist that the machines are perfectly secure. I cannot fathom the basis for their claims. I do not know of a single computer security expert who would testify that these machines are secure. I personally know dozens of computer security experts who would testify that they are not." Dr. Professor Rebecca Mercuri Dr. Rebecca Mercuri (Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Bryn Mawr College, referred to by some as "the leading independent expert on Electronic Voting technology") reports that: ::Summary Dr Mercuri topical website [http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html Hopkins, SAIC and RABA (from Concerned individuals ''vs.''Maryland State Board of Elections) (litigation) Maryland evaluated touch-screen voting machines from Diebold. Litigation has since commenced by Maryland citizens against the state for ignoring unanimous concerns from all three studies they commissioned. (Source: court papers filed): :Vulnerabilities found by Hopkins: :Diebold responses: :In addition to reviewing and confirming Hopkins and SAIC, RABA's "Red Team" also finally performed the last test required by law of a voting machine with respect to Security, namely ''"... a live simulation of an election according to manufacturer's' instructions, and tested some expected attacks"'': :As a result, emphasized that "the introduction of voter-verifiable paper receipts is absolutely necessary in some limited form" prior to the November 2004 election ... "the level of effort [needed to get into the system was pretty low ... right now, the bar is maybe 8th grade." and concluded that "you are more secure buying a book from Amazon than you are uploading your results to a Diebold server." ... This was because "Diebold basically had no interest in putting actual security in this system. It's not like they did it wrong. It's like they didn't bother.". :Other comments in court papers: ::Unlike the Hopkins Report, the latter reports did not get as far as to examine the potential for an inside error or inside attack (i.e. by Diebold programmers, developers of the embedded operating system, or possibly even partisan election officials). ::Most computer security experts, the CVVM white paper noted, believe that these types of attacks are both a more likely threat to the Diebold system, and a threat that is more likely to succeed. :Diebold response: ::After the RABA report was made public on January 29, 2004, the response from Diebold President Bob Urosevich was that "The findings in the SAIC and RABA reports both confirm the accuracy and security of Maryland's voting procedures and our voting systems as they exist today. ... Touch screen voting from Diebold Election Systems has evolved to be '''the most secure and accurate election system in the history of our democracy'''." Manipulation of punch-card voting machines Whilst much has been said on electronic voting systems, it should be noted that punch card systems are also able to be mis-configured: :"Punch-card manufacturers manage a high-risk security point because this is where the die cutting is done. By setting the cut so that some chads dislodge more easily than others, it is possible to manipulate a punch-card election." {Link without Title} In addition, the votes cast by punch card machines are counted by computerized central tabulators. They have not, however, been tested to see if they have security concerns like the central tabulators used to tabulate optical scan and DRE votes. Triad Engineer, interview by House Judicial Committee A video is available here (warning: 450mb QuickTime file) The testimony of CLINT CURTIS before the U.S. House Judiciary Members in Ohio is also available here: http://bradblogtoo.blogspot.com/2004/12/video-online-of-clint-curtis-testimony.html Other professional studies Other experts and organisations who have investigated security of voting machines include: # the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF.org) written by 3 security specialists and a computer science specialist # Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC.org) report to Congress on voting machine security # Report by a CISSP security qualified IT auditor - step by step how to gain remote access, edit the voting results and fix the system log to ensure it is unnoticed. #:''"As a result of my hands on testing, I have absolutely no faith that my vote was counted or will be in future elections where this software is used. It is simply too easy to change! Any motivated insider or Hacker of moderate skill can change hundreds of thousands of votes with very little effort and almost no chance of being caught. The best part is that if anyone tries to question the results, you can ridicule them and call them sore losers! Conspiracy theorists!"'' TECHNICAL OVERVIEW: EASE OF HIDING "BACK DOORS" IN COMPUTER SOURCE CODE ''Main article: Backdoor '' Historically the first paper on a serious Backdoor was issued by the creators of the Unix Operating system in the 1970's, and used to show how even Source Code review may not pick up a relatively simple back-door: :"It gives one of the most damning indictments of the way in which we all, still, trust the software we buy and use. The authors wrote that they had introduced code into the password and login utility to allow them to access any Unix machine; and that they had modified the C Compiler to place that code into versions of the login program that might be compiled; and finally, they had written the compiler so that, if it was compiling a compiler, it would similarly make sure that their special backdoor code was present in all versions." :"This would have meant that Ritchie and Thomson could access every Unix machine ever produced; they all trace their ancestors back through the original operating system and/or the original compiler. It would have been a masterstroke and caused governments and companies to panic. Fortunately it was not true, the authors wrote it simply as an example. But it makes you wonder what code is present in systems we all trust, hidden away in the depths." :"For this reason, the most secure operating systems - those rated as A1 in the old Orange Book scheme - must be securely designed, securely implemented, securely tested and securely rolled out. Most of the operating systems on which we rely, however, barely rate a C2 on that scheme." {Link without Title} THE "PROGRAMMING FRAUD" AFFIDAVIT UPDATED DEC.11 To date, one affidavit has emerged in which a programmer has given sworn testimony in relation to an alleged actual fraudulent program. Blackboxvoting.ORG have now retracted many of their initial doubts, having had time to study the matter further, although they say there are still some questions about it. A full discussion of the matter and blog can be found at bradblogtoo.blogspot.com (original site bradblog.com has moved all information there due to bandwidth issues). Note that Madsen has also reported these issues but ties them to a larger conspiracy, and accordingly his version is apparently less robust at this time. Dec.7 - RawStory.com examine plausibility, programmers conclude it is plausible and details make sense: :"From a technical standpoint, it is perfectly plausible" :"You can’t say this has not been used unless and until corporate control is willing to open this code to evaluation," adds Roxann Jerkot, who taught programming at Georgia’s Lanier Technical Institute, and who has been in private consulting business since 1985. "We don’t have any way to prove or disprove what this man is saying." :Nearly all programmers are in agreement that such a program would be hard to detect as it existed on the voting machines. Alan Schlingenbaum, who has an MBA from Harvard and works in the computer industry, says a distinction Curtis made is correct. "There is a very important distinction between source code and compiled code. It is very hard (virtually impossible, for most practical purposes) to look at compiled code and completely understand every aspect of how it works." :"Kim Winz, who has spent the last 14 years in software programming, notes that the programming language Curtis says he used is often used for prototyping, and that it could be easily adapted for Windows and Unix machines." Dec.7 - Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) investigating affidavit. Dec. 9 - "A spokesperson for the House Judiciary's Democrats said that Curtis did meet with several of its staff people who have put in calls to attempt to corroborate his story. The spokesperson also verified that other members of the media, including reporters from the New York Times, were working on the story. While Curtis' allegations do not specifically mention actual tampering with an election, if true they do point to interest by elected Republican officials into techniques by which voting totals from electronic voting machines might be altered. Moreover, it would suggest this interest, and the willingness to move past the theoretical stage, goes back at least four years to half a year or more before the disputed election of 2000." {Link without Title} Dec.11 - Yang issue a 3 line "categorical" denial of all allegations, and state Curtis was a "disgruntled employee". {Link without Title} Summary of affidavit :"I became the lead programmer for YEI Enterprises Inc. and had daily meetings with YEI CEO Mrs. Li Woan Yang. At the time, I was a life long registered Republican ... a man ... was introduced to me as Tom Feeney, future Speaker of the House of Representatives in Florida as well as YBI's corporate counsel and lobbyist ..." :"Mr. Feeney said that he wanted to know if YEI could develop a prototype of a voting program that could alter the vote tabulation in an election and be undetectable. He was very specific in the design and specifications required for this program. He detailed, in his own words, that (a) the program needed to be touch-screen capable, (b) the user should be able to trigger the program without any additional equipment, (c) the programming to accomplish this remain hidden even if the source code was inspected." :"If the code were compiled before anyone was allowed to review it then any vote fraud would remain invisible to detection." :"After further discussion, Mrs. Yang told Mr. Feeney that we would attempt to build a prototype for this program so he could see it, test it, and show it to others. It was my initial belief that ... he wanted to be able to detect and prevent that if it occurred. Shortly thereafter, as directed, I created the vote fraud software prototype ... the prototype things were not what they seemed. Hidden on the screen were invisible buttons. A person with knowledge of the locations of those invisible buttons could then use them to alter the votes of any candidate listed. By clicking the correct order of invisible buttons the candidate selected by the user is compared to other candidates within that same race. If the candidate they selected is leading the race, nothing happens. If the other candidate is leading the race, the vote totals are altered so that the selected candidate is now leading the race with 51% of the vote ... the user would receive no visible clues to the fraud that had just occurred ... The supervisors or any other voter would never notice this fraud since no visible sign would appear ... '''No amount of testing or simulations would expose the fraud as its activation and process is completely invisible to everyone except the person programming the vote fraud routine. [YEI] approved its distribution'''." :" Yang, YEI CEO immediately stated, "You don't understand, in order to get the contract we have to hide the manipulation in the source code. This program is needed to control the vote in South Florida." I was shocked that they were actually trying to steal the election ... She stated that she would hand in what I had produced to Feeney and left the room with the software." :"Soon thereafter, I at the Florida Department of Transportation. While there, I discovered some other illegal activities of YEI ... involving over-billing and defrauding of the State of Florida regarding contracts that I had worked on at YEI ... We later filed whistleblower complaints. Mrs. Georgalis was successful but mine was filed after the deadline and was dismissed. The IG ... Raymond Lemme, pursued some of the allegations I made against YEI as Tom Feeney and the vote fraud issue, illegal aliens ... fallacious over-billing, and a wiretapping module that was placed into a FDOT software program for the document management system ... in June of 2003, he told me that he had tracked the corruption "all the way to the top," and that the story would break in the next few weeks and I would be satisfied with the results." :"A few weeks later ... Mr. Lemme was found dead with his arm slashed in a hotel room..." :The affidavit also notes that Mrs Lang (CEO YEI) passed a lot of data from NASA to her brother (deported for spying) and that Mr Nee (Quality Control YEI), an illegal Chinese alien, included wiretaps in software and was subsequently arrested for sending radar guidance system chips for Hellfire Anti-Tank Missiles to a company in Communist China. Key points from background comments Background and ongoing updates at bradblogtoo.blogspot.com . Brad Friedman is an investigative writer and software designer (home website bradblog.com ): :"So far, as I reported originally, I haven't found any holes in Curtis' story. And there are loads of paper trail on it going back years. Newspaper articles, public records (lots of those, since there have been many court hearings on all the Yang (FEI) and Florida Dept. of Transportation stuff, etc)." :Obituary on Lemme and police report located. :"Clint Curtis ... reported that his previously healthy three-year old German Shepard has been found dead. Just a few hours after I published my story on Mr. Curtis. I don't wish to give any other details for the moment, but the story should get out there. And I'm sorry to say that this is the second time this has occurred to Mr. Curtis over the years since he began trying to tell his story." :"...close inspection of such source code ... {Link without Title} it very difficult for anything to be truly invisible when source code is closely inspected. Curtis claims that it was the fact that he thought such a program could never be used -- since the code would likely be discovered -- that he didn't give much thought to the election-rigging issue ... He told me that it was not until a story last summer on CNN which mentioned that source code for electronic voting machines was not being inspected, and was instead being given to states already-compiled in the machines, that he sat up, took notice, and recalled what he claims that Feeney had asked him about in October of 2000. :"The issue of the "QUITAM" or "Qui Tam" is one that ... I was unable to look into as much as I might have liked. Therefore, and since I am not a legal expert either, I can't speak to Harris' claims here, and I'd encourage others who can, to do so and see what might be made of them." :Link to article by Curtis {Link without Title} : "Everywhere you went there was booths where new voters could register. Celebrities in commercials were urging voters to get out and vote. Poll watchers were placed in polling stations across the country to guarantee that every voter would not be turned away on any technicality. What these well meaning groups failed to account for was that they were ... not taking into account that this election would be decided not by voters but by the rise of technology. Every one might be allowed to vote but their vote, and your vote made no difference at all. The programmers had already decided who would win and by how much ... The biggest turnout in history had no chance to win this election or any other unless the programmers of the voting machine allowed it. I believe they will allow it less and less as the machines control the elections ... This is not speculation. It is not a rant designed to make the losers feel better. I speak from first hand information and unless people stand up and act, democracy in this country is ended." SEE ALSO OFFICIAL REVIEWS ''(in chronological order)'' Diebold EXTERNAL LINKS ::''(NPOV note: the presence of any link above involving election irregularities is for those seeking further information on those irregularities in a general sense. It is not an opinion on this specific election.)'' |
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